An
Interpretive Model
for
Conceptual Music

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the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Music
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Statement of Originality

I hereby certify that the work embodied in the thesis is my own work, conducted under normal supervision.

The thesis contains no material which has been accepted, or is being examined, for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. I give consent to the final version of my thesis being made available worldwide when deposited in the University’s Digital Repository, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 and any approved embargo.

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Signed: ......................................................... Date: ......................
Acknowledgements and Dedication

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Abstract

Conceptual music is defined as music which is primarily concerned with the presentation of ideas and concepts. This is a broad category. It encompasses a variety of approaches to musical composition and production including, for example, program music, mash-ups, ekphrasis, and graphic scores. There have been previous studies of some of these sub-categories of conceptual music. However, to date, no musicological research has adequately recognised or dealt with conceptual music as a single field, unified by the pivotal role of ideas and concepts. For this reason, there exists no generally accepted terminology or established methodology for the exegesis of works of conceptual music – as conceptual works, first and foremost – regardless of any other musical styles or genres into which they might also be classified. This is “the exegetical problem of conceptual music.” Until now, it has remained largely unrecognised.

The aim of this thesis is to make a contribution towards addressing this problem, by developing an interpretive model suitable for the analysis and interpretation of conceptual music. The model developed here proposes a typology of five modes of conceptual music. Each mode is defined in terms of the different types of ideas or concepts which have been intentionally shifted into the interpretive spotlight by the artist or composer. Specifically, the five modes are labelled (1) identifying, (2) signifying, (3) crafting, (4) referring, and (5) worldmaking.

This five-category model is developed and justified through a detailed and wide-ranging argument which draws on observations and insights from a number of fields, including musical psychology, semiotics, and philosophy. In particular, the model integrates key aspects of the writings of three thinkers on the topic of human discourse – Charles Sanders Peirce, Paul Ricoeur, and Juri Lotman. The philosophical and theoretical writings of these three figures are, in many fundamental respects, sympathetically aligned. This is a point which has not been previously noticed in the research literature. Thus, this thesis is the first in-depth study to bring together, into a single overall interpretive framework, the complementary approaches of Peirce, Ricoeur and Lotman. It is also the first time that Stanley Salthe’s basic principles for coherent heuristic representations of natural systems have been consciously applied to the challenge of building an interpretive model adequate to the hermeneutics of music and the arts.

In order to prove the viability of the typology which has been proposed, each of the five modes is considered in turn, and used to enrich the detailed exegeses of selected genres and works of conceptual music (including some from the accompanying creative portfolio of original works by the author). From this, it is concluded that the proposed interpretive model – and the associated typology of five modes of conceptual music – represents a useful and novel contribution to musicological study of music in which ideas and concepts are paramount.
Conventions Used in This Thesis

Style

I generally follow the prescriptions of *The Chicago Manual of Style*, sixteenth edition,¹ using the “notes and bibliography” system. For citations of specialised materials, such as music scores, sound recordings, and films I adopt the recommendations in *VCA Citation Guide for Specialised Resources*, Version 1.6.²

Spelling

Except in quotations and citations (where the spelling of the original is retained), spelling conforms to the first-listed entry in the *Macquarie Dictionary*, seventh edition.³

Proper Names

a. Juri Lotman

For the sake of consistency, I have standardised the spelling of Juri Lotman’s name in the Roman alphabet to “Juri M. Lotman,” or “Juri Lotman,” regardless of the different transliteralisations from the Cyrillic (Юрий М. Лотман) found in translated sources.

b. Arnold Schoenberg

I have retained the spelling “Schönberg” wherever it appears as such in quoted sources or bibliographic citations. Otherwise, I use “Schoenberg,” the spelling the composer himself adopted in his later years when living in the United States.

Abbreviations

I adopt the usual scholarly conventions for abbreviated references to the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce. See Bibliography for details.

¹ *The Chicago Manual of Style*, sixteenth edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). My main departure from *Chicago* recommendations is that I do not quote Digital Object Identifiers (DOIs) where these are available. For internet only items, I quote the URL, but (as recommended by *Chicago*) without including date accessed information. See *Chicago* 14.184 and 14.185 for a discussion.


Wer will was Lebendigs erkennen und beschreiben,
Sucht erst den Geist herauszutreiben,
Dann hat er die Teile in seiner Hand,
Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.

- Goethe, Faust

4 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, Erster Teil, lines 1936-39. The following English translation is given by Walter Kaufmann:

Who would study and describe the living, starts
By driving the spirit out of the parts:
In the palm of his hand he holds all the sections,
Lacks nothing, except the spirit’s connections.

See Goethe’s Faust, the original German and a new translation and introduction by Walter Kaufmann, Part One and Sections from Part Two, (New York: Anchor Books, 1990), 199.
Part I

Establishing the Problem & Its Context
Chapter 1

The Exegetical Problem of Conceptual Music

1.1 Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of the entire thesis. I introduce the term conceptual music to refer to a range of musical and music-based multimedia works dealing with ideas and concepts. I claim that this has previously not been recognised as a cohesive and creatively stimulating category. For this reason, potential methodological approaches for effectively analysing and interpreting works of conceptual music – as a single group, unified by virtue of common features discernible amongst its members – have received little attention in musicological studies. In other words, there is no widely accepted lingua franca for describing and discussing such works from the perspective of their primary concern, which is with ideas and concepts, as distinct from any other aspects of their presentation. I refer to this as the “exegetical problem of conceptual music.” The overall purpose of this thesis is to develop and validate an interpretive model intended as a preliminary step towards addressing this problem.

The aim of this chapter is to lay out a high-level blueprint or “roadmap” showing how – in subsequent chapters – I shall approach the exegetical problem that I have identified.\(^1\) Firstly, I define five key terms: ideas, concepts, music, musical meaning, and interpretation. Secondly, I give an initial sketch of the individual steps that I shall take – in subsequent chapters – in order to systematically develop a theoretically-defensible and plausible interpretive model suited to the exegesis of conceptual music works of various kinds.

\(^1\) Some comments on scope and limitations are given in Appendix A.
1.2 The Exegesis of Conceptual Music ... A Neglected Subject

This thesis develops an interpretive model for the exegesis of music-based creative works in which conceptual dimensions are pre-eminent (hereafter referred to as conceptual music). By “conceptual music,” I mean music principally concerned with the articulation and communication of ideas and concepts, above and beyond any audible or perceptible layers of its presentation. To put it another way, in this thesis, conceptual music refers to music and musical works where ideas and concepts are at least as, or more, important to the overall aesthetic experience as any associated material traces, performances or sensory/perceptual impressions. I limit my scope to music in the Western tradition.

The motivation for this study arises from a problem which I first became aware of in relation to the exegesis of my own creative works. (Some of these are presented in the accompanying portfolio included in Appendix P.) In searching for a way to talk about these works, I realised that there exists no established terminology in the musicological literature for the analysis and interpretation of musical works in which the conceptual dimension is pivotal. That’s because, to date, no musicological research has adequately recognised or dealt with conceptual music as a single field, unified by the pivotal role of ideas and concepts. In order to discuss my works in a rigorous way, I first needed to come up with a cohesive and coherent vocabulary for doing so.

Thus, put simply, the primary purpose of this thesis is to develop a language suitable for talking about conceptual music, within the overall context of contemporary

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2 Under other circumstances, the model that I develop in this thesis could perhaps be better described as a “conceptual framework.” See, for example, Sharon M. Ravitch and Matthew Riggan, Reason & Rigor: How Conceptual Frameworks Guide Research (Los Angeles: Sage, 2017). Mark Hutchinson uses the term “conceptual framework” in this way; see Mark Hutchinson, Coherence in New Music: Experience, Aesthetics, Analysis (London: Routledge, 2016), 6. However, to talk of a “conceptual framework for the analysis of conceptual music” would not assist clarity of communication. Therefore, I refer to the framework that I shall develop as an “interpretive model.” I shall also sometimes use “framework” as a shorter alternative – and synonymous – term for “interpretive model.”

3 Undoubtedly, examples of conceptual music are also to be found in non-Western musical cultures. All that is required is that a listener’s attention is directed – either during performance or perhaps subsequently – towards the extra-musical aspects of the music-based experience. See Section 1.7 below. For example, it could be argued that music – or music combined with dance and/or communal performance – that is intended to bring about a trance-like state is a type of conceptual music, where attention is shifted away from the music and the individual self, to a transcendental or spiritual level which is extra-musical. Of course, both Western and non-Western musical traditions have music of this type. See, for example, Judith Becker, Deep Listeners: Music, Emotion, and Trancing (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2004). Also: David Aldridge, “Music, Consciousness and Altered States,” in Music and Altered States: Consciousness, Transcendence, Therapy and Addiction, ed. David Aldridge and Jörg Fachner (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2006), 12-14.
musicological discourse. The special terms, or *vocabulary*, of this language will be deployed to discuss conceptual music, and how it “works,” in ways that are qualitatively different from music which is primarily non-conceptual. My approach encompasses the perspective of composers/artists on the one hand, and their audiences on the other. That is to say, I seek to understand how works of conceptual music operate at the level of *human discourse*, from their creation by one or more artists, perhaps involving one or more performers, to their reception, co-creation and interpretation by an audience.

Within this frame, my emphasis is skewed towards the perspective of artists and composers. Using the terminology of critical theory, the primary focus of this thesis is about the *poetics* (making) of works of conceptual music in the contemporary artworld. This formulation should not be taken to imply that there is necessarily a vast difference between the roles of composer, performer and audience. A residual distinction is always minimally present, due to the need for the artist/composer to present the initial public perceptual object (see Chapter 2). The artist is, by definition, the *initiator* of the discourse processes associated with the spatio-temporal unfolding of a work. However, there are many examples of artists/composers whose participatory works rely, from the outset, partly or predominantly on decisions or actions taken by performers and/or audience members.

In many respects, the perspectives – and sometimes even the actions – of artists, performers and audiences are largely identical. Artists are constantly *interpreting* their own work. Performers and audiences are, to a greater or lesser extent, always complicit in the *making* of a work. In other words, *hermeneutics* (interpretation) is the constant companion of *poetics*, for artists, performers and audiences. For this reason, my definition of conceptual music adopts a strongly non-exclusionary attitude towards the definition of “audience.” In principle, I assume that the apperception and appreciation of the conceptual dimension of conceptual music is accessible to *all* potential members of a hypothetical audience, including performers, critics, interested members of the “general public,” and of course the composers and artists themselves.

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4 See Appendix B for a discussion of the term “poetics” in relation to music.
Complaints about the inadequacies of various approaches to musicological analysis and interpretation are not new. However, most of the historical debates associated with the opposition between “old” and “new” musicologies are largely peripheral to the central concerns of this thesis. The conceptual dimension of musical meaning – considered holistically – has received scant attention, largely ignored by “old” and “new” musicologies alike.

To be sure, certain types of music which often – but not necessarily always – involve a significant “conceptual” component have been the subject of previous musicological research. Examples include program music, musical quotation, citation, allusion, pastiche, homage, Gesamtkunstwerke, cover versions, and musical ekphrasis.

In various ways, ideas and concepts have motivated the work of many composers throughout history, especially several who were prominent in the experimental and avant-garde traditions of the post-World War II era, for example John Cage (see...
Chapter 11), or Mauricio Kagel’s new music theatre (musiktheater) pieces. Indeed, as I will argue, ideas and concepts are ubiquitous in music. However, I am not aware of any previous studies that have attempted to develop a single interpretive model explicitly and expressly concerned with the conceptual dimension in music. Such a model should be able to enhance – not merely passively accommodate, but actively enrich – interpretive approaches towards a broad spectrum of music-based works which above all are “conceptual,” regardless of any other category into which they could also be placed.

The previously unrecognised nature of the exegetical problem of conceptual music implies a corresponding need to look beyond the usual musicological approaches for a solution. In The Thought of Music (2016), Lawrence Kramer advocates a “philosophical hermeneutics of music.” He calls for new ways of talking in an academically-disciplined manner about music, particularly about the ideas with which music is “saturated” (and vice versa). Specifically, Kramer envisions a still “nameless discourse,” which “is, or would or will be, a language of musical understanding far removed from the still-familiar ways of talking about musical form or style or genre or, worse, structure. It even runs ahead … of the hermeneutically inspired language [which he favours] … The received language should be demoted or abandoned. … This process seems to require experiments of all sorts and to be quite unfinished; perhaps it is unfinished in principle.”

This thesis, then, can be considered as a preliminary or experimental contribution towards formulating a language of musical understanding that is adequate to at least some aspects of the hermeneutical challenge which Kramer has identified. There is an irreducible conceptual dimension in all music. Therefore, in one sense, this thesis is unavoidably about all music too. However, my scope is restricted to examples

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19 Ibid., 9.
20 Ibid., 3.
21 Ibid., 18.
22 This is not to claim that I think Kramer would necessarily whole-heartedly endorse the results of this experiment. Others who have taken up the challenge posed by Kramer include David Clarke, “Between Hermeneutics and Formalism: the Lento from Tippett’s Concerto for Orchestra,” Music Analysis, 30, no. 2/3 (2011): 309-59.
of music in which the conceptual dimension assumes a paramount importance. In a work of conceptual music, recognition and appreciation of its conceptual elements is essential to any adequate understanding or analysis.

Of course, there are grey areas. There is no shortage of musical works that undoubtedly involve a rich conceptual layer, but where audience awareness of the conceptual dimension is arguably not absolutely vital to a valid interpretation of the aesthetic experience. Thus, for example, some quotational practices (e.g. obscure musical cover versions or personal homages) often may not be recognised as such by an audience, or indeed may be deliberately disguised, without fatally compromising audience appreciation of the works involved. In Part III, I do consider several cases which fall within such “grey areas,” i.e. where conceptual as well as other dimensions all play important parts. Even in these cases, I shall argue that careful attention to the conceptual aspects of the work is pivotal to their comprehensive exegesis.

As a practicing musician and composer, my interest is certainly in music-based conceptual works created in recent times. Nevertheless, I also intend to show that the main analytical and interpretive problems associated with conceptual music works produced by contemporary artists and composers have, in some ways, always existed, at least at the periphery or in the background. What has happened is that some of these problems have emerged from the shadows, so to speak, and have become prominent, perhaps not for the first time in history. This re-emergence can, I think, be linked to certain current concerns of contemporary art. Specifically, Peter Osborne argues convincingly that all contemporary art today is post-conceptual, unavoidably implicated in the still vital legacy of conceptual art. If he is right, then an

23 In literature, a recent example is W. G. Sebald, whose major works abound in obscure and hidden allusions, awaiting discovery by dedicated scholars. Nevertheless, these same works can be – and usually are – read with only a minimal awareness of the full richness of their intertextual dimension. As J. J. Long observes, Sebald’s use of allusion “was a way of building into the text one’s own relationship to the canon in a way that could be appreciated only by those professionals in possession of sufficient knowledge to notice the allusions...” J. J. Long, W. G. Sebald: Image, Archive, Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 7. For a detailed study of many of Sebald’s obscure allusions, see Peter Schmucker, Grenzübertretungen: Aspekte der Intertextualität im Werk von W. G. Sebald (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012).


25 In this thesis, I shall use post-conceptual and conceptual art (both uncapitalised) generically, to refer to the wide range of historical and contemporary practices concerned with ideas and concepts. It will sometimes be useful
investigation into the available means for producing and interpreting works of conceptual music may be judged to be a timely and worthwhile undertaking. That, at least, is my aim.

I shall approach the topic of conceptual music in the context of contemporary art more generally. The historical divisions between different media – painting, sculpture, music, literature, film, and so on – have long ago collapsed. *Intermediality* and *multimediality* rule the day. Craig Dworkin observes that: “no single medium can be apprehended in isolation,” and “media (always necessarily multiples) only become legible in social contexts.”

Simon Shaw-Miller argues that, even at the heights of Modernism, there always existed a multimodal dimension within the single-medium arts, including so-called “absolute music.”

Research into perception and cognition finds that the sensory modalities are not independent of each other. Rather, the senses invariably work together to achieve “perceptual coherence.” Therefore, any division of the arts based on the individual senses is inevitably artificial.

The “bracketing” of other sensory modalities in order to focus on just one – say, hearing – undoubtedly simplifies the problem of research and analysis. However, it may also lead to a distorted or blinkered view, compromising our ability to properly appreciate what’s really going on in a given aesthetic experience. Thus, while my focus in this thesis is “music,” I shall need to look beyond the “pure” sonic dimension, in order to consider how text, visual images, and material artefacts, can influence – indeed, may be critical to – our conceptual understanding and experience of a work. Thus, aspects of the interpretive model I shall develop are, to some extent, applicable to a wide range of multimedia creative works in which the conceptual predominates, but which need not necessarily involve any music or sound. Nevertheless, the main thread of my argument comes into focus most clearly in the case of *conceptually-oriented* works, in which real

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or imagined *music/sound* – and the *temporal* dimension more generally – plays a significant role. So, that is where I shall devote my attention.

### 1.3 What Are “Ideas” and Concepts”?

I have defined “conceptual music” as music which is principally concerned with the presentation of “ideas” and “concepts.” In this section, I examine what is meant by these two terms. An adequate definition of these two apparently straightforward terms is far from obvious.

Debates regarding “concepts” and “ideas” – and the related term “forms” – have a long history stretching back to the dawn of Western philosophy. See Appendix C for an overview and discussion of the terminological issues. Writing independently, Andy Blunden\(^{29}\) and John Burbidge\(^{30}\) have both articulated a similar high-level model of concepts, one which I find compelling. Such a model explicitly emphasises an iterative, temporal dimension, in which concepts are *processes*, constantly evolving in a real-world context of human agents.\(^{31}\) Importantly, they show how psychological and philosophical perspectives are able to be reconciled into a coherent framework.

#### 1.3.1 A Process-Oriented Model

Both Blunden and Burbidge draw heavily on the works of Hegel, who in turn owes much to Goethe.\(^{32}\) They argue that concepts are not eternally fixed, idealised Platonic entities, forever frozen in time or abstracted space. Instead, individuals continually seek to interpret and re-interpret the “representations,” “ideas,” or “imperfect forms” [*Vorstellungen*] that they have “grasped,” constantly testing them in discourse with others. As thoughtful, embodied agents, participating and acting in a socio-cultural world, these individuals dialectically refine and re-interpret their subjective and personal experiences, until they arrive at a shared understanding of intersubjectively


\(^{31}\) In this sense, concepts are also inherently *dialogic*, to anticipate the discussion in Chapter 7.

\(^{32}\) For Hegel’s indebtedness to Goethe, see Blunden, *Concepts*, 102-105.
verifiable – and more or less stable – “concepts” \([Begriffen]\). This is the model I have illustrated in Fig. 1.1, retaining key German terms alongside their English translations (Appendix C).

**Figure 1.1. Idea [Vorstellung] and Concept [Begriff] on the Cyclical Continuum of Thought [Gedanke]**

Diagrammatically, Fig. 1.1 sums up how I define the terms “idea” and “concept” in this thesis. I envisage “idea” and “concept” respectively located at two poles of a continuum that covers the full range of states exhibited in human thought processes. There is no hard and fast dividing line between the two end points. “Ideas” (or “representations,” if you prefer) are at the individual, highly personal, subjective, end of the spectrum. “Concepts,” on the other hand, are “ideas” that have been refined and accreted with layers of meaning, perhaps over a considerable period of time, to the point that they have become socio-culturally accepted as legitimate and relatively stable entities (albeit not necessarily eternally unchanging). Thus, we can think of “ideas” or “representations” as embryonic or emerging “concepts,” not yet extensively acculturated or in general circulation (Fig. 1.2).

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33 In accepting that satisfactory definitions of “concept” are available, it does not automatically follow that any single definition is equally valid and robust in all possible contexts. On the contrary, I think that Daniel Weiskopf’s pluralist theory of concepts is more plausible than an insistence on a singular or uniform definitional approach. Weiskopf argues that “a theory of concepts should be a pluralist theory, in the sense that it should treat concepts as a set of different kinds of representational structures that are acquired and deployed under different circumstances and for different ends. Nevertheless, this does not prohibit us from formulating generalizations over concepts at higher levels of abstraction. Examples of these generalizations include those that involve the logical form of complex thoughts, conceptual combination, common mechanisms of concept deployment and concept acquisition, and the organization of long-term memory.” See Daniel Aaron Weiskopf, “The Plurality of Concepts,” *Synthese*, 169, no. 1 (2009): 169. Thus, my claim is that the definition of “ideas” and “concepts” presented in this chapter is plausible, adequate and useful with regard to the scope of this thesis.
Figure 1.2. Expanded Version of Fig. 1.1, to Explicitly Show the Socio-Cultural Dimension of Concepts

At the other extreme, there are arguably at least some concepts which – even in the process-oriented portrayal I have offered here – do, at the limit, come close to approaching the Platonic ideal of an eternally fixed essence. Thus, for example, we might concede that there is a notion of truth which transcends, or rises above, any and all context dependencies or the accumulated sediments of historical circumstance. This brings us into contact with the philosophical debates regarding metaphysical realism versus anti-realism (or nominalism), in relation to concepts. However, there is no need to pursue the issue here, as it is not material to my main argument. The ideas

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34 This is reminiscent of C. S. Peirce’s “Final Interpretant” (see Chapter 5 and Appendix F). It is perhaps also a resonance of Hegel’s “Absolute Idea” (See Appendix C). Similarly, Christopher Norris offers a “qualified Platonist” view of musical works. He argues that some – but by no means all – musical works manifest the characteristics of objectively existent, ideal Platonic entities, which have perduring, truth-like properties (e.g. formal, tonal), akin to the abstract objects of the formal sciences. See Christopher Norris, Platonism, Music and the Listener’s Share (London: Continuum, 2006), 5-9.
and concepts which are at the heart of conceptual music are, in the most general case, subject to temporal and contextual change (even if some can, at the limit, be imagined to be timeless and unchanging). Therefore, in this thesis, I adhere to a process-based paradigm, which holds that, in principle, ideas and concepts are in a constant state of evolution and development. Perhaps some converge towards a (never attainable?) ideal state. But, mostly, ideas and concepts can never entirely escape the contingencies of their past history.

Within a given culture, concepts are entities which have accumulated a cluster of remembered examples, potential meanings and prior associations, all related to matters of importance for a given community. As such, they are widely understood, or at least recognised, by individuals within that community. Concepts can be – indeed, *must* be able to be – quickly invoked by their *names, labels or symbols*, without the need for further laboured explanation by the participants in a community of discourse. Over time, such shorthand devices have been established within a given culture or tradition, making concepts available for efficient and coherent intersubjective discourse within that culture.35

In this sense, then, concepts can be thought of as symbols. But these symbols themselves are not static of frozen in time. Instead they – like the process-based concepts which they stand for – are dynamic. Charles Sanders Peirce states that

> every symbol is a living thing ... The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones.36

Quentin Skinner identifies three different ways in which conceptual change occurs, in changing the range of – (1) criteria (2) reference, and (3) attitudes.37 We need not

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36 CP 2.222 [Here I am using the standard academic convention for abbreviated references to Peirce’s works. See the Bibliography for details.]

pursue the details further here, other than to highlight the point that concepts change over time.

1.3.2 Characteristics of “Concepts”

What then are some of the essential features of “concepts”? I follow Andy Blunden (who emphasises the vital importance of Hegel on this topic\textsuperscript{38}), and take concepts to have at least the following inter-related characteristics –

a) Concepts are both complex processes\textsuperscript{39} and their product.\textsuperscript{40}

b) “A concept is not a neural structure, any more than a concept is some object existing in the world.”\textsuperscript{41}

c) “A concept is the sum of all the meanings it produces, but these meanings have to be taken in the context in which they are produced.”\textsuperscript{42}

d) There is an unavoidable “vulnerability of all concepts to self-contradiction and passing over into other concepts.”\textsuperscript{43}

e) “[A] concept makes sense only in the light of the history which brought it into being.”\textsuperscript{44}

f) “… each new relation is incorporated into the concept with all the former relations merged with it into a more concrete concept, so the form of movement [of concepts] is development.”\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{38} Indeed, Blunden states that “Hegel is indispensable if we are going to understand the complexities of the real life of concepts.” Blunden, \textit{Concepts}, 112. Blunden also draws on insights from Lev Vygotsky and Robert Brandom.

\textsuperscript{39} This is the essential argument of Blunden’s entire book. See, for example, Blunden, \textit{Concepts}, 112.

\textsuperscript{40} Blunden, \textit{Concepts}, 108. The Peircean flavour of this second point is unmistakable.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 42, italics in original. “… concepts cannot be understood as mirror-images of Doppelganger in the material world, but only as entities which span both worlds” (79). This point argues against translating \textit{Vorstellung} as “picture thinking,” if we take \textit{Vorstellung} to be an essential phase in concept formation (see Appendix C).


\textsuperscript{43} Blunden, \textit{Concepts}, 118. “… contradictions should not be regarded as failures, but rather that they simply express the vitality of concepts” (19). The “passing over into other concepts” is reminiscent of Burbidge’s description of concepts as irrefutably embedded within systems of concepts, each concept having “tendrils” that reach out and intertwine with other concepts. See Burbidge, \textit{Ideas, Concepts, and Reality}, 72.

\textsuperscript{44} Blunden, \textit{Concepts}, 119. “the project of creating a psychology of concepts on the basis of a concept being some kind of image inside the head is untenable. Only a theory which takes concept to be a process is going to be able to capture the nature of concepts” (133).

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 132.
g) A concept can be more or less “abstract” or “concrete”, depending on the stage of its historical development.

h) “Words as signs for concepts are essential for the existence of a concept.”

i) “Concepts always arise from some kind of predicament ... [a] problem [which] presents itself as a contradiction, and as such has to be grasped by a concept.”

j) “… creating a concept is something any one of us can do. But not every concept survives its birth ...”

k) “Any concept can be represented through other concepts in an infinite number of ways.”

In later chapters, I shall consider some of implications of these various characteristics of “concepts.” For the time being, we can note that Blunden’s final point suggests an interdependence between concepts and expository forms such as narratives, arguments, propositions, and so on. See Appendix C.4 for further discussion of this point.

1.4 Defining Music

The terms music and musical work have been much discussed and debated in the musicological and philosophical literature of recent decades. The debates are well-
known and extensively documented, so there is no need to review them here.\textsuperscript{51} To avoid unnecessarily narrowing the scope of this thesis, I shall follow those authors who use \textit{music} and \textit{musical works} in the broadest possible senses.\textsuperscript{52} I shall return to the subject of “works” in Chapter 2. For the time being, it is enough to note that I consider “works” – artistic and musical – to be, above all else, constantly evolving \textit{processes}, rather than ideal entities or types fixed for all eternity. These processes involve more than notation or scores, and have irreducible performative and cultural dimensions.\textsuperscript{53}

To offer a working definition, I take \textit{music} to refer to any work, object, performance or event which involves a sonic dimension – real or imagined\textsuperscript{54} – able to be meaningfully experienced by one or more human subjects as having artistic, aesthetic or socio-cultural significance. Thus, I make no essential distinction between \textit{music} and \textit{sound art} generally.\textsuperscript{55}

\section*{1.5 Meaning in Music}

\subsection*{1.5.1 Music, Meaning and the Ineffable}

The claim that music – particularly, instrumental or absolute music – is able to convey ideas and concepts is still not unanimously or unequivocally accepted.\textsuperscript{56} The issue is part of a larger historical debate about whether or not music – i.e. purely instrumental

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See, for example, Nick Zangwill, \textit{Music and Aesthetic Reality: Formalism and the Limits of Description} (London: Routledge, 2015).
\item Here I am allowing for the ability of musically-trained individuals to read a musical score and experience it as “music” in their “mind’s ear,” without any external aural event taking place. Dika Newlin reports that Schoenberg once said “The performer ... is totally unnecessary except as his interpretations make the music understandable to an audience unfortunate enough not to be able to read it in print.” Dika Newlin, \textit{Schoenberg Remembered: Diaries and Recollections} (1938-76) (New York: Pendragon Press, 1980): 164. See also Seth Kim-Cohen, \textit{In the Blink of an Ear: Toward a Non-Cochlear Sonic Art} (New York: Bloomsbury, 2009) for the notion of an imagined sonic art.
\item The same view is advocated by various authors, such as G. Douglas Barrett, \textit{After Sound: Toward a Critical Music} (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 5.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
music without any understandable natural language elements, spoken or sung – is able to express meaning. Scholars such as Peter Kivy have demonstrated that key aspects of the problem come into sharpest relief when considering “just plain music; music unaccompanied by text, title, subject, program, or plot; in other words, music alone.”57

Of course, one possible conclusion is simply to deny that music has any meaning whatsoever. Thus, for example, Stravinsky famously asserted that music (by which he meant purely instrumental music) is unable to express anything at all.58 Much the same claim was made by Vladimir Jankélévitch.59

The contrary – and more prevalent – view is that music is indeed meaningful, in one or more senses of the term. Amongst those who hold this view, it is possible to identify two main – and sometimes mutually opposed – schools of thought. The key point of difference hinges upon whether or not music’s meaning is assumed to be:

(a) conceptual, amenable to rational explanation and able to be represented in words; or

(b) non-conceptual, beyond the capabilities of language to adequately access and describe it.60

Roger Savage discerns two contrasting traditions in hermeneutical musicology, broadly aligned to these two above-mentioned perspectives on the nature of musical meaning.61 He argues that the first viewpoint underpins the work of musicologists whose aim is to verbally describe, demystify – or, more recently, deconstruct – any (supposedly) meaningful aspects of (absolute) music. In particular, scholars associated with this first line of thinking tend to deflate or deny the presence of the ineffable sublime in music

57 Peter Kivy, Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), ix. The distinction between absolute (or instrumental) music and music involving natural language is by no means clear cut. Does a vocalise, involving unintelligible, non-linguistic elements sung by a human voice count as absolute music? What about linguistic layers that are unintelligible to a listener, as in the case of world music lyrics sung in languages not known to a listener?


60 This point of difference amongst musicologists is mirrored in contemporary debates in epistemology and the philosophy of mind regarding the possibility – or not – of non-conceptual knowledge. On this broader question see, for example, Frank Hofmann, “Non-Conceptual Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues, 24, no.1 (2014): 184-208.

and art. Savage traces the origins of this attitude to the writings of Hermann Kretzschmar (1848-1924), who published numerous narrative interpretations of instrumental works in the Western classical music canon. Savage astutely argues that the demystifying impetus motivating Kretzshmar’s interpretations has a contemporary survival in the socio-cultural and philosophical pre-occupations typically encountered in postmodern deconstructionist critique and the “New Musicology.”

For Savage, this first school of thought is to be contrasted with an alternative phenomenological tradition of hermeneutics. This alternative tradition is exemplified by thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Mikel Dufrenne, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. For example, Gadamer argues that:

The weakness of idealist aesthetics lay in its failure to appreciate that we typically encounter art as a unique manifestation of truth whose particularity cannot be surpassed. … Art is only encountered in a form that resists pure conceptualization.

Elsewhere, he states:

Language often seems ill-suited to express what we feel. In the face of the overwhelming presence of works of art, the task of expressing in words what they say to us seems like an infinite and hopeless undertaking.

Nevertheless, somewhat paradoxically, Gadamer readily concedes that there is no other recourse than to rely on language in our imperfect attempts to reflect upon and describe personal experiences of the ineffable and sublime.

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The fact that our desire and *capacity to understand* always go beyond any statement that we can make seems like a critique of language. But this does not alter the fundamental priority of language. The possibilities of our knowledge seem to be far more individual than the possibilities of expression offered by language.\(^68\)

For Gadamer: “*Art demands interpretation* because of its inexhaustible ambiguity. It cannot be satisfactorily translated in terms of conceptual knowledge.”\(^69\) In statements such as these, Gadamer endorses the possibility of attaining a form of non-conceptual understanding and knowledge *directly*, through immediate sense perception and cognition, without the mediation of language.

Ricoeur also acknowledged the power of music – at least music which is “not in the service of a text” – to express sublime affects that are phenomenologically real and truthful, but elude the constricting and domesticating confines of language:

> Music creates feelings for us that have no name; it extends our emotional space, it opens in us a region where absolutely new feelings can be shaped. When we listen to a particular piece of music, we enter into a region of the soul that can be explored only by listening to *this* piece. … Could we not say that one of the main functions of music is to construct a world of singular essences in the realm of feeling?\(^70\)

Although he was critical of phenomenology, Theodor Adorno is another influential thinker who maintained that music is able to communicate a meaning beyond words. He considered that music – indeed, art generally – is profoundly non-conceptual.\(^71\) For him, the greatest music expresses an ineffable, non-mediated reality or, as Espen Hammer puts it, “a non-conceptual intimation of the absolute.”\(^72\)  

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\(^68\) Ibid., italics added.

\(^69\) Gadamer, *Relevance of the Beautiful*, 69.


observes that, for Adorno, the greatest music “as non-conceptual insight, can inform our consciousness where words and concepts may fail.”

1.5.2 Phenomenological versus Non-Phenomenological Hermeneutics?

For my purposes, the historically vexed problem of the sublime and ineffable in art and music is not pivotal and does not require further discussion here. However, the preceding discussion begs the question: Are we required to choose between the apparently opposed perspectives of phenomenological and non-phenomenological schools of thought in contemporary musical hermeneutics. In this section, I shall briefly outline why some of these differences seem to me to be mainly a question of relative emphasis – occasioned by qualitative differences in the nature of specific musical works chosen for consideration – rather than evidence of any fundamentally irreconcilable hostility.

Musical works that are strongly conceptual call for exegesis within a hermeneutic approach – such as the one advocated by Kramer – which is hospitable to discourse about ideas and concepts, ahead of emotions and feelings. From this perspective, it would be fair to say that the hermeneutic enterprise presented in this thesis – taking inspiration from Kramer – is distinctly non-phenomenological. However, this does not mean that I must, by default, be hostile to phenomenological approaches to musical hermeneutics. Rather, I do not accept that there is any need to automatically take sides.

To be clear, I am willing to agree with authors such as Gadamer and Ricoeur and accept that, in principle, there is potentially an ineffable dimension to music, indeed to art generally. This is a dimension which resists being perfectly or completely translated into words. Any attempt at verbal interpretation will inevitably be partial and incomplete, reduced by its failure to convey a non-conceptual “remainder” that cannot

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be adequately captured in language. Just as I have posited an irreducible conceptual dimension to all music (Section 1.2), there is – to a greater or lesser degree – an irreducible non-conceptual dimension also present in all music. But this does not mean that all music is equally non-conceptual. Specific musical works may emphasise the non-conceptual above the conceptual, and vice versa. In other works, both dimensions may be active. And here, I suggest, is one reason why phenomenological and non-phenomenological schools of thought in musicology sometimes appear to be in conflict. The non-conceptual dimension is primarily experienced in the realm of embodied feelings and emotions. Therefore, works of art and music in which the non-conceptual dimension is of primary importance are well-suited to phenomenological approaches to hermeneutics and aesthetics.

However, I do not consider that we are forced – a priori – to make an “either/or” choice between phenomenological and non-phenomenological approaches to musical hermeneutics. Rather, I agree with authors, such as Michael Gallope, who argue that both perspectives have much to offer. In my view, our choice of interpretive approach should be guided by:

1. the predominant qualities of the individual works under consideration, i.e. whether they are non-conceptual or conceptual, or both; and
2. the nature and substance of the insights to be discovered and articulated.

Works of conceptual music – the focus of this thesis – lend themselves, almost by definition, to a non-phenomenological perspective.

1.5.3 The Irreducible Dimension of the Extra-Musical

With the rise of the so-called “New Musicology,” the notion of “just plain music … music alone” has generally come to be recognised as an idealised abstraction, an artificial limit case that is impossible to experience in reality. Arguably, some genres

75 See also the discussion in Section 4.2.
and styles of music (such as absolute music) may approach this limit more closely than others. Also, through the exercise of concentrated attention, some listeners are able to focus almost exclusively on the musical, non-vocal dimension of even highly multimodal works (e.g. the music soundtrack of a film, or hearing the melody and chord progression of a song without paying conscious attention to the words).

Nevertheless, in reality, music (even absolute music) is always contextualised in myriad extra-musical ways that cannot be completely blotted out or bracketed as if they have no effect at all. This extra-musical information inevitably provides cues and pointers towards intended and unintended interpretations – i.e. meanings – of the work in the minds of an audience. Even in the case of music expressly intended to be listened to “purely” as music or sound (e.g. acousmatic and electroacoustic music), it is impossible for listeners to erase all memories of previously heard music, or their prior knowledge of pervasive cultural conventions (e.g. topics and tropes in Western art music, or the existence of genres such as “acousmatic music”). Françoise Barrière, a leading composer of musique concrète, is quoted as saying “a sound is never heard in the same way from one listener to another and even from one listening to another. Our past gives each sound an emotional and psychological significance.” Extra-musical context cannot be entirely eliminated, is constantly changing, and inevitably shapes meaning.

Also, research into embodied and enactive cognition suggests that some musical patterns may have morphed into clichés partly because they originally signified meaning by acting as sonic metaphors for different physical responses associated with human emotions (e.g. the descending tetrachord as metaphor for the embodied sighs of

77 This point is of course debatable. See, for example, the “deconstruction” of revealed meanings embedded in absolute music given by Daniel Chua, *Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).


81 This statement is attributed, without citation, to Barrière on a number of internet sites, for example www.sound-scotland.co.uk/site/2007/artists/BarriereFrancoise.htm. I have been unable to trace its original source, which may have been one of her many papers in French, or possibly an interview.
lament\(^{82}\)).\(^{83}\) With all this in mind, it seems that most musicologists would now agree that at least some, if not all, music is able to – indeed, unavoidably does\(^{84}\) – convey some kinds of cultural or extra-musical meaning.\(^ {85}\)

Stravinsky himself acknowledged as much. In the same passage in which he strongly disavows the expressive powers of music, he immediately adds the following:

> If, as is nearly always the case, music appears to express something, this is only an illusion and not a reality. It is simply an additional attribute which, by tacit and inveterate agreement, we have lent it, thrust upon it, as a label, a convention – in short, an aspect unconsciously or by force of habit, we have come to confuse with its essential being.\(^ {86}\)

In other words, even Stravinsky conceded that, in practice, music does indeed “nearly always” have meaning for listeners, due to acculturation and prior experience, despite its “essential being” as non-expressive.

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\(^{83}\) On musical meaning and embodied cognition, see Deanna Kemler, “Music and Embodied Imagining: Metaphor and Metonymy in Western Art Music” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2001).

\(^{84}\) The stronger view maintains that music must be at least minimally meaningful as a cultural construct, otherwise we wouldn’t be able to selectively hear some sounds as music and others as not music. This is position adopted by authors such as Michael Morris, who asserts that: “Works of art [including music] are not only meaningful, but *essentially* meaningful; that is to say, those things which are in fact works of art could not exist without being meaningful (or, indeed, having the meaning that they have).” See Michael Morris, “Doing Justice to Musical Works,” in *Philosophers on Music: Experience, Meaning, and Work*, ed. Kathleen Stock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 58, italics in original.

\(^{85}\) This is not to suggest that all scholars would today place the same degree of emphasis on extra-musical meaning, as may have occurred in the past. For some, other concerns and new paradigms of meaning are of greater interest. For example, Frances Dyson argues that notions of immersion, physicality, and embodiment offer a way of displacing the historical prominence given to questions of extra-musical meaning. Frances Dyson, *Sounding New Media: Immersion and Embodiment in the Arts and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

1.6 Why Interpretation?

1.6.1 Towards an Open Hermeneutics

In his recent trilogy of books, Kramer looks beyond whether music has meaning or not, a question which he considers to be now “exhausted.” For him, music undoubtedly has meaning: “The meaning of a musical act or occasion is the character of the experience it offers.” More importantly, Kramer argues that the availability of potential meaning in music carries with it an obligation, on the part of the musical analyst, to move away from mere description towards a mode of interpretation which is actively implicated in “accomplish[ing] musical understanding.” He claims that

our description must not only address the experience but also continue and transform the experience. To borrow an image from Lacan, these three actions – addressing, continuing, and transforming – make up a Borromean knot: they are all intertwined, and you cannot cut one without the whole assembly falling apart. … Addressing, continuing, transforming. To think in the mode sketched here is to weave such rings together. … When it comes to music, to think in this way is to exercise musical understanding, to philosophize musically, to think in tones.

Kramer’s views echo those of Nicholas Cook on the performative nature of all musical analysis. For example, referring to the writings of Schoenberg, Cook states that “analysis should aim not to replicate, in some veridical manner, but to complement the immediately perceptible and thus self-evident qualities of the music.” Cook goes on to add that “analysis is performative, in the sense that it is designed to modify the perception of music – which in turn implies that its value subsists in the altered experience to which it gives rise.” In this way, analyses and interpretations – if

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88 Kramer, Thought of Music, 16.
89 Ibid., italics added.
90 Ibid., 16-17, italics in original.
92 Ibid., emphasis added.
intersubjectively judged to be useful or valuable within a discourse community – can
themselves become part of a constantly evolving “world of the work.”

The approach towards interpretation advocated by Kramer and Cook has a venerable
history in Western philosophical tradition. Specifically, it is an important thread in the
thought of Paul Ricoeur, who develops it as a consciously Aristotelean orientation
towards representation, or *mimesis* (*contra* Plato’s “specular model of representation”).

For Aristotle *mimesis* takes place only within the area of human action, or production,
or *poiesis*. It is an operation, as is indicated by the -*sis* ending that it shares with *poiesis*
and with some other terms ... Accordingly, for Aristotle, there is *mimesis* only where
there is *poiesis*. On the other hand, far from producing a weakened image of pre-
existing things, *mimesis* brings about an augmentation of meaning in the field of action,
which is its privileged field.

To accomplish a type of musical understanding which goes beyond mere description,
Kramer advocates what he refers to as an extension of “open hermeneutics ... a practice
of open interpretation that includes creative activity, performance, and the reuse or
reiteration of cultural products as well as the production of discourse.” This discourse
is focused on “the problem of ideas” in music – “the ideas at issue are not ideas about
music, at least not primarily, but ideas about anything and everything else.” Kramer
characterises his own work in musicology as a “wager” which “sees a rough but vital
harmony among music, words, and ideas as they address, orbit, and collide with each
other. ... The premise ... is that ideas saturate music, and music saturates ideas, and so
does everything else (both ways).” This is an apt characterisation of my project in

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93 In other words, the *documentation* associated with an artwork becomes part of the work. See Philip
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Imagination* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 139, italics in original. As Valdés notes on p. xi, this
essay was the “kernel” for Ricoeur’s three-volume *Time and Narrative*.


97 Ibid., 2. This is an echo of Ricoeur’s “hermeneutic wager,” which Ricoeur describes as the task of
“follow[ing] the indication of symbolic thought ... verifying my wager and saturating it ... with intelligibility.” Paul
*Paul Ricoeur* (London: Routledge, 2003), 38; Timo Helenius, *Ricoeur, Culture, and Recognition: A Hermeneutic of
Cultural Subjectivity* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 47-49.
this thesis. Specifically, I am concerned with music in which the “saturation” of ideas and concepts has become a primary factor influencing its creation and reception.

1.6.2 The Standard of Verisimilitude

While Kramer’s debt to postmodern thinkers such as Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan is often apparent and acknowledged, he nevertheless pulls back from the furthest extremes of postmodern relativism and complete interpretive arbitrariness. At the limits, such a relativist position might insist that “open interpretation” is completely free and unconstrained. This is not how Kramer would have it. “We have to find a way into that intermediate space where our discourse ... can avoid playing fast or loose and can instead sway or channel or in every sense conduct the flow of signifiers.”98 To be sure, “genuinely open interpretation ... [is] an activity based not on a technique but on the embrace of exuberant understanding.”99

However, such exuberance remains subject to the non-negotiable standard of verisimilitude100 – the ever-present obligation of any interpretation to be truthful to its object. By this, Kramer is certainly not suggesting that the aim of interpretation is to arrive at some unique, universal or eternally unchanging end point of truthfulness. Far from it; he has a different type of interpretive truthfulness in mind. Here is how Kramer describes it:

Interpretation is always a risk, a venture or adventure. ... Interpretations are statements that simultaneously emphasize the promise of truth and render it questionable. An interpretation promises to reveal something about what the object of interpretation means, but in order to make this revelation it has to leave the safe ground of verifiable description. ... interpretations can be neither true nor false in a simple, unequivocal sense. ... What interpretations can be, in place of simply true, is to be true to their

98 Kramer, Interpreting Music, 6, italics in original.
99 Ibid., xiv, italics added. “Exuberant understanding” is Kramer’s translation of Nietzsche’s “fröhliche Wissenschaft.” As Kramer observes, the alternative translations “gay science” and “cheerful wisdom” are less useful.
object, to have the verbal equivalent of verisimilitude – literally likeness to truth – in relation to what they represent. .... In the best of cases, [interpretation is] indispensable to establishing the range of imaginable truths that come to surround anything we describe and re-describe, perceive or re-perceive, so that its interpretation becomes a part of our history and culture.  

Again, Kramer’s remarks are reminiscent of Cook’s injunction that the performative nature of analysis does not imply a “submission to unbridled subjectivity” or “unfettered speculation.” On the contrary, the validity of an analysis is able to be judged intersubjectively, by considering its coherence, and above all, its plausibility.

1.6.3 The Obligation to Interpret

For Kramer, despite the acknowledged riskiness of the enterprise, interpretation takes on the mantle of a moral obligation.

Should we interpret – not just music, of course, but anything: music just makes the stakes of interpretation abundantly clear – should we interpret when we cannot verify? Of course we should. That is exactly when we should interpret.

In other words, interpreting is an essential part of being thoughtfully human. Therefore, how we do it – whether for better or worse – makes a difference.

1.6.4 The “Problem of Application”

In pursuing the task of interpretation – which is precisely the central endeavour of this thesis – Kramer cautions against yielding to “the temptation to turn resources into

101 Kramer, Interpreting Music, 26-28, emphasis added. Anticipating the discussion in Chapter 13, I take Kramer to say that, in the best cases, verisimilar interpretations are themselves able to – indeed, ought to aspire to – enter the “world of the work.”


103 Kramer, Thought of Music, 28, italics added.
systems that end up doing one’s thinking for one.” He identifies “the problem of application,” which he characterises as a misplaced “confidence in the ideas ... of this applied to that.” In his view, affect theory and cognitive science are the two most recent examples of “the long-standing effort of ... empirical disciplines to either dismiss or domesticate the form of knowledge on which the humanities depends.” However, Kramer is not, in principle, against empirical knowledge from the sciences. On the contrary, he expressly states: “There is no reason why affect theory or cognitive science should not form collaborative means of producing humanistic knowledge, but there is every reason why they should not become complicit with its replacement.”

It will soon become apparent that a cornerstone of the approach that I pursue in this thesis is, in its gestation, inspired by insights from the cognitive sciences in relation to music. However, my aim is to use such as insights as an inspiration – a platform, if you like – for further elaboration and development, always aimed towards a distinctly humanistic discourse. To be sure, there is indeed a degree of “structure” in the interpretive model – and its associated vocabulary – which I set out to develop. Thus, it might be questioned whether I can avoid sliding precisely into the kind stultifying “application” of “systems” that Kramer rails against. Kramer warns of “the difficulty of separating rigor from rigidity.” I acknowledge the potential pitfalls of which Kramer speaks. However, his proscription of “application” and “system” is unnecessarily provocative and hard to defend. Surely, even Kramer’s slogan-like summation of “open hermeneutics” – address, continue, transform – is, at the high-level, a “system” or “method” of sorts. From his contrasting of rigour versus rigidity, in the passage quoted above, it seems to me that Kramer’s intended target is not “application” per se, but rather a mechanistic, rote, and unthinking mode of application. Kaplan’s Law of the Instrument states that “To a man with a

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105 Ibid., 5.
106 Ibid., 5-6. There seem to me to be faint echoes here of the postmodern critique of science, exemplified most famously in Paul Feyerabend’s *Against Method*, 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 1975). However, as discussed, Kramer himself certainly does not endorse a position of extreme epistemological relativism.
108 Ibid., emphasis added.
109 According to Kramer, “Application is precisely ... what we should not be doing.” Ibid., 4, emphasis in original.
110 Ibid., xiv.
111 Ibid.
hammer, everything looks like a nail.” This is undoubtedly a risk to any enquiry. However, Mary Hesse has persuasively argued that analogical thinking – which is simply the metaphorical application of relationships from one domain of knowledge to another – is essential to the formulation of new and veridical insights. Indeed, we could arguably go so far as to equate application with translation or interpretation, which is the essential process for the creation of genuinely new meanings (see Part II).

Additional support for this approach can be found in the writings of process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, who said that “… the true method of philosophical construction is to frame a scheme of ideas, the best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme.” Therefore, in this thesis, I shall not shy away from judiciously “applying” various aspects of an overall model to the interpretation of specific musical works.

At the same time, I aim to guard against the problem highlighted by Kramer, by not elevating my interpretive model to a pre-eminent epistemological (or, even worse, ontological) position which is – somehow – above or more “real” than the “exemplary singular” musical experiences or events which it seeks to enhance. Kramer is right to recall “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” first named by Whitehead. The model that I shall develop – one that is somewhat “structured” and “systematic” – is certainly not intended as a mental strait-jacket which prevents or undermines the kind of exuberant understanding that Kramer advocates as the foremost goal of interpretation. However, I do not relegate the interpretive model that I develop to an abject or apologetically inferior position. Here I take inspiration from the philosophy of enquiry exemplified in the work of Paul Ricoeur. Henry Venema has observed that

112 Abraham Kaplan, Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), 28. This aphorism is sometimes attributed, without citational evidence and therefore probably erroneously, to Mark Twain.


115 Kramer, Thought of Music, 18. Kramer explains: “Musical understanding depends on singularities, not on large generalities and above all not on a reified and rarefied ideal called Music, capital M. We have to address ... the singularity of the musical event ... in whatever form it takes – performance, recording, memory, score; the list goes on.” (17).

116 Ibid., 18. Kramer revives Whitehead here “not with the aim of absorption in pure process, but as a means of clearing the way for a discourse that preserves singularities without being confined to them.” I return to briefly discuss “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness” in Chapter 5.
Ricoeur’s entire philosophical project is predicated on the unity of methodological ‘explanation’ and hermeneutical ‘understanding’ of meaning. ... Therefore, every conversation about meaning is also about method, and dialogue concerning method is in turn revelatory of meaning. ... Explanation and understanding are intimately connected. Apart from the ‘world’ of meaning, methodological explanation remains lifeless.117

My goal is to employ the exegetical and rhetorical devices available within the interpretive model that I devise, in order to add something aesthetically new and valuable to the individual works that I consider in Part III. In other words, to anticipate the terminology of Chapter 6, my goal is to offer interpretations of specific works which are sufficiently illuminating and compelling that they may themselves become valid components in the “world of the work.” This becomes possible only if such interpretations satisfy some minimal standards of intersubjectively verifiable verisimilitude. In this sense, I aim to remain faithful to the three objectives which Kramer has set down as the purposive agenda of a new “philosophical hermeneutics of music”, i.e. to describe/address, continue and transform the musical experience.119

Like works of art, acts of interpretation cannot be verified or validated. They succeed insofar as they create a community of discourse, a grammar of understanding that becomes a qualitative part of the music – or anything else – that is being interpreted.120

My hope is that I achieve, at least to a considerable extent, the standard of success which Kramer has set down.

118 I agree with John Deely that intersubjectivity is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for testing the validity of knowledge. See John Deely, Purely Objective Reality (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2009), 143-64. However, further discussion of this point is outside the scope of this thesis.
119 Kramer, Thought of Music, 16.
120 Ibid., 94.
1.7 One More Time ... What is “Conceptual Music?”

At the beginning of this chapter, I somewhat loosely described “conceptual music” as music which is primarily concerned with “ideas” and “concepts.” In Section 1.3, I proposed a simple model which locates “ideas”/“representations” and “concepts” at two poles of a continuum of human thought processes (Fig. 1.1). Without further refinement or clarification, “conceptual music” would encompass all the various modes of thought that can be placed somewhere along the continuum in Fig. 1.1. In such a definitional framework, “conceptual music” would range from music principally about “ideas” or “representations” on the left, to music about “concepts” on the right.

While this is true to a point, there is perhaps a degree of risk in settling for such an unrestrained definition. Much, if not all, music – as the outcome of human agency – must be, in some way or another, the end product of “ideas” and intentions harboured by the composer(s) and/or performer(s). Thus, there may be a danger that “conceptual music” has been defined so broadly as to allow it to potentially encompass the entire universe of music, with everything hinging on how the qualifier “principally” is applied. Left unattended, this is a definitional vulnerability which could undermine the point of introducing “conceptual music” as a distinctive category in the first place.

A way of mitigating this risk is, however, offered by the model in Fig. 1.1. It is insightful to reflexively direct the model towards itself, so to speak, applying it to its own higher-level *raison d’etre*. This self-reflexive action enables me to elucidate an additional characteristic of “conceptual music” that I have not yet explicitly articulated. In so doing, the definitional criteria can be tightened up. The key here is to recognise “conceptual music” itself as a “concept.” Therefore, “conceptual music” is a descriptor that can only be validated and legitimised with respect to any particular musical examples through the consensus-building processes of socio-cultural discourse. The label “conceptual music” may be *proposed* by an individual commentator (such as myself) as being applicable to a specific work or musical event. But it is not able to be *unilaterally* conferred, by individual *fiat*, without also passing the tests of peer group scrutiny and debate, resulting in some significant degree of intersubjective agreement.
1.7.1 Two Criteria for Defining “Conceptual Music”

With this in mind, it now becomes possible to formulate not just one but two criteria that must be satisfied for music to be categorised as “conceptual music” –

1. Firstly, as already stated, “conceptual music” must be **principally** concerned with the presentation or manifestation of “ideas” and “concepts.”
   - This means that if the applicable “ideas” or “concepts” are **not** able to be recognised by an audience, a full understanding of a work of “conceptual music” is fatally compromised.

2. Secondly, some audience or critical community, consisting of more than a single individual, must (eventually) **intersubjectively recognise and agree**\(^{121}\) that the music in question meets the first criterion, i.e. that it is indeed **principally** – and **non-trivially** – about “ideas” and “concepts,” in a manner which has relevance and importance to that community.
   - This second criterion means that the specific “ideas” and “concepts” with which a work is principally concerned must themselves be intersubjectively identifiable, and agreed to be plausible in relation to the work in question, and available for critical discussion.
   - It also deals with the issue of impact and importance within a given community. The “ideas” or “concepts” with which a given work is principally concerned must be judged to have some significance or value – an axiological judgement, to be sure – to an intended target audience. It would be a simple matter to artificially construct a hypothetical example of a work of “conceptual music” in which the “ideas” or “concepts” associated with the work are of little or no lasting interest or concern to anyone in any likely audience. Leaving aside possibilities of

\(^{121}\) Such agreement need not necessarily be unanimous or complete. In any community, there will be differences of opinion and detailed debates.
humour, irony or institutional critique, such a work would not qualify as a genuine example of “conceptual music” under this criterion.

At the “meta-level” then, the labelling of a specific work as “conceptual music” is a product of the very same socio-cultural thought processes that shape and refine “ideas” into “concepts.” An individual commentator or composer might assert that a particular work is principally concerned with the presentation of an “idea” or “concept.” But that, of itself, is insufficient to admit that work into the category of “conceptual music.” Such an assertion also needs to be intersubjectively tested and validated within a socio-culturally competent community, or audience. Otherwise, it potentially remains nothing more than one person’s solipsistic assertion, which may or may not be truthful.

Finally, and importantly, the “ideas” or “concepts” which are essential to a work’s full appreciation must also hold some significance to a relevant audience or critical community.\(^{122}\) In other words, the “ideas” or “concepts” should themselves be non-trivial. They matter because they are likely to be associated with “predicaments” – which may be artistic or aesthetic – that are open or unresolved within a given community (see Item (i) in the ten characteristics of “concepts” listed above). John Burbidge puts it this way: “concepts are significant only if we can articulate conceptually what kinds of effects would result from putting those concepts into practice.”\(^{123}\) And, he affirms, it is “the community of discourse that constitutes the realm of conceptual significance.”\(^{124}\) This is illustrated in Fig. 1.2 above.

1.7.2 Who Decides Which Works Qualify as “Conceptual Music”?  

There is a difficulty lurking here. Who is in a god-like position to categorically decide whether or not a work put forward as “conceptual” has any real merit? History shows that it is possible for highly innovative, ground-breaking or “visionary” works to not be immediately appreciated, understood or valued by an artworld establishment, or by

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122 Of course, the individuals in that community may be dispersed geographically or temporally.  
society at large. It may take years, decades or even longer to achieve due recognition. In the model shown in Fig. 1.1, there is no hard and fast dividing line between “ideas” and “concepts.” Following Andy Blunden, “ideas” can be considered to be “concepts” in the early stages of their historical development. However, in principle, some “ideas” will always remain inherently trivial or insignificant to any and all communities, past, present or future. Most of these will not survive much beyond their gestation. Nevertheless, to guard against the failure to immediately or fully recognise the value of a work that is presented, a cautiously prudent attitude is to avoid any rush to judgement.

Critical openness and an initial suspension of disbelief need not necessarily lead to the unrestrained relativism associated with the extremes of nominalism. Peirce has eloquently argued that the truth of any matter – including the value or otherwise of artworks – will emerge and become apparent over time. This is an application of Peirce’s (late) theory of abduction. Abductive reasoning involves processes of constant testing, intersubjective discourse and evaluation against the yardstick of human experience in the real world. From an artworld perspective, interesting and important works will, sooner or later, be revealed for what they are, by virtue of their practical effects (to use Burbidge’s term quoted above).

What are the implications of these considerations for my proposed definition of “conceptual music”? “Conceptual music,” as I initially defined it at the start of this chapter, could encompass all stages of thought placed anywhere along the continuum in Fig. 1.1. In this section, I have tightened up the definition, emphasising the distinction between “ideas” and “concepts.” Strictly speaking, only works located towards the right pole of the spectrum – signifying a discernibly significant degree of socio-cultural recognition of a “concept” within a given community – should be considered to be “conceptual music” in the fullest sense of the term. “Works” dealing with “ideas,” which are situated closer to the left-side of the spectrum, are more aptly thought of as

125 However, a hypothetical work which is never accepted by a constantly evolving artworld must, by definition, always be excluded from the category of “art.” This is the paradox – or “fraud” – of “outsider art” in an artworld where literally anything can be put forward as “art.” See Adam Geczy and Jacqueline Miller, Fashionable Art (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 149-61. Anything can be art. It is just that some – perhaps most – “art” is not especially interesting and unlikely to ever be considered as important or valuable by any conceivable audience.

126 It is outside my scope to discuss Peirce’s theory of abduction further. For some useful entry points into the literature, see Geert-Jan M. Kruijff, “Peirce’s Late Theory of Abduction,” Semiotica, 153, nos. 1-4 (2005): 431-54; K. T. Fann, Peirce’s Theory of Abduction (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970). Note that, in a manuscript dated from 1906, Peirce used the term retroduction to replace abduction. See Prolegomena, 71.
being “conceptual music” in the early stages of their gestation and historical development. They may or may not survive to eventually emerge and be recognised as fully-developed instances of “conceptual music.”

However, there is no guaranteed method for predicting from the outset which works might ultimately trace a trajectory from “idea” to “concept,” and which are destined for disposal and oblivion. And there is the ever-present potential for previously ignored or dismissed works to be re-activated or mythologised in unanticipated ways. Therefore, for purposes of this thesis, I shall adopt an attitude of suspended disbelief with regard to individual works, at least until persuaded otherwise. In other words, I am willing to countenance works which are principally concerned with “ideas” – as distinct from “concepts” – as works of “conceptual music,” if only on a provisional basis. This is the same hospitable reception which I hope to receive in relation to my own nascent works of “conceptual music.” Let time be the judge.

1.8 First Steps towards an Interpretive Model

The preceding discussion has sketched a preliminary case for distinguishing a category of music referred to as conceptual music. To recap, this is music in which the presentation of ideas and concepts, rather than any audible manifestations, is of paramount importance to its overall meaning.

In such music, as we shall see, sonic dimensions and/or other media elements may also be present and important, to a greater or lesser extent. These perceptible elements may be individually appreciated for their particular formal or aesthetic qualities, considered in isolation. However, when considered from the perspective of the work as a whole, these perceptible elements are secondary to the conceptual dimensions, which are formed and function at a different level of abstraction, beyond the immediately material. For this reason, the usual analytical methods of musicology are not especially relevant.

If we accept that conceptual music is indeed a valid and distinctively discernible category, admittedly one with “fuzzy” boundaries, then a question that logically follows is what I have called the “exegetical problem” of conceptual music, i.e. “How does
conceptual music work (at the level of artistic discourse)?’

This is the core question that this thesis seeks to answer, by means of an interpretive model that is well-suited to engaging with the detailed issues that are implicit in the overall problem. I agree with Marion Guck, who claims that any musical analysis is essentially an invention or interpretation. The abstracted categories and terms of any model or analytical framework are artificial simplifications. They are invented to facilitate coherent discussion of certain selected aspects of “reality” which happen to be of interest to the analyst. As such, many of the complexities and rough edges of the real-world musical entities under investigation will inevitably glossed over or ignored completely.

Nevertheless, the goal of developing a model for the analysis and interpretation of certain types of music is not thereby fatally compromised. The discussion in Section 1.6 shows that musical analysis is not an “objective” science. It always involves a “performative” dimension.

From the outset, I adopt a strongly anti-reductionist stance towards the tasks of model-building and explanation. Specifically – and crucially – I accept the central principle of “hierarchical structuralism” formulated by Stanley Salthe. He claims that any adequate model of “reality” irreducibly requires at least three hierarchically distinct levels. This is a fundamental premise underpinning the design of my interpretive model, one to which I grant axiomatic status. Salthe argues that the “smallest cluster of levels required to represent fundamental interactive relationships is a triad of contiguous levels.”

Salthe acknowledges and was influenced by Peirce’s triadic ontology. The synergies between Salthe and Peirce have been recognised by a number of scholars, and

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127 Here I am alluding to Ian Bent’s well-known definition of musical analysis. See Ian Bent, Analysis (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1987), 5. It has been widely adopted, for example, by Judy Lochhead, who states that the “issue of how it works ... [defines] very broadly analytic project, ...”. Judy Lochhead, ““How Does It Work?” Challenges to Analytic Explanation,” Music Theory Spectrum, 28 (2006): 233, italics in original. The level of analysis is also important here. As I discuss in Chapter 4, my focus in this thesis is on the discourse level. However, the problem could equally well be considered at a lower, more detailed level, or at a higher, more abstracted level. While these lower and higher levels are explicitly recognised in the model that I shall develop, they are not my primary areas of focus.


129 I make no attempt to review the vast literature on reductionist versus anti-reductionist debates in philosophy and the sciences.

130 Stanley Salthe, Evolving Hierarchical Systems (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 75, italics added. In his later writings, Salthe distinguishes between two different types of hierarchical model, the scale (or compositional) hierarchy and the specification (or subsumption) hierarchy. See Stanley Salthe, “Hierarchical Structures,” Axiomathes, 22 (2012): 355-83, and the additional references cited therein. On his website, Salthe explains that “the two hierarchical formalisms do not serve a single function; one models stability, the other change. Therefore, it is not a matter of which one is more veridical to actual systems, but of what a modeller is interested in understanding.” See http://www.nbi.dk/natphil/salthe/.
are being further developed in fields such as evolutionary emergence\textsuperscript{131} and intersemiotic translation.\textsuperscript{132} Importantly, Salthe is \textit{not} claiming that this is how \textit{reality} itself is structured. Instead, his claim is that this is how “coherent and heuristically powerful”\textsuperscript{133} \textit{models of reality} should be (minimally) structured.\textsuperscript{134}

Adhering to this principle, in Chapters 4 to 8 I develop a \textit{three-layered interpretive model}, consisting of a \textit{lower-level}, a \textit{middle or focal-level}, and a \textit{higher-level}. The \textit{focal level} of this model (discussed in Chapter 6) deals with artistic \textit{discourse}, as transacted between artists/composers on the one hand, and their audiences on the other. In accordance with Salthe’s prescription, I also posit a lower-level and a higher-level on either side of the focal level.\textsuperscript{135} The lower-level is discussed in Chapter 5, which is devoted to a close investigation of the detailed \textit{semiotic processes} that constantly unfold beneath the emergent level of discourse. Chapter 7 shifts attention to the higher-level context within which all discourse operates, viz. the universe of continually evolving and interacting \textit{semiotic systems}. Chapter 8 brings all three levels together into an overall interpretive model.

In developing the three-layered model, I shall rely especially on the writings of two philosophers and one semiotician –

\begin{itemize}
  \item Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914),\textsuperscript{136}
  \item Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005);
  \item Juri Lotman (1922-1993).\textsuperscript{137}
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{132} Daniella Aguiar and João Queiroz, “Modeling Intersemiotic Translation: Notes towards a Peircean Account.” \textit{Proceedings of the 10th World Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (IASS/AIS)}, Universidade da Coruna, Spain, 2012, 337-44.


\textsuperscript{134} In other words, Salthe is well aware of Whitehead’s “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” On the various fallacies that bedevil theoretical work in the social and cultural sciences, see the excellent article by Irene Portis-Winner, “Facing Emergences: Past Traces and New Directions in American Anthropology, Why American Anthropology Needs Semiotics of Culture,” \textit{Semiotics} 2008, 278-86. Available at \url{www.ireneportis-winner.com}. The usefulness of models is not dependent on how “exactly” they are \textit{representations} of something. Rather, the value of models arises from their usefulness as epistemic artefacts or tools for generating new knowledge. See Tarja Knutttila, \textit{Models as Epistemic Artefacts: Toward a Non-Representationalist Account of Scientific Representation} (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 2005).

\textsuperscript{135} Salthe, “Hierarchical Structures,” 358.

\textsuperscript{136} To be precise, Peirce thought of himself as a semiotician first and foremost (SS 85-86), even though today he is widely regarded as a philosopher.

\textsuperscript{137} Co-founder of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics.
I use these three authors\textsuperscript{138} to establish various key principles applicable to the process, discourse, and systems levels respectively. This alignment between the aforementioned Salthe’s generic levels, and their specific articulation in the interpretive model developed in this thesis is illustrated in Fig. 1.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three-Level Hierarchy (Salthe)</th>
<th>Interpretive Model Developed in this Thesis</th>
<th>Key Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>higher-level (Chapter 7)</td>
<td>systems perspective</td>
<td>Juri Lotman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focal-level (Chapter 6)</td>
<td>discourse perspective (poetics, hermeneutics)</td>
<td>Paul Ricoeur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-level (Chapter 5)</td>
<td>process perspective</td>
<td>Charles Sanders Peirce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Figure 1.3} Three-Layered Interpretive Model Developed in this Thesis

Each of Peirce, Ricoeur and Lotman developed most of their key insights from markedly different perspectives. So much so, that my goal of bringing them into a constructive relationship with each other may, at first glance, appear to be a dubious undertaking.

However, as I discuss more fully in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the individual approaches of Peirce, Ricoeur and Lotman are, in many fundamental respects, sympathetically aligned. Indeed, occasional references – mostly neutral – to Peirce and Lotman can be found in Ricoeur’s writings, although he did not devote much discussion to either.\textsuperscript{139} Several authors have observed close parallels between Lotman and Peirce,\textsuperscript{140} even though

\textsuperscript{138} Rather than give full – and sometimes complex – bibliographical details in the footnotes, citations to primary sources by these three authors will usually be abbreviated, even in their first appearance. See the separate sections of the Bibliography at the end of this thesis for full publication details.

\textsuperscript{139} For Ricoeur’s occasional references to Peirce see, for example: The Rule of Metaphor, 1st ed., 34, 189, 231; Routledge Classics ed.: 38, 223, 273; 1st French ed.: 49, 240, 291; Oneself as Another, 49-50; “What is a Text?!,” 62; Ricoeur’s longest statement on Lotman appears to be the note in Time and Narrative II, 167, n. 45.

Lotman himself did not quite recognise them (based on a narrow characterisation of Peirce’s theory of signs.)\textsuperscript{141} I have not found any direct references to Ricoeur in Lotman’s writings. However, even between Ricoeur and Lotman, whose ideas seem to have developed largely independently of each other, it is possible to discern important parallels. To date, these appear not to have been noticed in the academic literature. Notwithstanding the similarities that I shall claim exist between them, each of Peirce, Ricoeur and Lotman developed some of their most important insights in areas that received considerably less attention in the writings of the other two. We might aptly characterise Lotman’s primary orientation as \textit{cultural, systems-based}, or “top down,” and Peirce’s as \textit{sign-based}, or “bottom up.”\textsuperscript{142} Ricoeur’s perspective rounds out these two somewhat abstracted – some might say “objective” – approaches, by attending to the thinking human subject … “the problematic of the self.”\textsuperscript{143} This three-way relationship is illustrated in Fig. 1.4.

\begin{flushleft}


\textsuperscript{142} This is essentially the same point that Mihhail Lotman makes when he refers to Lotman’s model as ‘holistic’ and Peirce’s as ‘atomistic.’ Mihhail Lotman, “Atomistic versus holistic semiotics,” \textit{Sign Systems Studies}, 30, no. 2 (2002): 513-26. Irene Portis-Winner also portrays Lotman’s model as essentially holistic: “Lotman’s concept of the semiosphere subsumes all aspects of the semiotics of culture, all the heterogeneous semiotic systems or ‘languages’ that are constantly changing and in that abstract sense, have some unifying qualities.” See Portis-Winner, \textit{Semiotics of Peasants}, 63.

\textsuperscript{143} Ricoeur, \textit{Oneself as Another}, 4.
\end{flushleft}
Of course, Figure 1.4 is an over-simplified caricature. The overlapping intersections in the Venn diagram remind us that there is a lot more to each of Peirce, Ricoeur and Lotman than any single label could adequately portray. For example, as Edna Andrews shows, Peirce was well aware that the sign classifications for which he is best-known involve cultural dimensions. His focus, above all else, was *semiosis* not signs *per se.*\(^ {144}\) Also, Peirce had a well-developed philosophy of the self, as argued by Vincent Colapietro.\(^ {145}\) Similarly, the very fact that Lotman conceived of translation between modelling systems as holding true even for an individual mind – *autocommunication* – confirms that he was not blind to the fact that individual interpreting subjects are essential actors in his model of cultural semiotics.\(^ {146}\) Finally, Ricoeur was undoubtedly concerned with the semiotic dimensions – at the levels of sign, text and culture – of his hermeneutic project.\(^ {147}\)

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\(^ {144}\) Andrews, *Conversations with Lotman,* 23.


Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that the primary emphasis in Lotman’s model of cultural semiotics was *systemic*, while Peirce’s approach is oriented to the *sign* itself. My aim is to show how these two semiotic perspectives complement each other and are enriched through close encounters with Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy of human discourse.

A number of studies discuss the relationships between Lotman and Peirce. Likewise, there are scholars who refer to Peirce and Ricoeur in the space of a single publication, not forgetting the scattered references to Peirce in Ricoeur’s own writings. However, there are very few authors who have referred to all three figures together. The main exceptions are various papers and books by Irene Portis Winner and Thomas G. Winner, writing together or separately, and several books by Eero Tarasti. I shall have occasion to cite these authors at relevant points in this thesis. However, none of their publications harmonise the thinking of all three figures in a single, unified model. In particular, discussion of Ricoeur vis-à-vis both Lotman and Peirce has received little or no attention.

Thus, as far as I am aware, this present thesis helps to fill two related “gaps” in the current research literature on the semiotics of art and culture –

- It is the first to offer a detailed discussion of the resonances between a range of ideas developed independently by Ricoeur and Lotman, especially with regard to the creation of new works in artistic and musical discourse.

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• It is the first *in-depth* study to bring together, into a single overall interpretive model, the complementary approaches of Lotman, Peirce and Ricoeur (while giving equal attention to Ricoeur).

My claim is that the resulting “three-dimensional” view – one which relies on Lotman, Peirce and Ricoeur in approximately equal measure – leads to a richer and more compelling interpretive model, at least for the exegesis of conceptual music, than any of the three individual approaches considered in isolation, or bilaterally.

1.9 Plan of Attack

The rest of this thesis is structured as follows –

Part I (continued) – Establishing the Problem & Its Context (Chapters 2 to 3)
Part II – Developing an Interpretive Model (Chapters 4 to 8)
Part III – Interpreting Works of Conceptual Music
  • Works by Other Artists & Composers (Chapters 9 to 13)
  • Exegesis of My Own Works in the Accompanying Creative Portfolio (Chapter 14)
Part IV – Conclusions & Directions for Further Research (Chapter 15)
Appendices – Ancillary Arguments, Related Topics & Original Works

In the remainder of this section, I give an overview of what is to come.

1.9.1 Part I (continued) – Establishing the Problem & Context

The remaining two chapters of Part I are devoted to further fleshing out some of the “big picture” context and basic definitions relevant to the exegetical problem of conceptual music.

Firstly, in Chapter 2, I step back temporarily from the subject of conceptual music, to consider the broader context of *conceptual art* more generally. This is a necessary
digression. Some of the fundamental issues associated with the exegesis of conceptual music, on which little prior research exists, have clear precedents in the expansive literature on conceptual art. Thus, by selectively turning to some of this literature, I am able to establish some important principles which can be carried over, without modification, to subsequent chapters, where I return to the exegetical problem of conceptual music.

Specifically, in Chapter 2, I closely examine the question: “What is minimally required in order for an artwork – in the most general sense – to be instanced?” If the essential features of a work of “conceptual music” are ideas and concepts, which I have defined as temporal processes unfolding at an immaterial level of human existence, perhaps it is possible for composers of “conceptual music” to completely cut all ties with the material world? It turns out that this issue has been canvassed before, by more than one author, in relation to the Conceptual Art movement of the sixties and later. In particular, I review the work of artist/philosopher Jeffrey Strayer, who has presented the most meticulous philosophical discussion of this topic that I know of. Strayer concludes that, even at the outermost limits of abstraction, all conceptual art minimally requires at least one material, public perceptual object, in order to initiate an “interpretive chain” from which a full work may subsequently emerge.

Chapter 3 is a review of the prior history and current usage of “conceptual music” and its related terms. It turns out that the term conceptual music, as a stylistic or generic label, occurs only rarely in English-language musicological literature or descriptions of contemporary musical practice. In the handful of cases in which it does appear, “conceptual music” is typically used as a conscious nod towards aesthetic ideals and/or artists associated with the Conceptual Art movement of the sixties and later. In German-language musicology, Konzeptmusik and associated terms have recently gained prominence. Again, a self-conscious association with the Conceptual Art tradition is everywhere in evidence.

From this perspective, these prior uses are aligned, at least in part, to my own usage. However, I use conceptual music in a more general sense, rather than binding it tightly

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to specific art-historical periods. Importantly, for my purposes, two scholars working independently – Mark DeBellis and Stefan Koelsch – have used “conceptual” to refer to a way of listening to music. I outline their usage in Section 3.4. It will enable me to develop some preliminary schematic distinctions which will serve as an interim “scaffolding” to support the subsequent development of the main interpretive superstructure that takes shape in Part II.

This literature review confirms the claim made in Chapter 1, viz. there is a lack of a widely agreed language for the discussion of conceptual music, one which is equipped to function beyond the acknowledged historical associations with Conceptual Art and its contemporary post-conceptual developments.

At this point, I will have established the exegetical problem of conceptual music, contextualised it in the field of musicology and conceptual art more generally, and given definitions of the key terms used in the rest of the thesis. I next turn to the task of building an interpretive model designed to deal with the exegetical problem that I have described.

1.9.2 Part II – Methodology: Developing an Interpretive Model

In Part II of this thesis, I develop an interpretive model. In order to do this, I draw on a wide range of authors.

As a preliminary step, in Chapter 4, I merge the usage of Mark DeBellis and Stefan Koelsch, reviewed in Chapter 3, to develop a consolidated three-part schema which models how humans make meaningful sense of musical experiences. This schema relies heavily on Koelsch’s synthesis of research evidence from the cognitive neurosciences. It divides the meaning associated with musical listening into three categories – musicogenic, intra-musical, and extra-musical. This particular terminology will eventually be jettisoned in later chapters, in favour of a vocabulary that I find more satisfying from a creative perspective.
At this point, I am ready to tackle the three main stages required to develop my overall interpretive model. As discussed above, the overall model takes the form of a three-layered hierarchy illustrated in Fig. 1.3. Each of these layers is strongly associated with the philosophical theories of Charles Sanders Peirce, Paul Ricoeur, and Juri Lotman, respectively. Chapters 5 to 7 deal with each in turn.

Firstly, in Chapter 5, I consider more closely how human individuals make sense of signs – musical or otherwise – in different contexts, i.e. by virtue of *semiotic process*. Here I introduce the semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce, which has, in my view, unrivalled explanatory power. However, I shall not seek to *directly* map Peirce’s well-known triadic sign typologies – such as *icon*, *index*, and *symbol* – onto specific musical features of any given “work.” That’s because my primary focus in this thesis is on the *discourse* level, not the more detailed lower level of particular signs and their dynamic inter-relations. Even at the discourse level, Peirce’s sign typologies can still be useful for making high-level distinctions between works in which one or other sign types tend to predominate. However, on their own, they shed little light on how it is possible for an *idea* or a *concept*, presented by a composer, to retain sufficient “stability” across an interpretive “chain” for it to be apprehended by an audience in a form that is broadly consistent with – or at least not irreconcilably opposed to – the composer’s intentions. In order to address this point, I refer to the model of semiotic process which Peirce articulated during the final phase in the development of his thought. Importantly, Peirce’s “Final Account” introduces two new notions – the Dynamic Interpretant and the Final Interpretant – that prevent semiotic processes spiralling out of control into complete arbitrariness.

Secondly, in Chapter 6, I turn to the nature of human discourse, as it is enacted between artists/composers on one hand, and their audiences on the other. This is the primary focus of the thesis. I begin with Ricoeur’s simple definition of “discourse” as an event in which “someone says something to someone about something.”¹⁵⁴ From the perspective of the artist/composer, this becomes a matter of *poetics*, i.e. what is it, precisely, that composers – especially composers of “conceptual music” – actually

“make,” in order to “say something”? I argue that, above all else, they make potential meanings, presenting them for interpretation by an audience. This enables me to build a bridge back to the model of musical meaning developed in Chapter 4. In particular, I consider how this model could be further elaborated in order to more explicitly link it to specific and observable creative outputs of real-world practitioners. At this point, I again turn to the writings of Paul Ricoeur, supplemented by a discussion of specifically musical considerations (which Ricoeur himself never addressed\textsuperscript{155}). I propose that there are at least three inter-related potential dimensions to what composers are ultimately making when presenting “works” to an audience –

1. A self-identity of the artist, in constant process of development.
2. An instantiation of an underlying technique or compositional theory, i.e. an underlying grammar of “syntactical” rules and “lexical” choices, implicitly or explicitly governing the work. (I adopt the Aristotelian term technē to refer to this dimension.)
3. A world of the work of art/music, conveyed in “semantic” terms, inviting interpretation in light of a given “pragmatic” context.

I take these three entities and “retrofit” them into the foundational three-category model of Chapter 4. I argue that they are a plausible mapping, based on resemblance, not a perfect equivalence. This allows me to move the interpretive model that is progressively emerging in Part II one step closer to the real-world of practising composers. Finally, this chapter concludes by considering the audience perspective. I argue that the process of interpretation (hermeneutics) on the part of an audience is essentially the inverse of the same process of creation enacted by the artist, but with one important difference, i.e. an obligation to discern, as far as practicable, the intentions of the artist/composer\textsuperscript{156} (even if such intentions are rejected in the resulting interpretation offered by the analyst).

Thirdly, Chapter 7 shifts attention to the higher-level of the three-layered hierarchy in Fig. 1.3, i.e. the systems level. This is the level of explanation which describes the

\textsuperscript{155} The same “gap” is also left under-developed by Koelsch in his model.

\textsuperscript{156} It is also possible that artists themselves also sometimes pause for moments of self-reflection, to consider and perhaps articulate their own intentions.
cultural context, norms and forces that govern the unfolding of discourse events and semiotic processes at the two lower levels. Here I draw heavily on the ideas of Juri Lotman (1922-1993), co-founder of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics.\textsuperscript{157} In Western academic circles, Lotman is perhaps the least recognisable identity in my chosen triumvirate of key figures. His best-known theoretical idea is the notion of the \textit{semiosphere}, by which he meant a pervasive and continually evolving universe of signification.\textsuperscript{158}

Arguably, however, Lotman’s most far-reaching claim is that new meanings can \textit{only} ever emerge through a process of \textit{translation} between at least two languages or, more precisely, between at least two \textit{semiotic modelling systems}.\textsuperscript{159} He asserts that “the elementary act of thinking is translation” and “the elementary mechanism of translating is dialogue [between two modelling systems].”\textsuperscript{160} For Lotman, this principle is fundamental. It holds true wherever new meanings arise.

By endorsing Lotman’s conception of \textit{translation between semiotic systems} as a universal governing principle, I am in a position to unite all three layers of my interpretive model into a cohesive whole. This move depends on two ancillary observations. Firstly, I note that, for many purposes, including mine in this thesis, \textit{translation} and \textit{interpretation} may be considered to be \textit{synonymous}.\textsuperscript{161} (I justify this equivalence with a detailed discussion in Appendix E.) Secondly, I demonstrate that semiotic modelling systems can be identified \textit{at all three levels} of my model, i.e. not just at the highest level. For example, at the lower level, Peirce’s conception of a simple sign – a \textit{representamen}, its \textit{object}, and the \textit{interpretant} – is, in his own view, nothing other than a translation process between the representamen and the object which leads to an interpretant. From this discussion, I conclude that processes of translation

\textsuperscript{157} For the history of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, see Maxim Waldstein, \textit{The Soviet Empire of Signs: A History of the Tartu School of Semiotics} (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008); Michael Fleischer, \textit{Die sowjetische Semiotik: Theoretische Grundlagen der Moskauer und Tartuer Schule} (Tübingen: Stauffenberg verlag, 1989); Igor Pilshchikov and Mikhail Trunin, “The Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics: A transnational perspective.” \textit{Sign Systems Studies}, 44, no. 3 (2016): 368-401.


\textsuperscript{159} This claim, in various wordings, appears several times throughout Lotman’s writings. See, for example, Juri Lotman, “On the semiosphere,” trans. Wilma Clark, \textit{Sign Systems Studies}, 33, no.1 (2005): 225. [Except in direct quotations, I adopt the standard Australian spelling “modelling.”]

\textsuperscript{160} Lotman, \textit{Universe of the Mind}, 143.

\textsuperscript{161} However, I agree with Paul Ricoeur, who opts to leave the matter not finally resolved.
and interpretation operate – indeed, are vital – at each of the three levels in my hierarchical model.

I conclude this chapter by considering the problem of where to search for semiotic modelling systems which might be especially relevant to the exegetical problem of conceptual music. Semiotic modelling systems are everywhere to be found. Systems which have greater relevance to the exegesis of conceptual music will be those which could be reasonably expected to add materially to our “exuberant understanding” of specific “singular exemplars.” I argue that at least one promising line of enquiry regarding highly relevant semiotic systems is to seek to identify the “other(s)” – which may be “hidden” – of the artistic “text” that has been presented to an audience. Such “other(s)” may be – and often are – located within the immediate artworld context of the artistic works in question. Or, they might be introduced from literally anywhere in the wider socio-cultural semiosphere. I briefly review the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin and (again) Paul Ricoeur, to conclude that all “texts” are irreducibly related to their “others,” even if those others are not immediately apparent. These textual “others” – which, in the artworld, can range from genres, styles, to specific individual works – are all semiotic modelling systems too. Thus, recalling Lotman’s key insight, the translation between a text and its other(s) is able to create new interpretive meanings. In other words, I claim that the interpretive understanding of an artistic or musical “text” – such as a work of conceptual music – can be positively enhanced through careful attention to that text’s “other(s).”

Chapter 8 is the final chapter in Part II. There I recap the various strands of argument presented in Chapters 4 to 7, and consolidate them into a single interpretive model, with some of my earlier terminological “scaffolding” now jettisoned.

I observe that, in the case of those artworks which may be described as conceptual music, there are no practical limits or restrictions whatsoever regarding the nature and content of the ideas and concepts with which such artworks may be principally concerned. Literally anything at all may be “shifted” into the conceptual “spotlight” associated with a work, from within the artworld itself or indeed from anywhere in the wider semiosphere. This “conceptual shifting” may be achieved intentionally by the artist, for example through the deployment of standard paratextual devices, such as titles.
and program notes. Or, it may occur without the sanction, or even the awareness of, the artist, as new ideational content is accreted to the world of a work due to external events, or the interpretations and actions of others.

Despite this potentially omnivorous and unpredictable nature of conceptual music – or indeed of conceptual art generally – I suggest that certain approaches to conceptual content are sufficiently prevalent to warrant tentative differentiation in a preliminary typology. Specifically, I re-visit the model of musical listening and experience that has been progressively elaborated over the course of previous chapters. At the discourse level, conceptual listening involves a deliberate intellectual engagement with a musical work in the extra-musical domain. However, reprising earlier observations, I argue that each of the different domains and levels in my model can function as a fertile source of ideas and concepts which artists can – and often do – self-consciously shift or transfer into the conceptual domain. This is true even for those parts of the model that reflect non-conceptual modes of musical experience. In other words, I claim that it is not uncommon to find that the proximate sources of the ideas and concepts which artists are interested in highlighting in conceptual music and art may simply be the different domains and levels already present in any model which adequately encompasses the full range of musical or aesthetic experience. This is, arguably, a manifestation of the “metareferential turn” which Werner Wolf and others have identified as a defining characteristic of post-millenial art. This recursive ability of artists to self-referentially take previously implicit or non-conceptualised aspects of their creative work and explicitly transfer them into the realm of the conceptual is illustrated in Fig. 8.2 (reproduced for ease of reference as Fig. 1.5 below).

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These considerations enable me to consolidate the discussion in earlier chapters and propose a preliminary typology of five modes of conceptual music. I have labelled each mode with a verb, to highlight my claim that each of them describes intentional actions which are invariably taken by all artists or composers in the production and presentation of any creative works. For music-based works, when one or more of these creative actions are intentionally shifted into the conceptual spotlight, they become modes of conceptual music. Reading from left to right, each of the five modes refers to one of the domains or levels shown in Fig. 1.5, as follows –

- identifying [identity];
- signifying [signs of a work];
- crafting [technē];
- referring ["other(s)" of a work];
- worldmaking [world of a work].
I claim that this typology distinguishes five available approaches for creating conceptual music which can be identified in the creative works of a broad spectrum of artists, including myself. Often, several of these modes are discernible in a single work. By the end of Part II, I will be ready to test the viability of the interpretive model that I have articulated. That is the purpose of Part III.

1.9.3 Part III – Interpreting Works of Conceptual Music

In Part III of this thesis, I test the usefulness of the interpretive model developed in Part II, by applying it to the analysis and interpretation of a range of works. Firstly, in Chapters 9 to 13, I consider works by composers and artists other than myself. Each of these chapters focuses on one of the five modes of conceptual music identified in the typology developed in Part II. This alignment is shown in Fig. 1.6.
In Chapter 14, I apply the interpretive model to a discussion of some of my own works, which are also described further in Appendix P. Several of these works were the initial catalyst for the theoretical explorations presented in this thesis. My early frustrated attempts to adequately articulate how and why the superficially disparate and apparently disconnected diversity of my creative activities were unified at some level, led me to recognise the exegetical problem of conceptual music described in Section 1.1. Thus, employing the interpretive model with my own works serves as a further demonstration of its validity and versatility. My aim is to show that it is not only useful for the exegesis of works by others, but is also creatively stimulating in my own practice.

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163 The main internet portal into the full spectrum of my creative practice (as an individual and with collaborators) is my personal website www.ilmartaimre.com.
1.9.4 Part IV – Conclusions & Directions for Further Research

In Part IV (Chapter 15), I recap the main outcomes and conclusions arising from this project. Also, I outline some potentially fruitful lines of further research that I have not been able to pursue here.

Figs. 1.7 and 1.8 summarise the overall “roadmaps” of this thesis in tabular form. I will use these roadmaps at the start of each chapter to remind the reader where that particular chapter fits into the overall exposition.

1.10 Summing Up

In this chapter, I have argued that it is legitimate to demarcate a category of music which I label *conceptual music*. I define this category as music that is *essentially* concerned with the presentation of *ideas* and *concepts*. That is not to suggest that other concerns may not also be present and apparent in conceptual music. Indeed, in view of the irreducible multimodality of sensory perception and continuously unfolding processes of human cognition, there is no such thing as a “purely” conceptual work of music. Nor is there such a thing as a “purely” musical work. Senses other than hearing are always engaged in the apperception of an aesthetic object or experience. Nevertheless, acknowledging the inevitable “fuzziness” of the definitional boundaries, in this thesis *conceptual music* refers to music-based works in which the conceptual dimension is pivotal to any adequate understanding or interpretation.

I claim that “the exegetical problem of conceptual music” is a neglected subject in musicological research. The aim of this thesis is to develop a robust interpretive model which is well-adapted to tackling the particular exegetical challenges posed by conceptual music.
**Part I**

- **Problem, Definitions & Context**
  - Prior Use of “Conceptual Music” (Chapter 3)
  - Conceptual Art Context (Chapter 2)
  - Defining the Problem (Chapter 1)

- **Main Point Discussed**
  - infrequently used in English, stronger precedents in German
  - public perceptual object
  - no vocabulary for exegesis of “conceptual music”

- **Key Author(s)**
  - n/a
  - Jeffrey Strayer
  - Lawrence Kramer, Hegel

**Part II**

- **Methodology**

<table>
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<td>systems perspective</td>
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<td>discourse perspective (poetics, hermeneutics)</td>
<td>Paul Ricoeur</td>
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<td>lower-level (Chapter 5)</td>
<td>process perspective</td>
<td>Charles Sanders Peirce</td>
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<td></td>
<td>model of musical meaning (Chapter 4)</td>
<td>three-category model</td>
<td>Stefan Koelsch, Mark DeBellis</td>
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**Part III**

Interpreting Works of Conceptual Music (Chapters 9 to 14)

**Part IV**

Conclusions & Directions for Further Research (Chapter 15)

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**Figure 1.7**  “Roadmap” for Parts I and II of This Thesis
| Part IV | Conclusions & Directions for Further Research  
(Chapter 15) |
<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mode of Conceptual Music</strong></td>
<td><strong>Main Composers &amp; Works Discussed</strong></td>
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</table>
| n/a  
(Chapter 14) | Ilmar Taimre – Works in accompanying creative portfolio |
| **worldmaking** [world of a work]  
(Chapter 13) | Harry Partch – Delusion of the Fury  
Rohan Kriwaczek – The Art of Funerary Violin  
Ragnar Kjartansson (feat. The National) – A Lot of Sorrow |
| **referring** ["other(s)" of a work]  
(Chapter 12) | Beck – Sea Change  
Arnold Schoenberg – Verklärte Nacht (Transfigured Night)  
Gavin Bryars – The Sinking of the Titanic |
| **crafting** [technē]  
(Chapter 11) | John Cage – Europera 5  
Peter Ablinger – Weiss/Weisslich  
Lawrence English – Viento |
| **signifying** [signs of a work]  
(Chapter 10) | León Schidlowsky – Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen  
Dieter Schnebel – MO-NO  
Adolf Wölfli – St. Adolf Giant Creation |
| **identifying** [identity]  
(Chapter 9) | David Bowie – “Ashes to Ashes”  
Arnold Schoenberg – Pierrot Lunaire |

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| Part II | Methodology – Developing an Interpretive Model  
(Chapters 4 to 8) |
|---|---|
| Part I | Establishing the Problem & Its Context  
(Chapters 1 to 3) |

Figure 1.8  “Roadmap” for Part III of This Thesis
Part IV  
Conclusions & Directions for Further Research  
(Chapter 15)

Part III  
Interpreting Works of Conceptual Music  
(Chapters 9 to 14)

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Part I  
Problem, Definitions & Context  
Main Point Discussed  
Key Author(s)

| Prior Use of “Conceptual Music” (Chapter 3) | infrequently used in English, stronger precedents in German | n/a |
| Conceptual Art Context (Chapter 2)          | public perceptual object                        | Jeffrey Strayer |
| Defining the Problem (Chapter 1)             | no vocabulary for exegesis of “conceptual music” | Lawrence Kramer, Hegel |

This chapter
Chapter 2
Conceptual Art and Materiality

2.1 Introduction

Conceptual music, as I have defined it, is associated with a turn towards *post-conceptualism* in contemporary art more generally. Indeed, as discussed more fully in Chapter 3, many present-day composers of conceptual music explicitly cite the progenitors of the conceptual art tradition, such as John Cage, as key influences. Unlike the situation for conceptual music, there is a vast literature on conceptual and post-conceptual art. Certainly, some of the philosophical problems and debates associated with conceptual art have obvious parallels in conceptual music. For this reason, in this chapter (and in Appendix D), I pause to take a step back from the topic of conceptual music and consider some key insights from scholars and practitioners who have written on conceptual art.

My aim here is not to offer any systematic account of conceptual or post-conceptual art. Rather, I seek to establish some key principles regarding the nature of *conceptualisation* and *abstraction*, applicable to conceptual art and conceptual music alike.

2.2 All Art is Conceptual … To Some Degree

In recent essays and lectures, Peter Osborne argues convincingly that contemporary art is necessarily post-conceptual. He poses the rhetorical questions “is not all contemporary art in some relevant sense ‘conceptual’? Is there, then, such a thing as a

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1 Setting aside any historical or chronological considerations, for my purposes, the terms *conceptual* and *post-conceptual* are functionally synonymous, and I shall generally use them interchangeably. In the literature, *post-conceptual* appears in both hyphenated and unhyphenated forms. In this thesis, I shall default to the hyphenated form.

completely non-conceptual art?” In Osborne’s view, with which I agree, the answer is clearly “no.”

Clodagh Emoe gives a convenient overview of the four characteristics of post-conceptual art which Osborne identifies –

1. “ineliminability but radical insufficiency of the aesthetic dimension of the artwork”
2. “the necessary conceptuality of art”
3. “the anti-aesthetic use of aesthetic materials”
4. “the multifarious forms that [can] constitute art ... i.e. the essential “transcategorical” nature of post-conceptualism.”

Mostly, I agree. However, with regard to Osborne’s third point, I see no compelling reason to insist that aesthetic materials must only be used anti-aesthetically in the making of post-conceptual art. More importantly, as I shall discuss below, it is not necessary to automatically default to an anti-materialist bias in the making of post-conceptual art. Indeed, it may be more interesting to consider what happens to conceptual art when artists deliberately pull away from the “objectless” end of the material/dematerialised spectrum. In Section 2.5, I give some examples of post-conceptual art which promiscuously embraces multiple relationships with a brazenly sensuous materiality.

2.3 The Outermost Limits of Conceptual Art

Of all the philosophical problems presented by conceptual art, perhaps the most fundamental is the quest for dematerialisation. This refers to the notion that art could

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4 Clodagh Emoe, “Exploring the Philosophical Character of Contemporary Art through a Post-Conceptual Practice” (PhD diss., Dublin Institute of Technology, 2014).
be entirely cerebral and abstracted, with no dependency on the materials of the world whatsoever. At one time, at least for a brief moment, dematerialisation was widely thought to be the ultimate goal of conceptual art at its purest limits. See Appendix D for an overview. However, that goal proved to be stubbornly elusive. It was soon recognised as a chimera.

In his book *Subjects and Objects* (2007), Jeffrey Strayer gives what is, to my knowledge, the most systematic and rigorous analysis of art at the outermost limits of conceptual abstraction. In this remarkable study, Strayer meticulously develops an ontology for the consideration of “the limits of Abstraction in art.” He demonstrates that, even at the extreme limits, an “artist’s determination of the identity of an artwork depends on the use of at least one *public perceptual object*”. I do not need to delve into the details of Strayer’s careful argument here. Suffice to say that he forensically and conclusively demonstrates why the absolute dematerialisation of art was always an unattainable impossibility. Conceptual art, even at the outermost limits, must retain some remnant connection with materiality, i.e. the world of perceivable sensory objects, beings and events. No matter how far into the virtual we might seek to push, the bonds with the material world can never be entirely broken.

There is no shortage of scholars and artists who, from different starting points, arrive at essentially the same endpoint, albeit none of them as rigorously as Strayer. In a 1965 interview, Marcel Broodthaers summed it up as follows:

I put the idea before the plastic. The means of expression must be subordinated to the idea. … But, I discovered recently that to express an idea properly, I had necessarily to

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10 Strayer, *Subjects and Objects*.
12 Strayer, *Subjects and Objects*, 1. Strayer’s primary concern is with the visual arts tradition, including conceptual art. However, in principle, his conceptual system is applicable to “any object meant by its producer to enter art history” (36), which would include music, sound art, multimedia, and so on.
13 Ibid., 3, italics added.
play around with plastic elements. In one sense, one always ends up back in the plastic element.\textsuperscript{15}

Appendix D gives several additional quotations along the same lines. The recent anthology \textit{Materiality}\textsuperscript{16} indicates that the role of materials has re-emerged as a central concern for many contemporary artists. Finally, we can note that, in the hard sciences too, at least some scholars claim that, mathematical abstractions notwithstanding, all \textit{information} is fundamentally \textit{physical}.\textsuperscript{17}

The key point is straightforward and compelling. No matter how abstracted and cerebral the intended meaning(s) of a work of conceptual art – or music – might be, there always remains an inescapable dependency on the material presentation of one or more public perceptual objects.

\subsection*{2.4 The “Innermost Limits” of Materiality in Conceptual Art}

If we accept the requirement for a minimally unavoidable physical materiality at the outermost limits of conceptual art, what can be said about the \textit{innermost} limits? Or, to put it another way, how far could we go in overlaying a work of conceptual art with an \textit{excess} of perceivable materiality before the \textit{conceptual} essence of the work is somehow smothered to the point that it “disappears”, and is no longer meaningfully retrievable or accessible to an audience? This returns us to Peter Osborne’s related question quoted in Section 2.2 above: “Is there, then, such a thing as a completely non-conceptual art?”

I am not aware of any analyses of this question which proceed with the same thoroughly systematic rigour adopted by Jeffrey Strayer in his examination of \textit{outermost} limits. It is beyond my scope to attempt such a similarly thorough analysis of the \textit{innermost} variant here. Instead, I shall briefly review some specific examples to make a reasonably convincing case that, while there may be some \textit{practical} constraints (e.g. the size of the physical universe), there probably is no \textit{theoretical} upper limit to the

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
aggregation of publicly perceivable material elements which an artist may choose to associate with a work of conceptual art.

Certainly, history shows that is possible to produce art that is self-consciously intended to primarily convey ideas – a “conceptual art,” if you like – but which is nevertheless generously, even excessively, presented to an audience via a profuse abundance of material objects and sensory stimuli. As cases in point, I present the following four examples –

- Moscow Conceptualism;
- Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk (and its subsequent development and contemporary re-emergence);
- Baroque (and neo-Baroque) art;
- the contemporary post-conceptual style referred to as “Romantic conceptualism.”

2.4.1 Moscow Conceptualism

For examples of conceptual art at the maximal end of the continuum of public perceptual objects used to present a work, let us turn to the installations of Ilya and Emilia Kabakov. The Kabakovs are perhaps the best-known of the contemporary artists associated with the movement known as “Moscow Conceptualism.” The majority of the Kabakovs’ installations are presented with a generous abundance of material artefacts. And yet, there is no doubt that the primary intent of these works – their meaning – lies in the realm of ideas. As a case in point, consider The Untalented Artist (1988), illustrated in Fig. 2.1.

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On the Kabakovs’ official website, this work is described as follows:

In this room, three large canvases rest on the floor against the walls. Each canvas is divided half horizontally and depicts various scenes, including a soccer match, a drawing class in an art academy, a group of workers, and three views of the countryside with assorted landmarks or industrial settings. The narrative of The Untalented Artist describes the man as 50 years old (approximately Kabakov’s age when he created the work), who took some art classes when he was younger and now works for the state. The paintings resemble the crude works created for propaganda, agitation and advertisements for official events.21

The Kabakovs’ installations are, first and foremost, works of conceptual art. However, they are located in a tradition of conceptualism which followed a markedly different arc than the archetypically minimalist/anti-materialist curve of Western Conceptual Art. Boris Groys observes:

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21 [www.ilya-emilia-kabakov.com/installations-1/](www.ilya-emilia-kabakov.com/installations-1/)
It could be said that Soviet culture had always been conceptual ... When looking at a painting normal Soviet viewers quite automatically ... saw this painting inherently replaced by its possible *ideological-political-philosophical commentary*, and they took this commentary into account when assessing the painting in question.  

To highlight the quite different notions of conceptualism that underpinned Western Conceptual Art vis-à-vis Moscow Conceptualism, Matthew Jackson contrasts citations from Lucy Lippard’s *Six Years* and Hermann Hesse’s novel *The Glass Bead Game (Magister Ludi)*. For Jackson, “Hesse ... reads like a spokesman for Moscow Conceptualism, insofar as he imagines working with *diverse cultural phenomena* as if they were ‘colours on a painter’s palette’.” Jackson’s reference is to the following passage in Hesse’s book: “The Glass Bead Game is thus a mode of playing with the *total contents and values of our culture*; it plays with them as, say, in the great age of the arts a painter might have played with the colours on his palette.”

This brief discussion anticipates the argument I shall develop further in Chapter 7, viz. that in creating a work of conceptual art or music, it is possible for an artist/composer to draw literally on anything – “the total contents and values of our culture,” as Hesse puts it. And there is no fundamental reason why the conceptual imperative which underpins such works needs to constrain or narrowly de-limit the material aspects of what is publicly presented.

### 2.4.2 The Total Work of Art (Gesamtkunstwerk)

For a second example of conceptual art which is also extravagantly materialistic, I turn to the operas of Richard Wagner. These are amongst the most sensuously and perceptually lavish of any in the Western operatic tradition.

However, Wagner’s *ideas* – his theory of the total work of art (Gesamtkunstwerk) and his philosophical speculations about the nature of the erotic – were even more important.

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24 Jackson, *The Experimental Group*, 181, italics added.

to how these operas were intended to be understood than any of their surface manifestations. Adrian Daub argues that Wagner’s approach “entailed a move to an opera that understood itself as a carrier of an implicit or explicit philosophical program – that understood itself in terms of a philosophy of history and a theory of modernity.”

In other words, Daub almost seems to be saying that, besides – or beneath, if you like – the lavish overburden of extravagant orchestration, labyrinthine narrative, and spectacular costume and stage designs typical of Wagner’s operas, there are additional conceptual layers, equally important to the total work, and also intended to be recognised and appreciated by the audience.

After Wagner, the notion of Gesamtkunstwerk was central to the thinking of many artists and composers of the Jugendstil period, and continued into the Expressionist era, manifested in the works of Wassily Kandinsky, Arnold Schoenberg, and others. Indeed, Anke Finger sees the total artwork as a forerunner of conceptual art, principally because it is, above else, itself an idea. For her, writing with Danielle Follett, the Gesamtkunstwerk is an “aesthetic concept, project, or aspiration ... understood above all as an aesthetic ambition to borderlessness.” Follette and Finger suggest that three types of blending are typically simultaneously present in Gesamtkunstwerke.

On a primary and material level, this merging may refer to a lack of boundaries between the different arts and genres, as in multimedia, operatic, and synesthetic creations, as well as to the blending of ‘poesy’ with philosophy and criticism. This first, aesthetic level is necessarily intertwined with the next level, the political: the transgression of the borders between art and life ... Finally, it may involve an aspiration toward a more metaphysical sort of borderlessness, a merging of the present, empirical reality with a nonpresent, or not-yet-present, envisioned totality, unity, infinity, or absolute.

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31 Ibid., 3-4.
The key point to be highlighted in all this is the centrality of idea and concept to the notion of Gesamtkunstwerk, and the merger of aesthetic and political. The material elements of total artworks – such as the musical scores of Wagner’s operas – can, of course, be individually analysed at a detailed level. However, no exegesis of these works could be considered complete without close, and arguably primary, attention to their conceptual dimensions.

2.4.3 Baroque (and Neo-Baroque)

Angela Ndalianis argues that Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk project has historical antecedents in the Baroque, a period in which the arts were undoubtedly also rich in material dimensions.32 Walter Benjamin, in his remarkable postdoctoral habilitation thesis The Origin of German Tragic Drama (2003/1928), refers eloquently to the superabundance of materiality in the Baroque aesthetic:

> It is common practice in the literature of the baroque to pile up fragments ceaselessly, without any strict idea of a goal, and, in the unremitting expectation of a miracle, to take the representation of stereotypes for a process of intensification.33

The “miracle” which victoriously overcomes the potentially contradictory absence of “any strict idea of a goal” is, of course, the conceptual “intensification” which is achieved Baroque art. In other words, despite the unremitting “pile up [of] fragments” at the surface level, the art succeeds at the conceptual meta-level. While Benjamin is here talking specifically of literature, a similar description could be safely applied to all the arts of the Baroque era.

Without entering into a detailed discussion here, there is, in my view, considerable merit to Ndalianis’ argument, i.e. that many aspects of the Baroque find later resonance in both Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk, and the intermedial arts of our present era.34

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In a similar vein, Umberto Eco argued that the contemporary “open work” had a historical precedent in the “open form” of the Baroque.

Baroque form is dynamic; it tends to an indeterminacy of effect (in its play of solid and void, light and darkness, with its curvature, its broken surfaces, its widely diversified angles of inclination); it conveys the idea of space being progressively dilated. Its search for kinetic excitement and illusory effect leads to a situation where the plastic mass in the Baroque work of art never allows a privileged, definitive, frontal view; rather, it induces the spectator to shift his position continuously in order to see the work in constantly new aspects, as if it were in a state of perpetual transformation. ... He is no longer to see the work of art as an object which draws on given links with experience and which demands to be enjoyed; now he sees it as a potential mystery to be solved, a role to fulfil, a stimulus to quicken his imagination.35

Eco is quick to add that “these conclusions have been codified by modern criticism ... it would be rash to interpret Baroque poetics as a conscious theory of the ‘open work’.”36

Nevertheless, excess was, for Baroque theorists, not merely a hedonistic indulgence, but an idea with aesthetic and philosophical purpose. For example, in his book Hyperboles (2010),37 Christopher Johnson shows that, in the Baroque, the excess of hyperbole was thought of as an important rhetorical technique. Contemporaneous theorists of Baroque music viewed hyperbole as a musico-rhetorical technique for representing the overstepping of boundaries.38

In his dissertation, Joshua Ritter offers an interesting suggestion:

As the most effective trope for expressing the inexpressible and describing what is beyond description, hyperbole risks being misapprehended, and it stretches and strains

36 Eco, Open Work, 7.
37 Cristopher D. Johnson, Hyperboles: The Rhetoric of Excess in Baroque Literature and Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Department of Comparative Literature, 2010).
38 See Dietrich Bartel, Musica Poetica: Musical-Rhetorical Figures in German Baroque Music (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 303.
facts and language so it might transcend the ‘ordinary’ and communicate as yet unimagined possibilities.\textsuperscript{39}

In essence, each of these authors is saying that the hyperbolic excesses of the Baroque and neo-Baroque, although typically manifested via materialistic exuberance, had a fundamentally conceptual purpose. Hyperbole was used as a rhetorical device in order to “say something,” i.e. to convey meanings. Such meanings remained perfectly evident to thoughtful observers, even while they simultaneously appreciated the sensory overload of superficial appearances. And, that’s the key point here – the conceptual dimension in art and music can readily transcend a maximal aesthetic with respect to any of its materials.

2.4.4 Romantic Conceptualism

In 2007, Jörg Heiser curated an exhibition titled “Romantic Conceptualism” at Kunsthalle Nürnberg.\textsuperscript{40} In 2014, Scot Cotterell used the same name for an entirely different exhibition which he curated for Contemporary Art Tasmania.\textsuperscript{41} While these events are hardly sufficient – and were never intended – to constitute a “movement,” they do offer other examples of post-conceptual art which is self-consciously conceptual while at the same time distanced from any associations with extreme minimalism or rationalism.

We see precisely this kind of distancing in Susan Hiller’s \textit{Dedicated to the Unknown Artists} (1972–76). Ellen Seifermann and Christine Kintisch cite this as a watershed work which proves “that Conceptual art ... is ... perfectly well able to deal with Romantic subject matter.”\textsuperscript{42} Jörg Heiser observes that this work – presented as a

\textsuperscript{39} Joshua R. Ritter, “Recovering Hyperbole: Re-Imagining the Limits of Rhetoric for an Age of Excess” (PhD diss., Georgia State University, 2010), 2, emphasis added. Available at http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/communication_diss/22.

\textsuperscript{40} Ellen Seifermann and Jörg Heiser, eds., \textit{Romantischer Konzeptualismus/Romantic Conceptualism} (Bielefeld: Kerber Verlag, 2007).

\textsuperscript{41} Scot Cotterell, \textit{Romantic Conceptualism} [Exhibition Catalogue] (n.p. [Hobart]: Scot Cotterell and Contemporary Art Tasmania, n.d. [2014]). Available at http://contemporaryarttasmania.businesscatalyst.com/2014%20Exhibitions/Romantic%20Conceptualism/Scot_Cotterell_CAT_Romantic_Conceptualism.pdf. While the catalogue notes the earlier use of “Romantic Conceptualism” by Heiser, there is, as far as I am aware, no other connection between the two exhibitions.

collection of 305 postcards showing “rough seas” at various locations around the British coast (see Fig. 2.2) – manifests a version of conceptualism that is markedly different from the minimalist aesthetic usually encountered in Conceptual Art, at least up to that time:

What appears as ‘mere’ collecting is actually much more than that. Rather than a feeling of terse coolness in the tradition of Minimalism or Conceptual art ... Hiller’s pieces set up a constant oscillation between emptiness and weightiness, a kind of psychoactive restlessness. This restlessness arises from the clashing of a pointedly distanced, technical serial, Conceptual method with something that has a particularly strong semantic charge.  

In an interview with Heiser, Hiller herself states that “the piece is excessive. There is too much imagery.” Therefore, the viewers’ attention shifts to the imaginary.

![Image of Susan Hiller's Dedicated to the Unknown Artists (1972–76)](image)

**Figure 2.2** Susan Hiller, Dedicated to the Unknown Artists (1972–76)


Used with permission of Susan Hiller and Tate.

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44 Susan Hiller, “Interview with Jörg Heiser and Jan Verwoert,” in Seifermann and Heiser, Romantischer Konzeptualismus, 153.

45 Acquired by Tate in 2012. Reference T13531.
2.4.5 Conclusion

This concludes the discussion of four examples which I have selected in support of my key assertion, viz. that there is no theoretical upper limit to the extent of material exuberance or maximalism that may be associated with a work of conceptual art or music. The issue does not depend on the richness or otherwise of the perceivable materials. Whether or not a work is conceptual depends, first and foremost, on which dimensions of meaning are essential to its adequate understanding.

Each of the examples discussed in this section are – at their intentional core – steadfastly conceptual. Nevertheless, they are dependent for their realisation on the existence of an almost gratuitously abundant assemblage of material artefacts and “publicly perceivable objects” of various kinds. Ironically, sometimes these objects may, in fact, be dematerialised – at least, in the contemporary “digitised” sense of the word – as long there remains some physical mechanism, such as a computer connected to the internet, for them to be publicly perceivable.

One important consequence of an overabundance of perceivable objects is the greater emphasis it places on a continuing process of interpretation and re-interpretation. Unlike the case of minimally instantiated works which, at one level, can perhaps be intellectually grasped in a single encounter, massively saturated works exceed the perceptual and cognitive abilities of an individual observer to fully “contain” them, even after multiple experiences. Post-conceptual art which is deliberately premised on a lavish feast of sensible materiality therefore requires audience members to chart a personal course, or trajectory, through the extravagant surplus of meaning offered by the work.

The task of alerting an audience to a multiplicity of possible meanings has been part of the conceptual manifesto right from the outset. Thus, Charles Harrison, referring specifically to Marcel Duchamp’s *Fountain* (1917), argues that

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46 The term is, of course, borrowed from Paul Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976).
the interest of [this] art resides in its power of exemplifying or calling attention to certain of the meanings with which the world is saturated.\textsuperscript{47}

Nevertheless, when the universe of public perceptual objects associated with a work exceeds the practical limits of total apprehension by any single individual, attention is drawn to a somewhat different point than just the availability of multiple meanings. It is now also drawn to the opportunity – perhaps even the obligation – to construct personal meanings or interpretations, which are “located” at the meta-level of ideas and concepts.

2.5 Summing Up

The meticulous analysis presented by Jeffrey Strayer in his book Subjects and Objects (2007)\textsuperscript{48} explains why the idea of a completely dematerialised art was always an impossible dream. He shows that, even at the outermost limits of conceptual abstraction, the interpretive process must always begin, at some originating point in time and space, with at least one public perceptual object (although “the artwork need not itself be a perceptual object”\textsuperscript{49}).

This conclusion carries over, without any need for modification, into the interpretive model that I develop for conceptual music. Indeed, the boundaries between conceptual music and conceptual art more generally are blurred. That’s because the musical dimension in conceptual music can remain entirely imaginary (Section 1.5). In order to be manifested to an audience, a work of conceptual music (or art) – no matter how “dematerialised” it might otherwise be – always minimally requires the presentation of at least one public perceptual object at some initiating point in the process of its reception. This minimal requirement mandates an essential step in the exegetical analysis of any work of conceptual music (or art), viz. the explicit identification of the public perceptual object(s) on which that work essentially depends (as distinct from any objects whose presence and recognition by an audience may be plausibly deemed to be optional).


\textsuperscript{48} Strayer, Subjects and Objects.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 122.
A corollary follows from this: even if it is not intended to be part of the artwork itself, but merely an “entry portal” into the work, a public perceptual object must, inevitably, also manifest aesthetic qualities of its own. This corollary explains why conceptual art and maximalism are not, in principle, diametrically opposed to each other. In other words, conceptual art does not necessarily need to default to a minimalist or transiently experiential aesthetic. Whether or not a work may legitimately be referred to as “conceptual” is independent of its material characteristics.

All works of art and music involve a combination of conceptual and non-conceptual dimensions, in a constant state of flux. It is always a matter of degree, never an either/or distinction. Works of conceptual art and conceptual music are simply those in which the conceptual dimension is manifestly present and, moreover, of primary importance to any well-rounded interpretation or understanding. Importantly, as I shall argue in Part II, artists and composers (as well as audiences and commentators) are able to deliberately shift a listener’s conceptual attention onto dimensions which would otherwise remain hidden – in the shadows, so to speak – and function “non-conceptually.”
**Part I**

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**Part III**

*Interpreting Works of Conceptual Music (Chapters 9 to 14)*

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**Part IV**

*Conclusions & Directions for Further Research (Chapter 15)*
Chapter 3

“Conceptual Music” – A Review of Prior Usage

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss prior uses of conceptual music and related terminology. The review of relevant literature shall proceed in four stages.

Firstly, I consider English-language contexts. It turns out that, until recently, the term conceptual music, as a stylistic or generic label, occurred only rarely in Western musicological literature or descriptions of contemporary musical practice. Such occasional prior uses that do exist will be reviewed in Section 3.2. In the handful of cases in which it does appear, “conceptual music” is typically used as a conscious nod towards aesthetic ideals and/or artists associated with the Conceptual Art movement of the sixties and later. From this perspective, these prior uses are aligned, at least in part, to my own usage. However, as already discussed in Chapter 1, I use conceptual music in a more generic sense, rather than binding it tightly to specific art-historical periods. Nevertheless, in Part III, I shall show how music-based works that are related to the Conceptual Art tradition undoubtedly fit very comfortably into the broader interpretive model of this thesis.

Secondly, in Section 3.3, I review Konzeptmusik and associated terms. These have recently gained prominence in German-language musicology. Where leading practitioners – such as Johannes Kreidler and Peter Ablinger – make appearances in English-language publications or performances, the term “conceptual” has been used. Again, the self-conscious association with the Conceptual Art tradition is everywhere in evidence.

Thirdly, in Section 3.4, I observe that there is a long history of music which is concerned with the presentation and/or realisation of ideas and concepts, without ever being explicitly labelled conceptual music.

Finally, in Section 3.5, I turn my attention to an important use of the term “conceptual” in relation to music, not as a stylistic category, but as a way of *listening* to music. In this guise, the term appears in the writings of two scholars working independently – Mark DeBellis and Stefan Koelsch. In Part II (Chapter 4), the usage of DeBellis and Koelsch will be reconciled to establish a three-category model of musical meaning, which becomes the main foundational “building block” on which the rest of my overall interpretive model will be progressively constructed (in Chapters 5 to 8).

### 3.2 “Conceptual Music” as a Musical Style or Genre

In English-language contexts, usages of the term “conceptual music” – as a category label for a musical style or genre – are isolated cases, notable for their rarity. Indeed, in a blog entitled “Conceptual Music?”, Karen van der Staal observed that, while various parallels between music and the conceptual art movement can be readily identified, “a conceptual music movement does not seem to exist.”² Her assessment, made in 2011, has been somewhat overtaken by more recent developments in German musicology, where the terms *Neuer Konzeptualismus*, *Konzeptmusik* and *konzeptioneller Musik* have gained currency (see Section 3.3 below). Nevertheless, it is true to say that, in English-language contexts, “conceptual music,” *as a stylistic label*, is still not a commonly-used term. The rest of this section briefly reviews the few English-language examples that I have been able to discover in contemporary academic or practitioner publications.

#### 3.2.1 Seth Kim-Cohen

Perhaps the most important recent English-language use of the term “conceptual,” as a label for a style of music and sound art, is found in Seth Kim-Cohen’s book *In the Blink of an Ear* (2009).³ Kim-Cohen talks of “the conceptual turn” in music, and points to the work of a number of contemporary artists whose “sonic art” may be understood as part of the Conceptual Art tradition. The roots of this tradition can be traced, *via* John Cage,

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LaMonte Young, Tony Conrad and other Conceptual Artists, to pioneers such as Marcel Duchamp and Luigi Russolo.

In essence, Kim-Cohen’s book presents a sketch history of the contemporary rise of post-conceptual art⁴, from a sonic arts perspective. More recently, in Against Ambience (2013),⁵ Kim-Cohen rails against the apparent demise of the (post-)conceptual turn. There is no need to discuss the details here.⁶ The key point is that, in Kim-Cohen’s writings, the term “conceptual” applied to contemporary music and sound art is aligned to the post-conceptual movement in the arts generally.

3.2.2 Edward Pearsall

In his textbook Twentieth-Century Music Theory and Practice (2012), Edward Pearsall introduces “conceptual music” as a category of works which “abandon the medium of sound altogether ... whose performances involve something other than the production of sound.”⁷ The example that he offers is Pauline Oliveros’ Sonic Meditations (1974),⁸ a set of 25 instruction-based pieces. However, as an examination of the text score for that work reveals, most of these pieces, in performance, are not intended by the composer to be entirely devoid of a sonic dimension.⁹ So, it is hard to see how strictly Pearsall intends “conceptual music” to apply to works in which “music falls completely silent.”¹⁰ In the end, Pearsall gives no history of “conceptual music.” Nor does he mention the contemporary European use of the label, which was emerging just as his book appeared. However, it is apparent that he thinks of “conceptual music” as an analogue of the Conceptual Art movement of the sixties, and quickly moves on to other topics.

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⁴ The term “post-conceptual” was introduced by Peter Osborne, and has gained wide currency. See Chapter 2 for further discussion.
⁵ Seth Kim-Cohen, Against Ambience and Other Essays (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016).
¹⁰ Pearsall, Twentieth-Century Music, 241.
3.2.3  *Justin Saragoza*

Composer Justin Saragoza deploys the label “conceptual music” to refer to some of his works. For Saragoza, conceptual music equates to a set of instructions which, if followed, would result in a musical composition. In his view

there is no need to perform conceptual music. Being a concept, it can very simply remain within the imaginings of the individuals [sic] mind; which is the stage of its performance.\footnote{www.justinsaragoza.com.}


### 3.2.4  *Steve Kornicki*

Steve Kornicki, a composer/musician, defines conceptual music as “music that involves process as its focus.”\footnote{www.stevekornicki.com} Kornicki states that his conceptual compositions\footnote{For example, Steve Kornicki, *Orchestral, Conceptual and Ensemble Music*, CD Baby, 2005, CD; Steve Kornicki, *Transformations & Manipulations*, CD Baby, 2007, CD.} “draw their influences from the process-oriented music of Brian Eno, William Basinski, Terry Riley, Steve Reich, Tod Dockstader, Phill Niblock and David Behrman.”\footnote{www.stevekornicki.com} Although he doesn’t elaborate, it is apparent that Kornicki’s use of “conceptual music” is broadly aligned with a Conceptual Art aesthetic.
3.2.5 Jo Collinson Scott

In her PhD thesis, Jo Collinson Scott uses the term Conceptual music (capitalised) as an analogue of Conceptual Art.\(^{18}\) In an essay, she states:

> Conceptual artworks and pieces of Conceptual music test ideas that, in their testing, present a challenge to the philosophical understandings of the terms ‘art’ and ‘music’. … These Conceptual works function like thought experiments in philosophy but are enacted as objects.\(^{19}\)

For Scott, Conceptual music is “a critique of music presented as music.”\(^{20}\) As examples of Conceptual music, Scott points to John Cage’s 4’33” (1952), La Monte Young’s Composition #5, 1960, and George Brecht’s boxed event cards Water Yam (1963-ca. 1970).\(^{21}\)

3.2.6 Concept Albums and Concept Musicals

By definition, concept albums\(^{22}\) and concept musicals\(^{23}\) are explicitly claimed to be “about” ideas and concepts of various kinds. Most often, these ideas and concepts are presented via the mechanisms of a loose plot or sketchy narrative, delivered principally through a natural language component, which is sung, spoken or printed. Such claims of conceptualisation are sometimes fairly tenuous, as with The Beatles’ Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band (1967) album.\(^{24}\) Nevertheless, these genres certainly display

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\(^{20}\) Ibid., 126.

\(^{21}\) For a photograph of Brecht’s Water Yam boxes, see Hannah Higgins, Fluxus Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002): Fig. 3.

\(^{22}\) There is small but useful academic literature on the topic of concept albums in rock and popular music, including: Marianne Letts, Radiohead and the Resistant Concept Album (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Tim Smolko, Jethro Tull’s Thick as A Brick and A Passion Play: Inside Two Long Songs (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); Phil Rose, Roger Waters and Pink Floyd: The Concept Albums (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2016); Gareth Shute, Concept Albums ([n.p.]: Investigations Publishing, 2013) is a light, non-academic introduction.

\(^{23}\) Christine Young-Gerber, “‘Attention must be paid’, cried the balladeer: The concept musical defined,” Studies in Musical Theatre, 4, no. 3 (2010): 331-42.

a conceptual dimension (as inevitably all music does). Thus, whenever the conceptual
dimension becomes paramount, or at least is of equal importance with other dimensions,
specific works in these genres undoubtedly would fall within the definition of
conceptual music as I have defined it.

All vocal musical genres which involve narrative – opera, ballads, and so on – could
similarly be said to be types of conceptual music, at least in cases where the conceptual
dimension is pre-eminent. However, in my view, almost all examples from these genres
are, despite their initial claims as “conceptual,” not primarily concerned with ideas and
concepts. Instead, their most important defining characteristics reflect the usual
mainstream music-industry concerns of popular melodies and memorable lyrics.
Nevertheless, paradoxically, some of these works may enter the canon. When that
happens, they become so well-known, that they are transformed into generally-
recognised concepts in their own right. This has occurred with Sgt. Pepper, not only as
music but also as album packaging. In such cases, these works have become
“conceptual” at the level of general culture and are available to be intertextually
referenced in all forms of discourse, including creative works by contemporary artists
and composers.

3.2.7 Other Potential References

There are a small number of other miscellaneous references to “concepts” in music,
which prima facie might also be relevant to the focus of this thesis. On closer
inspection, however, they offer little that is useful and have not been pursued further.
For the sake of completeness, I shall briefly list them here.

- Guerino Mazzola is the lead author of a massive tome entitled The Topos of
  the reference to “logic of concepts” is initially intriguing, the volume itself turns
  out to be an intensely mathematical theory. Dmitri Tymoczko gives one of the
  few detailed reviews of Mazzola’s book, focusing only on a small section

\textsuperscript{25} Guerino Mazzola, The Topos of Music: Geometric Logic of Concepts, Theory, and Performance, with 17
collaborators and 2 contributors (Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 2002).
dealing with traditional counterpoint rules. He suggests that Mazzola’s theoretical assertions on that subject are not in accord with historical practice, thus calling into question the practical applicability of Mazzola’s entire project. It is beyond my scope to pursue this further.

- Some authors have applied conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) to the analysis of music. Perhaps the best-known example is Lawrence Zbikowski’s *Conceptualizing Music* (2002). The analytical methodology advocated by adherents of CMT can be usefully applied to the consideration of music-text relations, and multimodal analysis, especially in cases where relationships of resemblance, similarity and mimesis play a key role. However, such approaches offer only a narrow window into the poetics and hermeneutics of the full spectrum of conceptual music, as defined in this thesis, in which other sign processes – involving metonymy or symbolism – may be just as, or more, important than those involving metaphor.

- Robin Maconie’s *The Concept of Music* (1990) is not relevant to my topic. It is an overview of different aspects of Western music aimed at the general reader.

### 3.2.8 What About John Cage and Other Conceptual Artists?

As far as I can ascertain, neither John Cage nor any of the leading figures associated with Conceptual Art ever used the term “conceptual music” to refer to their own work. Nevertheless, as the preceding discussion shows, Cage is undoubtedly an archetypical example of a composer of conceptual music, as one facet of his overall artistic practice. I consider works by Cage in Chapter 10.

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In an interview, composer Terry Riley, once referred to the work of Adolf Wölfli as “conceptual music”\(^\text{29}\) (see also Section 10.5). However, this is apparently a unique occurrence amongst Riley’s published statements.

3.3 **Konzeptmusik, Neuer Konzeptualismus and Relationale Musik**

3.3.1 Konzeptmusik & Neuer Konzeptualismus

Amongst German-speaking critics and composers, the terms *Neuer Konzeptualismus*, *Konzeptmusik* and *konzeptioneller Musik* have recently gained currency. They emerged in the wake of Harry Lehmann’s book *Die digitale Revolution der Musik* (2012),\(^\text{30}\) which included a chapter entitled “Musikkonzepte.” There, Lehmann presents a sketch history of the role of concepts in modern art and music, referencing the long-running new music publication series *Musik-Konzepte*, and the works of John Cage, György Ligeti, and Marcel Duchamp, amongst others. Lehmann’s use of *Konzept* functions as a Germanicised version of the English word “concept,” clearly an allusion to Conceptual Art.\(^\text{31}\)

In his book, Lehmann presents a historical model which claims that the history of modern art and music, up to the present era, can be described as the “immanent decoupling” [\(\text{immanente Ausdifferenzierung}\)]\(^\text{32}\) of work, medium, and concept. Lehmann’s model is, in my view, debatable. However, for my purposes, it doesn’t really matter whether it is plausible or not. The key point is that, due in no small part to Lehmann’s writing, the terms “concept” and “conceptual” have become newly prominent in contemporary German musicological literature. In recent years, they have appeared regularly in leading contemporary music journals.\(^\text{33}\)


\(^{31}\) This attaches a connotation to *Konzept* which, traditionally, was not found in common German usage. Thus, for example, authors such as Hegel do not use “Konzept” for “concept,” they use “Begriff.” See Appendix C. The basic dictionary definition of *Konzept* is “rough copy, first or rough draft; notes.” See *Cassell’s German-English/English-German Dictionary*, rev. Harold T. Betteridge (London: Cassell & Co., 1978): 361 (entry: *Konzept*). However, it is true to say that, increasingly, the meaning of “concept” – in its English sense – is finding its way into the contemporary meaning of *Konzept* in German, at least in musicology circles.

\(^{32}\) Lehmann, *Die digitale Revolution*, 108.

\(^{33}\) See, for example: *Die Neue Zeitschrift für Musik*, #1, 2014, special issue on “Konzeptmusik”; Gisela Nauck, “Neuer Konzeptualismus: Eine Reaktionen auf musikkulturelle Erstarrungen,” *positionen: Texte zur aktuellen Musik*,
Two German-speaking composers who are recognised as leading practitioners of *Konzeptmusik* are Peter Ablinger (born in Austria) and Johannes Kreidler (Germany). Outside of Germany and Austria, we can note Antoine Beuger\(^34\) (born in Netherlands), Michael Pisaro\(^35\) (born in USA) and others in the international Wandelweiser group,\(^36\) as well as Jarrod Fawler, Cory Arcangel, and Seth Kim-Cohen (all USA).\(^37\) Again, John Cage and the Conceptual Art tradition loom large as acknowledged pioneers for all of these present-day composers.

A good sense of what contemporary practitioners mean by the label *Konzeptmusik* is given in the first three (of twenty-one) sentences in Johannes Kreidler’s blog “Sentences on Musical Concept-Art” (2013):

1. A conceptual piece is determined by a trenchant idea.
2. The idea is a machine, which produces the work of art. The process should not have any interference, it should take its course. (LeWitt 1967)\(^38\)
3. The concept machine today is, above all, the algorithm.\(^39\)

In other words, just as we saw in the English-language examples reviewed in Section 4.2, the German stylistic/generic label of *Konzeptmusik* is considered by its prominent practitioners as a contemporary extension of the Conceptual Art tradition.

While such associations with Conceptual Art and the “postconceptual turn” are valid as far as they go, I have adopted a broader definition of “conceptual music,” as discussed

\(^{34}\) Lely and Saunders, *Word Events*, 104-108.
\(^{35}\) Ibid., 315-27.
\(^{37}\) All included in Kreidler’s list, Kreidler, “Mit Leitbild?!” 33. See also Lely and Saunders, *Word Events*, 211-23, on Seth Kim-Cohen.
in Chapter 1. To recap, I apply the term to any music-based works in which ideas and concepts – not just those which serve as an algorithmic formula or script – are of critical importance in forming a satisfactory understanding of the perceivable dimensions that have been presented to an audience. Such works may certainly include – but are not limited to – those produced as part of the Conceptual Art movement that flourished in the sixties and beyond.

### 3.3.2 Relational Music

Another term coined by Harry Lehmann to refer to prevalent practices in contemporary art is relational music [Ger. Relationale Musik].\(^{40}\) He acknowledges\(^{41}\) that his use of the term is inspired by Nicolas Bourriaud’s *Relational Aesthetics* (2002/1998).\(^{42}\) Matthew Shlomowizt reports that, in Lehmann’s view, “for ‘new music’ to maintain its core value of newness, the search for novel music material has been replaced by a search for novel relationships between music and ideas, which is what he means by Relational Music.”\(^{43}\) Lehmann focuses his survey on works in which music is combined with other media.\(^{44}\) He names three “strategies for conceptualisation” [Konzeptualisierungsstrategien] which have been employed to establish such relationships in New Music: visualisation [Visualisierung], theatricalisation [Theatralisierung] and semanticisation [Semantisierung].\(^{45}\)

### 3.4 Ideas & Concepts in Music

While the term “conceptual music” has only recently entered musicological discourse (and only then primarily in German musicological contexts), music concerned

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\(^{41}\) Lehmann, *Die digitale Revolution der Musik*, 115.


\(^{44}\) Shlomowitz points out that the relationships of interest to Lehmann can also be represented within the single medium of sound/music (ibid.).

\(^{45}\) Lehmann, *Die digitale Revolution der Musik*, 116.
principally with ideas and concepts has a much longer history. Indeed, in his discussion of *Musikkonzepte*, Lehmann\(^{46}\) aptly cites Arnold Schoenberg’s *Die Glückliche Hand* [The Fortunate Hand], Op. 18 (1913) as a work primarily concerned with the multimedial presentation of central point or idea, i.e. the inescapable “tragedy of the creative man, gifted with ‘green fingers’.”\(^{47}\) Indeed, Schoenberg himself characterised this work as a form aimed at “making music with the means of stagecraft,”\(^{48}\) which he goes on to describe as “music made with ideas.”\(^{49}\)

From this perspective, it becomes apparent that the works of several composers have been primarily concerned with the relationships between *music* and *ideas/concepts*. The example of Schoenberg has already been mentioned. Another important example is Mauricio Kagel, whose instrumental “musical theatre” [*instrumentals Theater*] traces its performative, audio-visual heritage, somewhat influenced by John Cage and the Fluxus movement, to forerunners such as Schoenberg and Stravinsky.\(^{50}\) The current revival of interest in “composed theatre” also has its roots in the same tradition.\(^{51}\) Within the broader domains of *experimental music* and *contemporary music theatre*, there are many works which are, above all else, vehicles for the *presentation* and/or *realisation* of ideas and concepts.

Although they don’t use the term “conceptual music,” a number of authors have recognised that music can be *about* ideas and concepts of various kinds (and *vice versa*). I have already discussed the trilogy of books by Lawrence Kramer\(^{52}\) (Chapter 1).

Two other book-length studies of the theme *ideas in/as music*, are Michael Spitzer’s *Music as Philosophy* (2006),\(^{53}\) and Mark Evan Bonds’ *Music as Thought* (2006).\(^{54}\)

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\(^{46}\) Ibid.
\(^{49}\) Ibid., 209.
\(^{52}\) Kramer, *Interpreting Music: Kramer, Expression and Truth; Kramer, Thought of Music*.
Spitzer discusses the Hegelian logic of “concept” which Theodor Adorno claimed to have found in Beethoven’s “middle period.” Bonds also concerns himself with Beethoven, specifically with “the process by which purely instrumental music – music without a text and without any suggestion of an external program – came to be perceived as a vehicle of ideas.” The discussions given by Spitzer and Bonds are often illuminating and do indeed deal with the overall subject of conceptual music, as I have defined it. However, their approaches are historically and critically discursive, eschewing any explicit conceptual frameworks or over-arching models. So, their books are not directly useful for developing an integrated interpretive model for the exegesis of conceptual music.

This brief discussion explains why, in Part III, I am able identify music-based works drawn from a vast and eclectic range of eras and styles, and still claim them to be examples of “conceptual music,” i.e. because they are primarily concerned with ideas and concepts. As we shall see there, many of these examples rely directly on one or more of the “strategies for conceptualisation” identified by Lehmann, i.e. visualisation, theatricalisation and semanticisation (which I take to mainly mean the use of spoken or written texts and paratexts).

In Chapter 4, I consider how the notion of theatricalisation can be extended to encompass a “theatre of music” which does not necessarily need to be actualised in a physical performance, but can also be virtual, or even “enacted” entirely in the mind. There I shall also introduce the metaphor of a “conceptual spotlight.” I use this metaphor as an anchoring device in my interpretive model, to explain how artists and composers adopt different modes of “shifting” certain types of ideas and concepts into the main arena of an audience’s attention.

55 Spitzer, *Music as Philosophy*, 44.
3.5 Conceptual Listening

In the previous section we saw that the label “conceptual” is not often used to refer to a particular style or genre of music. However, it has been applied by two English-speaking scholars, working independently, to describe a way of hearing and making sense of music. The two scholars in question are Mark DeBellis and Stefan Koelsch. The next two sub-sections consider each of them in turn.

3.5.1 Mark DeBellis – Music & Conceptual Hearing

In his book *Music and Conceptualization* (1995), 58 Mark DeBellis talks of a “conceptual” way of hearing music, equating it with a syntactical level of cognition. DeBellis argues that “the way an ordinary listener, untrained in music theory, hears [non-verbal] music is nonconceptual.” 59 He goes on to claim that non-conceptual hearing “is to be contrasted with that of the trained music analyst, whose hearing is typically conceptual and theory laden; musical training thus characteristically advances one’s listening from a nonconceptual to a conceptual level.” 60

DeBellis is at pains to clarify that his focus “is not a study of the representational content of music, but a study of the content of mental representations of music. Music may represent storms, Adam’s fall from grace, or locomotives, but this semantic dimension of music is not ... [his] topic. It is rather the cognition of music, considered more or less syntactically, and the description of that cognition.” 61

He is also careful to state that “It does not follow from this, of course, that the ordinary listener’s hearing is entirely nonconceptual, that it involves the employment of no concepts whatever. The claim is merely that the ordinary listener’s representation of

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59 Ibid., 1.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., 1-2, italics added.
some musical events and properties, of which scale degree is a salient example, fails to be conceptual."62

Naomi Cumming, working within a Peircean semiotic framework, accepts DeBellis’ distinction between non-conceptual and conceptual modes of listening. She emphasises that even though “ordinary listeners do not understand music in a ‘conceptual’ manner, [this] does not prevent them from understanding musical signs which do not depend on an explicit reference to rule-governed (and verbally described) interpretants.”63

DeBellis’ model has been questioned by some commentators.64 Perhaps the most trenchant objection is given by Michael Spitzer in his book *Metaphor and Musical Thought* (2004). Spitzer certainly accepts that music can be listened to conceptually, but defends a kind of conceptualisation that transcends rationality. He opposes both DeBellis’ model and *inter alia* some of the default assumptions of conceptual metaphor theory, because they “do violence to ... [the] artistic particularity” of the aesthetic object which is music.65 Spitzer “strongly dispute[s] DeBellis’s thesis that there is a sharp discontinuity between theoretically informed listeners and listeners with no technical knowledge of music. Such a separation is based on the objectivist myth that musical structure is abstract, whereas it is really continuous with ordinary people’s bodily experience.”66 The following passage, with reference to Adorno, sums up Spitzer’s position:

> Although, on the one side, music’s truth content is that it exemplifies a mode of conceptless cognition – a higher kind of rationality that transcends concepts – it nonetheless mimics the workings of concepts and language ... This mimesis is played out in the apparent musical logic of thematic development, as well as the dialectic of musical form and content, which could be thought to mirror the interplay of concepts and percepts. ... Conceptualization is lifted up to the higher dimension of aesthetic

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66 Ibid., 79.
experience, from which perspective reason itself appears all too human ... Music mimes concepts all the better to resist (‘critique’) them. The analogy between music and concept must be grasped, then, ‘in terms both of the ineluctability of this mimesis and of music’s attempt to escape it’. 67

The key point to emerge from these passages is that, despite their differences, both DeBellis and Spitzer allow for a mode of musical listening which is referred to as “conceptual.” Also, they both agree that some musical experiences can be “non-conceptual.” The main definitional difference between Spitzer and DeBellis is whether or not the opposition between conceptual and non-conceptual modes of listening is distinct and clearly marked (as DeBellis would have it), or blurred and substantially over-lapping (as Spitzer contends). On this point, I tend to side with Spitzer, for two reasons. Firstly, I am persuaded by the arguments of those philosophers who contend that hard-and-fast ontological and categorical distinctions, when pressed to their limits, inevitably expose their previously hidden contradiction. Such, for example, is the view of philosophers such as Hegel68, Nietzsche69, probably Heraclitus70, and in a more nuanced manner, Charles Sanders Peirce.71 It seems as if the universe – whether physical or mental – is inherently “fuzzy,” in at least some ways, to some irreducible degree. Secondly, as discussed in the next sub-section, some evidence from the cognitive sciences seems to indicate that, while different modes of musical listening may be more or less dominant for an individual subject at different points in time, these modes are inherently interdependent and always operate concurrently to a greater or lesser extent.

To conclude this sub-section, note that for Spitzer, following Adorno, the non-conceptual listening experience may be more profound or transcendent than the conceptual. This is a point on which DeBellis is silent. While the ineffable in music is an important and long-standing theme in musicology, further discussion of it is outside the scope of this thesis.

### 3.5.2 Stefan Koelsch – Musical Meaning & Cognitive Studies

In his book *Brain & Music* (2012), Stefan Koelsch presents a model aimed at synthesising a large corpus of research findings in the neuroscience of music. According to Koelsch, *musical meaning* is one of eight domains of cognitive activity in the human psychology of music. Musical meaning itself can be sub-divided into three main categories – *extra-musical, intra-musical*, and *musicogenic*. Koelsch refers to the extra-musical dimension as *conceptual*, while both the intra-musical and musicogenic dimensions are considered to be *non-conceptual*. Extra-musical and musicogenic categories are further divided into three sub-categories each. Koelsch’s model of the domain of musical meaning can be summarised as shown in Fig. 3.1.

![Table 3.1: The Dimensions of Musical Meaning According to Stefan Koelsch](image)

*Figure 3.1 The Dimensions of Musical Meaning According to Stefan Koelsch (adapted by the present author, extending Table 10.1 in Koelsch, Brain & Music, 157). Reproduced with kind permission of Stefan Koelsch.*

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72 Authors who have considered the topic of music and ineffability include Jankélévitch, *Music and the Ineffable*; Beate Kutschke, “Music and Other Sign Systems,” *Music Theory Online*, 20, no. 4 (2014).
74 The full model of all eight domains is summarised in ibid., 250, Table 13.1.
Koelsch’s terminology has resonances with the two-category model of musical meaning articulated by Leonard Meyer in several books.\(^75\) Like Meyer before him, Koelsch emphasises that, in real-world situations, musical meaning typically involves multiple dimensions operating together.\(^76\) I would go a little further. Many – but by no means all – scholars argue in favour of the cognitive penetrability of perception. This view holds that lower levels of human cognitive processing – sensation and perception – are able to be permeated downwards and influenced by processes operating at higher levels of conception. It is beyond my scope to enter into the details of this much-debated topic.\(^77\) Suffice to say that, in my view, the boundaries between different layers of any model of human cognition are systemically real – indeed, they are essential for a realistic biological model\(^78\) – while also being permeable in both directions.

I find Koelsch’s model to be particularly useful as a scientifically-grounded springboard for the further development of an interpretive model that is well-suited to the exegetical challenges I shall tackle in this thesis. This starts to become apparent in Chapter 4, where I compare DeBellis’ model with Koelsch’s, and recognise the common ground that exists between them.

\(^75\) Leonard B. Meyer, *Emotion and Meaning in Music* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 32-40. Leonard B. Meyer, *Music, the Arts, and Ideas: Patterns and Predictions in Twentieth-Century Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 6. Specifically, Meyer distinguished between two modes of musical meaning, which he variously labelled (1) designative/referential/extra-musical and (2) non-designative/non-referential/embodied. For Meyer, designative meanings in music “refer to the extramusical world of concepts, actions, emotional states, and character.” (Meyer, *Emotion and Meaning*, 1, emphasis added.) Importantly, Meyer argued against the fallacious either/or opposition which others had attempted to impose in debates about musical meaning. Nevertheless, his primary interest was non-referential meaning. He devoted little attention to referential meaning, a topic which he acknowledged “would require a separate study of its own” (2). To my knowledge, Meyer never employed the adjective “conceptual” to refer to “extra-musical” meaning. However, in other respects, Meyer’s distinction between “referential” and “non-referential” meaning in music is evidently an early formulation of the high-level distinction between “conceptual” and “non-conceptual,” a line of thought later elaborated upon by Koelsch, who refers to Meyer’s terminology at various points, e.g. *Brain & Music*, 158, 171, 176-77

\(^76\) Ibid., 157.


\(^78\) Here again I reflect the arguments of Stanley Salthe (discussed in Chapter 1) who claims, I think persuasively, that models of real biological systems cannot be reduced to a single homogenous system of processes, but must always be made up of at least three distinguishable sub-systems in a hierarchical relationship. The sub-systems are able to exchange information across their permeable boundaries, but are nevertheless qualitatively and irreducibly different from each other. See Salthe, *Evolving Hierarchical Systems*; also, Stanley N. Salthe, *Development and Evolution: Complexity and Change in Biology* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).
3.5 Summing Up

In this Chapter, I have reviewed a range of prior uses of the term “conceptual” in relation to music. I have focused on recent academic and practitioner literature, in English and German. This review found that, as a stylistic or generic label, “conceptual music” appears only rarely in English-language contexts. In recent years, “konzeptueller Musik” (and related terms) have come into prominence in German musicological publications. In all cases, English and German, where “conceptual music” is used to describe a musical style or genre, there is an explicit association with Conceptual Art movements of the sixties and later. While such usages and associations are not inconsistent with the definition of “conceptual music” that I have put forward, they do not represent the full scope of the label as I use it in this thesis.

A different use of “conceptual,” as a way of listening to music, has been proposed by two scholars – Mark DeBellis and Stefan Koelsch – working independently. For my purposes, their approaches are a thought-provoking starting point for the interpretive model I shall develop in Part II. As a preliminary step towards this goal, in Chapter 4, I show that the details of their terminological approaches are fundamentally in agreement.
Part II

Methodology: Developing an Interpretive Model
### Part I

**Defining the Problem**

(Chapter 1)

- **Main Point Discussed:** no vocabulary for exegesis of “conceptual music”
- **Key Author(s):** Lawrence Kramer, Hegel

**Conceptual Art Context**

(Chapter 2)

- **Main Point Discussed:** public perceptual object
- **Key Author:** Jeffrey Strayer

**Prior Use of “Conceptual Music”**

(Chapter 3)

- **Main Point Discussed:** infrequently used in English, stronger precedents in German
- **Key Author:** n/a

### Part II

**Methodology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three-Level Hierarchy (Salthe)</th>
<th>Interpretive Model Developed in this Thesis</th>
<th>Key Author</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>higher-level (Chapter 7)</td>
<td>systems perspective</td>
<td>Juri Lotman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focal-level (Chapter 6)</td>
<td>discourse perspective (poetics, hermeneutics)</td>
<td>Paul Ricoeur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-level (Chapter 5)</td>
<td>process perspective</td>
<td>Charles Sanders Peirce</td>
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</table>

**Problem, Definitions & Context**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Problem, Definitions &amp; Context</th>
<th>Main Point Discussed</th>
<th>Key Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior Use of “Conceptual Music” (Chapter 3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conceptual Art Context (Chapter 2)</td>
<td>public perceptual object</td>
<td>Jeffrey Strayer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Part III

**Interpreting Works of Conceptual Music**

(Chapters 9 to 14)

### Part IV

**Conclusions & Directions for Further Research**

(Chapter 15)
Chapter 4

A Preliminary Model of Musical Meaning

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present a simple model of musical meaning, as a starting point for further development.

Firstly, in Section 4.2, I synthesise the terminology of Mark DeBellis and Stefan Koelsch (Chapter 3) into a three-part schema which models how humans make meaningful sense of musical listening experiences.

Secondly, in Section 4.3, I develop an important extension to the basic schema presented in Section 4.2. I show that it is possible for an artist to take any or all aspects of that artist’s hitherto private or subjective engagement with a work-in-progress, and to represent such aspects publicly to an audience, with the conscious intention that they are also integral to reception of the work as a whole, and are intended to be interpreted conceptually. I introduce the theatrical metaphor of a “conceptual spotlight” in order to help visualise the attentional shifts involved.

Arrived at from this direction, this conclusion may be somewhat unexpected, possibly seen to be in apparent conflict with any previously assumed distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual. However, a moment’s reflection confirms that there is no fundamental contradiction. It is rather an issue of acknowledging the ever-present potential for self-reflexivity in processes of interpretation and re-interpretation over time, and the qualitatively different roles of artist and audience in art-world contexts. Indeed, as we shall see, many artists and composers make precisely this type of move, presenting what was once non-conceptual as conceptual. In other words, the schema that I articulate in this chapter simply reflects a longstanding and common practice in the art-world. I shall take this schema, and its implications, forward into subsequent chapters. It is the main foundational “cornerstone” underpinning the interpretive model that I shall progressively elaborate in Part II.
4.2 Synthesising DeBellis’ and Koelsch’s Models into a Single Framework

From the discussion in Chapter 3, it is apparent that DeBellis’ category of conceptual listening is more or less aligned to the dimension which Koelsch labels “intra-musical.” Yet, DeBellis expressly states that he is not concerned with what Koelsch labels “extra-musical.” Thus, these two authors evidently use the terms “conceptual” and “non-conceptual” in slightly different ways. Nevertheless, their points of difference are not great and their models do not seem to me to be fundamentally opposed. Fig. 4.1 displays both frameworks side by side. Note that I have reversed the order of Koelsch’s three main categories, placing musicogenic on the left-hand side. This is intended to align to the model of ideas/concepts developed in Chapter 1, where “ideas” – as “personal,” non-conceptual modes of thought – are shown on the left of Fig. 1.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DeBellis</th>
<th>non-conceptual</th>
<th>conceptual or non-conceptual *</th>
<th>[not in scope]</th>
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<td>conceptual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>musicogenic</td>
<td>extra-musical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical</td>
<td>emotional</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>[not further divided]</td>
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Figure 4.1 A Comparison of DeBellis’ and Koelsch’s Usage of “Conceptual” in Musical Meaning

From Fig. 4.1, it is apparent that a reconciliation of Koelsch’s and DeBellis’ models can be simply achieved, in just two moves –

- Firstly, consider the intermediate category of “intra-musical” in Koelsch’s framework. DeBellis claims that “intra-musical” relationships can be perceived or experienced either conceptually or non-conceptually, depending on one’s level of musical training. Such a possibility is not considered by Koelsch. However, I agree with DeBellis that many musically-trained listeners are able to hear and instantly conceptualise the musico-theoretical design of a piece (e.g. its chord progressions, interval sequences).
Secondly, DeBellis expressly excludes a consideration of “representational content” in his model. I see no good reason to exclude such extra-musical content from a more general framework, one which is aimed at accommodating all “conceptual” dimensions of musical experience. Indeed, it seems to me that, by excluding “representational content” from his scope, DeBellis has blinkered himself to a recognition that musicogenic modes of listening can also be experienced conceptually by appropriately trained or perceptive listeners (e.g. music psychologists). Or, putting it another way, and retaining Koelsch’s terminology, it is possible for some listeners to self-reflexively contemplate the non-conceptual aspects – musicogenic and intra-musical – of their musical experience and thereby simultaneously translate (or re-present) them as a meaningful event in the conceptual realm.\footnote{A similar point is made by Leonard Meyer, in Emotion \& Meaning, 38-39. Notice, in passing, that the practice of “active listening” to music as a kind of “wordless rhetoric” – discussed by Mark Evan Bonds in his books – is an example of conceptual listening of the “intra-musical” type, in which ideas from a non-musical domain (classical rhetoric) are translated to have musical correspondences. See: Bonds, Music as Thought. Also, Mark Evan Bonds, Wordless Rhetoric: Musical Form and the Metaphor of Oration (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).}

With these two moves, I propose a consolidated model of musical listening as illustrated in Fig. 4.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-conceptual</th>
<th>non-conceptual</th>
<th>conceptual</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>musicogenic</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>extra-musical</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.2. Consolidated Model of Three Modes of Musical Meaning

In Fig. 4.2, I have dispensed with DeBellis’ conditional characterisation of the intra-musical as either non-conceptual or conceptual depending on musical training. Instead, I suggest that only the extra-musical domain is inherently conceptual, and vice versa. However, as discussed above, it is possible for at least some listeners to self-reflectively translate aspects of non-conceptual meaning into the conceptual domain. In recognition of the debates surrounding cognitive penetrability (see Section 3.5.2 above), I allow for the possibility of bi-directional information flows across the permeable boundaries.
between the three high-level categories in the consolidated model shown in Fig. 4.2. This possibility is illustrated by the inclusion of the horizontal arrows in Fig. 4.3, representing the flow of musical meanings from one domain to another, and back again.²

![Figure 4.3](image)

**Figure 4.3** Expanding Fig. 4.2 to Explicitly Show the Possibility of Bi-Directional Information Flows Between the Three High-Level Categories of Musical Meaning

Of course, both Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3 are artificial abstractions. They conveniently enable us to focus analytical attention on specific aspects of an indivisible whole, as if everything else can be legitimately “bracketed” or temporarily ignored.³

Finally, note that, I have chosen to not explicitly show Koelsch’s further divisions, i.e. of *extra-musical* into *iconic*, *indexical*, and *symbolic*, and of *musicogenic* into *physical*, *emotional*, and *personal*. To be clear, I consider that these lower-level tripartite divisions are valid, in light of the semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce (see Chapter 5 and Appendix F). Indeed, the *intra-musical* category could also be plausibly sub-divided into three, from a Peircean perspective. However, such lower-level distinctions – always implicit – are not essential to the interpretive model that I am developing and will not be pursued further in this thesis.

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² For the sake of simplicity, I shall sometimes refrain from including all the arrows in Fig. 4.3 in later diagrams which extend this basic schema. Nevertheless, they should always be assumed to be implicit.

To recap the argument so far, the essential point is that, following Koelsch, I have identified the *conceptual* with the *extra-musical* domain of musical meaning.\(^4\)

### 4.3 Extending the Model – The “Theatre of Music”

The model in Fig. 4.3 is applicable to the listening experience of any human individual, albeit an experience so far considered in isolation from the surrounding context or any non-musical elements which may also be present. In real art-world situations, of course, contextual factors and other media are invariably also at play. As a step towards a more realistic model, let us now turn to consider the differentiated roles of artists and audiences in the presentation and reception of creative works. Except in the most extreme and deliberate indeterminate works, the artist occupies a privileged position *vis-à-vis* the audience. Specifically, it is the artist who determines precisely what information about a work is (initially) presented for apprehension by an audience, as well as the means of its presentation. Even for works at the extreme limits of indeterminacy, the artist is still the one who ultimately specifies the initiating rules that govern what is eventually presented or experienced.

Fig 4.4 attempts to illustrate this creative flexibility available to the artist. The artist has the choice of presenting *any* of the dimensions of musical meaning operating within his/her overall conception of a “work” as one or more of the elements that constitute a work. Depending on the artist’s decisions, one or all of the dimensions of musical meaning may be consciously invoked in presenting a work to audiences. This is indicated by the three vertical arrows in Fig. 4.4. In *conceptual music*, the artist intends to focus the audience’s attention on the *extra-musical* dimension of meaning.

Regardless of the artist’s intentions and deliberate best efforts, an audience may remain unaware of, or choose to ignore, some meaningful dimensions of a work, even if presented and made accessible. In such cases, the work is interpreted by an audience

\(^4\) A precedent for this equivalence – albeit not employing precisely the same terminology – can be found in the writings of Leonard Meyer (see Chapter 3).
largely in terms of the other dimensions. In the end, it is always the human agents in an audience who ultimately interpret the work.\(^5\)

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**Figure 4.4**  *The Artist Chooses Which Aspect(s) of Musical Meaning to Foreground in Presenting a Work. However, the Audience Always Has the Final Choice of Where to Focus.*

So, we can safely conclude that the role of the artist – and the actions available to her/him – is qualitatively different, in some important respects, from that of the audience. Once we contemplate this further, it becomes apparent that the artist has the option of making *self-referential moves* which can feed back into the work as it takes shape and is presented. Specifically, an artist is free to take aspects of what was previously personal, hidden and non-conceptual in their own experience and understanding of a work-in-progress, and “package” these aspects – as a deliberately *conceptual* dimension of the work – *for public presentation* to an audience.\(^6\) In music, a

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\(^5\) Taken to an extreme, the recognition of an audience’s privileged role in the interpretation of works led to the postmodern elimination of the creators of texts. This was most famously formulated by Roland Barthes in his essay “The Death of the Author,” included in Roland Barthes, *Image Music Text*, trans. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana Press, 1977): 142-48. At its limits, such a view is logically untenable, as many commentators have cogently observed. See, for example, Nicholas Zurbrugg, *Critical Vices: The Myths of Postmodern Theory*, with commentary by Warren Burt (Australia: G+B Arts, 2000): esp. 17-40; Nicholas Zurbrugg, *The Parameters of Postmodernism* (London: Routledge, 1993): esp.16-18.

\(^6\) The point of difference between artist and audience hinges on who has the “first move” in presenting something publicly, not on who has the option of self-reference. Of course, an audience member is also able to interpret...
composer may choose to give an audience some insight into the particular intra-musical processes or music-theoretical systems underpinning a given work. Or, they may choose to keep such aspects of a work’s technical scaffolding hidden, as far as possible, from public scrutiny. The key point is that, if the artist or composer chooses, formerly personal and non-conceptual elements can be translated into “ideas” and “concepts” which are also able to be presented publicly, in addition to any immediately perceivable material surfaces or sounds. In this way, previously non-conceptual elements, once “shifted” into the extra-musical domain, are able to be understood as conceptual dimensions integral to the presented work as a whole. This act of “shifting” is, of course, a creatively interpretive or hermeneutical gesture, which makes explicit that which was formerly only apprehended subliminally, intuitively or non-conceptually.⁷

Metaphorically, we can picture the extra-musical domain as a particular area located on the overall “theatrical stage” of musical meanings. In conceptual music, it is this extra-musical area to which a composer wishes to direct an audience’s attention, shining a “spotlight” on it, as it were. The spotlight itself remains fixed. In conceptual music, it is always directed onto the extra-musical area of the attentional “stage.” However, like performers and actors on a theatrical stage, various ideas and concepts can be moved — or “shifted” — in and out of the spotlight (Fig. 4.5).

something that has been presented to her/him from a self-referential perspective (although that perspective may remain private and never be communicated socially for inter-subjective validation).

⁷ Roger Savage observes that many musicologists characterise the project of musical hermeneutics as the means of “spanning the gap between a work’s self-referential or so-called intramusical meaning and a meaning that by convention has been defined as extramusical.” See Roger W. H. Savage, *Hermeneutics and Music Criticism* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 4, emphasis added. His book argues that musicological approaches which claim the (absolute) music is best understood either as (1) ineffably intramusical (the romantic/modern view of absolute music) or (2) unavoidably and complicitly extramusical (the postmodernist or deconstructive view of “new” musicology) are both flawed extremes of an undesirable “disciplinary divide.” (69, 71). Notably, to articulate a hermeneutic musicology which acknowledges the truths contained in both extremes, Savage draws heavily upon Paul Ricoeur. As Richard Kerney has aptly put it, Ricoeur was “the inveterate mediator, someone who navigated and negotiated transits between rival positions.” See Richard Kearney, “Paul Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of Translation,” *Research in Phenomenology*, 37 (2007): 147. Ricoeur himself described his work in terms of elaborating “fragile mediations” between the “strong polarities” of “legitimate antagonisms.” Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics: Writings and Lectures, Volume 2*: 3. Also relevant in this context is Ricoeur’s own late return to his earlier concerns with phenomenological — or tangible — modes of understanding, as distinct from intellectual or linguistic modes. See, for example, Richard Kearney, “Thinking the Flesh with Paul Ricoeur,” in *Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Paul Ricoeur: Between Text and Phenomenon*, ed Scott Davidson and Marc-Antoine Vallée eds. (n.p.: Springer, 2016), 40. Elsewhere, Kearney states that, with Ricoeur: “It is not then a question of opposing ‘subjective’ narration to ‘objective’ explanation. It is a question of appreciating that explanation without narration is ultimately inhuman, just as imagination without hope of explanation runs the risk of blind irrationalism.” See Richard Kearney, *On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2004), 103. Charles Reagan makes a similar point when he says that “Ricoeur’s goal is to develop a hermeneutic of the self that bridges the gap between the cogito and the anti-cogito.” See Charles E. Reagan, “Personal Identity,” in *Ricoeur as Another: The Ethics of Subjectivity*, ed. Richard A. Cohen and James L. Marsh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002): 5. I return to discuss Ricoeur in considerable detail in Chapter 6. However, as my primary concern is with the conceptual or extramusical dimensions of musical meaning, I do not address the phenomenological aspects of Ricoeur’s philosophy and their implications for musicology.
Figure 4.5 Conceptual Music Shines the Attentional Spotlight on the Extra-Musical Domain

The metaphor of an attentional “spotlight” resonates with the notion of a theatre of music, briefly suggested by James Tenney in the closing paragraph of A History of ‘Consonance’ and ‘Dissonance’ (1988). To a far greater extent than has hitherto been recognized, the Western musical enterprise has been characterized by an effort to understand musical sounds, not merely to manipulate them – to comprehend ‘nature,’ as much as to ‘conquer’ her – and thus to illuminate the musical experience rather than simply to impose upon it either a wilful personal ‘vision’ or a timid imitation of inherited conventions, habits, assumptions, or ‘assertions.’ In this enterprise, both composers and theorists have participated, although in different, mutually complementary ways – the former dealing with what might be called the ‘theatre’ of music, the latter with its theory.

In a lecture paper, Richard Vella develops Tenney’s thought-provoking suggestion and expounds upon the etymological roots of two key words: “theatre” and “text.” He draws upon the rich polysemy inherent in these terms to suggest an expanded – or “inverted” – notion of a music theatre/theatre of music. This is a theatre which “is essentially about … the viewing (perceiving) of a thesis, theory, metathesis via music.

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9 Ibid., 103, emphasis in original.
10 Vella, “Music/theatre as a theatre of ideas.”
(action in sound) and its relationship to the text (the overall web) [of all its inter-woven elements and contextual associations].”\textsuperscript{11} In short, for Vella, “music theatre is … music with a thesis (an argument).”\textsuperscript{12}

The parallels with conceptual music, as I have defined it, are evident. In a theatre of music, the aesthetical spotlight is focused on a thesis, argument or point of view represented (perhaps as a narrative) in a music-based medium. This may include music alone (e.g. absolute music, as well as instrumental program music) or multimodal genres, such as opera and film music. The connection to conceptual music hinges on the recognition that concepts are amongst the handful of essential raw ontological materials required to formulate and represent all such expository forms (Appendix C.5). Regardless of medium, meaningful “utterances” – even deliberate attempts at artistic incoherence or anti-meaning – cannot be articulated (or predicated) without the use of concepts.

Vella comments on the exegetical problem raised by the all-embracing notion of a theatre of music which he has sketched. He asks: “If everything can be perceived as a music theatre how can we begin to discuss it?”\textsuperscript{13} The interpretive model developed in this thesis offers one potential (and partial) answer to this question, viz. discussion becomes possible if we seek to discern – and name – qualitatively different modes of musical “theatricality,” through which distinctive types of thesis, argument or point of view are presented by practising artists and composers.\textsuperscript{14}

Referring to Figs. 4.4 and 4.5, conceptual music (as defined in this thesis) essentially and critically involves dimensions of musical meaning located in the conceptual/extra-musical domain at the right-hand side of the diagram. Thus, a composer who aims to make works of conceptual music is consciously and intentionally operating primarily in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 33, emphasis added.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 32.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 32.
\item \textsuperscript{14} This accords with the nature (and limits) of critical analysis and discourse in music, articulated by Leonard Meyer, who stated: “To understand the world, we must abstract from the ineffable uniqueness of stimuli by selecting and grouping, classifying and analysing. We must attend to some features of an object, person, or process rather than others – distinguishing (from some particular point of view) the essential from the accidental, the intrinsic from the incidental.” See Leonard Meyer, “On the Nature and Limits of Critical Analysis,” in \textit{Explaining Music: Essays and Explorations} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 3-4. This prescription was presciently written in 1973, before the then-emerging wave of postmodernist critique had attained its full force. The essay from which it is quoted still serves as a perceptive argument against the excesses of reductionism or the deconstructionist aversion to theorising.
\end{itemize}
this domain. Similarly, an audience member who apprehends a work as an example of conceptual music is consciously listening and interpreting musical meanings located in the same domain.\textsuperscript{15} This is illustrated in Fig. 4.6.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{conceptual_music_diagram.png}
\caption{Conceptual Music (as Defined in this Thesis) is Located in Extra-Musical Domain of Musical Meaning}
\end{figure}

In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I shall further elaborate the model in Fig. 4.6, to highlight other referential options – or conceptualising “shifts” – which are available to an artist or composer aiming to create works of conceptual music. This includes the option of reaching out, whether implicitly or explicitly, beyond any immediately personal perspectives, to her/his (and the audience’s) culture, in all its unruly complexity. This allows the artist to introduce literally any aspect of that culture as a conceptual element which can be intentionally identified as integral to a “work.”

\textsuperscript{15} I have already mentioned the possibility that a work intended by a composer as conceptual music may not be appreciated as such by audience. The inverse possibility might also occur, i.e. a work not intended by a composer to be conceptual might nevertheless be interpreted as such by an audience. This could occur either because the composer was unaware of the conceptual aspects of her/his work, or because conceptual dimensions became affixed to the world of a work at a later point, with or without the sanction or awareness of the composer. A classic example of the latter phenomenon is The Beatles’ song “Helter Skelter” (1968), which only acquired its tragic – but arguably unshakable – conceptual associations with the infamous Manson murders as a result of external events completely outside the control of its composer Paul McCartney.
4.4 Summing Up

In this Chapter, I have built on the term “conceptual,” referring to a way of listening to music, as proposed by two scholars – Mark DeBellis and Stefan Koelsch – working independently. I show that the details of their terminological approaches are fundamentally in agreement. Any differences can be readily brought into alignment in a three-part schema which I put forward. I equate the extra-musical dimension with the conceptual domain, a relatively uncontroversial move with well-established precedent. Importantly, I introduce the explanatory metaphor of a conceptual “spotlight” shining onto a stage on which a theatre of music is performed. In this way, the three-part schema developed in this Chapter (Figs. 4.3 and 4.4) becomes the point of departure for further development of the full interpretive model to be constructed in this thesis. The full model will involve three main “building blocks,” each aligned to Salthe’s three-level hierarchical model. The detailed development of these “building blocks” will be undertaken in Chapters 5 to 7. In Chapter 8, I bring everything together into a consolidated interpretive model.
### Part I

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### Part III

Interpreting Works of Conceptual Music (Chapters 9 to 14)

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### Part IV

Conclusions & Directions for Further Research (Chapter 15)
Chapter 5
Developing an Interpretive Model – I. A Process Perspective

5.1 Introduction

In this and the next two chapters, I progressively develop each of the three layers which make up the overall interpretive model for conceptual music. This chapter focuses on the lower-level of the three-layered hierarchy illustrated in Fig.1.3, i.e. the process perspective on how musical meanings are signified.

The discipline which investigates how meanings are conveyed and construed by virtue of signifying acts and associated processes is, of course, semiotics, the study of signs. Following Charles Sanders Peirce, we can define semiotics as the “formal science of signs” and meaning as the “action of signs.”

The scale and interdisciplinary reach of contemporary semiotics is immense and continues to grow. It is well beyond my scope to attempt any systematic overview here. Instead, in this chapter, I draw selectively on the semiotic theory of Peirce to introduce some general principles and specific approaches that will be useful in subsequent chapters. Unlike most prior applications of Peircean ideas to music (see Section 5.6 below), my primary focus in this thesis – i.e. the discourse level – does not require any micro-analyses of brief musical passages using, for example, his detailed sign typologies. Thus, while I will give a brief sketch of Peirce’s sign classifications and ontological categories, it is his mature process-oriented philosophy, in concert with the most fundamental sign relation, which is more useful for my purposes.

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5.2 The Development of Peirce’s Semiotic Theory

Perhaps no theory of human sign use – semiosis – has been as influential over the last century as that of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). In this chapter, I briefly describe those aspects of Peirce’s semiotic theory that are needed for incorporation into my interpretive model. Peirce continued to develop his thinking on semiotics over the course of his intellectual life (see Appendix F). To be sure, there is a continuity of key ideas over time. However, to talk of a single Peircean model of semiotics would be misleading. Instead, Peirce’s thought is usually described in terms of three distinct periods: the Early, Interim, and Final Accounts (Appendix F).

I do not have the space here to review the many terminological problems which have been aired in the extensive secondary literature on Peirce. I shall simply adopt the terminology and diagrammatic conventions that I consider to be useful and defensible, erring towards simplicity wherever possible.

While his terminology may have shifted somewhat over time, Peirce never abandoned his most fundamental model of signification. In this, he distinguished three essential elements – the sign, object, and interpretant. Also, in his Early Account, Peirce had already distinguished three types of sign – icon, index, and symbol. He subsequently expanded his sign typology into more complex classificatory schemes: the Interim

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3 Peirce also used representamen to refer to what he later called “sign.” I am content to follow Peirce’s own later view that the term “representamen” is clumsy and unnecessary. “I formerly preferred the word representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word.” SS:193, italics in original. This is a much-discussed issue amongst Peirce scholars. See, for example: Mats Bergman, *Peirce’s Philosophy of Communication: The Rhetorical Underpinnings of the Theory of Signs* (London: Continuum, 2011): 77-79, 95-97.

4 Ogden and Richards used referent to mean Peirce’s object. See Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (New York: Harcourt, 1923): 11-12. Peirce himself sometimes also used the term ground for object (e.g. CP 2.228). We do not need to pursue these finer points of Peirce’s terminology here.
Account comprising ten sign types, a version with twenty-eight classes of signs, and the sketchy Final Account, involving sixty-six sign types. These later classifications were articulated in explicit connection with another cornerstone of Peirce’s emerging philosophy, i.e. that only three basic ontological categories are required to characterise not only the essential qualities of signification, but of all reality. He labelled these three most fundamental universal categories *firstness*, *secondness*, and *thirdness* (see Appendix F.5 for further discussion).

Peirce’s many neologisms and idiosyncratic terminology can act as frustrating obstacles to anyone seeking to understand his model of semiotics. Fortunately, I do not need to draw on the intricacies of the Interim and Final classifications of sign types. That’s because my emphasis is on the *dynamic, process-oriented* aspects of Peirce’s philosophical system, rather than an attempt to apply his detailed categorical distinctions as an analytical taxonomy. In any case, I agree with Vincent Colapietro who argues that Peirce’s categories should be viewed as a heuristic device, not “as a static taxonomic but rather as a dynamic, interrogative framework.” Also, a static interpretation of Peirce’s categorical triads can lead to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness (see Section 5.7 below).

In this thesis, I shall rely only on the two most basic of Peirce’s classificatory schemes, i.e. *sign/object/interpretant* and *icon/index/symbol*. These two schemes were never superseded in Peirce’s more detailed accounts, merely elaborated. The next two sections describe these two triadic groups in more detail.

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5.3 Sign/Object/Interpretant

For Peirce, a sign is always something that is to be interpreted as a reference to an intended object, which itself may or may not be immediately or physically apparent to all interlocutors at a given moment of apprehension. Of critical importance, he considered the interpretant as an entity that is immediately able to be taken up as a new sign, available for further interpretation. In his early formulations, Peirce envisaged semiosis to be a continuing process of interpretation and re-interpretation, as each new interpretant becomes the next sign in a progressive chain. He described this process in the following definition of a sign:

Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum.9

The triadic nature of the sign relation is essential. Peirce’s definition of “sign” is inextricably tied to the participation of all three entities involved in the relation – i.e. sign, object, and interpretant. This irreducibility has led some authors to define the triadic relation itself as the Peircean “sign.” However, as T. L. Short has argued, such a conflation of terminology is not justified.

Writers who suppose that Peirce held the sign to be a triad or a triadic relation, rather than one relatum of a triadic relation, must then invent a third part or third relatum, in addition to the sign’s object and its interpretant. This they usually call a ‘sign vehicle’. They then identify a sign either as vehicle plus object plus interpretant or as the relation that binds the three. But there is no basis for this in any Peircean text. The ‘sign vehicle’ is the sign, as Peirce conceived of signs, and the object and interpretant are other things, distinct from the sign.10

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9 CP 2.303
10 Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 19. The term “sign vehicle” is not found in Peirce. Therefore, I shall avoid using it further in this thesis. One author who retains the notion of “sign-vehicle” is Atkin, Peirce, 131-32, 143-44, 233. As Short notes (Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 19, n. 6), and Atkin acknowledges (Peirce, 162, n. 8), the term “sign-vehicle” seems to originate with Charles Morris, and was never used by Peirce. See Charles Morris, “Signs, Language, and Behaviour [1946],” in Charles Morris, Writings on the General Theory of Signs (The Hague: Mouton, 1971): 96. The fact that some authors do use “sign-vehicle” in their discussion of Peirce reminds us of a self-evident point, of which Peirce himself was well aware, viz. not all qualities or aspects of a physical object which is taken to be a sign are necessarily relevant to its signifying function, at a particular point in time or in a given context. Examples are commonplace in experience. To give just one: The typographical style of a printed or hand-drawn arrow, indicating the way to a location, is typically of no importance to the intended interpretation. Unless some
Any static, two-dimensional diagram will, in some way, fall short of capturing the multi-dimensional and temporally dynamic nature of Peirce’s semiotic theory. Peirce himself was a constant advocate of diagrammatic thought. Illustrations often appear in his writings. Nevertheless, several aspects of Peirce’s conception of sign relationships and semiotic processes were presented only in words, without any supporting figures. This has left interpreters of Peirce largely free to invent their own diagrammatic representations. In Appendix F, I briefly review some of the different approaches found in the literature. For my purposes, a useful representation of the sign-object-interpretant relationship is as a tripod form shown in Fig. 5.1.

![Figure 5.1 Peirce’s Fundamental Sign-Object-Interpretant Relation](image)

5.4 Icon/Index/Symbol

From his earliest writings, Peirce distinguished three types of sign – icon, index, and symbol, differentiated by the nature of their relation to the object to which they refer. He retained this trichotomy throughout his life, writing as late as 1908 that it “is the one which I most frequently use.” In his Interim and Final Accounts, Peirce expanded his

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special circumstances apply, all that matters is the directionality of the arrow, something that is determined by a conventional relationship between the pointed arrowhead and the straight line of its shaft.


12 Peirce used the terms “refer” and “denote” to mean the relation of a sign to its object. EP 2.292.

13 CP 8.368
sign classification. But those later expansions need not detain us, as they are not required for my interpretive model.\textsuperscript{14}

In summary, Peirce’s three basic sign types are defined as shown in Fig. 5.2.


d | r | m
---|---|---
\textit{icon} | \textit{resemblance, similarity}\textsuperscript{15} | musical trill to mimic birdsong\textsuperscript{16} \\
\textit{index} | \textit{contiguity, causality, connection}\textsuperscript{17} | sounds indicating their physical cause (e.g. bells)\textsuperscript{18} \\
\textit{symbol} | \textit{convention, habit, rule of interpretation, law}\textsuperscript{19} | national anthems, leitmotifs\textsuperscript{20} \\

\textit{Figure 5.2 Peirce’s Three Basic Sign Types}

An important point to note is that, depending on context, any given sign may take on the qualities of \textit{any} of these “types.” In other words, the “type” of a sign is not forever fixed.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{14} Several authors have expressed a concern that applications of Peirce’s sign theory which do not go beyond his basic triad of icon/index/symbol are at risk of being too superficial, given the increased detail and richness of his later accounts. See, for example, Atkin, \textit{Peirce}, 126; James Elkins, “What does Peirce’s sign theory have to say to art history?” \textit{Culture, Theory, and Critique}, 44, no. 1 (2003): 5-22; Short, \textit{Peirce’s Theory of Signs}, ix. I agree that there is a lot more to Peirce’s mature model of semiotics than I am presenting in this chapter. However, my emphasis is on sign processes rather than detailed sign typologies. So, a discussion of, say, Peirce’s Interim sign classification would be largely a distraction which finds no subsequent development in the remainder of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{15} CP 2.276.


\textsuperscript{19} CP 2.307; EP 2:292.


\textsuperscript{21} For an example of how musical signs can change their types, see Cumming, \textit{The Sonic Self}, 90-91. The inherently dynamic nature of signs and signifying presents fundamental obstacles for anyone attempting to fully describe such constantly changing processes in linguistic or diagrammatic terms. See Floyd Merrell, \textit{Sign, Textuality, World} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 79-80.
Referring to the three universal categories mentioned above, Peirce considered that the three entities in the sign relation – *sign* (*representamen*), *object*, and *interpretant* – principally manifest the qualities of *firstness*, *secondness*, and *thirdness* respectively. Similarly, the sign types of *icon*, *index*, and *symbol* are aligned to the categories of *firstness*, *secondness*, and *thirdness* respectively. Fig. 5.3 expands Fig. 5.2 to show this correlation.

<table>
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<th>Type of Sign</th>
<th>Relation to Object Referred To</th>
<th>Universal Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>icon</td>
<td>resemblance, similarity</td>
<td>firstness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>index</td>
<td>contiguity, causality, connection</td>
<td>secondness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>symbol</td>
<td>convention, habit, rule of interpretation, law</td>
<td>thirdness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 5.3 Expansion of Fig. 5.2 to Include Peirce’s Universal Categories*

Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that there exists a broad alignment between Peirce’s sign classification and Roland Jakobson’s famous distinction between *metaphor* and *metonymy*. The latter two terms continue to be much used and debated in the contemporary literature of cognitive linguistics and related disciplines. Appendix G gives a brief review of the topic. It shows that, at the high-level (1) *metaphor* is an *iconic* sign relation, and (2) *metonymy* is *indexical*.

### 5.5 The Problem of “Infinite Semiosis” in Peirce’s Earlier Accounts

Many of Peirce’s writings show that he viewed semiosis as an infinite process. For example, in the passage already quoted above, he expressly states that each interpretant becomes a sign for a subsequent interpretant, “*ad infinitum.*”24 Other similar passages could be adduced:

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22 EP 2, 272-273 (1903)
24 CP 2.303.
A sign is not a sign unless it translates itself into another sign in which it is more fully developed.\(^{25}\)

There is no exception, therefore, to the law that every thought-sign is translated or interpreted in a subsequent one, unless it be that all thought comes to an abrupt and final end in death.\(^{26}\)

At the heights of postmodernism, many scholars – most famously Jacques Derrida and Umberto Eco – seized upon the potential for unlimited open-endedness implied by statements such as these. For example, consider this passage from Derrida’s *Of Grammatology* (1976 [1974]):

Peirce goes very far in the direction that I have called the de-construction of the transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign-to-sign. … The *representamen* functions only by giving rise to an *interpretant* that itself becomes a sign and so on to infinity.\(^{27}\)

Patrick Bouregois rightly observes that parody\(^{28}\) is the inescapable consequence of Derrida’s reading of Peirce:

… it is a misfocus in a Derridean context to be overly concerned with the distinction between productive or reproductive imagination since it makes no difference. What is important is the substitution. … the question of how to escape from parody cannot be asked because there is no escaping it. The imagination that is deconstructed into [a] parody of itself as an ongoing process of copying … There is no way out of the cave of mirrors for there is nothing outside of writing. All is text. … This is the deconstructive sense of philosophy at the boundary end, not in the sense of being completed, but of the postmodern order of perpetual allusion.\(^{29}\)

\(^{25}\) CP 5.594.  
\(^{26}\) CP 5.284, W2:224.  
T. L. Short also singles out the passage from Derrida quoted above and notes its subsequent reverberations in Umberto Eco’s theory of semiotics. However, as Short points out, while Eco’s model of “unlimited semiosis” can indeed be attributed to Peirce, it is not an adequate interpretation of Peirce’s later writings, in which the “flaws” of unlimited semiosis were corrected. Similarly, Albert Atkin discusses how, in his Final Account of signs, Peirce overcame the two problems of infinite semiosis associated with his Early and Interim accounts, viz. –

(1) the problem of the final sign – “how a sign comes to mean anything without an end to interpretation,” and

(2) the problem of the first sign – “how a sign can be about anything without a first immediate sign of an external object.”

The pivotal innovation which enabled Peirce to address these two problems was the introduction of a number of sub-types of object and interpretant. Atkin summarises Peirce’s Final Account as shown in Fig. 5.4.

30 Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 45.
31 Ibid., 45-59. See also, Short, “Development.”
32 Atkin, Peirce, 159.
33 Ibid.
With these additional sub-types, a more sophisticated model of continuing semiosis emerges. Specifically, Peirce now stipulated that semiotic processes, while potentially infinite, must nevertheless also be subject to two governing principles –

- they must have a *beginning* at some point in time; and
- they tend to *converge* towards a resting point – the so-called “Final Interpretant” – rather than spiralling out in an endless trajectory of complete arbitrariness and unconstrained relativism.

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34 Atkin, “Peirce’s Final Account,” 69.
35 Peirce did allow for the possibility that potentially infinite semiotic processes could nevertheless terminate with the death of all participants in the process.
36 The term “converge” is used here deliberately. As Ilya Farber discusses, Peirce was steadfast in the “assumption that inquiry must ultimately converge on true beliefs about reality.” Ilya Farber, “Peirce on Reality, Truth, and the Convergence of Inquiry at the Limit,” *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 41, no. 3 (2005): 541.
Even so, despite its name, the “Final Interpretant,” in the grand scheme of things, is still provisional. Like Hegel, Peirce allowed that all concepts, no matter how apparently stable, remain subject to potential future revision in the light of new information, unexpected events and discoveries.\textsuperscript{37}

Using the tripod diagrammatic form (Fig. 5.1), this Final Account of Peirce’s model of semiotic process can be illustrated as in Fig. 5.5. The tripod form can be readily deployed to represent links in a chain, showing signs becoming interpretants, which in turn become signs, and so on. In Fig. 5.5, the stipulation that there must be an initial sign associated with an “Immediate [Object] within the Sign”\textsuperscript{38} is reflected by the vertical dashed line, indicating that the semiotic process involves a necessary originating point situated in the material world.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{Figure 5.5 Combining Two Tripod Modules as Links in the Semiotic Chain}

\begin{quote}

\textsuperscript{38} EP 2.480. On Peirce’s notion of Immediate Object, see also Atkin, \textit{Peirce}, 159.

\textsuperscript{39} Arguably, the Immediate Object should be shown on the cognitive/conceptual side of the dashed line, as Peirce sometimes described the object as “a sort of idea.” (CP 2.228). This point of detail is not central to the key point in the present discussion, which is that the chain of interpretation must always begin with an originating sign in the material world. For the sake of simplicity, I shall show it as part of the sensory/perceptual domain.
\end{quote}
Peirce’s discussion of the Immediate Object is characteristically opaque. Nevertheless, as a solution to the “problem of the first sign,” it is reminiscent of Jeffrey Strayer’s notion of public perceptual object, discussed in Chapter 2. In other words, no matter how much conceptual distance is cognitively traversed in order to eventually arrive at a Final Interpretant, the interpretive journey must always begin with an originating event that involves the sensory/perceptual experience of a material object. Thus, I would suggest that Peirce’s initial sign, which he obscurely stated contains the Immediate Object “within” itself, can be equated to Strayer’s public perceptual object. I have illustrated this in Fig. 5.6.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5.6 Relating Strayer’s “Public Perceptual Object” to Peirce’s “Immediate Object”**

Of course, the chain of tripod forms can be extended indefinitely, while depicting the eventual convergence towards a Final Interpretant (Fig. 5.7).
Figure 5.7  Extending the Chain of Tripod Modules Converging Towards a Final Interpretant

The diagrams so far presented in this sub-section are, I think, useful adjuncts to the understanding of Peirce’s theories. However, they undoubtedly fall short of depicting the rich complexities likely to be found in most real-world situations. For example, it is only in “limit cases” – at the outermost limits of abstraction – that a single public perceptual object is presented to an audience for interpretation as a work of art or music (Chapter 2). More commonly, multiple material objects are presented, either concurrently in the same space/time location, or perhaps at different places and/or times. Indeed, even a conventional piece of music could be thought of as a temporal sequence of different audible events, i.e. public perceptual objects, revealed during the course of a performance. If we attempted to persevere using tripodic forms to illustrate more realistic cases, then the diagrams would quickly become unmanageable. This is apparent when we tackle a fairly rudimentary example, involving the synchronous presentation of a visual and a sonic “object,” followed later in time by the presentation of a text “object,” shown in Fig. 5.8.40

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40 Note that in Fig. 5.8 I have introduced the term “blended space,” which I have taken from conceptual metaphor theory.
Figure 5.8  A More Complex Example

Even so, Fig. 5.8 is still an artificially simple example. More realistic cases, if we attempted to illustrate them, would quickly expand into a visually overwhelming tangle of multiple intertwined semiotic processes. Some processes might interconnect at different points in time. Others may branch into two or more new “strands,” perhaps to subsequently re-connect again. New signs may be introduced as additional strands in the overall semiotic “mix,” as attention is directed to previously unrecognised or unavailable public perceptual objects. In music, this is commonplace. For example, a composer might introduce new leitmotifs at different times during a work, which subsequently go on to interact with each other, creating new interpretative possibilities which could not have been possible until all the relevant leitmotifs had first been established.

The discussion above alerts us to the potential limitations of any low-level model for explicating the processes of musical signification. Specifically, what is missing from this low-level perspective is the role of the interpreter and the pivotal importance of context in influencing the choice of plausible interpretations. The process model developed in this chapter has said nothing about who is interpreting. However, as Peirce often insisted, “a sign ... is something which stands to somebody for something in
some respect or capacity.”41 There needs to be an interpreting subject. Only then it becomes possible to state that “Nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign.”42

Here we find ourselves circling around what I consider to be the essential point to be gleaned from Peirce’s insights – the central importance of the interpretant, in all its stages.

From an exegetical or hermeneutic perspective, the problem always returns to: “What is this about (in this context and at this point in history)?” In Peircean terms, the question becomes: “What is the interpretant?” Or, more precisely: “What was the immediate interpretant at the point of origin, what is now the dynamic interpretant, and what can we plausibly say (if anything) about it as it continues to move forward, and perhaps converges towards a final interpretant?” Of course, it is possible that, from the outset, a work might very well be about many things, simultaneously. Certainly, what a work is about might – indeed, should be expected to – change over time. A work will very likely mean different things to different people, over time or over space. And, finally, there is always the possibility that unforeseen events may radically alter any previously traversed path of convergence towards a final interpretant – which is now suddenly superseded and no longer “final” – into a hitherto unforeseeable new trajectory.43

This inescapable polysemy – involving both uncertainty and under-determination, synchronically and diachronically – is the root cause of the riskiness which Kramer says is inherent in the interpretive act (see Chapter 1). This riskiness has caused many to adopt a studiously agnostic stance to the works of art and music placed before them, leading them to eschew the act of interpretation altogether. And yet, to interpret is precisely what Kramer argues we must do. Or, taking seriously his injunction to not only describe/address, but also to continue and transform, we who are in the audience find ourselves entrusted with the obligation to become co-creators of the “work”.

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41 CP 2.228, emphasis added.
42 CP 2.308.
43 I have already cited The Beatles’ “Helter Skelter” (1968) as an example of such an unexpected radical shift in the conceptual meaning associated with a work. See Chapter 4.
5.6 Prior Applications of Peirce’s Semiotic Theory to Music

A number of scholars have set out to apply different aspects of Peirce’s semiotic theory to music. The best-known examples are perhaps Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Naomi Cumming, Raymond Monelle, Vladimir Karbusicky, and Robert Hatten. To these names, we could add many others, such as Eero Tarasti, David Lidov, José Luiz Martinez, William Dougherty, Thomas Turino, Kelly Parker, and Felicia Kruse. Most of these authors concentrate primarily on Western art music of the Classical era.

Ben Curry gives a useful and thorough review of prior applications of Peirce by musicologists. Thus, there is no need to cover the same territory here. Glossing over the detailed differences between individual authors, and anticipating the terminology of Terrence Deacon (see Section 5.7), I suggest that it is possible to broadly distinguish two approaches in the literature –

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44 Nattiez, Music and Discourse.
45 Cumming, The Sonic Self.
49 Tarasti, Signs of Music. See also Tarasti, A Theory of Musical Semiotics, 54-58.
56 The exceptions are: Martinez, who deals with Hindustani music; Turino, who applies Peirce to his personal experiences as a string-band musician; Parker, who deals with jazz.
57 Ben Curry, “Reading Conventions, Interpreting Habits: Peircean Semiotics in Music” (PhD diss., School of Music, Cardiff University, 2011).
• *synchronic*,\(^\text{58}\) which tend to downplay the constantly changing nature of
temporal, dialogic, and context-dependent sign processes. Analyses of this type
are often oriented towards identifying the more or less static presence of Peirce’s
*universal categories* (firstness, secondness, thirdness) and/or *sign typologies
within* the limited compass of an individual musical work (typically specified by
a written score) and/or listening experience.

• *diachronic*, emphasising the dynamic, dialogic and situation-dependent aspects
of signs unfolding in semiotic *processes*, intramusically or extramusically, often
over longer time spans and/or interpretive chains.

Synchronic applications of Peirce in musicology tend to assume that the “work” is an
idealised entity, in a sense timeless or atemporal.\(^\text{59}\) By contrast, under a diachronic
approach, the musical work is treated “as a process of representation and
interpretation.”\(^\text{60}\) This was the orientation ostensibly adopted by Jean-Jacques Nattiez
in *Music and Discourse*.\(^\text{61}\) However, Curry gives an incisive critique of why Nattiez
fell short of consummating the revolutionary semiotic project that he appeared to
promise:

... by confusing the object in the Peircian sign complex for the sign Nattiez claims an
engagement with semiotics that does not actually take place. Nattiez’s analyses in this
sense can scarcely be classed as semiotic because they do not consider the way in which
music can function as a sign that throws up a set of interpretants in relation to an object.
They are concerned only with an object of enquiry conceived through the traditionally
privileged parameters of pitch and rhythm.\(^\text{62}\)

Tarasti’s explorations in “existential semiotics” adopt a diachronic perspective, often
taking inspiration from Peirce’s dynamic conception of semiotics, supplemented with
perspectives from Hegel, Algirdas J. Greimas, and Floyd Merrell,\(^\text{63}\) amongst others.\(^\text{64}\)

\(^{58}\) Tarasti seems to be referring something similar when discusses his efforts to discover a “new musical
semiotics … which break[s] free from a slavish and rote-like *syntagmatic analysis,*” Tarasti, *Signs of Music*, 70.

\(^{59}\) Parker, “Normative Judgement in Jazz,” 27.

\(^{60}\) Parker, “Normative Judgement in Jazz,” 28.

\(^{61}\) Nattiez, *Music and Discourse*.

\(^{62}\) Curry, “Reading conventions,” 79.

\(^{63}\) In his many books and papers, Floyd Merrell has written perceptively Peirce, dynamic processes and
semiotics. He occasionally discusses the relevance of Peirce’s ideas to music. See, for example, *Sign, Textuality, World*

\(^{64}\) Tarasti, *Existential Semiotics*, 17-35.
In his words, “existential semiotics … studies unique phenomena – unlike most previous semiotics, which have investigated only the conditions of such particular meanings. It studies signs in movement and flux, signs becoming signs.” Tarasti’s existential semiotics is perhaps more aptly described as a (still developing) synthesis of multiple threads of influence and innovation, rather than the straightforward extension of any single precursor, certainly not of Peirce alone. Nevertheless, his overall program has a number of resonances with the approach I develop in this thesis. Certainly, I refer to some of the same primary authors who have inspired Tarasti, especially Peirce and Lotman (as discussed in Chapter 1). However, a key point of differentiation is that my interpretive model relies much more extensively on Ricoeur (see Chapters 6 and 9), than does Tarasti in any of his books and essays. For this reason, it is outside my scope to review Tarasti’s existential semiotics in this thesis.

A particularly successful diachronic application of Peirce’s ideas to music is by Kelly Parker, in her study of the different versions of John Coltrane’s *A Love Supreme*. Parker reaches two conclusions, with which I agree:

- Successful interpretations preserve the trace of Coltrane’s original immediate object and acknowledge (without copying) the compositional and performance decisions [e.g. main motifs, rhythm, tempo, textures] he made on the original recording.
- The musical symbol *A Love Supreme* ... [represents] the blues, the church, and other key influences in Coltrane’s world. That world is the dynamic object of *A Love Supreme*. There is no ‘correct rendition’ of this musical work, but competent and excellent interpretants of it preserve – as their object – the trace of that world and all else that the work has accrued since it first came to be.

Parker is making an important argument here. Certainly, there are no “correct renditions.” Nevertheless, for Parker, it is still possible to make normative judgements regarding “competent and excellent” interpretations. Such judgements are to be based...
on a criterion of faithfulness – or we could say verisimilitude, to use Kramer’s term (see Chapter 1) – to the “traces” of the “world of the work,” as originally presented by its creator, and as that “world” has subsequently evolved, through processes of cultural “accrual.” She shows that the “world of the work” can expand to include even written texts, citing the example of an academic essay written long after the first recording of *A Love Supreme* was released.

One quibble with Parker’s argument is that she seems to allow no room for the possibility of interpretive critique, in which the criterion of verisimilitude is deliberately defied or negated, in order to actively register critical disagreement or opposition. However, this is a secondary point. It is readily addressed by explicitly allowing for critique as a valid interpretive possibility. With this correction, Parker’s terminology and position is broadly consistent with my own. In particular, her observation that each musical symbol – able to be named in natural language (e.g. *A Love Supreme*) – has as its object (whether immediate or dynamic) a “world” of the work is, in my view, unusually insightful. It exemplifies how Peirce’s semiotic model can still be refreshingly applied in contemporary musicology.

The approach that I am pursuing in this thesis is also process-oriented and diachronic. However, the primary focus of my analysis is on the discourse level, not the process level discussed in this chapter. In other words, I am principally concerned with cases in which the operational or functional details of signifying processes lose their analytical importance, because the intentional act of signifying has itself been elevated to a position of conceptual prominence. For this reason, I have no particular need to refer further to most of the previous musicological literature on Peirce. However, a specific weakness occasionally evident in some of this literature is worth calling out at this point, so that it can be guarded against in my own analytical interpretations developed later in this thesis. I am referring to the so-called “Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.”

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71 Recall Andy Blunden’s observation that, by definition, symbols and concepts must be able to be named in natural language. See Section 1.3.2, item (h).
5.7 The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness

The “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” is the fallacy of reification, i.e. of treating abstractions as concrete realities. It was named as such by Alfred North Whitehead, one of the founders of modern process philosophy. According to Whitehead, “This fallacy consists in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. There are aspects of actualities which are simply ignored so long as we restrict thought to these categories.” In a cautionary reminder, Thomas Sebeok stated that “what a semiotic model depicts is not ‘reality’ as such, but nature as unveiled by man’s method of questioning.”

A similar observation is given by Terrence Deacon, specifically in relation to Peirce’s classificatory schemas and our ability to apply them to apparently stable semiotic entities, such as texts, works of art and music. Deacon identifies a devastating point of failure which, in my view, undermine all attempts to match Peirce’s sign typologies to specified elements in musical works. In fact, there are two inter-related points of failure. The first is the assumption that any mapping of sign type to element within a work is able to be achieved “objectively,” independently of context or reception history. The second is the assumption that there exists a stable conception of a work available for the type of analysis presumed under the first assumption.

Deacon considers these points of failure to be a problem that could potentially “doom semiotic theories to the status of mere taxonomic exercises where different scholars are free to invent their own categorical principles without careful reflection on the underlying generative processes and constraints that determine the semiotic differences they hope to distinguish.” In an insightful passage, worth quoting at length, he explains the crux of the problem as follows:

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Of course communicative intention is also an interpretation, and this also does not fix the referential function of a sign vehicle. Whether something is interpreted iconically, indexically, or symbolically depends on what’s going on in the mind of the beholder. Recognizing that that the same sign vehicle need not always be interpreted as intended, or is referring always in the same way is the first step toward reframing semiosis in diachronic, not synchronic, terms. A sign vehicle can be interpreted in multiple ways not because it is in some way a combination of sign types, a fractional mixture of iconic, indexical, and symbolic features, but because its semiotic significance is not vested in the sign vehicle at all. Although a given interpretation may depend on some feature intrinsic to that artefact for motivating its semiotic function, no semiotic attributes are invested in the sign vehicle itself. They are properties of it being interpreted (whether in its creation or its consideration). So given that the same sign vehicle can be interpreted differently by different individuals, or at different phases of considering it, worrying about whether it is a ‘pure’ sign of a given type or a ‘mixed’ sign commits the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.\(^75\)

This is a salutary reminder that not just sign-types but indeed all analytical categories – including those which I am developing in my interpretive model – are not inherent in the text or object under consideration, but are merely “properties of being interpreted.” Naomi Cumming pondered whether the imposition of a tightly-specified framework – in her case, Peirce’s fundamental categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness – might have the undesirable effect of unnecessarily constraining imaginative thinking and hypothesis formulation:

Any schematism holds the danger of coming to look like a strait-jacket, its purpose to restrict movement of thought. The sets of answers to Peirce’s questions about signs, arranged so regularly in groups of three, could well yield a restrictive result like this in interpreters obsessed with classification.\(^76\)

She immediately points to an alternative perspective as the effective antidote:

More productive, however, is an awareness of the provisionality and fallibility of any scheme, its purpose not so much to provide fixed categories for signs as to separate out

\(^75\) Ibid., 12, italics in original, bold face emphasis added.
\(^76\) Cumming, The Sonic Self, 101-102.
the kinds of questions that might be asked of them or the directions that answers could take.\textsuperscript{77}

Certainly, I acknowledge these aspects of the interpretive model developed in this thesis.

5.8 Summing Up

In this chapter, I have sought show how the semiotic theory of Charles S. Peirce continues to have relevance to contemporary musicological studies. The pivotal move is to resist any temptation to match Peirce’s ontological schemas and sign typologies to the detailed musical elements of a given work. Instead, a more promising way forward is – I argue – to look towards Peirce’s mature model of semiotic process, in which he recognised an evolving sequence of interpretants – immediate, dynamic, and final. I single out Kelly Parker’s illuminating study of John Coltrane’s \textit{A Love Supreme}, which successfully demonstrates a diachronic approach to applying Peirce’s theories. Such a diachronic perspective involves a close reading of the historical evolution of a “world of a work,” over time and in changing contexts. This is a guiding principle which I adopt, where applicable, for the exegetical analyses presented in Part III.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 102, italics added.
### Methodology

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| Model of Musical Meaning (Chapter 4) | three-category model | Stefan Koelsch, Mark DeBellis |

### Problem, Definitions & Context

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Chapter 6

Developing an Interpretive Model – II. A Discourse Perspective

6.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with conceptual music from the perspective of the discourse which takes place between artists/composers and their audiences. That is the level at which what composers of conceptual music are making (poetics), and what is presented to an audience for interpretation (hermeneutics), come into sharpest relief.

I shall argue that, in the most general terms, composers of conceptual music are making a constellation of meanings, actualised and potential. This enables me to use the three-category model of musical meaning developed in Chapter 4 as a starting point for further elaboration of my interpretive model. The main aim of this chapter is to align that three-category model more closely to the observable practices of composers. To achieve this, I turn to the writings of Paul Ricoeur, supplemented by a discussion of specifically musical considerations (which Ricoeur himself never addressed). Through the lens of Ricoeur’s hermeneutical phenomenology, I identify three specific types of meaningful content which may explicitly fore-grounded and presented – as ideas or concepts – in works of conceptual music. These are – (1) a self-identity of the artist (2) a compositional theory, and (3) a world of the work of art.

1 My musical/artistic engagement with Ricoeur follows a path which is substantively different from the one pursued – to good effect – by Michael Spitzer in Metaphor and Musical Thought, 92-111. As suggested by his title, Spitzer is primarily concerned with the workings of metaphor, and he focuses on Ricoeur’s account in The Rule of Metaphor (1994). My focus is on Ricoeur’s model of discourse, and the actions of making and interpreting meanings by intentional agents engaged in discourse processes. Roger Savage’s Ricoeur-inspired account of the “worlding” power of music, to mimaetically express and bring to perceptual experience the aporias of time versus eternity, resonates more closely with my own reading of Ricoeur’s notion of the “world of the work,” as developed in this Chapter and Chapter 8. Savage has developed his approach to a Ricoeurean musical hermeneutics in a number of books and papers, including Roger W. H. Savage, Hermeneutics and Music Criticism (New York: Routledge, 2010); Music, Time, and Its Other: Aesthetic Reflections on Finitude, Temporality, and Alterity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018); “Is Music Mimetic? Ricoeur and the Limits of Narrative.” Journal of French Philosophy, 16, nos. 1 and 2 (2006): 121-33. When the aporias of time/eternity which are latent in a musical work or performance are “shifted” into the conceptual spotlight – either by a composer or due to the subsequent interpretive paratexts of a perceptive analyst or critic – then that work qualifies as an example of conceptual music, as I have defined it.
6.2 Discourse According to Ricoeur

The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur famously defined “discourse” as an event in which “someone says something to someone about something.” In other words, for Ricoeur, discourse is an intentional and rhetorical act. Ricoeur himself was primarily concerned with non-artistic discourse involving natural language, spoken or written (as illustrated in Fig. 6.1). However, it is entirely consistent with his overall philosophy to assert that Ricoeur’s definition of discourse also applies to artistic and non-linguistic modes of discourse, such as the visual arts or absolute music.

It is true that Ricoeur often used “text” to refer to conventional written texts, and he frequently drew attention to the differences between spoken and written discourse in natural language. However, Ricoeur certainly viewed the paradigm of “text interpretation” as being applicable to all conceivable modes of discourse, even including “meaningful action.”

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2 Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography,” 22. The full quotation in this case is “someone says something to someone about something in accordance with rules (phonetic, lexical, syntactic, stylistic).” Ricoeur expresses variations of this formulation in several places. See, for example, Ricoeur, Hermeneutics: Writings and Lectures, vol.2, 12; Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 66; Paul Ricoeur, “Biblical Hermeneutics,” Semeia, 4 (1975): 66; Paul Ricoeur, “Becoming Capable, Being Recognized,” trans. Chris Turner. [Original “Devenir capable, être reconnu.” Esprit, 7 (July 2005): 2; Paul Ricoeur, “The hermeneutical function of distanciation,” in Ricoeur, Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, 138. See also Adriaan Peperzak, “Ricoeur and Philosophy: Ricoeur as Teacher, Reader, Writer,” in Davidson, Ricoeur Across the Disciplines, 26-27. In a lecture delivered in 1988, Ricoeur preceded his usual formulation with a more technical terminology: “Discourse articulates a subject of discourse, and act of discourse, a content of discourse, a meta-linguistic code, an extra-linguistic reference, and an interlocutor. This can be summed up by the formula: someone following common rules says something about something to someone else. In other words, a ‘speaker’, something ‘said,’ a ‘saying’ (or meaning), a ‘world’ (or referent), rules (phonological, lexical, and syntactical, and an ‘allocation.’” In Ricoeur, Hermeneutics: Writings and Lectures, vol. 2, 12.

3 Simms, Paul Ricoeur, 34.

4 On Ricoeur and the rhetorical tradition, see Andreea Deciu Ritivoi, Paul Ricoeur: Tradition and Innovation in Rhetorical Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).


6 Ricoeur, “What is a text?” 43

7 Paul Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action as a Text [1971],” in Ricoeur, Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, 197-221. Sergey Zenkin suggests that, in his later writings, such as Time and Narrative and Memory, History, Forgetting, Ricoeur pulled back from his earlier assumption of a fully generalisable homology between text and action, and instead limited its applicability to the assimilation of social action into narrative text. Referring inter alia to the work of Jurij Lotman, he argues that Ricoeur’s earlier position regarding the homology between text and action was more powerful than his later constrained version of it. He claims to offer a methodological paradigm that is still worth developing today. While I think Zenkin puts forward a compelling argument, I will not pursue it further here. See Sergey Zenkin, “Social Action and its Sense: Historical Hermeneutics after Ricoeur,” Études Ricoeurriennes/Ricoeur Studies, 3, no.1 (2012): 86-101.
I take the Ricoeur’s simple model of discourse as being applicable to all “texts,” in the most general sense. As discussed in Chapter 2, what is “said” or communicated to an audience in artistic discourse, must always be first presented in the form of public perceptual objects, by means of which an artwork or musical work is instantiated and intended to be apprehended, available for interpretation. However, this does not mean that the conceptual content of artistic discourse can be simply equated with the sum total of the perceptual objects and events on which it depends. On the contrary, through processes of semiotic interpretation (see Chapter 5), the conceptual dimension emerges from its material underpinnings, radically transcending its origins in a public perceptual substrate. Thus, turning to the issue of poetics, precisely what conceptual artists/composers principally “make” is something that, ontologically speaking, exists at a different, immaterial, level of reality.

6.3 Poetics of Conceptual Music … The Making of What?

The preceding discussion focused attention on the question of “What is it that the conceptual artist or composer actually makes?” At first glance, we might be tempted to simply respond that they make “works”. But this is not a particularly satisfying answer.

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8 Here I use Jeffrey Strayer’s terminology, discussed in Chapter 2
It returns us back to more or less where we started, logically requiring us to ask “What is a work of art?”, or perhaps “Where is the work?” It is not possible to simply equate conceptual works of art or music with some or all of the material objects or physical traces that might be associated with them. Of course, such material traces are important and can never be entirely dispensed with (Chapter 2).

However, in light of the discussion in Section 1.6, I propose that the essence of a work of art or music – especially a conceptual work – lies, first and foremost, in the meanings that it conveys over time and space. To recap the quotation from Michael Morris:

> Works of art [including music] are not only meaningful, but essentially meaningful; that is to say, those things which are in fact works of art could not exist without being meaningful (or, indeed, having the meaning that they have).  

If this is granted, then we can reasonably claim that what an artist or composer makes when creating a work is, above all else, a constellation of meanings, actualised and potential. Therefore, I propose that a plausible starting point for further consideration of what composers specifically make is the model of musical meaning articulated in Chapter 4. In terms of that model, the entities that a composer makes in a musical work may be categorised into one of three main dimensions of meaning. This is illustrated in Fig. 4.3 (repeated below as Fig. 6.2).

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**Figure 6.2. Composers Make Experiential Entities Which May Be Categorised into One of Three Dimensions of Musical Meaning (copy of Fig. 4.3)**

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To be clear, Fig. 6.2 is applicable to all types of music, not only what I have defined as conceptual music. That’s because all music unavoidably contains elements that fall into each of the three of the main categories of meaning – musicogenic, intra-musical, and extra-musical. Of course, in this thesis, my focus is on music in which the conceptual dimension is strongly pronounced and critical to a fully-balanced appreciation of what the work is about.

6.4 Grounding the Model of Musical Meaning in Observable Practice

So far, the discussion in this chapter has remained at a fairly general level of abstraction. However, at this point in its evolution, the model in Fig. 6.2 is still too far removed from the observable actions and self-attested motivations of practising artists and composers. In order to ground things a little more solidly in real-world experience, I shall now develop a mapping between the three abstract categories in Fig. 6.2 and three specific manifestations of creativity that can be discovered in the practices of countless composers.

I do not claim that the proposed mapping is the only one that is conceivable or defensible, or that it is somehow uniquely superior to any alternative mappings that might be suggested. Also, the mapping that I put forward is based on a logic of resemblance, not the logic of classes or an assertion of exact equivalence or identity. Nevertheless, I do claim that the extension of Fig. 6.2 that I shall present in this section satisfies the criterion of verisimilitude (see Chapter 1). If that claim is correct, then the approach that I adopt should serve to illuminate, in the spirit of “exuberant

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10 However, also recall the discussion in Chapter 4 – it is possible, through acts of self-reference in presentation to an audience, for a composer to elevate elements in the musicogenic or intra-musical categories to the point that they take on a conceptual significance.

11 As Mary Hesse has shown in her landmark writings on models, analogical mapping – from one domain of knowledge to another – can be a powerful way of prompting new insights. See Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science, 57. Juri Lotman goes so far as to claim that new information/knowledge can only be produced through a process of translation between at least two different semiotic systems (see Chapter 7 for further discussion of Lotman). In this chapter, I am introducing a plausible mapping – or translation – between the abstract categories in Koelsch’s cognitive model of musical meaning and some more tangible categories, based on my reading of Ricoeur, which have a resonance in the worlds of practising composers.

12 For an excellent discussion of the distinction between the logic of resemblance and the logic of classes, see T. K. Seung, Plato Rediscovered: Human Values and Social Order (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 178. Again, as I shall discuss in Chapter 7, Juri Lotman has convincingly argued that perfect equivalence or identity between two semiotic systems becomes nothing more than a sterile tautology, unable to generate any new information.
understanding,” at least some of the ways that composers of conceptual music make use of ideas and concepts in their works.

In order to proceed, I turn first to the writings of Paul Ricoeur to discover two fundamental entities which he claims that all artists (including authors and composers) inevitably must make as part of their creative practice. Next, I take these two entities and “retrofit” them into the three abstract categories of Fig. 6.2. I argue that they are a plausible mapping, based on resemblance (i.e. not perfect equivalence). This allows me to move the theoretical framework of Fig. 6.2 one step closer to the real-world of practising composers. Finally, I complete this stage of theoretical model-building by addressing a “gap” that is not explicitly considered in the writings of Ricoeur (who, of course, was not a composer). The same “gap” is also left under-developed by Koelsch in his model. So, I will look to some observed practices of composers in the Western tradition to propose a way of filling it.

Let us begin with Ricoeur. In his many writings, Ricouer argues that artists must inevitably create at least two dimensions in any creative act. These are –

(1) an “identity in process” of the artist, and
(2) a “world of the work of art” (which members of an audience are invited to interpret and respond to, consequently shaping – i.e., making\textsuperscript{13} – aspects of their own identities).

According to Ricoeur, it is in exactly these two areas that we should locate two of the essential aims of a fundamentally creative – and moral – poetics. He stated that “discourse has not just one sort of reference but two: it refers to … the world or a world, and it refers equally to its own speaker.”\textsuperscript{14}

The next two sub-sections expand on Ricoeur’s important insights on artistic creativity and two inescapable aspects of its ultimate outcomes.

\textsuperscript{13} Here again, we see that interpretation, or hermeneutics, is essentially also a way of making, or a poetics, as seen from the perspective of an interpreter.

\textsuperscript{14} Ricoeur, Hermeneutics: Writings and Lectures, vol. 2, 49.
6.4.1 Identity in Process of the Artist

In *Oneself as Another*, Ricoeur develops a distinction between two types of identity – *idem* (an identity of sameness, constancy and continuity) and *ipse* (an identity of selfhood, actions, agency and intention). *Personal or narrative identity* is made (*poesis*) – and continually re-made and developed – by virtue of the dialectical relationship between *idem* and *ipse*, over time. Ricoeur’s focus is typically on *ipse* identity and the ethical implications of intentional agents interacting with and recognising the personhood of others in the creation of their own overall narrative identity. Specifically, he associates *ipse* identity with the capacity to make choices, form intentions, take actions and keep promises. It is through the accretion of such actions over time, all undertaken by the same (*idem*) agent, through which a personal or narrative identity is formed and presented to others. Mostly, Ricoeur discusses these topics in terms of a volitional *ipseity* made manifest through human acts of discourse – i.e. texts – expressed in *natural language*, spoken or written. However, in some essays and interviews, Ricoeur makes it clear that he considers the poetics of identity to be applicable to all the arts generally.

Specifically, Ricoeur talks of works as “testifying to” or “designating” the *ipse*-identity of the artist. In a 1996 interview, he put it this way:

> We could even say that the artist is the unity of multiple works: what is not said in one is said in another. The identity of the creator reduces itself, fragments itself and is reconstructed through this series which constitutes the approximation of an unsayable. In addition we recognize the works: we say, it’s a Cézanne, it’s a Monet. The series – this is what creates the interest, testifying to the identity of the creator.

He concludes:


Each work is each time a new work, but one which, in participating in a series, 
designates the ipseity of the creator …

In essence, Ricoeur is saying that not only does the artist make materially-manifested 
“works,” but also that – through these works – an artist “designates” or demonstrates the 
essential human agency of her/his selfhood (or ipseity). It is this volitional presentation 
of selfhood which – in dialectical relation with the continuity of idem-identity – shapes 
and nourishes the personal or narrative identity of the artist, always in the process of 
continual development. In other words, the “work” of the artist encompasses something 
more – or other than – its physical and material manifestations. For Ricoeur, the 
identity of an artist is an integral part of the creative “work.”

In the same interview, Ricoeur states that just as the ipseity of the artist emerges from 
the unity of multiple works, so too the “recipients” of the works are also invited to 
shape their own identities.

To understand, for the spectator or listener, is also to know how to follow the trajectory 
from one work to another: the game of identity and plurality in the composition of a 
promise to oneself, of a self-constancy in diversity.

He goes on to explain that the formation of identity – for artist and for audience – is 
imintely related to a constructive engagement with the “world” opened up before the 
work … which he views as a second essential dimension of a genuinely creative act. In 
this sense, poetics and hermeneutics are two sides of the same coin.

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17 Ibid., 946.
18 Ibid., emphasis added.
Influenced by Aristotle’s philosophy on friendship and selfhood,19 Ricoeur maintains “a distributive conception of selfhood.”20 He states explicitly that “the notion of narrative identity … can be applied to a community as well as to an individual.”21 Thus, for Ricoeur, as for Aristotle, the identity that is created by artists and composers can, in fact, be – at least in part – a shared or distributed identity, constructed collaboratively in a spirit of virtuous friendship.22 This makes Ricoeur’s model of identity particularly relevant to acts of collaboration, in music and the arts.

While most of Ricoeur’s writings on identity concentrate on narrative identity and the importance of ipse identity, it should be kept in mind that, in his philosophy, idem identity has not been eliminated. On the contrary, both aspects of identity – idem and ipse – are in a constant dialectical relation and a process of mutually-influencing development, through which character is progressively formed. Thus, while ipse identity receives the lion’s share of attention in Ricoeur’s works, an irreducible presence of idem identity is always assumed, even when it is not highlighted. This point is discussed further in Chapter 9, when we come to consider how artists and composers are able to present a constantly changing ipse identity to their audiences.

6.4.2 The World of a Work of Art/Music

In various passages, Ricoeur talks about works of literature – and, by extension, artworks and musical works generally – as opening up a “world of the text,” a “world in

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19 Ricoeur’s conception of identity has acknowledged resonances with Aristotle’s writings on the self and identity. See, for example, Oneself As Another, 181. References to Aristotle abound in Ricoeur’s writings. He taught courses on Plato and Aristotle. See Paul Ricoeur, Being, Essence and Substance in Plato and Aristotle (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). Peter Simpson explains that, in Aristotle’s philosophy, “self-knowledge … comes to its full completion in … virtuous friendship. … [As] self-knowledge is necessary to being fully a self, then it follows that the self only comes to full completion in being a virtuous friend to a virtuous friend. It will be in virtuous friendship alone that selves come to their perfect realization as selves. … We each reflect the self back to each other, and the self-knowing that we could not do well on our own we do easily together. This is what Aristotle ultimately has in mind by the striking phrase he uses on several occasions about a friend, that a friend is heteros or allos autos and even heteros ego. … there is no reason not to translate it also as meaning that a friend is ‘the self or I as other,’ or even ‘the other as self or I.’” See Peter Simpson, “Aristotle’s Idea of the Self,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 25 (2001): 319-20, italics in original.
20 I have taken this apt summation from Molly Harkirat Mann, Ricoeur, Rawls, and Capability Justice: Civic Phronesis and Equality (London: Continuum, 2012), 69.
22 If this is accepted, then the practice of collaboration in music and arts is elevated to a potential axiological purpose which is above and beyond the mere efficient partitioning of labour.
front of the text,”23 a “world before the text,”24 or a “world of the work.”25 These slightly different wordings all refer to the same notion, which he sees as the essential goal of interpretation, or hermeneutics, i.e. “to interpret is to explicate a sort of being-in-the-world which unfolds in front of the text.”26

In an interview, Ricoeur explains that “world” is exactly the right word to use here.

I believe it is necessary to retain the word ‘world’: it designates a possibility of inhabiting, or a habitability put to the test. A world is something I find and which I can inhabit under diverse modalities, according as it is hospitable, familiar, strange, or hostile. … In refiguring our world, the work of art is revealed in its turn as capable of being a world.27

Ricoeur’s conception of a “world of the work” is intimately bound up with his theory of imagination and productive reference. This is aptly characterised by Roger Savage:

The distance a work of fiction, an artwork, or a musical composition takes from the practical field of our everyday experiences attests to the imagination’s power of invention. This distance, in turn, is the condition for a work’s capacity to renew reality in accordance with the world that the work projects. Ricoeur stresses that the greater the retreat from literal representation … the greater its biting power.28

While she doesn’t refer to Ricoeur in her book Forgetting the Art World (2012),29 Pamela Lee also talks of the work of art’s world. For her, this notion offers a way out of a contemporary dilemma: how are we to understand and interpret artworks now that

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26 Ricoeur, “Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation”, in Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, 141, emphasis added. For Ricoeur, such explication or exegesis is an essentially linguistic activity (see Appendix E.3).
27 Ricoeur, “Arts, language and hermeneutical aesthetics,” 946. In the same interview, the interviewers Jean-Marie Brohn and Magali Uhl state that “refiguration … expresses the capacity of the work of art to restructure the world of the reader, auditor, or spectator in upsetting his horizon, contesting his expectations, remodeling his feelings in reworking them from the inside” (944).
literally anything and everything can be classed as “art”? Lee acknowledges the impossibility of “ignoring or standing outside it [the artworld], as if one could lay claim to a space beyond its imperial reach by wandering just far enough afield.” Her response is to shift the focus of analysis and critical discussion from the ‘global art world’ itself to the *work of art’s world*. She explains that “to speak of the ‘the work of art’s world’ is to retain a sense of the activity performed by the object as utterly continuous with the world it at once inhabits and creates: a world Möbius-like in its indivisibility and circularity, a seemingly endless horizon.” Lee’s language here is opaque. But it seems to me that she is gesturing towards an open-ended and recursive quality associated with the human interpretation of signs. Peirce sometimes referred to this quality as “infinite semiosis” (Chapter 5).

To summarise the discussion above, the task of interpretation is one of making sense of a world that emerges “before” the works. This includes an obligation to understand – not necessarily uncritically – the identity and intentions of the artist, at least to the extent that these are discoverable in the world of the work. The process of “making sense” is open-ended. But it is not completely arbitrary. Interpretations which are sufficiently stable to be able to be inter-subjectively validated as plausible are always latent within any semiotic process. This is an axiomatic consequence of intentional agency. In Peirce’s terminology, such interpretations correspond to “Dynamic Interpretants,” which have been accepted as legitimate amongst a community of enquirers at a given point in time. In principle, a maturing sequence of “Dynamic Interpretants” could, over time, move closer to – asymptotically approach – a “Final Interpretant” which is accepted at least within that community. However, in practice, due to the spatiotemporal finitude of enquiring agents, the continuously evolving constitution of all communities, and the ever-present contingency of unforeseen events or new information, the “Final Interpretant” is ultimately an unattainable ideal, unable to be ever finally and permanently grasped. This is especially the case with artworks

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30 Mark Lafrenz, “Cultural Intentions, Reference, and Art,” *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, 51, no. 2 (2017), 107, citing Arthur Danto’s claim that “anything … can become art, but not anything can be art at any time.” (ibid.)
31 Lee, *Forgetting the Art World*, 2. Adam Geczy and Jacqueline Millner have observed that there is today “no seditious or radical outside” to the artworld. See Geczy and Millner, *Fashionable Art*, 18-19. They allow for the possible exception of ‘Outsider Art’ as lying outside the art world, an important point which I not pursue here.
32 Ibid., 8, italics in original.
33 CP 8.184
which are intentionally polysemic, deliberately imbued with multiple legitimate meanings and ambiguities.

In its ceaseless movement towards the “Final Interpretant,” the process of interpretation resembles a somewhat circuitous, exploratory journey, one with a far destination – perhaps glimpsed in the distance – as its ultimate goal. The journey itself offers many opportunities to pause and take in contemplative views along the way. New discoveries are always possible around the next bend. Different travellers will notice – and later recall as significant – different things along the way. And yet, the journey is not entirely random or arbitrary, capable of any meanings whatsoever. Regardless of any vicissitudes or unexpected encounters, it remains a purposeful activity, undertaken by intentional agents. In philosophical terms, it is implicitly or explicitly directed towards continuing growth in self-knowledge, for both artist and audience. In Ricoeur’s words:

Texts speak of possible worlds and of possible ways of orienting oneself in these worlds. … Interpretation thus becomes the apprehension of the proposed worlds which are opened up by the non-ostensive references of the text. … let the work and its world enlarge the horizon of the understanding which I have of myself.  

Thus, when the invitation to hermeneutics is accepted, the act of interpretation by an audience is as much an act of moral creativity as is the artists’ act of creating the originating “text.” In other words, both the artist and the interpreting audience are engaged in the poetics – or making – of ipse-identity.

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37 The essence of ipse-identity is “a subject capable of designating itself as being himself the author of his words and acts, a non-substantial being and non-immutable subject, but nonetheless one responsible for his saying and doing.” Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography,” 49.
6.4.3 Mapping Ricoeur’s Insights into the Emerging Interpretive Model

From a composer’s perspective, Ricoeur’s two essential dimensions of artistic creativity – identity in process and a world of the work – align well with two categories of musical meaning shown in Fig. 6.2, i.e. the musicogenic and extra-musical respectively. To justify this claim, recall, from Chapter 4, that Koelsch sub-divides two of the categories in Fig. 6.2 into three further sub-categories each, as follows –

- musicogenic
  - physical
  - emotional
  - personal

- extra-musical
  - iconic
  - indexical
  - symbolic

Let us consider each of these in turn.

Musicogenic

The three sub-categories of musicogenic meaning proposed by Koelsch can be taken to refer to different aspects of how a composer may respond to her/his own works, during or after the process of creating them. To put it another way, these musicogenic sub-categories may be interpreted as three possible dimensions of the composer’s own identity which, to a greater or lesser extent, may become “invested” in the work as it is shaped. Certainly, it is not unknown for a composer or a musician to incorporate some or all of the three sub-categories of their own “take” of musicogenic meaning into a piece that they are working on or performing. Specifically, the physical and the emotional dimensions of musicogenic meaning are none other than what is nowadays
studied under the subject of embodied or enactive cognition. These dimensions are particularly important in certain styles and genres of music, for example, involving improvisation, or trance.

Musical passages with deep personal significance or private associations are frequently present in many composers’ works, even if they aren’t always publicly advertised to an audience as such. Examples abound. In classical instrumental music, to cite just a handful of cases, we have: Leoš Janáček’s String Quartet No.2 (“Intimate Letters”) (1928), explicitly inspired by his amorous correspondence with the much younger Kamila Stösslová; Arnold Schoenberg’s String Trio, Op. 45 (1946), a musical self-portrait of his near-fatal heart attack; Schoenberg’s Piano Concerto, Op. 42 (1942), a programmatic musical representation of his exile from Hitler’s Germany; George Enescu’s Impressions d’Enfance, Op. 28 (1940), a suite of musical impressions of Enescu’s own childhood. In vocal music, especially in rock and popular music, self-portraiture and (sometimes disguised) personal confession are ubiquitous, for example:


41 These letters are available in English translation in John Tyrrell, ed. and trans., *Intimate Letters: Leos Janáček to Kamila Stösslová* (London: Faber and Faber, 1994).


John Lennon’s harrowing *Plastic Ono Band* album (1970);\(^{45}\) many songs by Vic Chesnutt\(^ {46}\) or Carly Simon.\(^ {47}\)

Extra-musical

Let us now consider Ricoeur’s account of the “world of the work.” It seems to me that this is an important characteristic of many works in the Western classical repertoire, as well as in popular music. For example, all examples of *program music* contrive to establish a convincing musical representation of an *extra-musical* world – a world of ideas, narratives, fictions, characters or concepts – that is understood to exist beyond the music itself. Jonathan Kregor observes that

> at least as practiced by Berlioz and Schumann, Liszt and Strauss, program music is not just music. Rather, it is music plus a title, a poem, a person – that is, something *extrinsic* to the music itself. Thus, the decision for the analyst and listener becomes whether to accept that extrinsic element as part of the work’s identity and, by extension, how then to involve it in the search for a work’s meaning.\(^ {48}\)

Again, the realm of rock and popular music is rife with examples. A small selection must suffice: David Bowie’s fictional characters “Major Tom” and “Ziggy Stardust,” the loose plotlines of archetypical concept albums such as The Who’s *Tommy* (1969), *Quadrophenia* (2003) or The Residents’ “Mole trilogy” about battles between the Moles and the Chubs.\(^ {49}\)

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\(^{45}\) *John Lennon/Plastic Ono Band*, Apple PCS 7124 (UK), 1970, CD. In a 1971 interview with *Rolling Stone* magazine, Lennon describes the album as follows: “I think it’s realistic and it’s true to the *me* that has been developing over the years from ‘In My life,’ ‘I’m a Loser,’ ‘Help!’ ‘Strawberry Fields.’ They were all personal records. I always wrote about me and didn’t really enjoy writing third-person songs about people who lived in concrete flats and things. I like first person music. But because of hang-ups and many other things, I would only now and then specifically write about me. Now I wrote *all* about me and that’s why I like it. It’s *me*, and nobody else. So I like it.” In Jann S. Wenner, *Lennon Remembers*, new ed. (New York: Verso, 2000), 9, italics in original.


\(^{48}\) Kregor, *Program Music*, 2, italics added.

Consolidating the Model So Far

We are now in a position to establish two mappings between Fig. 6.2 and the two goals of creative artistic practice discussed by Ricoeur. This mapping is illustrated in Fig. 6.3.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 6.3.** Mapping Ricoeur’s Two Aspects of Creative Poesis into the Model of Musical Meaning Presented in Chapter 4.

There is an obvious “gap” in Fig. 6.3 as it stands ... we have no mapping from Koelsch’s *intra-musical* category. This is addressed in the next section.

### 6.4.4 The “Syntactic” and “Lexical” Dimensions – Downplayed by Ricoeur

Ricoeur’s writings, while unfailingly insightful and thought-provoking, reflect a “blindspot” regarding dimensions of creativity that lie outside his primary preoccupations of *metaphor/mimesis* and the *semantic* dimension of meaning. As far as I am aware, Ricoeur never engages with the possibility that a creative literary work is able to represent more than just a metaphoric, *semantically*-grounded “possible world” or narrative. Indeed, in some of his most influential writings, Ricoeur expressly denied the possibility that *metonymical* statements, operating at syntactical or lexical levels of
from the mainstream rules governing the composition of written texts in English. Were it not for his stature as an
important author, it is arguably doubtful that any literary audience would have paid such devoted and significant
critical attention to his final book, 

Thus, we might suspect that Ricoeur would also have been dismissive of the potential
meaningfulness of metonymical forms in the other arts. However, to persevere with the
linguistic metaphor, a moment’s reflection confirms that creative works are also able to
indeed to some extent unavoidably must – instantiate their own assumed syntactic and lexical
universes, which are also able to be presented as meaningful entities. These are
the presentational “rules” and available “vocabularies” which – either invisibly or
manifestly – shape and govern the form of the “work” as it is publicly presented. 54

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manifestly – shape and govern the form of the “work” as it is publicly presented. 54

51 Ricoeur, From Text to Action, 80. As far as I am aware, Ricoeur never extrapolated this assertion to any
statements about the minimal requirements of artworks more generally. In view of various literary genres that are
based on very brief poetical “works” his claim is debatable. Consider, for example, haiku or one sentence poems by
Gertrude Stein or Joseph Kossuth. Aphoristic writings by philosophers such as Nietzsche or Wittgenstein are perhaps
another example of very short written “works” capable of standing alone. Refer: Kenneth Goldsmith, Uncreative
Writing: Managing Language in the Digital Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). In the context of
artworks more generally, Ricoeur’s length criterion is clearly untenable. As evidence, we need only recall that many
iconic works of Conceptual Art were exhibited as “written pieces” that were no longer than a single sentence.

52 The hierarchical terminology of linguistics – e.g. lexical, syntactical, and semantic – is, strictly speaking,
inapplicable to music. For example, there is no clear isomorphic equivalence between written or spoken sentences in
natural language and any structural units which may be identifiable in some types of music (or indeed the visual arts).
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of auditory stream segregation indicates that, in their listening, humans are able to
“parse” an aggregated mass of sonic stimuli into discernible and relatively stable units, perceived to exist at multiple
levels of hierarchical organisation. For an early, but still useful, discussion see Leonard Meyer, “Hierarchic
Also relevant: Albert S. Bregman, Auditory Scene Analysis: The Perceptual Organization of Sound (Cambridge, MA:

53 For example, Byron Almén, A Theory of Musical Narrative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
Of course, the informational content of musical units at different levels of a hierarchical schema may vary from
composer to composer, depending on their individual musical “language.”

54 In literature, the grammar/vocabulary used by an author is not necessarily exactly identical to the grammar and
vocabulary taken for granted in the day-to-day “real world,” i.e. the world outside the realm of the arts. Instead, an
author’s syntactic and lexical worlds might be partly or largely invented, perhaps highly idiosyncratic and artificial.
Indeed, the departure from what is considered to be “normal” may be substantial and stark. At the same time,
however, a complete “disconnect” between an author’s personal grammar/vocabulary with what is generally accepted
as “normal” would simply be perceived by audiences as madness, rather than audacious creativity. On the other
hand, every individual’s writing style, no matter how “normal” it might be, still reflects – to some minimal degree – a
uniquely personal syntax and lexicon. There are various well-known authors – for example, James Joyce – who
pushed the envelope of “English-language” syntax and vocabulary close to the outermost limits of intelligibility.
Joyce essentially became his own ultimate arbiter of what was (or was not) syntactically and lexically acceptable in a
passage of prose, defying norms and breaking with accepted tradition. With each new book, he moved ever farther
from the mainstream rules governing the composition of written texts in English. Were it not for his stature as an
important author, it is arguably doubtful that any literary audience would have paid such devoted and significant
critical attention to his final book, Finnegans Wake (1939). And yet, countless detailed studies of Joyce’s work attest
to the fact that his works are not the rantings of an unhinged madman. On the contrary, within their own worlds,
In music, there are many examples of composers who have constructed their own highly personalised “lexical and syntactical universes,” consisting of a “vocabulary” of musical units, idiosyncratic rules and theoretical systems governing pitch combinations and sequences (e.g. Arnold Schoenberg, Josef Hauer), intonation (e.g. Harry Partch, Ben Johnston), octave and interval divisions (Alois Hába, Ivan Wyschnegradsky), timbral/textural effects (e.g. Edgard Varèse, Iannis Xenakis, Giacinto Scelsi), or metamusical choices affecting sonic outcomes (e.g. John Cage). The compendious two-volume survey *Théories de la composition musicale au XXe siècle* (2013)\(^{55}\) includes literally dozens of examples of musical theories and systems invented by twentieth-century composers. The point is that these personal “syntactical and lexical musical universes” are typically as much an essential aesthetic component of the overall “works” created by their progenitors as are any immediately audible or perceivable “surface” qualities.

From this discussion, I propose that an obvious way to fill the “gap” in mappings left vacant in Fig. 6.3 is to recognise that, to a greater or lesser extent, composers inevitably create their own *techniques* or “ways of making,” i.e. their own intra-musical universes. These may be largely adopted (perhaps implicitly) from elements already widely accepted and readily understood in the musical culture of the society in which the composer is working. An obvious example is the harmonic language and conventions of Western common-practice tonality. In which case, composers will still evolve their own individual compositional styles within that harmonic language, sometimes referred to as a composer’s “voice.” On the other hand, a composer’s techniques, or intra-musical universe, may be a conscious and perhaps radical departure from what had hitherto been the accepted *status quo*. In such cases, many composers have devoted much effort in “promoting” their personal compositional systems. Often, a composer’s system takes centre stage in her/his practice, to the extent that any specific compositions are so bound up with their techniques that they are no longer independent of them. Rather, the works may be thought of more as proofs and exercises, submitted to public

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Joyce’s last works manifest the most microscopically defensible spelling distortions, intricate multilingual word associations, puns, and so on. See, for example, the essays in Luca Crispi and Sam Slote, eds., *How Joyce Wrote* Finnegans Wake: *A Chapter-by-Chapter Genetic Guide* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007).

scrutiny in order to demonstrate the worthiness and creative potential of the underlying theories.

In *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristole referred to the technical knowledge, or craftsmanship, involved in ways of making as *technē*.

For Aristotle

art [*technē*] is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning. All art is concerned with coming into being, i.e. with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is the maker and not in the thing made.

The suggestion that a work of art, literature or music could intentionally and self-referentially shine a clear – and faithful – conceptual spotlight on the means of its own making is one which would have been met with scepticism by many leading thinkers of postmodern critical theory.

For example, Jacques Derrida expressly claimed that the essence of “texts” is their resistance to any transparent self-revelation (hence the need for deconstruction):

A text is a text insofar as it conceals from a first glance, a first approach, the law of its composition and the rule of its play. A text remains, moreover, imperceptible. Its law and rule are not hidden away in the inaccessibility of a secret, but they never offer themselves, in the present, to anything that could in all rigor be called a perception.

At least for the presentational layer of a text, I disagree. Countless texts and their associated paratexts openly seek to reveal their *technē*, or ways of making. This is not to claim that there might not exist deeper layers of *technē*, where subterranean “laws” and sub-conscious “motivations” which govern a work’s making may remain

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56 *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139b15; *technē* is often translated as “craft” or “art.” See also: Tom Angier, *Technē in Aristotle’s Ethics: Crafting the Moral Life* (London: Continuum, 2011).


58 This may be another reason why the topic of *technē* receives so little attention in Ricoeur’s writings from that era.

unexpressed or incapable of direct expression.\textsuperscript{60} However, these possibilities do not negate the usefulness of defining a mode of technē which is able to – and often does – function as a pivotal conceptual dimension, intentionally located and highlighted at the presentational layer of a work.

Summing up, I propose that the “gap” in Fig. 6.3 may be filled as shown in Fig. 6.4. This move completes the formulation of another “building block” to be incorporated into my overall interpretive model.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Figure 6.4. Filling the “Gap” in Fig. 6.3. Composers Inevitably Instantiate a Compositional Theory (technē), Which May Also Be Invented or Made by Them}
\end{center}

\textbf{6.5 Simplifying the Model}

Notice that, in specifying the three-stages of poetics (i.e. making musical meaning) as shown in Fig. 6.4, I have – somewhat circuitously – returned to what is essentially a paraphrase of Ricoeur’s simple definition of discourse: “Someone says something about something.” Or, in the language more applicable to the artist or composer: “I make something [about something].” This statement can be parsed into the three individual words: I/make/something. It seems to me that, remarkably (or perhaps not), each of these words aligns quite naturally with one aspect of the three-part answer that I have

\textsuperscript{60} Such deeper layers may be partly uncovered through the activity of deconstructive hermeneutics.
proposed to the question “What is it that the artist/composer makes?” – (1) an identity (i.e. a way of being) [= “I”]61 (2) a technē (i.e. a way of making) [= “make”], and (3) a world of the work (i.e. a way of meaning) [= “something”]. This alignment is illustrated in Fig. 6.5.62

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 6.5. Returning the Interpretive Model to a Paraphrase of Ricoeur’s Basic Definition of Discourse**

The essential content of Fig. 6.5 can also be presented verbally, as a series of predicates which expand upon the basic formula of poetic acts, viz. “I make something” (Fig. 6.6).

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61 My use of the word “being” should not be interpreted as a disavowal of the temporally evolving, process-oriented aspects of identity. Identity – as ways of being – is always in a state of “becoming,” manifested as a changing dialectical relationship between idem and ipse, over time (Section 6.4.1 above). Here, then, I do not use “being” in the same sense as Tarasti, who equates the term with “a state of rest, stability, and dissonance.” See Eero Tarasti, “Music as Narrative Art,” in Narrative Across Media: The Languages of Storytelling, ed. Marie-Laure Ryan, James Ruppert, John W. Bernet (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 296. For Tarasti’s terminological distinction between being and becoming, see also: Tarasti, “Existential Semiotics and Cultural Psychology,” 317.

62 There is a kind of symmetry here which, personally, I find pleasing (although that, of itself, proves nothing).
The recursiveness indicated by the arrows in Fig. 6.5 also imply the inverted form of these predicates (Fig. 6.7).

With Figs. 6.5 to 6.7, we have travelled a considerable distance from the terminology shown in Fig. 6.2. So much so that some of what has led up to this point may now be regarded as “temporary scaffolding.” A synthesis of Koelsch’s and DeBellis’ models provided a useful starting point from which I could begin to develop an interpretive model for conceptual music. But now that we have arrived at Fig. 6.5, parts of that earlier scaffolding are no longer essential and can be jettisoned.

A more artistically satisfying variant of Figs. 6.4 and 6.5 — with non-essential elements removed — is shown in Fig. 6.8. Here I have included examples of how artists and
composers, in their creative practice, could – and invariably do – “make” aspects of a “work” in each of the “aspects of making” in Fig. 6.5. For instance, it is commonplace to talk of an artist’s or composer’s identity in terms of her/his individual style or “voice.” Similarly, personal compositional theories – technē – often take centre stage in “works” of many composers (e.g. Messiaen, Xenakis). And, of course, different ways of creating a world of potential meanings are incredibly diverse. Some of the possibilities include: utopian/dystopian universes, possible worlds, narratives (fictional and non-fictional), ekphrastic translations, homages, didactic exemplars, polemical statements, critiques.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>artist, composer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ways of being</td>
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<tr>
<td>e.g. artistic “voice,” personal emotions, identity expressed sonically (signature sound, etc)</td>
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<tr>
<td>technē</td>
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<tr>
<td>ways of making</td>
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<tr>
<td>e.g. personal compositional theories, systems, models/methods for creative process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>world of a work</td>
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<tr>
<td>ways of meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. utopian, dystopian, narrative, polemical, didactic, ekphrasis, homage, critique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a work of conceptual music</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.8 Three Aspects of Making (Poetics) from the Perspective of the Artist/Composer

Recall from Chapter 4 that the realm of ideas and concepts is located solely in “conceptual” or “extra-musical” category of musical listening, which I have now aligned to the world of a work. For this reason, I have shaded this area of Fig. 6.8, to indicate that this dimension is where works of conceptual music are “located” along the spectrum of musical expression. To use the metaphor of a “theatre of music” (Section

63 Andrew Shenton, Olivier Messiaen’s System of Signs: Notes Towards Understanding His Music (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).
65 To anticipate the discussion in Chapter 7, it is also possible for composers and artists to make conceptually referential gestures to the identity or technē associated with other composers, perhaps as a homage or parody. For example, in his Concerto for Orchestra (1943), Bartok includes a reference – possibly satirical – to the march theme from Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony (1941), not just rhythmically and melodically, but also by emulating and exaggerating the “banal symmetry” of its compositional design, or technē. See Esti Sheinberg, Irony, Satire, Parody and the Grotesque in the Music of Shostakovich: A Theory of Musical Incongruities (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 99-100.
The conceptual “spotlight” is always fixed on the extra-musical area of the presentational “stage.” The extra-musical category is the only domain of meaning in which natural language can make explicit and refer to what would otherwise remain unspoken, implicit or hidden beneath the surface. Concepts – in order to exist as concepts – must be able to be named, in language, at least in principle if not always in practice (see Section 1.3.2, item (h)). However, previously non-verbalised aspects and qualities present in the domains of identity and technē may be transferred or “shifted” into the conceptual domain, to become explicit elements in the world of a work. This transference – from the non-conceptual to the conceptual – occurs by virtue of acts of naming or “paratextual” description, which can be undertaken by the artist/composer (or indeed by the audience, as I shall discuss in Section 6.5.1 below).

Finally, it should not be forgotten that the artist/composer can draw on the full universe of ideas and concepts for elements that she/he chooses to incorporate into the world of a work. In other words, the ideas and concepts which are pivotal in a given work of conceptual music need not only come from the domains of artistic identity and technē.

I will “unpack” this important point in Chapters 7 and 8. For the time being, as a reminder of the potentially omnivorous nature of conceptual music, Fig. 6.9 introduces an additional arrow to Fig. 6.8. This arrow indicates that an artist/composer may intentionally introduce ideas and concepts into a work of conceptual music which could, in fact, come from anywhere at all.

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67 This includes citational or referential relationships the works of other artists/composers, including – but not limited to – references to their identity and/or technē.
6.5.1 The Power of Paratext to Introduce External Conceptual Content

The “externalising” manner of introducing – or emphasising – a conceptual dimension in a piece of music, where otherwise it would perhaps barely exist, is extremely common. It can be achieved through a variety of paratextual devices (e.g. titles, program notes)\(^\text{68}\) or reliance upon the assumed familiarity of non-verbal referential signals amongst the audience (e.g. sound effects, musical “topics”).

The act of naming is a common and powerful method. Simply giving a work a title that refers to external ideas and concepts instantly brings those ideas and concepts into the world of the work (provided, of course, that the title is recognised by the audience). There are countless examples.

Consider, for instance, Krzysztof Penderecki’s renowned composition *Threnody for the Victims of Hiroshima* (1960). Originally, Penderecki had apparently entitled the piece 8’ 37”, in reference to its duration (and possibly in imitation of the title of John Cage’s 4’33” (1952)).\(^\text{69}\) Indeed, the première performance of the work went under this

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original title, as did the first recording of it. While rightly criticised as opportunistic, the decision to re-title the piece was, from a career perspective, inspired. It has undoubtedly contributed to its subsequent commercial success and assured it a permanent place in the canon of modern twentieth-century compositions. All this was achieved through the choice of a new title, which introduced conceptual content – previously not explicitly present – into the world of the work. The first and original title (8’ 37’’) is relatively neutral, perhaps an allusion to Cage. In terms of interpretive potency, the second title is much less ambiguous and more suggestive. It is a deliberate attempt to claim an artistic connection to one of the most horrifying events in the history of World War II. Importantly, in this case, it is possible to hear various passages in the piece as sonic metaphors for the horrors of nuclear war (e.g. “screams,” the low-pitch drones of “bomber aircraft”). In other words, Penderecki’s choice of the new title was not incongruent with how it sounds. However, the world of a work can be a promiscuous place. Different elements need not remain faithful to only one concept. Thus, excerpts from Threnody to the Victims of Hiroshima have been used for the music soundtracks of at least two films without any immediate plot connection to nuclear war – The Shining (1980) and Children of Men (2006).

A candid discussion of the power of titles in the presentation of avant-garde music can be found in remarks made by composer George Flynn regarding his trilogy of piano works, collectively titled Trinity. The work is comprised of three separate pieces, or sections, written over a period of 25 years – “Wound” (1968), “Kanal” (1976), and “Salvage” (1993). In an interview published in 2003, Flynn explains the connection between the titles of the individual sections and traumatic historical events (the details of which need not detain us here). According to the interviewer, Flynn considers that “understanding these ‘extramusical’ aspects [i.e. those conveyed by the titles] may give listeners a point of entry into work they might otherwise find impenetrable.” However,

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70 In his review of a recording of the work, Paul Griffiths stated that “the Threnody (1959-61) makes me uneasy by choosing to refer to an event too terrible for string orchestral screams ....”. See Paul Griffiths, [Review of EMI EMD 5529]. The Musical Times, 117, no. 1605 (1976): 915.
72 The work as a whole is available on two different CD releases: George Flynn Trinity, Frederik Ullén (piano), BIS-CD-1593/94, 2007 (which also includes a PDF version of the entire score). Also George Flynn Trinity, George Flynn (piano), Southport S-SSD 5501-2, 2000. Individual sections have also been released on the following LP recordings: George Flynn Wound/John Cage Winter Music, George Flynn (piano), Finnadad QD 9006, 1974 (re-issued on CD on Southport S-SSD 5501-2 (Disc 1)); George Flynn Kanal, George Flynn (piano), Finnadad 90864-1, 1987 (re-issued on CD on Southport S-SSD 5501-2 (Disc 1)).
the composer “acknowledge[s] that if nobody knew what this was about and had not been told in advance they never would have divined this from the music.”

In other words, the title of a work is inextricably bound up with the potential meaning(s) of the work. In effect, it becomes an irreducible part of the work. It can – and often does – play a pivotal role in transforming a sonic world into a conceptual world. Umberto Eco observes that a “title … is in itself a key to interpretation.” Ben Arnold elaborates:

A title of any musical composition means something; it directs our attention to a particular corner of the universe. It may be vivid or bland; it may be clever or dull; but it remains, in its most basic role, a label for discussing the content within a work. It is more than a label, however, for in its direction, it becomes part of the content - a variable in the whole composition and a definite and distinct part of the work. The listener weaves the idea conveyed by the title into the musical experience itself. The title is often a direct indication of the composer's intentions; as well, it, in more cases than not, sets up certain expectations in the listeners. The title of a composition could be considered as important as the final cadence.

6.5.2 The Role of Artistic Intentions

This brings us to a consideration of creative poetics that I have so far left to one side – the historically much-debated issue of artistic intentions. Does it really matter what the artist intended to make? Ricoeur frequently emphasised “the semantic autonomy of the text,” which he characterises as follows:

The text’s career escapes the finite horizon lived by its author. What the text now means [to its readers] now matters more than what the author meant when he wrote it.

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75 Arnold, “Music, Meaning, and War,” 20, emphasis added.

76 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 30.
Elsewhere, he explains that this involves

a threefold autonomy: with respect to the *intention of the author*; with respect to the
cultural situation and all the sociological conditions of the production of the text; and
finally, with respect to the original addressee. What the text signifies no longer
coincides with what the author meant …

There are countless examples where precisely this kind of “escape” has occurred with a
text (e.g. The Beatles’ “Helter Skelter,” noted in Section 4.3). Also, there is no way to
prevent audiences and readers in the general public from responding to and interpreting
works in any way they might choose, regardless of how their choices may or may not be
aligned to what the artist had originally intended. However, these observations do not
amount to an open invitation – at least from the perspective of the disciplined
hermeneutic scholar – to impose whatever interpretation she/he feels like reading into or
onto a text (*eisegesis*, or the “affective fallacy.”)

Ricoeur himself was well aware of – and warned against – the “fallacy of the absolute
text,” which is

the fallacy of hypostasizing the text as an authorless entity. If the intentional fallacy
overlooks the semantic autonomy of the text, the opposite fallacy forgets that a text
remains a discourse told by somebody, said by someone to someone else about
something.

From the outset, Ricoeur acknowledged that “the autonomy of the text, which will be at
the centre of our own reflections [at that point in time, written in 1973], can only be a
provisional and superficial phenomenon.”

I review the problem of artistic intentions in more detail in Appendix N. There I
conclude that in order to ascribe meaning – at some level – to the manifested actions of
a human agent, we must also seek to understand intentions. Some *account* of publicly

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77 Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences*, 91, italics added.
79 Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, 30
80 Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences*, 51.
accessible information regarding artistic intentions – minimally, an awareness of the artist’s sanction – is essential to interpretation which satisfies the criterion of verisimilitude (Chapter 1). With Ricoeur, I do not grant any paramount standing to such information. Nevertheless, any adequate act of scholarly interpretation – including, of course, analysis – needs make respectful enquiry regarding a composer’s rhetorical intentions in the presentation of a particular work (insofar as those intentions are able to be inferred or discovered).

Referring to Gadamer, Roger Savage argues that it is also conceivable that a (musical) work may be the vehicle for conveying powerful and truthful meanings which were never consciously intended by its author. Such meanings are experienced intuitively and directly by the listener – without any intervening rationalisation or conceptualisation – due to the “ontological vehemence” inherent in the work.\(^1\) This returns us to the topic of non-conceptual meanings which can be directly perceived and cognitively experienced, without the mediation of concepts, words and language. It is the appropriate focus of hermeneutic phenomenology, founded on the insights of philosophers such as Gadamer (see Section 1.5). Nicholas Davey aptly observes that

\begin{quote}
Gadamer’s determination to reveal the cognitive content of aesthetic experience requires exposing the ontological grounding of subjectivity. To approach artworks \textit{solely} on the basis of subjective responses to them or to read them \textit{only} in terms of an artist’s intentionality is, for Gadamer, always to miss the point.\(^2\)
\end{quote}

Such valid observations do not undermine the claim I am making, i.e. that academic rigour in the exegesis of music – especially of music which \textit{is} primarily concerned with ideas and concepts – requires a hospitable openness and diligent attempt to understand the artistic intentions of the composer(s). This is true even if the work itself has “escaped” from – or has unwittingly exceeded – those original intentions.


6.6 The Perspective of the Audience

The model of creative poetics shown in Fig. 6.8 is as applicable to individuals in the audience as it is to the artists/composers. Kramer’s three-stage characterisation of “open hermeneutics” – to address/describe, continue, and transform – is not discriminatory with regard to who is sanctioned or permitted to undertake the activity of interpretation. The opportunity to address, continue and transform a work, to offer an interpretation of “exuberant understanding,” is available to all ... artist/composers, critics, academics, and audience members alike. Indeed, the intentional admixture of any conceptual content by the artist/composer depends on acts of self-interpretation (hermeneutics) occurring as an integral part of the creative process (poetics). Kramer observes that between “expression through art and ... expression in response to art ... there is no clear difference.”

In any case, even the distinction between artist/composer and audience is often blurred. This is especially the case once we allow that some interpretive acts may gain widespread acceptance, so much so that they themselves become part of the world of the work. Such interpretations don’t necessarily need to enjoy the sanction, or even involvement, of the original creators of the “work.” In that sense, the interpretive audience can become co-creators of a constantly evolving world of the work. Therefore, precisely the same domains, sketched above as “aspects of making” (poetics), relevant to the perspective of the artist/composer, can also be considered to be fertile domains for the exploration of “aspects of interpretation” (hermeneutics).

In other words, in the paradigm of “open hermeneutics,” poetics and hermeneutics are fundamentally inter-related processes. Or, perhaps better, we could say that they describe one and the same process, viewed from different angles. Artists/composers are interpreting as they are making and creating. Audiences are making and creating as...

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83 Kramer, Interpreting Music, 33.
84 Of course, the audience can include a diversity of individuals, including analysts, musicologists, critics and commentators. Thus, in principle, influential musicological studies may become an important part of the “world of the work” which is being discussed.
85 Kramer makes a similar point, ibid., 32.
86 Roger Savage puts it well: “Just as a theory of poetics provides a critical point of access to understanding the productive forces upon which a work draws, a theory of interpretation [i.e. hermeneutics] is called upon to mediate between the verisimilitude of the art work and the realities, present and possible, to which it attests.” Roger Savage, “Aesthetic Criticism and the Poetics of Modern Music,” British Journal of Aesthetics, 33, no. 2 (1993): 149.
they interpret. Therefore, the model shown in Fig. 6.9 is equally applicable to both. To reflect this, Fig. 6.10 adjusts label “artist/composer” from Fig. 6.9, to explicitly include “audience.”

Figure 6.10  Three Aspects of Making (Poetics) and Interpreting (Hermeneutics) in Artistic Discourse

6.7  Summing Up

In this chapter, I have reviewed the question of what it is that artists and composers exactly make when they are making artworks or musical works. I argued that, above all else, they are making potential meanings. This claim enabled me to return to the model of musical meaning developed in Chapter 4. In particular, I considered how this model could be further elaborated in order to more explicitly link it to specific and observable creative outputs of many real-world practitioners. At this point, I turned to the writings of Paul Ricoeur, supplemented by a discussion of specifically musical considerations (which Ricoeur himself never addressed). I proposed that there are at least three interrelated aspects to what composers are ultimately making when presenting “works” to an audience –

1. A self-identity of the artist, in constant process of development.
2. An instantiation of an assumed compositional theory (or technē), i.e. an underlying grammar of “syntactical” rules and “lexical” choices, implicitly or explicitly governing the craftsmanship manifested in the work.
3. A world of the work of art, conveyed in “semantic” terms, inviting interpretation in light of a given context.⁸⁷

Next, I proposed a “mapping” (Fig. 6.4) which aligns these three dimensions with the three-category model of musical meaning developed in Chapter 4. All three aspects are at least implicitly present, to a greater or lesser extent, in all musical works. Often, the first two – identity and technē – may remain implicit and exert their influence behind the scenes. In that case, an interpreter may need to put in extra effort to discover their relevant characteristics. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, composers of conceptual music may deliberately choose to explicitly foreground aspects of identity and technē, presenting them, self-referentially – as ideas or concepts – in the worlds of their works.

Regarding the topic of artistic intentions, a much-contested issue in the history of critical theory (see Appendix N), I maintain that an enquiry regarding intentions cannot be entirely eliminated from any adequate interpretation of creative works. Thus, the discussion in the chapter has identified a checklist of four points to be considered as potentially important factors relevant to the poetics and hermeneutics of any work of conceptual music – (1) a self-identity of the artist, (2) a compositional theory, or technē, (3) a world of the work, and (4) the intentions of the artist/composer.⁸⁸ Not all of these four areas would be equally important – or even necessarily merit close consideration – in every case.

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⁸⁷ Note that each of the terms “syntactical,” “lexical,” “semantic,” and “pragmatic,” are used here in a metaphorical sense, to refer to analogues in music and the non-linguistic arts, not only their meaning in linguistics. See Section 6.4.4 above.

⁸⁸ This is not the same as suggesting that the axiological values – aesthetic, ethical, or political – which are manifested in any of these four areas must necessarily be accepted uncritically, or simply allowed to pass in a neutral stance of relativistic tolerance. Too hasty a rush to judgement is always unwise and to be avoided. However, critical and moral judgements are never completely “off limits.” Indeed, under some circumstances, they may well be an obligation on the part of the interpreter (e.g. to expressly disavow any morally indefensible content). While I consider that there is an inescapable axiological dimension in all acts of interpretation, it is outside my scope to discuss this point further in this thesis.
### Part III

Interpreting Works of Conceptual Music  
(Chapters 9 to 14)

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<td>five modes of conceptualisation</td>
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### Part II

This chapter

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Chapter 7

Developing an Interpretive Model – III. A Systems Perspective

7.1 Introduction

In this fourth of five chapters devoted to the building of methodology, I shift attention to consider the higher-level of the three-layered interpretive model that I am progressively developing. At this higher-level, the discursive actions of individuals (at the middle or focal-level) and the unfolding of semiotic processes (at the lower-level) are no longer discernible in detail. Instead, they have coalesced to form the general patterns and recurring laws that characterise the “big picture” scale and dynamics of socio-cultural systems.¹

One of the most important theoretical thinkers on the fundamental principles observable in the semiotic behaviour of such systems was Juri Lotman (and those who followed him in the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics). I shall draw on Lotman’s insights regarding the semiosphere, and the role of translation between semiotic modelling systems.

The chapter concludes with an elaboration – into the socio-cultural realm – of the model of musical meaning that was introduced in Chapter 4, and further developed in Chapter 6. This hinges on the recognition that “texts” are always in a dialogic relation with a universe of social and cultural constructs, viz. their “others.” By the end of this chapter, I will have reached a point at which I will be ready to consolidate the various component developed so far into a single overall interpretive model. The task of consolidation will be undertaken in Chapter 8.

¹ Stanley Salthe emphasises that, in a compositional hierarchy, the scale and rate of change at the higher-level is at least an order of magnitude larger or slower, respectively, than at the focal-level immediately below it. Salthe, “Hierarchical Structures,” 362.
7.2 The Semiotic Theories of Juri Lotman

7.2.1 Background

In Western academic circles, Juri Lotman (1922-1993), co-founder of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, is less well-known than Peirce and Ricoeur. Nevertheless, Lotman’s earlier work in cultural semiotics achieved considerable recognition in the West, particularly in the 1970s. During that period, mutual influences and resonances can be traced in the writings of several of his contemporaries, for example, in the dialogic perspectives of Umberto Eco and Mikhail Bakhtin, or in the systemic approaches of Niklas Luhmann. Importantly, in the late 1960s, Lotman established a fruitful relationship with Thomas A. Sebeok, thereby helping to lay some of the main foundations for the widespread syncretism that presently characterises semiotic studies in the twenty-first century. However, in the last decades of the twentieth century, Lotman’s reputation somewhat faded in the West. It is only relatively recently that there has been a resurgence of interest in Lotman amongst Western scholars, partly fuelled by the English translation of his last two books.

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2 In this thesis, I standardise the transliteration of Lotman’s name to “Juri M. Lotman” or simply “Juri Lotman” if the middle initial is not required.
3 For the history of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, see Waldstein, The Soviet Empire of Signs; Fleischer, Die sowjetische Semiotik.
7 Tuuli Raudla and Tanel Pern, “The Tartu Connection: Thomas Sebeok’s correspondence with Juri Lotman,” in Semiotics Continues to Astonish: Thomas A. Sebeok and the Doctrine of Signs, ed. Paul Cobby et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2011): 475-84; see also the chapter entitled “The Estonian Connection,” in Thomas A. Sebeok, Global Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001): 160-71. Lotman’s ideas were an important influence on subsequent work by Thomas A. Sebeok and Marcel Danesi, in their joint project to articulate a universal semiotic framework, which they refer to as modelling systems theory (see Appendix I). However, I have no need to refer to the details of modelling systems theory in this thesis. Susan Petrilli characterises Sebeok as “the greatest master of signs in semiotics of the twentieth century.” Susan Petrilli, “About a master of signs starting from The Sign & Its Masters,” in Cobby et al., Semiotics Continues to Astonish, 294. According to John Deely, Sebeok “was the single most important intellectual of the 20th century for the development of semiotics in what we have come to understand of it by the 21st century’s first decade.” John Deely, “Thomas A. Sebeok and semiotics of the 21st century,” in Cobby et al., Semiotics Continues to Astonish, 121.
Lotman’s conception of the *semiosphere* is fairly well-known, although it is not always appreciated as the paradoxical and paradigm-shifting notion that it is.\(^{10}\) However, there is no need to discuss it in detail here. It is enough to observe that Lotman, much like Peirce, conceives of a universe of signs in constant flux – the *semiosphere* – as the all-encompassing arena in which meaning-making processes unfold. Within this overarching context of the semiosphere, it is Lotman’s theory of *semiotic modelling systems* – and the essential function of translation between such systems – which is of primary importance for my purposes.

### 7.2.2 The Requirement for At Least Two Semiotic Modelling Systems

Arguably, Lotman’s most far-reaching claim is that new meanings can only ever emerge through a process of *translation* between at least two languages or, more precisely, between at least two *semiotic modelling systems*.\(^{11}\) For Lotman, “the elementary act of thinking is translation” and “the elementary mechanism of translating is dialogue [between two modelling systems].”\(^{12}\) He justifies this conclusion by contrasting *creative or artistic* translation – which is never exactly reversible – with rote or mechanical mappings between two codes (see Appendix L for details). Critically, it is *only* artistic translation through which genuinely new information is created.

A closely related proposition follows: “the minimal meaning-generating unit is not one language, but two.”\(^{13}\) Lotman points out that this proposition – i.e. that all meaning requires *at least* two languages – has implications that are far-reaching and profound:

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\(^{11}\) This claim, in various wordings, appears several times throughout Lotman’s writings. See, for example, Juri Lotman, “On the semiosphere,” 225. To be sure, as Peeter Torop argues, preparatory groundwork for this proposition can be identified in the ideas of several key figures in Lotman’s intellectual milieu – including, at least, the Russian Formalist Juri Tynyanov, Roman Jakobson, Mikhail Bakhtin (particularly his unfinished work on chronotope). See Peeter Torop, “Foreword: Lotmanian explosion”, in Lotman, *Culture and Explosion*, xxxiii-xxxv.

\(^{12}\) Lotman, *Universe of the Mind*, 143.

Even the nature of the intellectual act could be described in terms of the translation, a definition of meaning as a translation from one language to another, whereas extra-lingual reality may be regarded as yet another type of language.\textsuperscript{14}

In a later formulation, he put it this way:

Culture is in principle polyglottic and its texts are always realised in the space of at least two semiotic systems.\textsuperscript{15}

Lotman considered this principle applicable to all semiotic systems generally, not just to the restricted case of translation between natural languages.\textsuperscript{16}

\subsection*{7.2.3 The Necessity and Desirability of Mistranslation}

In Lotman’s semiotic theory, mistranslation between at least two semiotic modelling systems is unavoidable and inevitable. More than this, it is desirable and essential. Mistranslation is the only process through which genuinely new information is able to be created. In Culture and Explosion, Lotman illustrates the critical importance of mistranslation by reference to a simplistic – and, as he is quick to point out, inadequate\textsuperscript{17} – diagram (Fig. 7.1), where A and B represent the “lingual space” of a speaker and hearer respectively.

\textsuperscript{14} Lotman, Culture and Explosion, 6.
\textsuperscript{16} Characteristically, Lotman uses key terms, such as translation, language, and text, in their broadest possible senses. For Lotman, “language” means not just natural language, but, in its most general sense, refers to a “modelling system”. For him, any [modelling] system that facilitates “communication between two or more individuals may be defined as a language.” See Juri M. Lotman, The Structure of the Artistic Text, trans. Ronald Vroon (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, 1977), 7. In earlier works, Lotman considered natural spoken languages to be primary modelling systems, while languages of culture (the arts, music, architecture, etc) are secondary modelling systems. However, he later rejected this idea. See Aleksei Semenenko, The Texture of Culture: An Introduction to Yuri Lotman’s Semiotic Theory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 38. Meanwhile, Thomas Sebeok appropriated Lotman’s model, and supplemented it with Jakob von Uexküll’s central idea of the Umwelt, to develop a three-tiered schema, in which natural language becomes the secondary modelling system. See Sebeok, A Sign Is Just a Sign; also Thomas A. Sebeok and Marcel Danesi, The Forms of Meaning: Modeling Systems Theory and Semiotic Analysis (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000): 6, Fig. 3; 16, Fig. 4. While an important enhancement, Sebeok’s schema is not central to my argument in this thesis, and I will not consider it further.
\textsuperscript{17} Lotman comments on the inadequacy of two-dimensional diagrams for visually representing multiple interacting semiotic systems: “The problem of the intersection of semantic spaces is complicated by the fact that the
Referring to this diagram, Lotman gives one of the more eloquent versions of his counterintuitive claim that “inadequate” translation can be a good thing.

The space of intersection between A and B becomes the natural basis of communication. Meanwhile, or so it seems, the non-intersecting parts of these spaces are excluded from the dialogue. However, here we find ourselves faced by yet another contradiction: the exchange of information within the intersecting parts of the semantic space suffers from the self-same flaw of triviality. It appears that the value of dialogue is linked not to the intersecting part, but to the transfer of information between non-intersecting parts. ... the more difficult and inadequate the translation of one non-intersecting part of the space into the language of the other, the more valuable, in informative and social terms, the fact of this paradoxical communication.18

In *Universe of the Mind*, he puts it this way:

... where translation is impossible ... it is precisely in these situations that efforts to translate are most determined and the results most valuable. For the results are not precise translations, but *approximate equivalences* determined by the cultural-psychological and semiotic context common to both systems. This kind of ‘illegitimate’, imprecise, but approximate translation is one of the most important

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18 Ibid., 5, italics added.

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features of any creative thinking. For these ‘illegitimate’ associations provoke new semantic connections and give rise to texts that are in principle new ones.\textsuperscript{19}

Or, more succinctly: “The combination of translatability-untranslatability ... is what determines the creative function.”\textsuperscript{20} This principle resonates with Ricoeur’s theory of imagination, which holds that the greater the distance between an artworld text and reality, the greater the potential “productive reference” of that text (see Section 6.4.2).

In Fig. 7.2, I have expanded Fig. 7.1 to show how key elements of Lotman’s theoretical ideas integrate into a single overall model of semiosis. Here I explicitly show that context and the semiosphere play an essential role (as Lotman emphasises in the above-quoted passage). Fig. 7.2 illustrates the case in which new information – [text b] – is created by the receiver, who translates or interprets [text a], transmitted in language A (a semiotic modelling system), into language B (the second semiotic modelling system).

Figure 7.2 An Expanded Version of Fig. 7.1, Showing Other Key Aspects of Lotman’s Overall Model of Semiosis.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 37, italics added
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 13.
Lotman conceived of the notions of semiosphere and semiotic modelling system as abstractions applicable at any level of semiosis, from the micro to the macro.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, for example, Lotman considered the principle of translation between two modelling systems to apply equally to models of brain processes in humans (which assign markedly different functions to left and right brain hemispheres),\textsuperscript{22} at one end of the spectrum, and to “the global semiotic unity,” at the other end of the spectrum.\textsuperscript{23} Lotman himself put it this way – “the development of right-left … from the genetic-molecular level to the most complex information processes, forms the basis of dialogue — the basis of all meaning-making processes.”\textsuperscript{24}

From this we can see that there is a \textit{recursive, multi-level structure} implicit in Lotman’s overall framework. This means that a specific grouping of entities and relationships at one level of a given model can also be viewed as a sub-system appearing as a single entity from a higher-level perspective. To illustrate how this recursive principle operates, consider Fig. 7.3 where the familiar elements of Fig 7.2 are used to illustrate a more complex scenario. In Fig. 7.3, an individual artist creates a “composite” text that already involves a translation between two semiotic sub-systems A and B (which are part of a larger meta-system, X). The artist then “transmits” that text to a receiver. The receiver, in turn, interprets (translates) the received text for themselves, into the language or semiotic system which is assumed to be most relevant in light of the apparent semiotic context (with or without an awareness of the initial translation process undertaken by the artist).

\textsuperscript{21} Aleksei Semenenko observes that “Lotman described all semiospheric levels from human personality to the text to larger semiotic unities as ‘semiospheres inserted into one another’.” See Semenenko, \textit{Texture of Culture}, 125, citing Lotman, “On the semiosphere.”


\textsuperscript{23} Lotman, “On the semiosphere,” 225.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., italics added.
The examples discussed above are all relatively simple. Certainly, they are far less complex than those which we could expect to typically encounter in real art-world situations. Nevertheless, they illustrate two core principles of Lotman’s semiotic model:

- the requirement of translation between at least two semiotic modelling systems, within the semiosphere, as the minimal meaning-making process ("the principle of multiple semiotic systems");
- the universal, scalable and recursive applicability of “the principle of multiple semiotic systems” to all semiotic processes at all levels ("the principle of recursive universality").

I shall carry both these principles forward into my own interpretive model.

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25 The short-hand descriptions of these principles are my own, not Lotman’s.
It might be argued that the universal applicability of Lotman’s “principle of multiple semiotic systems” across all levels of semiotic processes – i.e. from micro to macro – undermines its discriminatory powers once we seek to apply it to specific cases. If semiotic systems are everywhere and easily to be found, what’s the point of searching for them? From the previous discussion, it is correct to notice that it would be a trivial task to always point to at least two semiotic modelling systems that are active in any semiotic exchange. For example, we could simply acknowledge the interaction of the left- and right-hemispheres in the brain(s) of any human agent(s) who are engaged. Or, only slightly less trivially, we could identify each of the distinct tonal layers of polytonal composition as a separate semiotic modelling system interacting within a larger whole. Once we start looking, examples could be multiplied indefinitely.

However, any objection to enlisting Lotman’s insights on the basis of their ubiquitous manifestations would be misguided. Such a critique would disregard the core motivation for identifying any semiotic modelling systems which may be functioning in a given situation. This motivation is, of course, not to merely catalogue as many semiotic sub-systems as possible. Rather, it is to increase explanatory power at the chosen level of analysis. It may indeed be a relatively simple matter to identify any number of semiotic modelling systems which may be active across multiple levels of signification. However, the goal of the hermeneutic analyst lies elsewhere. That goal is to selectively delineate only those relevant semiotic modelling systems which serve to best explain how key processes of translation and interpretation “work” at the level of analysis under consideration. This goal, in turn, serves the overall purpose of developing “exuberant understanding,” as discussed in Chapter 1.

7.3 The Artwork and Its “Other”

We are now ready to return to the topic of conceptual music and consider how Lotman’s semiotic theories can be used to supplement the interpretive model that I have been assembling in previous chapters. In particular, the “principle of multiple semiotic systems” interacting within a semiosphere foregrounds an aspect of artwork creation (poetics) and reception (hermeneutics) that is sometimes downplayed or ignored, i.e. the material surface of any public perceptual objects which are presented to an audience is
never able to be interpreted in abstracted isolation. There is always a context that governs any interpretation of what is available to perception. This context itself is comprised of multiple overlapping semiotic systems, including the “worlds” of the artist and audience, and their domains of prior knowledge – some shared and well-known, some more exclusive – about styles, genres, prior works, culture and history. We can think of any publicly presented object as a semiotic system in its own right, one which is always in an implicit or explicit dialogue with at least one other semiotic system, i.e. the shared contextualising knowledge of its relevant artistic heritage.

In other words, while our analytical focus continues to be on the “work” as presented to an audience at the “discourse level” (Chapter 6), it would be impossible to develop an adequate analytical explanation of what is “going on” without also explicitly identifying and describing the influence of the most relevant semiotic system(s) operating at the cultural level. That’s because it is only from semiotic systems at the cultural level that both artist and audience members are able to draw critical contextual information about genres, styles, prior works, general cultural history, and so on. Without this contextual knowledge, the full meaning of the work cannot be properly understood. Importantly, to prevent a totally opaque solipsism on the artist’s part, or a correspondingly complete incomprehension on the part of the audience, at least a common kernel of this contextual information must be shared between artist and audience, equally available to both. This state of affairs is illustrated in Fig. 7.4.
Notice that a process of translation or interpretation occurs not only between artist and audience but also – figuratively speaking – between the “text,” as presented via public perceptual object(s), and relevant point(s) of shared cultural reference. These cultural references are often not presented directly, in material form. Typically, they are taken for granted, “hidden” from direct perception. But they are active nevertheless, recalled by artist and audience alike from a shared cultural memory. This returns us to Peirce’s tripartite model of semiosis, discussed in Chapter 5. Recall that, in Peirce’s model, the interpretant is never the outcome of a simple dyadic signifier/signified equivalence (à la Saussure). Rather, there is always an object – the referent or “invisible other” of the sign (or representamen) – which governs the range of possible and plausible interpretants.

Here we begin to see more specifically where – in seeking to enhance our understanding of artistic and musical “texts” – we might profitably look for the semiotic systems which make it fundamentally possible for such “texts” to create new meanings, indeed for them to be meaningful at all. Of course, overall context matters and cannot be dispensed with. However, of itself, talking of context does not get us very far. It is
relatively trivial to observe that works of art or music can only be interpreted as such if
an audience first appreciates that whatever is being presented to them is intended to be
perceived in an artworld context. While this observation is undoubtedly true, it hardly
adds to our understanding of individual works.

Kramer asks: “How do we know what context is pertinent?”26 His question stems from
a sceptical position, betraying a certain pessimism regarding the investigation of context
as a useful interpretive concern. However, I am inclined towards a more optimistic
viewpoint. Thus, to Kramer’s question, I would propose that the “pertinent” context(s)
– those which are worth the effort of being explicitly identified and attended to – are
those which serve to add the most to the “exuberance” of our interpretive understanding.
Also, more often than not, contextual specifics and singular instances will probably be
more illuminating than observations regarding broad generalities. In other words, it
seems to me that our analytical insights are likely to become more focused and incisive,
and our understanding potentially more “exuberant,” the more precisely – and
persuasively – we are able to pinpoint the cultural other(s) (i.e. objects in Peirce’s
terminology) to which the presented “text” (i.e. sign) refers. In order of increasing
specificity, such cultural objects may range from high-level entities such as national
cultures, traditions and genres, at one end of the spectrum, to more specific constructs,
such as characteristic styles of artistic sub-groups or individual artists, signature sounds
or identified canonical works, at the other end.

Taking stock of the argument so far, Lotman’s conception of translation in an artworld
context applies in two related but distinct directions – (1) between artist(s) and
audiences, and (2) between a work (as manifested by one or more public perceptual
objects) and its relevant cultural other(s). To be precise, both forms of translation
process take place in the minds of the human agents, i.e. artist(s) and audiences
participating in an artworld experience. In postmodern critical theory, the second type
of relationship – between “texts” and their “other(s)” – is a well-established principle,
referred to as intertextuality. However, the first type of relationship – between artist(s)
and audiences – was downplayed or neglected in the writings of most postmodern

26 Kramer, Thought of Music, 91.
theorists active in the West. The next sub-section explores possible reasons behind this neglect.

7.3.1 Intertextuality or Dialogism?

One of the lasting intellectual legacies of twentieth-century critical theory is the recognition that every “text” can only be understood in relation to its “other.” There is no such thing as a completely autonomous “text.” It has become a generally-accepted truism that “all texts invoke and rework other texts in a rich and ever-evolving cultural mosaic.”

The intellectual origin of this notion can be traced to the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin. From there, it undoubtedly influenced Lotman, and also found its way into the thinking of seminal postmodern theorists such as Julia Kristeva and Tzvetan Todorov, to name just two.

Kristeva’s favoured term for this fundamental operating principle of culture was intertextuality. This term has become so widely used in contemporary critical theory that its early history – and the alternative term which it displaced – is rarely remarked upon today. However, it is a point that is worth briefly re-visiting. Andrea Lesic-Thomas explains that Kristeva introduced the term “intertextuality” in a purposeful move to replace Bakhtin’s notion of “dialogism.” “Intertextuality” quickly gained currency, and was adopted by influential scholars such as Todorov. Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio argue that, in using the disinterested term “intertextuality,” rather than “dialogism,” Todorov “dampens the revolutionary charge of Bakhtin’s thought, if not

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31 Lesic-Thomas, “Behind Bakhtin,” 1. According to Sophie Vlacos, “For Kristeva, Bakhtinian polyphony promised a means of return to the question of the exculpated subject. Recognising the climate as an intertemperate one, however, she held back the theme of subjectivity, or rather intersubjectivity, in favour of the more conducive proposition of intertextuality.” Sophie Vlacos, *Ricoeur, Literature and Imagination* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 41.
completely annulling it.”\footnote{33} In a similar vein, Lesic-Thomas states that “the conceptual change which accompanied [the] terminological change from ‘dialogism’ to ‘intertextuality’ is probably one of the greatest intellectual repackaging and marketing schemes in recent history.”\footnote{34} These are weighty criticisms. However, I tend to agree. “Intertextuality” serves to hide or “bracket” – if not erase – the intentional actions of the artists behind the “texts,” granting full interpretive control to the audience of readers. In other words, with “intertextuality,” the focus of investigation is all too easily reduced solely to texts and their entangled networks of interconnection, celebrating “the death of the author.”

“Dialogue,” on the other hand, explicitly preserves a recognition of the communicative actions of intentional human agents – both authors and readers – and their mediated interactions.\footnote{35} Importantly, Bakhtin’s conception of “dialogue” entails an axiological imperative which is not present in the neutered term “intertextuality.” Bakhtin insisted on the essential role of otherness – or \textit{alterity} – not just with respect to the identity of the human subject, but also with regard to the identity (i.e. meaning) of artistic texts.\footnote{36} In his view:

\begin{quote}
The organizing power in all aesthetic forms is the \textit{axiological} category of the other, the relationship to the other …\footnote{37}
\end{quote}

Or, again:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\footnote{33} Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio, \textit{Semiotics Unbounded: Interpretive Routes through the Open Network of Signs} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 145.
\footnote{34} Lesic-Thomas, “Behind Bakhtin,” 1.
\footnote{35} On this point see also Matthias Freise, “After the Expulsion of the Author: Bakhtin as an Answer to Poststructuralism,” in \textit{Face to Face: Bakhtin in Russia and the West}, ed. Carol Adam et al., 131-41 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997).
… the text lives only through contact with another text (context). We understand that this contact is a *dialogic* contact between texts (utterances) and not a mechanical contact of opposition between abstract elements … Behind this contact there is a contact between people and not between things.\(^{38}\)

Notice that Bakhtin maintains that the dialogic principle applies in the same two directions which also underpin Lotman’s model, as discussed above (Fig. 7.4). As Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio put it: “According to Bakhtin, dialogue consists in the fact that one’s own word always alludes to the word of the other, in spite of itself and whether it knows it or not.”\(^{39}\) The “other” in these passages refers not only to the immediate and present interlocutor, but also to the “intercorporeal [other] in both a diachronic and synchronic perspective.”\(^{40}\) It therefore includes cultural memories of the historical “other,” as conveyed in artefacts and texts. Petrilli and Ponzio sum it up in a simple proposition: “Identity is dialogic.”\(^{41}\) This principle applies to all types of identity, including the identity of texts. Umberto Eco put it this way:

Thus I rediscovered what writers have always known (and told us again and again):
books always speak of other books, and every story tells a story that has already been told.\(^{42}\)

Ricoeur made a similar observation. According to him, “each work is an original production, a new existent in the realm of discourse. But the reverse is no less true: innovation remains a rule-governed behavior. The work of imagination does not start from scratch. It is connected in one way or another to the paradigms of a tradition.”\(^{43}\)

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\(^{38}\) Mikhail Bakhtin, *Estetika slovesnogo tvorchestva* [*Aesthetics of Verbal Art*] (Moscow: Oskusstvo, 1979 [1974]). This passage in English translation is quoted from Petrilli and Ponzio, *Semiotics Unbounded*, 146, emphasis added.

\(^{39}\) Petrilli and Ponzio, *Semiotics Unbounded*, 144.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 275.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 267.

\(^{42}\) Eco, *Postscript*, 20. In Bakhtin’s terminology, “[The speaker] presupposes not only the existence of the language system he is using, but also the existence of preceding utterances – his own and others’ – with which his given utterance enters into one kind of relation to another (builds on them, polemizes with them, or simply presumes they are already known to the listener). Any utterance is a link in a very complexly organized chain of other utterances.” Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, trans. Vern W. McGee, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 69.

\(^{43}\) Paul Ricoeur, “The Text as Dynamic Entity,” in *Identity of the Literary Text*, ed. Mario J. Valdés and Owen J. Miller (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 182. He goes on to say that the identity of a text is located at a “point of equilibrium between the process of sedimentation and the process of innovation, and implies a twofold identification, that of the *paradigms that it exemplifies* and that of the deviance that measures its novelty.” Ibid., 183, emphasis added. Of course, Ricoeur steadfastly defended the irreducibility of human agency in such formulations (Chapter 6). Henry Venema comments on these passages that, for Ricoeur, “the identity of a text and the question of
Petrilli and Ponzio link the Bakhtinian notion of dialogic otherness to the Peircean model of semiotics:

Like Peirce, Bakhtin placed the sign in the context of dialogism – which is the only context where it flourishes as a sign …  

They explain that

the sign, insofar as it is a sign, is other; in other words, a sign can be characterized as a sign because of its structural opening to the other and, therefore, because it is [in] dialogue with the other. This suggests that the sign’s identity is grounded in the logic of alterity.  

With these observations in mind, the obvious question for the analyst is: “Which other(s)?”

7.3.2 Locating the “Other(s)”

Without denying the essential and irreducible role of agency and intentions in the unfolding processes of translation, Fig. 7.5 brings together these different perspectives – of Peirce, Ricoeur, Lotman and Bakhtin – on the relation between an artworld text and its “other(s).” Specifically, Fig. 7.5 illustrates the second type of translation in Lotman’s theoretical model, i.e. every artistic text has a contextual or textual “other,” which may often be implicit or “hidden.” At general levels, such relationships are trivially easy to identify and nominate. Every tango is related, by generic relation, to every other tango. Every symphony is part of the symphonic tradition in Western music.

The aim of exuberant understanding is to move beyond such relatively trivial observations. Our interpretive understanding of a given “text” is likely to be more

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enhanced the more precisely we are able to locate a work’s “other(s)” within the unruly, amorphous flux of signifying processes which Lotman refers to as the \textit{semiosphere}.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure.png}
\caption{Every Artistic Text is in Dialogue with Its Artistic Other(s)}
\end{figure}

Inevitably, the degree of precision with which a work’s “other” can be specified may vary greatly, depending on the work. In some cases, the “other” is a single identifiable work. In music, examples of paired relationships between a single work and a single other include \textit{arrangements}, \textit{cover versions}, and \textit{pastiche}.\footnote{These are all types of parody as Linda Hutcheon defines it. Linda Hutcheon, \textit{A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth-Century Art Forms}, repr. ed., with a new introduction (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000).} Recursively, the immediate “other” of a work can sometimes be an earlier version of itself. In music, such cases are known as \textit{re-arrangements} or \textit{remixes}.

The “other(s)” of a work may also involve an assemblage of multiple individual items, some or all of which are able to be identified. In music, these are known as \textit{medleys},
collages, and mash-ups. For example, Karlheinz Stockhausen’s work *Hymnen* (1966-7) is “an enormous tapestry of national anthems,” created using recorded extracts of about forty national anthems, supplemented with other recordings of people’s voices, crowds, radio noises and animal sounds. In this case, the work’s musical “others” are the various national anthems sampled, which are mostly readily recognisable in the released recording of the work. Perhaps less obviously, the “others” of this work also include some “non-musical” sound elements, representing concepts such as the notions of “radio transmission,” “crowds” and “animals.” These “other(s)” have been introduced into the work from the wider semiosphere, where they had previously not necessarily been considered as part of the “art/music world.” I shall discuss this in more detail in the next section.

### 7.4 The “Other” as Concept

The discussion so far applies to all works of art and music. An additional observation returns us to the topic of conceptual music. In the same way that a composer of conceptual music may choose to shine a conceptual “spotlight” onto dimensions of meaning which were previously non-conceptual (see Chapter 6), the “other(s)” of a work may also be self-consciously and explicitly “shifted” to become primary aspects of its conceptual content. The “shifting” of a work’s “other(s)” into the conceptual domain can be achieved through the same mechanisms already discussed in Chapter 6, such as paratextual devices (e.g. titles, program notes) or reliance upon the assumed familiarity of non-verbal referential signals amongst the audience (e.g. well-known melodies, “signature” sounds).

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49 After the appearance of *Hymnen*, other musical works which adopted similar tape collage approaches – such as The Beatles’ “Revolution #9” (1969) – would now include Stockhausen’s work *Hymnen* amongst their inner circle of closely related musical “others.” Indeed, The Beatles’ track frequently repeats the spoken phrase “number nine,” evidently a direct citation of a spoken phrase which also appears in *Hymnen* (Side 1). See Ian Macdonald, *Revolution in the Head: The Beatles’ Records and the Sixties* (New York: Henry Holt, 1994), 233-34.

50 Karlheinz Stockhausen, *Hymnen, für elektronische und konkrete Klänge*, Deutsche Grammophon 139 421/22, [1969], 2 vinyl LPs.
From this, it becomes apparent that there exists another dimension – consisting of the “other(s)” of a work – which may be pivotal to the interpretation of a given work of conceptual music. For conceptual works of this type, any exegesis should aim to identify the work’s “other(s),” as specifically as possible, based on the available evidence. Often, the artist or composer may have made the identification of the work’s “other(s)” relatively straightforward, e.g. by providing explicit information in the form of titles, program notes, or other paratexts. In other cases, however, a work’s “other(s)” may not be immediately apparent or self-evident, but may nevertheless be important to a well-rounded interpretation. In such cases, any claims regarding the specific “other(s)” which are considered to be significant should aim to satisfy the same criterion of verisimilitude which governs all other aspects of the interpretive undertaking.\footnote{Kramer reminds us that interpretations “can be neither true nor false in a simple, unequivocal sense.” Kramer, \textit{Thought of Music}, 27. Instead, they are inherently open to debate and revision. Nevertheless, the riskiness of interpretation is no reason to not attempt it.}

At a minimum, an artworld text’s “others” are, by definition, artworld texts which are either presented co-temporally or, more usually, have gone before. Through the intentional actions of human agents, these other texts are able to participate – synchronically or diachronically – in a dialogue with the artist’s text by virtue of their presence in the cultural memory shared by artist and audience. Therefore, for heuristic purposes, we can envisage that a text’s others are shared cultural and contextual knowledge “located” at the socio-cultural level of the three-layered hierarchical model that I have been developing. This is illustrated in Figure 7.6 (compare this with Fig. 6.8).
So far in this discussion, I have focused the discussion on artworld “texts” which are intentionally highlighted by an artist as the conceptual “other(s)” of a work. However, the boundaries between the artworld and the wider semiosphere are notoriously porous. Indeed, literally anything in the semiosphere may be instantly inducted into the artworld through the purposeful action of one or more artists (Chapter 6). Accepting this to be the case, it is apparent that, in a single deliberative gesture (involving one or more public perceptual objects), an artist\(^{52}\) could simultaneously (1) shift any aspect of the semiosphere into the artworld, and (2) highlight that aspect of the (formerly) “exterior” world as an important conceptual focus of a work.

This approach to conceptualisation is illustrated in Fig. 7.7, which now includes an additional arrow flowing – via the artworld – into the conceptual “world of the work.” This new arrow may be thought of as a more generalised variant or sub-type\(^{53}\) of the mode of conceptualisation in which an artist intentionally refers to the “other(s) of a

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\(^{52}\) Of course, such gestures are also available to audiences and critics.

\(^{53}\) It might be argued that an intentional reference to pre-existing artworld entities is sufficiently different from a reference to “exterior” entities in the wider semiosphere to warrant treating them as qualitatively distinct modes of conceptualisation. However, for the sake of keeping the scale of this thesis within manageable limits, I will consider the two approaches to be variants of a single overall mode.
work,” where the “other” may now also be an aspect of the exterior world which had previously been located outside the artworld (i.e. until the artist’s intervention). There are no limits on what such exterior “other(s)” could include. Thus, the generalised version of this mode encompasses an extraordinarily diverse range of creative possibilities.

Figure 7.7 Generalised Version of “Other(s) of a Work” Showing the Possibility of Including Texts Drawn from Aspects of Worlds Previously External to the Artworld
In Chapter 6, I observed that the interpretive model which is emerging in this thesis can be expressed as a series of verbal predicates, all expansions of the fundamental formula “I make something” –

\[
\begin{align*}
I & \text{ make [something]} \\
I & \text{ make [an identity]} \\
I & \text{ make [ways of making]} \\
I & \text{ make [worlds of potential meanings]}
\end{align*}
\]

Looking at Fig. 7.7, there is a logical extension to this list –

\[
I \text{ make [a relationship to other something(s)]}
\]

As we have seen, the nature of this relationship is general in the extreme. It encompasses a vast range of creative practices and possibilities, including imitation, transformation, adaptation, translation, interpretation, representation, distortion, mistranslation, criticism, opposition, homage, allusion, quotation, to name just some. I shall use “referring” as the name for this mode of conceptualisation. It is a term which does equal justice to the diverse range of relationships listed above, as well as to any and all referred entities, regardless of whether they are located in the artworld or in the semiosphere.

### 7.5 Summing Up

This chapter has elaborated the socio-cultural systems level of the interpretive model which I have been progressively articulating. The key point to emerge from this discussion is that works of art or music always exist in an implicit or explicit dialogue with their textual and cultural “other(s).” Therefore, in principle, all works could be considered and interpreted in relation to their “other(s).” However, when those “other(s)” remain in the conceptual background, as secondary aspects of the work overall, they need not necessarily receive close attention in an exegetical analysis. In
cases where the “other(s)” of a work have been raised to a position of conceptual prominence, they need to be considered in any well-rounded interpretation. In Chapter 12, I will consider some examples of precisely this type of conceptual music.

The next chapter ties together the main threads of argument developed in this and preceding chapters of Part II, to present a consolidated and somewhat simplified interpretive model. This model will then be tested, in Part III, for its interpretive usefulness.
### Part I

**Problem, Definitions & Context**

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### Part II

**Methodology**

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### Part III

**Interpreting Works of Conceptual Music**

(Chapters 9 to 14)

**Part IV**

**Conclusions & Directions for Further Research**

(Chapter 15)
Chapter 8

A Consolidated Model for the Exegesis of Conceptual Music

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I bring together the main threads of argument developed in previous chapters to present a consolidated interpretive model for the exegesis of conceptual music. This will involve two main steps.

Firstly, I recapitulate an important insight which first emerged from the discussion in Chapter 6, i.e. there are no practical limits or restrictions whatsoever regarding the nature and content of the ideas and concepts with which works of conceptual music may be principally concerned. Literally anything at all may be “shifted” into the conceptual “spotlight” associated with a work. The potential for “conceptualising shifts” became apparent – and could only be clearly articulated – at the discourse level of the interpretive model (Chapter 6). From there, it was carried forward into the development of the higher level of the model in Chapter 7. However, in hindsight, it is now clear that “conceptualising shifts” are also relevant to the lower level of the model developed in Chapter 5.

Secondly, therefore, I re-visit this lower level of my three-layered model. Specifically, I apply precisely the same principle to this lower level as was done in Chapter 7 for the higher level of the model, i.e. to recognise the potential for artists to intentionally “shift” aspects of lower level sign processes into the conceptual domain. This move completes the development of the final version of my interpretive model for the exegesis of conceptual music.

I conclude this chapter by observing that the main divisions in the final version of the interpretive model can be thought of as five different modes which artists and composers might adopt in creating works of conceptual music. These five modes form

---

1 Such “conceptualising shifts” may be achieved intentionally by the artist, for example through the deployment of standard paratextual devices, such as titles and program notes. Or, they may occur without the sanction, or even the awareness of, the artist, as new ideational content is accreted to the world of a work due to external events or the actions of others.
the basis of a preliminary typology of conceptual music. I assert that these modes are discernible in works by other artists, as well as in works from own creative practice. (Of course, more than one mode may be operating in a given work.) This assertion will be tested and justified in Part III of this thesis where I will work through each of the five modes in sequence.

8.2 Ideas and Concepts in Conceptual Music Can Come From Anywhere

To begin this section, recall the discussion in Chapter 1. There I proposed a model representing a continuum of thought, ranging from ideas at one end of the spectrum, to concepts at the other end (Fig. 1.1, reproduced as Fig. 8.1 for ease of reference).

![Diagram](image.png)

*Figure 8.1. Vorstellung and Begriff on the Cyclical Continuum of Thought* [Gedanke]

(= Fig. 1.1)

If this is accepted, then it follows that there is no limit to what this continuum of thought is able to contain within it. I take it as axiomatic that anything in the universe of signs – or semiosphere, to use Lotman’s term – is available to thought.

Thus, in principle, when it comes to works of conceptual music, there are no practical limits or restrictions whatsoever regarding the nature and content of the ideas and concepts with which such works may be principally concerned. To repeat: Literally anything at all may be “shifted” into the conceptual “spotlight” associated with a work.
In preceding chapters, this general principle has already been exemplified a number of
times. Thus, in Chapter 6, we saw that identity and technē, both normally non-
conceptual dimensions of musical signification (see Chapter 4), may be consciously
shifted into the conceptual domain, either by the artist or the audience. In Chapter 7, I
showed how the same “conceptualising shift” could be applied to the “other(s)” of a
work, which could be located either in the artworld or in the broader semiosphere.

8.3 Signifying Processes as Concept

It now becomes clear that an additional “conceptualising shift” is also possible within
the three-layered model that I have been developing. Specifically, there is nothing to
prevent artists from also shining the conceptual “spotlight” directly onto the signifying
processes which are unfolding in their own work. In other words, the lower level of the
interpretive model can also serve as a source of ideas, in the same way that the higher
level is able to do. Fig. 8.2 extends Fig. 7.6 to explicitly show this additional
possibility.
In terms of the predicative formulation given in Chapters 6 and 7, one additional statement is required to reflect this –

I make [something]

I make [an identity]
I make [ways of making]
I make [worlds of potential meanings]
I make [relationships to other something(s)]
I make [ways of signifying]

At this point, it is useful to re-cap some of the key points from previous chapters. Conceptual music is “located” in Koelsch’s extra-musical domain (Chapter 4). I have equated this domain with Ricoeur’s “world of a work” (Chapter 6). Every work of art
establishes a world which opens up “before” it. This world comes into existence for all works, both conceptual and non-conceptual, as an inevitable concomitant of the work’s emergence, precisely at the same time as the work itself is first created – as an intentional act – by the artist(s) and made manifest to target audience(s) through the presentation of one or more public perceptual objects (Chapter 2). From the moment of their first presentation, the work and its world – like the twin stars of a binary system – simultaneously become available to audiences for potential recognition, appreciation or immersion. All works are inextricably coupled to an associated world. That world often remains passive and is of secondary importance. It may serve as an unremarked and conventionalised backdrop for other dimensions of the overall aesthetic experience, such as embodied sensory and perceptual effects (i.e. non-conceptual dimensions (Chapter 4)). However, in conceptual works, the world of the work – always a world of ideas and concepts – has a preeminence well above all other aspects of the intended experience. In terms of the theatrical metaphor introduced in Chapter 4, conceptual music shines a fixed spotlight onto the extra-musical world of a work. This is illustrated in Fig. 8.3.

Figure 8.3 Interpretive Model – Conceptual Music Shines a Spotlight on the Extra-Musical World of a Work
8.4 Worldmaking as Concept

One final step needed in order to complete the interpretive model which I have been developing. In chapters 5 to 7 I have discussed four different ways in which composers of conceptual music can seek to focus audience attention on a particular dimension of a work’s formation and configuration. Specifically, a composer may choose to “conceptualise” the dimensions of (1) identity, (2) technē, (3) signs, or (4) the relationship to “other(s)” of a work (either in the artworld or the wider semiosphere). These four dimensions might otherwise remain implicit or unnoticed, except that they have been intentionally “shifted” out of the productive and presentational shadows and into the conceptual spotlight of the work’s world. Putting it another way, these four “modes of conceptualisation” all involve a self-referential foregrounding of processes and relationships that are irreducibly involved with a work’s making or coming into being, i.e. in the creative act itself. In terms of the predicative formulation above, these four modes equate respectively to the four statements:

- I make [an identity]
- I make [ways of making]
- I make [relationships to other something(s)]
- I make [ways of signifying]

So far, I have left the omitted fifth statement in this sequence – i.e. I make [worlds of potential meanings] – in a somewhat under-examined state. That’s because, in the interpretive model which has been progressively emerging, it “maps” onto the extra-musical domain of conceptual music itself. In order to present any of the first four statements for consideration as concepts, a conceptualising “shift” – into the “spotlight” of Fig. 8.3 – is required. However, this fifth mode of conceptualising is not dependent on “shifting” anything from another domain of meaning into the conceptual spotlight. Rather, this mode operates by shining the spotlight onto itself, i.e. onto the conceptual domain of the “world of the work.” Like the other modes, it is self-reflexive. But it operates recursively, so to speak, at a higher meta-level of self-reflection than the others. I shall refer to this mode of conceptualising as worldmaking, a term first coined...
by Nelson Goodman\(^2\) (see Appendix K).

At first glance, it may seem strange to talk of “worlds” and worldmaking as being in the conceptual spotlight, which I have already equated with the “world of the work.” Any momentary sense of paradox can be dispelled once we recall that each of the other modes of conceptualising discussed in previous chapters may be highlighted to varying levels of intensity, or “illumination,” to continue the spotlight metaphor. All modes of conceptualisation are latently and irreducibly present in all works. The intensity to which any particular mode is highlighted extra-musically, for clear visibility and conceptual attention by an audience, can vary from work to work. Similarly, all works involve the creation of a “world.” However, when the conceptual spotlight is aimed squarely and intensely on the existence of a rich and immersive world which has been painstakingly created by the artist(s), we can say that the world itself – or the creative act of worldmaking – has been elevated to a conceptual prominence. The capacity for worldmaking assumes a “starring” role, above and beyond the presence of any individual works which also exist in that world, and serve as tangible manifestations of it.

Artists and composers operating in this mode, present informational and sensory content which has been designed to be so expansive or immersive that it typically exceeds the ability of a human audience to take it all in or completely comprehend it in any single experiential event (e.g. a performance, viewing, or reading). In such content-saturated and perceptually overloaded cases, the created worlds are sufficiently “developed” and cohesive in their various informational, logical and spatio-temporal dimensions to be able to support the presentation of multiple distinctive works, all of which remain consistent with those principles. In other words, the artist-created “world” itself becomes a kind of meta-work. Individual works which are consistent with the artistic “laws” governing that world serve as “entry portals” into it.

For some composers of conceptual music, the essential ability – indeed, obligation – on the part of artists to make worlds becomes, at a meta-level, the central point of their

creative practice and major work(s). In such cases, the worldmaking ability of artists becomes the pivotal concern, focused on answering the question “What kind of world is it that I choose to make?” Composers who work in this domain are employing a fifth mode of conceptualising, which focuses on the creative act of worldmaking itself.

8.5 A Preliminary Typology of Conceptual Music

The previous section completes the progressive development of a unified interpretive model aimed at the exegesis of conceptual music. In Figs. 8.2 and 8.3, the flow of multiple arrows into the domain labeled “conceptual music” reflects the principle that literally anything in the entire universe of signs (semiosphere) can be “shifted” into the “spotlight” of the “world of a work,” including the capacity for worldmaking itself. At first glance, the omnivorous capacity of conceptual music to draw on ideas and concepts from literally anywhere might suggest that any attempt to devise some kind of typology is quixotic and doomed to fail. This would be unduly pessimistic. Of course, no typology could be expected to be optimal in all circumstances. However, in my view, the interpretive model shown in Fig. 8.2 contains within it a simple typology of conceptual music which seems potentially useful for the exegesis of a wide range of works. Most of this typology has already revealed itself in earlier chapters, in the “checklists” of items which I have identified for potential consideration in developing a well-rounded interpretation.

Specifically, I propose a preliminary typology of five modes of conceptual music. I have labelled each mode with a verb, to highlight my claim that each of them describes intentional actions which are invariably and irreducibly taken by all artists or composers in the production and presentation of any creative works. For music-based works, when one or more of these creative actions are intentionally shifted into the conceptual spotlight, they become distinctive modes of conceptual music. Reading from left to right, each of the five modes refers to one of the domains or levels shown in Fig. 8.2, as follows –
• identifying [identity];
• signifying [signs of a work];
• crafting [technē];
• referring [“other(s)” of a work];
• worldmaking [world of a work].

Several of the verbs which I have chosen as labels for different modes of conceptualisation in music have prior history and come with a certain amount of intellectual “baggage.” For example, Tom Angier has given an excellent account of the range of meanings associated with technē, and the difficulties of aligning it with any single English equivalent. His decision to emphasise “crafting” in the title of his book has encouraged me to choose this as a satisfactory label in my own terminology. Similarly, the term “referring” is heavily laden with philosophical and linguistic connotations, so much so that some scholars are reluctant to offer anything beyond a “broad characterization” in place of definitions. Without embarking on a detailed review of this heavily contested domain, I use the term “referring” to highlight the non-controversial observation that “we make our discourse concern particular objects.” Those “objects” may be “texts” in the artworld, or perhaps semiotic or socio-cultural “objects” located in the broader semiosphere. Thus, sidestepping the many detailed debates, I am content to define “reference as a relation between one kind of thing and another kind of thing.” As a final example, Goodman’s term “worldmaking” has spawned its own substantial secondary literature.

The prior history of each of these terms is acknowledged. But it is not especially important for my purposes. My over-riding aim has been to find simple English labels to distinguish the five modes of conceptualising shown in Fig. 8.2. I suggest that the labels which I have chosen achieve this objective, while steering clear of any jarring inconsistencies with their pre-existing connotations. Indeed, many of these prior

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3 Angier, Technē in Aristotle’s Ethics.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., emphasis added.
connotations are entirely consistent with my intended associations. For example, Keir Elam characterises referring and predicating as “the fundamental universe-stocking acts,”\(^8\) which is reminiscent of Lotman’s claim that new knowledge is only generated by acts of translation between semiotic systems (Chapter 7).

This five-fold typology does not pretend to do equal justice to all the possible ways in which conceptual music may be presented or the unbounded sources available for its conceptual content. It is especially attuned to meta-referential and self-reflective approaches to conceptual art and music. For this reason, it is well-suited to the exegesis of certain works above others, including works from my own creative practice. Alternative typological schemas could no doubt be conceived to divide up the domain of conceptual music on some other defensible basis (e.g. modes of socio-cultural critique, or modes of intermedial ekphrasis). All that I claim is that the proposed typology effectively distinguishes five available approaches for creating conceptual music which can be discerned in the creative works of a broad spectrum of artists, including myself. To justify this claim, the first five chapters of Part III will address each of the five modes in order, and test the usefulness of the typology for the interpretation of works of conceptual music. This chapter sequence is shown in Fig. 8.4.

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8.6 Summing Up

This chapter has presented the final version of an interpretive model for the exegesis of conceptual music. Embedded with this framework is a basic typology of five modes of creating conceptual music, which I have labelled as –

- **identifying** [identity];
- **signifying** [signs of a work];
- **crafting** [technē];
- **referring** [“other(s)” of a work];
- **worldmaking** [world of a work].

I claim that these modes are discernible in the conceptual works of a range of artists and

---

Note that sequence of modes in this list simply reflects the chapter order in Part III. This is purely for convenience of exposition, in dealing with inter-related topics. There is no other significance intended in my choice of this particular sequence.
composers, including myself. To justify this claim, Part III of this thesis will demonstrate the usefulness of this typology for the interpretive analysis of a broad spectrum of specific works.

Notice that, in Fig. 8.3, most of the arrows which flow into the “conceptual music” spotlight originate from within the different sub-domains of the artworld domain. Only one arrow “reaches” into the “world of a work” from beyond the artworld – i.e. from the general semiosphere – and is classified as a sub-type of the referring mode. In other words, the model that I have arrived at displays the greatest degree of classificatory discrimination amongst the different possible sources of ideas and concepts within the artworld itself. This is not surprising, given that the project of progressively articulating this model began with the premise that my focal level is discourse, between artists/composers and their audiences. Thus, the interpretive model is likely to be especially sympathetic to the meta-referential (including self-referential) and ekphrastic attitudes which characterise the work of many contemporary artists. However, this orientation implies no particular viewpoint or agenda regarding the autonomy of art. On that historically vexed issue, the model in Figs. 8.2 and 8.3 is agnostic. The explicit arrow flowing from the semiosphere to the artworld allows for artistic engagement with the wider world in all conceivable ways, including critical, polemical, political and spiritual.

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10 Wolf, Metareferential Turn.
12 Ever since Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory was (unfairly) interpreted and rejected as a defence of the autonomy of art, the notion of autonomy in the arts has been at least suspect, if not completely discredited. The relevant literature is extensive. See, for example, James M. Harding, “Historical Dialectics and the Autonomy of Art in Adorno’s Asthetische Theorie,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 50, no. 3 (1992): 183-95. In essence, any strong view of art’s autonomy precludes the practice of art as cultural, social or political critique. In a short essay, Peter Osborne identifies four misconceptions of autonomy in art, viz. (1) aesthetic autonomy, (2) self-referentiality, (3) freedom of the artist, and (4) freedom from social determination. See Peter Osborne, “Theorem 4: Autonomy. Can It Be True of Art and Politics at the Same Time?” (2012). Available at www.onlineopen.org/download.php?id=364.
Part III

Interpreting Works of Conceptual Music
Part IV
Conclusions & Directions for Further Research
(Chapter 15)

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| worldmaking [world of a work]  | Harry Partch – Delusion of the Fury  
|                          | Rohan Kriwaczek – The Art of Funerary Violin  
|                          | Ragnar Kjartansson (feat. The National) – A Lot of Sorrow |
| referring ["other(s)" of a work]  | Beck – Sea Change  
|                          | Arnold Schoenberg – Verklärte Nacht (Transfigured Night)  
|                          | Gavin Bryars – The Sinking of the Titanic |
|                          | Peter Ablinger – Weiss/Weisslich  
|                          | Lawrence English – Viento |
| signifying [signs of a work]  | León Schidlowsky – Deutschland, ein Winternächten  
|                          | Dieter Schnebel – MO-NØ  
|                          | Adolf Wölfli – St. Adolf Giant Creation |
| identifying [identity]  | David Bowie – “Ashes to Ashes”  
|                          | Arnold Schoenberg – Pierrot Lunaire |

Part III
Establishing the Problem & Its Context
(Chapters 1 to 3)

Part II
Methodology – Developing an Interpretive Model
(Chapters 4 to 8)

Part I

This chapter
Chapter 9

Mode of Identifying – Identity as Concept

9.1 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to a discussion of identifying, the first of the five modes in the typology of conceptual music proposed in Chapter 8. The purpose is to review specific case studies which provide evidence to support the claim already put forward in Part II, i.e. that certain music-based works by well-known artists cannot be effectively understood or interpreted without a recognition and close examination of the dimension of artistic identity, a dimension which is predominantly conceptual.

Before considering any individual works, I first return – in Section 9.2 – to a closer reading of the writings of Paul Ricoeur on identity. This enables me to tease out some of the practical ways in which identity can be made manifest to an audience in order for its conceptual importance to be able to be initially recognised and appreciated. I will show that there is an irreducible material domain to the presentation and recognition of artistic/musical identity.¹

In Sections 9.3 and 9.4 I turn to the main business of this chapter, viz. to discuss two works in which the dimension of identity is prominent and conceptually important. My aim is to show that close examination of the central place of artistic identity in these works enhances the richness and insightfulness of their exegesis, significantly more so than if their conceptual dimension were not noticed or deliberately ignored. Inter alia, I shall remark on the practical means through which key aspects of identity in these works are presented to audience. These ancillary observations will serve to confirm that the various material qualities of identity, theoretically derived from Ricoeur’s writings in Section 9.2, are indeed utilised in the creative works of real-world practitioners.

¹ In view of the discussion in Chapter 2, this conclusion is not surprising.
The works/artists I shall discuss are –

- **Section 9.3 – David Bowie**
  - “Ashes to Ashes” (1980), a single from the album *Scary Monsters (and Super Creeps)* (1980), plus official video;
  - “Love is Lost (Hello Steve Reich Mix for the DFA by James Murphy (edit))” (2013), from the album *The Next Day*, plus Bowie’s video for the edited version.

- **Section 9.4 – Arnold Schoenberg**

Finally, in Section 9.5, I conclude this chapter with a summary of the key points established in the preceding discussion.

### 9.2 Identity According to Ricoeur – A Closer Look

In artworld and musical contexts, the notion of narrative identity has been enthusiastically embraced. Thus, for example, the life story of a questing, revolutionary hero is an archetypical trope – of the lone visionary genius – which is often associated with artists, writers and composers of the Classical\(^2\) and Romantic\(^3\) eras. With adjustments to deflate the historical emphasis on the place of exceptional genius in the scheme of things, this image – of a constantly evolving, and perhaps “messy,” artistic identity – is still relevant to the present era.\(^4\) However, while it holds sway in various contemporary contexts, the notion of identity is undoubtedly multi-faceted and

---


\(^3\) For example, Simon Williams, *Wagner and the Romantic Hero* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

sometimes actively contested.\textsuperscript{5} I make no attempt to review the extensive wider literature here.

In Chapter 6, I introduced “identity” as a key category in my interpretive model \textit{via} the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. In this section, I return to consider his model of identity more closely.

Arto Laitinen itemises no less than eight different characterisations of \textit{narrative} or \textit{personal} identity\textsuperscript{6} in Ricoeur’s writings.\textsuperscript{7} While the details are not important, this observation indicates that, for Ricoeur, narrative identity was a complex and subtly nuanced notion. In view of the complexities, I will concentrate only on those aspects of Ricoeur’s model which are most helpful for the exegesis of musical works in which the notion of \textit{artistic identity} has been shifted into the conceptual spotlight.

The three key points of Ricoeur’s model of identity that I wish to emphasise may be summarised as follows –

\begin{itemize}
  \item Narrative identity is the outcome of a constantly developing \textit{dialectical relation} between selfhood (\textit{ipse}) and sameness (\textit{idem}).\textsuperscript{8}
  \item \textit{Ipse} identity is made manifest – or “designated” – through intentional acts of human \textit{agency}, as “works” and the associated volitional choices which underpin emplotment. In light of the discussion in Chapter 2, the manifestation of \textit{ipse} identity requires the material presentation of at least one public perceptual object.
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{6} In his later writings, Ricoeur uses \textit{narrative} and \textit{personal identity} interchangeably. See, for example, Paul Ricoeur, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 101.


\textsuperscript{8} As Olav Bryant Smith shows, Ricoeur’s model of narrative identity has strong resonances with Whitehead’s process metaphysics. Smith, \textit{Myths of the Self}, 40.
• *Idem* identity is simultaneously the *source* of possible narrative identities, the constraining *ground* of their limits, and the return *destination* for their accretion, sedimentation and, perhaps, eventual reconciliation. The *material* or mundane dimensions of *idem* identity also can never be entirely eliminated.

Let us consider each of these points in turn.

### 9.2.1 Narrative Identity as a Dialectical Relation (or Process)

In the third volume of *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur introduces an essential distinction between an abstract “identity understood in the sense of being the same (*idem*), [and] identity understood in the sense of oneself as self-same [soi-même] (ipse).”\(^9\) He explains that

> The difference between *idem* and *ipse* is nothing more than the difference between a substantial or formal identity and a narrative identity. … [narrative] identity rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text. … Unlike the abstract identity of the Same, this narrative identity, constitutive of self-constancy, can include change, mutability, within the cohesion of one lifetime.\(^10\)

In the passage above, first published in French in 1985, Ricoeur simply equates *ipse*-identity with *narrative identity*. However, he subsequently refined his model of identity, specifically in *Oneself as Another* (1992 [1990]), in lectures,\(^11\) and in *The Course of Recognition* (2005 [2004]). In these writings, Ricoeur corrected his earlier failure to properly recognise the importance of sameness (*idem*) and to clearly distinguish between *narrative* identity and selfhood (*ipse* identity). In these later formulations, narrative (or personal) identity is now construed as the outcome of a
continuing dialectical relation between idem identity and ipse identity.\textsuperscript{12} For example, from 1993, we have this succinct statement:

The notion of narrative identity provides the appropriate occasion for an explicit dialectic between the idem and the ipse poles of personal identity.\textsuperscript{13}

Admittedly, some of Ricouer’s statements on this topic are somewhat opaque, for example, when he talks of the “pole of character, where idem and ipse tend to coincide.”\textsuperscript{14} Ricoeur himself describes such statements as “barely skirting paradox.”\textsuperscript{15} However, he is quick to affirm that “this overlapping of ipse and idem is not such that it makes us give up all attempts to distinguish between them.”\textsuperscript{16} Thus, the dialectical interdependence of ipse and idem identity in the formation of narrative identity remains secure and underpins much of Ricoeur’s late period thought. Both aspects are involved in the presentation and interpretation of identity. Ipse identity only makes sense – indeed, is only possible – in terms of an ongoing dialectical relation with idem identity.\textsuperscript{17}

This is “the dialectic of selfhood and sameness,” which Ricoeur highlighted as one of the three pillars of his “hermeneutics of the self.”\textsuperscript{18} In my view, it is his most potent insight into the nature of narrative identity. Charles Reagan sums it up well: “Narrative identity is between the poles of sameness as character and selfhood as responsibility.”\textsuperscript{19}

In other words, narrative identity fundamentally and irreducibly depends on two forms of identity – sameness (idem) and selfhood (ipse) – interacting in a continuing dialectical relation throughout the course of an individual’s life.

\textsuperscript{12} For a good discussion of this important development in Ricoeur’s thought on identity, see Sebastian Kaufmann, “The Attestation of the Self as a Bridge Between Hermeneutics and Ontology in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur” (PhD diss., Marquette University, 2010): 99.

\textsuperscript{13} Ricoeur, “Self as Ipse,” 114. Similar passages can be found in The Course of Recognition, 101-102, and Oneself as Another, 140.

\textsuperscript{14} Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 119. By this, he seems to mean that ipse identity is something which is able to overcome idem identity through force of habit, in a sense transforming or supplementing idem identity with the permanence of “character.” Thus, he elaborates: “By means of this stability, borrowed from acquired habits and identifications … character assures at once numerical identity, qualitative identity, uninterrupted continuity across change, and, finally permanence in time which defines sameness. I would say, barely skirting paradox, that the identity of character expresses a certain adherence of the ‘what?’ to the ‘who?’” Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 122.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 122.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} “… one cannot think the idem of the person through without considering the ipse, even when one entirely covers over the other.” Ibid., 121.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 16.

9.2.2  Ipse Identity

In his earlier writings on identity, Ricoeur generally focused his discussion on narrative identity, which – at that point – was not yet clearly differentiated from *ipse* identity. However, as discussed in the previous sub-section, Ricoeur eventually refined his model, to conceive of *narrative identity* as a dialectical relation between two forms of identity (*idem* and *ipse*).

Within this dialectical conception, *selfhood* or *ipse* identity is the location of *action, intention, agency* and *choice* (within the limits of externally imposed constraints). As David Hall, puts it: “Ricoeur claimed that selfhood is attested to in the *capacity to act* and in the abilities of the will to leave its traces on the course of events in the world.” Ricoeur himself put it this way:

> To begin to unfold the notion of ipseity is to look into the nature of the question to which the self constitutes [a] response, or a range of responses. The question is the question who, distinct from the question what. It is the question we preferentially pose in the *domain of action* when, in searching for the *agent*, the author of the action, we ask, ‘who did this or that?’

For Ricoeur, the making and keeping of promises to others is one of the most important realms for practising the volitional agency, or self-constancy, which he associates with *ipse* identity. However, Ricoeur also extended the notion of selfhood into the realm of the arts, observing that the actions and works of an artist “testify to” or “designate” the *ipseity* of their creator (Chapter 6). Notice Ricoeur’s careful use of language here. Works and actions – which we can collectively refer to as “texts” – are not simply equated with *ipse* identity. Rather, these “texts” *manifest* the existence of *ipseity* by

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20. This is because, for him, *ipse* identity was the necessary counterbalance to the notion of static identity that he found deeply problematic in the philosophies of Locke and Hume. See Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 125. Many secondary discussions of Ricoeur’s conception of identity tend to follow this early lead and also concentrate on *narrative* and/or *ipse* identity.


23. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 123. From this perspective, the axiological implications of *ipseity* come clearly into view.
virtue of the assumption – on the part of an audience – that one or more intentional human agents are the author(s) of the works and actions that are being presented.\footnote{While the axiological implications of *ipseity* are still relevant in artworld contexts, they are perhaps less immediately apparent once the focus of attention is turned towards the "texts" themselves.}

At a more mundane level, we should not forget that there is also an irreducible material aspect to every presentation of *ipseity*. Even the most abstracted works and "texts" require at least one public perceptual object in order to become manifested (Chapter 2). For example, in the case of making promises, some form of natural language utterance – spoken or written – must first occur.

### 9.2.3 Idem Identity

In view of the axiological implications associated with the intentionality and agency of selfhood, it is perhaps not surprising that Ricoeur’s writings on identity focus predominantly on the pole of *ipseity*. For Ricoeur, moral and ethical questions were never far from his central concerns.\footnote{See, for example, Boyd Blundell, *Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy: Detour and Return* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).}

However, as we have seen, at least in his later writings, Ricoeur does not dismiss or exclude idem identity from his overall model of identity. On the contrary, he acknowledges that, interacting with ipse identity, there is also a unifying thread of constancy to human identity – an irreducible sameness associated with the unique existence or personhood of each productive individual. In Ricoeur’s terminology, this sameness is the connecting thread of idem identity, which persists regardless of life’s vicissitudes and the exigencies of chance events, transcending the passing of time or the separation of space.\footnote{In this regard, Ricoeur’s philosophy can be characterised as a form of personalism, linked to Emmanuel Levinas and Max Scheler. See Annette Hilt, “Traces of the Person: Max Scheler’s and Paul Ricoeur’s Attempts on Personal Ethics,” *Frontiers of Philosophy in China*, 10, no. 1 (2015): 130-47.} Bernard Daunehauer explains that

a person’s idem-identity is the identity by virtue of which he or she remains spatiotemporally selfsame. This identity includes not only one’s distinctive biological makeup (e.g., one’s distinctive DNA), but also one’s acquired habits, dispositions,
beliefs, and self-assumed roles. This idem-identity is describable in empirical terms. By contrast, a person’s ipse-identity is not empirically evident. It is, rather, discernible as a kind of self-constancy, an ongoing capacity to make commitments and either keep them or break them.27

Typically for him, Ricoeur himself was attracted to the axiological aspects of idem identity, associating it with “character” (see Section 9.2.1 above). In light of this, we might question Daunehauer’s assertion that idem-identity is completely “describable in empirical terms.” However, in my view, Dauenhauer is right to at least partly associate idem identity with the material, publicly perceivable, manifestations of constancy, continuity and sameness. As we saw in Chapter 2, the material dimension can never be entirely dispensed with, even at the outermost limits of conceptual abstraction. Therefore, in the remainder of this section I will concentrate on this material aspect of idem identity.

In his writings, Ricoeur does not devote much discussion to idem identity. He devotes even less to its material dimensions. Nevertheless, Ricoeur did – very briefly – sketch a high-level conception of idem identity able to accommodate more dimensions besides just “character,” which remained his principal focus. Specifically, his few remarks point to at least two additional aspects of idem identity, besides character, which can be extrapolated into the material realm. These are proper names and substance.

Firstly, let us consider proper names, which Ricoeur discusses in the following passage:

To state the identity of an individual or community is to answer the question ‘Who did this?’ ‘Who is the agent, the author?’ We first answer this question by naming someone, that is, by designating them with a proper name.28

He immediately continues, arguing that the permanence of a proper name throughout the course of an individual life29 is inextricably bound up with the need to tell “the story

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28 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. 3, 246, emphasis added.
29 In Western cultures, names are typically more or less constant throughout a lifespan, changing only to mark major transitions such as marriage. In other cultures, names are not necessarily as constant as in the West. However, naming of individuals is a universal practice found in all human cultures (although naming systems themselves are far from uniform). See: Ellen S. Bramwell, “Personal Names and Anthropology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Names
of a life,” i.e. narrative identity. For Ricoeur, “taking the subject … designated by his, her, or its proper name, as the same throughout a life that stretches from birth to death,”30 evidently refers to an aspect of idem identity, albeit one that only becomes meaningful in dialectical relation to ipse identity, coming together into an overall narrative identity.

Secondly, carrying on from the passage just quoted, Ricoeur also refers, in passing, to idem identity as “substantial or formal identity.”31 In Oneself as Another he gives a fuller discussion of this aspect of idem identity, characterising it as the answer to the question “What am I?” (whereas ipse identity is the answer to “Who am I?”).32

According to Ricoeur, the formal sameness of substance in idem identity involves qualities of similitude, uninterrupted continuity, and permanence in time.33 In the case of human identity, this is explicitly associated with the “ontology of one’s own body.”34

Without dwelling at length on this topic, it is evident that Ricoeur acknowledges that, besides the abstracted notion of “character,” there is also a material aspect to idem identity, associated with the existence of a nameable and physically embodied agent. Recognition of who is speaking relies on the universal human ability to recognise the humanity of their interlocutor, and to distinguish between the tangible “whatness” of unique individuals on the basis of their distinctive physiological and behavioral traits. This ability depends on the relative stability or permanence of such traits over time.35

Humans naturally rely on a wide variety of perceptible traits, and employ all sensory modes, when engaged in recognising and establishing the identity of other individuals.

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30 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. 3, 246.
31 Ibid., emphasis added.
32 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 118. See also, Simms, Paul Ricoeur, 102-103.
33 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 116-18.
34 Ibid., 112.
35 The relative stability provides the evolutionary basis for the rapidly growing field of biometrics. Btihaj Ajana observes that biometrics is dedicated to the “purging of identity from its narrative dimension.” Btihaj Ajana, “Recombinant Identities: Biometrics and Narrative Bioethics,” Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 7, no. 2 (2010): 237. In other words, using Ricoeur’s terminology, we could say the field of biometric identity is defined as the study of idem identity, to the exclusion of ipse identity. This is not necessarily a pejorative description of the field of biometrics. However, I agree with Ajana, who claims that the ethical aspects raised by “biometric technology’s overzealous aspiration to accuracy, precision and objectivity” are “one of the most pressing bioethical questions vis-à-vis the realm of identification.” Ibid.
Undoubtedly, however, the most evolutionarily well-developed capabilities in this regard involve visual cues (especially facial recognition)\textsuperscript{36} and aural information (especially vocal recognition)\textsuperscript{37}. Thus, it is not surprising that the visual and aural dimensions of physical identity feature far more prominently in artistic explorations of identity than any other sensory modes (e.g. smell, touch, or taste).

9.2.4 A Consolidated View of Ricoeur’s Model of Identity for Art-World Contexts

Bringing together the threads of discussion in the three preceding sub-sections, and recalling the discussion in Chapter 2, I propose that Fig. 9.1 is a useful diagrammatic representation of Ricoeur’s model of identity.

\textsuperscript{36} In normal, unimpaired humans, the ability to recognise individual faces is special and distinct from the processing of non-face stimuli. See, for example, Charles A. Nelson, “The Development and Neural Bases of Face Recognition,” *Infant and Child Development*, 10, nos. 1-2 (2001): 3-18. The extraordinary human capability to recall individual faces is linked to the evolutionary importance of being able to rapidly distinguish between unique individuals, including one’s own mother. Thus, for example, Alice O’Toole is on safe ground when she asserts that each human face is unique and, as such, provides information about the identity of its owner. Humans can keep track of hundreds (if not thousands) of individual faces. This far exceeds our ability to memorise individual exemplars from any other class of objects …

\textsuperscript{37} A primordial evolutionary capability in humans is that of familiar voice recognition, (contrasted with unfamiliar voice recognition), sometimes also referred to as “vocal recognition of identity.” Diana Sidtis and Jody Kreiman state that “No known limit has been demonstrated for the repertory of recognisable voices in humans.” See Diana Sidtis and Jody Kreiman, “In the Beginning Was the Familiar Voice: Personally Familiar Voices in the Evolutionary and Contemporary Biology of Communication,” *Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science*, 46, no. 2 (2012): 148.

As we have seen, both selfhood and sameness involve an irreducible combination of material and immaterial aspects. In Fig. 9.1, I have shown those elements which are predominantly immaterial – at least as far as Ricoeur conceives them – within dashed line borders. Material items are shown with solid lines.\textsuperscript{38} For simplicity, I have explicitly shown only the two traditional perceptual senses that are typically most dominant in the realm of music and the performance arts, i.e. \textit{visual} and \textit{aural}.\textsuperscript{39} Also, I have expanded Ricoeur’s conception to encompass both \textit{embodied} and \textit{non-embodied} material aspects of identity. This non-embodied sub-category of substance enables me to accommodate distinctive elements – labelled as \textit{totem objects} in Fig. 9.1 – which are often exclusively or recognisably associated with the publicly presented identity of artists and musicians. Examples include –

\textsuperscript{38} The distinction between material and immaterial is sometimes blurred. For example, a person’s name can perhaps be thought of as an abstracted, immaterial entity. Yet, even a name cannot ever be made manifest, communicated or subsequently recalled in memory without the initial presentation of a material object or event (e.g. being written down or audibly spoken). These finer points need not detain us further.

\textsuperscript{39} Unusual limit case examples could be envisaged in which the other traditional senses – smell, taste, and touch – are elevated to a degree of importance usually not associated with music and the performing arts.
• Signature instrumental sounds,\textsuperscript{40} such as the unmistakable guitar timbres of Jimi Hendrix.

• Brands and logos, such as the ankh-like symbol used by (The Artist Formerly Known As) Prince.

• The music of Beck has a recognisable “sound,” involving a complex palette of “retro” and contemporary elements, as well as his singing voice. Eirik Askeroi refers to these elements as \textit{sonic markers}.\textsuperscript{41} In combination, they form a reasonably reliable material hallmark of Beck’s artistic identity.

• In the field of painting, an artist’s personal signature on a material object (e.g. canvas) is an example of a distinctive, non-embodied material trait of identity, one on which questions of authentication often depend.

Notice that, in Fig. 9.1, there is a material or mundane component associated even with the ipse branch. This is to reflect the irreducible dependence on public perceptual objects (PPOs) for the apperception of \textit{all} artistic texts and actions, as discussed in Chapter 2.

Finally, as suggested by the dialectical arrows between the public perceptual objects (PPOs) in the ipse branch, and the various visual and aural dimensions of the idem branch, the distinction between selfhood and sameness can be tenuous. The two poles sometimes seem to be on the verge of collapsing into each other, “barely skirting paradox,” as Ricoeur himself observed. Does a particular PPO serve as a manifestation of \textit{ipse} or \textit{idem} identity, or both? In many cases, the answer may be unclear or debatable. Nevertheless, for the sake of a heuristic framework, I shall follow Ricoeur and maintain a distinction between \textit{ipse} and \textit{idem}. The key point is that it is the \textit{narrative identity} which emerges from their dialectical relation is the focal “identity” that has been shifted into the conceptual spotlight in some works of conceptual music.

\textsuperscript{40} Iain Morley summarises the evidence which suggests that human voice recognition and recognition of complex musical timbres both depend “on right-hemisphere neurology, with little or no input from left-hemisphere analytical structures … The mechanisms for voice recognition are almost certainly evolutionarily far older than those for linguistic processing; the fact that timbre-rich musical sounds are processed exclusively by these mechanisms could suggest that musical processing also predates linguistic processing, or at least that the processing of tonal content predates the processing of semantic content.” Iain Morley, “Hominin Physiological Evolution and the Emergence of Musical Capacities,” in \textit{Music, Language, and Human Evolution}, ed. Nicholas Bannan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 118, emphasis in original. See also Iain Morley, \textit{The Prehistory of Music: Human Evolution, Archaeology, & the Origins of Musicality} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 177.

The *ipse* and *idem* branches of Fig. 9.1 provide a way of “unpacking” how this overall narrative identity is practically manifested in specific cases.

Within this framework, there are four broad areas through which an artist is able to publicly present a narrative or personal identity to an audience –

- works, texts
- name
- embodied presentation (including voice, appearance, costume)
- signature objects and non-embodied material traces (including sonic markers).

In works of conceptual music, if artistic identity is an essential or important dimension, then we can expect that various elements in these four areas would have been deployed – or subverted – by the artist in order to highlight the significance of this mode. Of course, not all areas will necessarily be applicable in all cases. However, typically, embodied presentation – either in person or mediated – is the primary means by which an audience is able to infer the existence of one or more uniquely identifiable human individuals who are to be associated with any other aspects of identity which are being presented contiguously. Thus, when artists deliberately erase or obfuscate the dimension of embodied presentation in their work, issues of identity are inevitably highlighted and perhaps problematised.42

The topic of authenticity is often entangled with questions of identity, especially in relation to music. However, when it comes to artistic identity, any simple opposition between authentic/inauthentic is unable to be sustained and is largely irrelevant to the problem being addressed in this thesis. See Appendix M for a discussion. In other words, fictional identity is a perfectly valid form of artistic identity, which some composers may adopt and intentionally shift into the conceptual spotlight.43

I am now ready to turn to a detailed discussion of two case studies for which the

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42 Such, for example, is the case of the anonymous artist known by the name Banksy, which may or may not refer to a single male individual. See: Banksy, *Exit Through the Gift Shop – A Banksy film*, Madman UPC 932225086463, 2010, DVD.

43 For an excellent study, see Jody Kingston, “Composing (as) another: music, fiction and the search for identity.” (PhD diss., Queensland University of Technology, 2012).
conceptual dimension of (fictional) artistic identity is – I shall argue – essential to any adequate interpretation of the works in question. The works that I have chosen to consider come from very different genres and historical eras. At the extremes, they are separated by more than a century. Nevertheless, they are united by a shared – and revealing – association with Pierrot, the archetypical tragic-comic clown, who first came to prominence in seventeenth-century Italian commedia dell’arte. For this reason, Appendix J gives an overview of the Pierrot character, focusing on aspects which are particularly relevant to the case studies in this chapter.

9.4 David Bowie and the Mask of Pierrot – Fictional Identities as Concept

In contemporary rock music, the artist who has done more than any other to personally and prominently don the mask of Pierrot is undoubtedly David Bowie. For Bowie – famous for his constantly changing stage personae – the character of Pierrot was primary. We could even say it was primordial, the one character with whom he expressly identified throughout the long arc of his career. Indeed, some of his earliest compositions as a songwriter, written while he was a member of Lindsay Kemp’s Mime Troupe, were for Kemp’s pantomime Pierrot in Turquoise (or, The Looking Glass Murders) (first performed in 1967). In that show, the role of Pierrot was played by Kemp, while Bowie’s character was named Cloud. The production was a trippy fantasy, based on the traditional love-triangle/revenge scenario involving Pierrot, Columbine, and Harlequin. The three songs Bowie wrote especially for the pantomime were titled “Threepenny Pierrot,” “Columbine,” and “The Mirror.” These songs – and the essential plot of Pierrot in Turquoise – show that, from the beginning, Bowie was

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44 The fact that Pierrot serves as a common theme across the two works discussed in this chapter, and my own collaborative project In Memory of Johnny B. Goode (see Chapter 14), is convenient from the perspective of expository efficiency. It also highlights the often complex connections and intertwined nature of creative works across the ages. However, I should emphasise that the essential argument of the present chapter is not fundamentally dependent on Pierrot, or indeed on any specific character or persona. The argument that I wish to defend in this chapter is simply that some music-based works cannot be reasonably understood or interpreted without a concerted appeal to issues of artistic identity as an extra-musical or conceptual dimension.

45 “David Bowie” was itself a stage name adopted by David Robert Jones, apparently to avoid confusion with Davy Jones of the US made-for-TV group The Monkees.

46 The only recording of this production is from a 1970 performance filmed for television, titled The Looking Glass Murders. It is included on the official DVD Love You Till Tuesday, Universal 602498233603, 2004. The songs are readily available on the internet and unofficial recordings.

47 A fourth song included in the show – “When I Live My Dream” – was recycled from Bowie’s first LP on the Deram label, the commercially unsuccessful David Bowie (1967) (Deram DML 1007/ SML 1007). Another early piece was “The Mask,” which was a mime performance with narration, included in the Love You Till Tuesday promotional film from 1969, on Love You Till Tuesday, DVD.
intimately familiar with the *commedia dell’arte* tradition in mime, puppetry\(^\text{48}\) and the performing arts. His interest in the mask of Pierrot was lifelong. It manifested itself repeatedly in his work.

As early as 1971, in a *Rolling Stone* interview, Bowie explicitly linked his work – as a rock artist – to the Pierrot tradition:

*What the music says may be serious, but as a medium it should not be questioned, analyzed, or taken so seriously. I think it should be tarted up, made into a prostitute, a parody of itself. It should be the clown, the Pierrot medium. The music is the mask the message wears – music is the Pierrot and I, the performer, am the message.*\(^\text{49}\)

In an interview from 1976 he states:

*I’m Pierrot. I’m Everyman. What I’m doing is theatre, and only theatre. … What you see on stage isn’t sinister. It’s pure clown. I’m using myself as a canvas and trying to paint the truth of our time on it. The white face, the baggy pants – they’re Pierrot, the eternal clown putting over the great sadness of 1976.*\(^\text{50}\)

It is important to recognise that the character that Bowie is specifically referring to as “Pierrot” in this 1976 interview is, in fact, his “Thin White Duke” persona (Fig. 9.2). This is the character who appeared in the artwork of the album *Station to Station* (1976), and on stage in the associated concert tour.\(^\text{51}\) It is also, arguably, the same – or at least a similarly costumed – character who appears to be dead, in a police crime scene or accident victim photo, on the cover of *Lodger* (1979) (Fig. 9.3).

Visually, the images of The Thin White Duke are some distance removed from the

\[^{48}\text{The opening sequence of *The Looking Glass Murders* uses puppets.}\]
\[^{50}\text{Jean Rook, “Waiting for Bowie, and finding a genius who insists he’s really a clown,” *Daily Express*, 5 May 1976. A full transcript of this article can be found on www.bowiegoldenyears.com. Also quoted in Dillane “Culminating Sounds,” 35.}\]
\[^{51}\text{Referred to as the Isolar tour, or simply as The Thin White Duke Tour. Refer: Nicholas Pegg, *The Complete David Bowie* (Richmond: Reynolds & Hearn, 2004). For a collection of photographs taken on the Thin White Duke tour, see Andrew Kent, *David Bowie: Behind the Curtain*, foreword by Cameron Crowe (Chicago: Press Syndication Group, 2016).}\]
traditional Pierrot iconography found in the *commedia dell’arte* and its revival in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, in the absence of Bowie’s explicit statement, we might have hesitated to identify The Thin White Duke as a variant of Pierrot. However, any such hesitation would overlook the pervasive “Pierrot Noir” alter-ego of the traditional Pierrot Blanc during the *fin-de-siècle* and Belle Époque eras (see Appendix J). In light of Bowie’s unequivocal comment, and the clear visual parallels to Pierrot Noir, the equivalence is secure. The splayed body on the cover of *Lodger* not only reprises The Thin White Duke’s sartorial look, it bears a striking resemblance to the Jules Chéret’s Pierrot illustrations from almost a century earlier (see Appendix J). In any case, the design of the inner cover of *Lodger* – which juxtaposes photos of a baby, the dead Thin White Duke, and Christ – suggests that Bowie was using the album artwork to signal that this chapter in his artistic evolution had come, or was coming, to a close. And so it turned out to be with his next album, in which all previous variants of Pierrot are (apparently) killed off.

*Figure 9.2  David Bowie as the Thin White Duke*

Source: Photo by Andrew Kent. © Andrew Kent. Used by kind permission of Andrew Kent. Also reproduced in Andrew Kent, *David Bowie: Behind the Curtain* (Chicago: Press Syndication Group, 2016), 31-32.
The album in question was *Scary Monsters (And Super Creeps)* (1980). Here the appearance of Pierrot is visually striking and immediately obvious. Bowie wears a specially-designed Pierrot costume (Fig. 9.4). This is a clear allusion – at least to those in the know – to Bowie’s early performance work, prior to rock stardom, as a member of Lindsay Kemp’s mime troupe. Images of Bowie in this costume are presented

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52 Bowie is one of three characters in Kemp’s film *The Looking Glass Murders* (1970). Kemp himself plays the Pierrot character. Bowie wrote the songs for the film, including one titled “Threepenny Pierrot”. The film was officially released on DVD in 2004 on Bowie, *Love You Till Tuesday*. The soundtrack has appeared at least once on unofficial bootlegs, including *Pierrot in Turquoise*, clown records IO-001. Bowie’s costume for the Pierrot character in “Ashes to Ashes” – one of three characters in the video played by Bowie himself – is said to be a “reproduction” of a Lindsay Kemp outfit. See Victoria Broackes, “Putting Out Fire With Gasoline: Designing David Bowie,” in *David Bowie Is…*, ed. Victoria Broackes and Geoffrey Marsh (London: V&A Publishing, 2013), 136. After a preliminary search, I have been unable to locate any images to confirm that Bowie’s costume is an exact reproduction of any Lindsay Kemp costume. However, there is no doubt that Bowie’s costume is, at the very least, similar to and in the spirit of – or a homage to – the Pierrot stylings adopted by Kemp. See, for example, Anno Wilms, *Lindsay Kemp & Company*, foreword Derek Jarman, ed. David Haughton (Berlin: Alexander Verlag, 1987). Although Bowie made the Pierrot persona a centerpiece of his own work, he freely acknowledged that his early exposure to the character was through his involvement with Lindsay Kemp: “Lindsay Kemp was a living pierrot [sic] … He lived and talked Pierrot. He was tragic and everything in his life was theatrical. And so the stage thing for him was just an extension
across all visual aspects associated with the release of this album, including the album
cover, picture sleeves for singles, publicity photographs and, perhaps most memorably,
the ground-breaking video produced for the single,\textsuperscript{53} “Ashes to Ashes” (Fig. 9.5). This
was reportedly the most expensive music video ever produced up to that time.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{b Bowie as Pierrot}
\caption{Bowie as Pierrot}
\begin{flushright}
Source: Photo by Chris Duffy © Duffy Archive. Used by kind permission of Chris Duffy, Duffy Archive Limited.
\end{flushright}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{53} The video is readily available from a variety of physical and internet sources, for example:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CMThz7cO6K0.
Figure 9.5  Stills from the official video for David Bowie’s “Ashes to Ashes” (1980)

Source: https://www.vevo.com/watch/david-bowie/ashes-to-ashes/USJT20200075. Permission to reproduce requested, no reply received.
As the title suggests, “Ashes to Ashes” is often interpreted as a kind of self-reflection on – or “purge”\(^{54}\) of – Bowie’s various incarnations and work up to that point. Most obviously, the lyrics open with the verse:

Do you remember a guy that’s been
In such an early song
I’ve heard a rumour from Ground Control
Oh no, don’t say it’s true\(^{55}\)

This, of course, is a direct self-reference to “Space Oddity” (1969), which famously opens with the line “Ground Control to Major Tom.”\(^{56} \text{ }^{57}\) The chorus of “Ashes to Ashes” further reinforces the self-referential link to Bowie’s earlier hit:

Ashes to ashes, funk to funky
We know Major Tom’s a junkie
Strung out in heaven’s high
Hitting an all-time low\(^{58}\)

And finally, the outro repeats:

My mama said, ‘To get things done
You’d better not mess with Major Tom.’\(^{59}\)


\(^{57}\) The original promotional video for “Space Oddity” makes clear, perhaps more in hindsight than when first released, that Major Tom was one member of a constantly expanding troupe of Bowie’s assumed characters, albeit one of the earliest. The video is available on a number of official DVD releases, including *Best of Bowie*, EMI DVD. Also available on YouTube at: https://youtu.be/D67kmFzSh_o.

\(^{58}\) See note 55 above for copyright information.

\(^{59}\) See note 55 above for copyright information.
While the soundtrack to “Ashes to Ashes” repeats the outro, the video shows Bowie – as Pierrot – walking along the beach with an elderly woman, evidently the “mama” referred to in the lyrics. This echoes an image first used in 1969 for the cover art of the *Space Oddity* album (Fig. 9.6). It is as if both Major Tom and Pierrot are being metaphorically consigned to the “ashes” of the song title.

*Figure 9.6*  George Underwood, *The Depth of the Circle*. *Used as Back Cover of David Bowie, Space Oddity* (1969). *(Note Pierrot walking with elderly woman in lower left corner.)*

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60 Bowie’s second album, titled *David Bowie* (1969) (Philips SBL 7912), was subsequently re-packaged with the title *Space Oddity* (1972) (RCA LSP 4813).
According to Camille Paglia, “in the finale of ‘Ashes to Ashes,’ Bowie was questioning his identity as an artist and as a man.” I agree, but would go further. I am inclined to view the Pierrot character as emblematic of Bowie’s overall artistic identity, up to that point and even to the end of his life. Beneath all the many changes in his superficial appearances, for Bowie, Pierrot represented the protean identity par excellence, a character without any fixed qualities, a mirror for all those around him, always in an irreconcilable state of perpetual “questioning.” In other words, at a meta-level, I see Pierrot as the constant presence that best symbolises Bowie’s self-revealed artistic identity, which paradoxically involves no clear or stable identity at all. As intimated by Bowie in the passage quoted above, Pierrot is the archetypical Everyman. This is a particularly apt characterisation, well-grounded in historical tradition.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Pierrot had evolved to the point that he was able to take on virtually any role whatsoever (Appendix J). This is evident in the contemporaneous postcards and other ephemera associated with the ubiquitous cabaret pantomimes and cantomimes in which the Pierrot character appeared. These show Pierrot portraying, amongst many other roles, the spurned lover, family man, abusive alcoholic, narcissist, each of the seven deadly sins, the five senses, and a practitioner of several of the main divisions of the arts. Often represented as childlike or effeminate in his male form, in some contexts Pierrot had a female counterpart (sometimes named as Pierrette). Above all, however, the fin-de-siècle Pierrot typically has an androgynous appearance, neither male nor female in gender, or perhaps both, even in scenes where he embraces his female love interest, Columbine.

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62 Discussing Watteau’s painting Pierrot, dis Gilles, Marika Knowles links the silence of Pierrot – as a mime – to the character’s essential mirror-like fluidity. “Pierrot exists in part to reflect, to willingly become whatever the viewer suggests about him. This is one of the ways in which Pierrot allegorizes the silence of the work of art as a space of projection.” Marika T. Knowles, “Pierrot’s Silence,” in Silence. Schweigen: über die stumme Praxis der Kunst, ed. Andreas Beyer and Laurent Le Bon (Berlin: Deutscher Kunstlerverlag, 2015), 144.

63 Traditionally, since the eighteenth century, there are said to be five major arts: painting, sculpture, architecture, music, and poetry. This is sometimes expanded to seven, with the addition of dance and theatre. Many other schemes have also been put forward. For the classic paper on the history of the divisions of the arts see Paul Oskar Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics, Part I,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 12, no. 4 (1951): 496-527; “The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics (II),” Journal of the History of Ideas, 13, no. 1 (1952): 17-46. For a dissenting view, see James I. Porter, “Is Art Modern? Kristeller’s ‘Modern System of the Arts’ Reconsidered,” British Journal of Aesthetics, 49, no. 1 (2009): 1-24. For another recent perspective on the debate, see Allen Speight, “Hegel on Art and Aesthetics,” in The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism, ed. Matthew C. Altman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014): 687-703. There are a number of early twentieth century postcards showing Pierrot as a practitioner of painting, sculpture, poetry, and most commonly, music (where a mandolin or guitar is typically included in the iconography).
In view of his background in Lindsay Kemp’s Mime Troupe, it is likely that Bowie was well aware of the historical fluidity of the Pierrot character in the European mime tradition. Certainly, Kemp himself had a clear sense of his own place in that tradition. Thus, I suggest that by referring to Pierrot as Everyman, Bowie was knowingly alluding to Pierrot’s historical ability to inhabit all possible identities and, thereby – ironically – to have no stable identity whatsoever. This essential lack of a unified identity is precisely the “real” artistic identity that Bowie was revealing, whenever he donned the truthful mask and garb of Pierrot.

After an absence of over three decades, both Pierrot and The Thin White Duke (a version of Pierrot as we saw above) return to Bowie’s final work. Specifically, they reappear as the only two characters in Bowie’s self-made video, for the “James Murphy for the DFA remix” of “Love Is Lost,” a track from Bowie’s penultimate album *The Next Day* (2013). Even the cover art of the album points to a deliberate self-referential perspective, being a re-working – indeed a self-effacement – of the cover of his best-selling album *Heroes* (1977). This self-referential dimension is further emphasised in this “Love Is Lost” video. Pointedly, in several scenes, Bowie’s own face – clearly recognisable – is superimposed on a mannequin wearing a black Pierrot costume (Fig. 9.7 (a)). In other scenes, the Thin White Duke version of Pierrot carries the metallic/white Pierrot “Ashes to Ashes” variant (Fig. 9.7 (b)). The black-and-white cover art of *The Next Day* reinforces these oppositions.

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66 It seems hardly coincidental that the visual presentation of Bowie’s final works emphasised the opposition between black and white. Thus, the 12” single containing the music for the remix version of “Love Is Lost” is pressed on white vinyl and housed in an almost completely white sleeve with a die-cut square hole on one side. Bowie’s next and final release – ★ [Blackstar] (2016) – was released on vinyl as an almost completely black artefact, with a die-cut star in the front cover. See the Discography at the end of this thesis for release details. The lyrics to the title track “Blackstar” repeatedly refer to a contrast between “a white star” and “a black star,” with the Bowie affirming that “I’m not a white star, I’m a black star.” See David Bowie, ★ [Blackstar] [sheet music album], London: Wise Publications, 2016), 13-4. There are several plausible readings of this. For my part, however, I suggest that one defensible interpretation can be traced to the historical opposition between the “white Pierrot (good)” and “black Pierrot (evil)” (see Appendix J).
Figure 9.7  Stills from the Bowie-directed video for “Love Is Lost” (Hello Steve Reich Mix by James Murphy for the DFA - Edit) (2013)


Musically, this remix version of “Love Is Lost” includes a clear quotation – possibly sampled – of the distinctive synthesizer\(^{67}\) hook from the introduction to “Ashes to Ashes” (Fig. 9.8).\(^{68}\) This instantly recognisable hook acts as an indexical sign which points to Pierrot. By virtue of the video for “Ashes to Ashes,” Bowie’s Pierrot had

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\(^{67}\) Dillane et al., “Culminating Sounds,” 48 suggest that timbre of this riff also hints to the sound of “a kind of organ-grinder (an allusion to earlier dramatic theatre and street forms).”

\(^{68}\) Conveniently, “Love is Lost” is in the key of B♭ m. This facilitates the quotation of the opening hook from “Ashes to Ashes,” which begins on a B♭ m chord.
acquired a musical signature, or distinctive leitmotif. Whenever it was subsequently used – as in the remix version of “Love Is Lost” – an association with Pierrot is inevitably evoked in the minds of any listeners who have at least a passing familiarity with Bowie’s best-known work.

Figure 9.8 The introduction to David Bowie’s “Ashes to Ashes” (1980)


Lyrically, “Love Is Lost” alludes to loss, endings and new beginnings, as does “Ashes to Ashes.” However, the lyrics of “Love Is Lost” are sufficiently ambiguous to suggest caution before reading too much into them. For my purposes that is not important.

69 Aileen Dillane et al. observe: “That clown and this riff are inextricably linked.” Dillane, “Culminating Sounds,” 48
What matters here is that all the observations discussed in this section, taken together, serve to support my main claim, viz. the persona of Pierrot – as artistic identity – is a central and recurring theme in Bowie’s work.\textsuperscript{70} It is one to which he drew explicit attention at key points in his career, notably at its beginning, middle, and end stages.

Except for the earliest songs Bowie wrote for \textit{Pierrot in Turquoise}, his references to Pierrot were only ever introduced indirectly, through costume and paratextual devices such as interviews, rather than directly through lyrical content.\textsuperscript{71} Nevertheless, through such extra-musical devices, Bowie’s Pierrot became explicitly identified with “Ashes to Ashes,” so much so that an identifiable \textit{musical} quotation from that song was subsequently potent enough to be able to serve as an indexical pointer to Pierrot in the remix version of the later song “Love is Lost.” This pointer was emphatically reinforced by the costumes used in the video, leaving no doubt that the conceptual content of “Love is Lost (James Murphy Remix)” – taken as a multimedia whole involving music and video – is at least partly intended to be “about” Bowie-as-Pierrot, or \textit{vice versa}.

Throughout each of these presentations of Pierrot, we remain quite certain that it is always Bowie himself who is hidden behind the mask. Indeed, he never really “hides” as such. His \textit{face} and \textit{eyes} – which were famously and singularly distinctive due to their mismatched colour, caused by a childhood accident – remain in plain sight, albeit made up and framed in costume to create the illusion of Pierrot. But such contrivances never completely obscure the uniquely identifying visual traces of the artist – “David Bowie” – who we are well aware is acting in this role. Similarly, despite its impressive range and textural dexterity, Bowie’s \textit{voice} is always unmistakably recognisable. It serves to unite the otherwise wildly disparate musical styles and genres found across his expansive recorded legacy.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{70} Other resonances with the Pierrot character are also discernible. For example, the \textit{mirror} – a key element in the \textit{fin-de-siècle} iconography of Pierrot (see Appendix J) – was a recurring feature in Bowie’s photographic presentations of himself. Notably, it appeared as a unifying graphic theme across the differently-packaged versions of his career-spanning retrospective collection \textit{Nothing Has Changed} (2014). This collection was released in several different formats and editions, all of which used images of Bowie reflected in a mirror. The trope of narcissistic self-regard in a mirror is a core element in the iconography of Pierrot.

\textsuperscript{71} Except for the songs composed for \textit{Pierrot in Turquoise}, as far as I am aware Bowie never again made explicit mention of Pierrot in any of his lyrics.

\textsuperscript{72} Shelton Waldrep rightly observes that “music … often lacks embodiment. Rock music in general and David Bowie in particular counter this absence. … One might say that Bowie’s voice is unique and what gives it its startling quality is the fact that no one else sounds like him. His voice is always recognizable in a song, and he calls a lot of attention to it by the many ways he manipulates it. But even if it were not the case that he often changes his voice
9.4.1 Conclusion

In this section, I have given a detailed discussion to show that any critical interpretations of “Ashes to Ashes” and “Love Is Lost (Remix)” would be seriously deficient if the pivotal dimension of artistic identity – and specific links to the character of Pierrot – were not taken into account. We have seen that such links were intentional and introduced by Bowie himself, who was well aware of the theatrical tradition that he was tapping into. To be sure, stripped of their extra-musical elements, the two songs are still able – and are often expected – to stand alone as purely sonic entities, for example, on the radio or as internet streams. However, in this case study, I have presented a range of evidence to support my contention that these works cannot be fully understood without a close examination of the way artistic identity has been used to infuse a rich layer of conceptual meaning into their content. Others, working from different starting points, have reached similar conclusions. It could be further argued that Pierrot – as the protean Everyman – is an appropriate emblem or “über-persona” for many of the other characters which Bowie assumed throughout the course of his career.

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73 Kathryn Johnson points out that Bowie was very well-read, especially in the arts, and always viewed his creative works holistically as multimedia entities, often laced through with allusions and hidden references. Indeed, he aspired “to become a medium” in his own right. See Kathryn Johnson, “David Bowie is,” in Devereux, David Bowie: Critical Perspectives, 14.

74 Others who have discussed Bowie’s adoption of the Pierrot persona include Carpenter, “‘Give a man a mask … ’”; Waldrep, Future Nostalgia; Dillane, “Culminating Sounds”.

75 Philip Auslander connects Lady Gaga’s contemporary “deconstruction of rock star identity from within rock itself” to the pioneering innovations of David Bowie, and their subsequent ramifications into glam. He suggests a connection between Cindy Sherman and Lady Gaga which “is manifest not only in specific iconography but also at a deeper level in that both suggest that artistic identity resides more in a process than an image.” Auslander positions Lady Gaga at the contemporary leading edge of a comet trail whose origins can be traced back to Bowie. Philip Auslander, “Twenty-First-Century-Girl: Lady Gaga, Performance Art, and Glam,” in Global Glam and Popular Music: Style and Spectacle from the 1970s to the 2000s, ed. Ian Chapman and Henry Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2016), 189, emphasis added.

76 Perhaps it is too long a bow to draw to suggest that this applies to Ziggy Stardust or Aladdin Sane, whose visual appearances bear no obvious resemblance to the standard visual iconography of Pierrot. But it seems to me likely that a deeper excavation into Bowie’s work would reveal other links to Pierrot, above and beyond those which I have highlighted here. As an example, the Thin White Duke character – who we have already shown to be an incarnation of Pierrot – re-appears in Bowie’s video for “Lazarus” (2016) from the ★ (“Blackstar”) album. See, for example, Joe Lynch, “David Bowie Is the Sickly Thin White Duke in Creepy ‘Lazarus’ Video,” Billboard, 7 January 2016. Available at www.billboard.com. Also, in the “Button Eyes” version of Bowie portrayed in the same video, it is tempting see a connection to the marionette tradition of Pierrot (see Appendix J). However, it is outside my scope to pursue this line of enquiry any further.
9.5 Schoenberg\textsuperscript{77} as Pierrot – The Case of \textit{Pierrot Lunaire}

If Bowie epitomised the creative possibilities of multiple artistic identities close to the limits of protean diversity and incipient fragmentation, then Schoenberg is an archetypical example of the complete antithesis. Throughout his career, the main – in some ways the only – artistic identity who Schoenberg was concerned with presenting, portraying, promoting or defending was, of course, “Arnold Schoenberg,” composer/artist and music theorist.\textsuperscript{78}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure9_9.jpg}
\caption{Arnold Schoenberg in Vienna, 1911. Several drawings and paintings by Schoenberg hanging on wall. Photograph by Alban Berg.}
\label{fig:9.9}
\end{figure}

\textit{Figure 9.9} Arnold Schoenberg in Vienna, 1911. Several drawings and paintings by Schoenberg hanging on wall. Photograph by Alban Berg.

Source: Arnold Schönberg Center, Vienna (ASC-ID: PH1533 = PH7974), used by permission.

\textsuperscript{77} Depending on the primary sources cited, I use both spellings – Schönberg and Schoenberg. However, where there is no particular reason to use “Schönberg,” I adopt “Schoenberg” (the spelling the composer himself adopted in later life, when living in the USA).

The well-known anecdote, repeated more than once by Schoenberg himself, goes as follows: when a superior army officer once asked him, ‘‘So you are this notorious Schoenberg, then.’ ‘Beg to report, sir, yes,’ I replied. ‘Nobody wanted to be, someone had to be, so I let it be me.’”

There are plenty of indications that the “Arnold Schoenberg” considered himself if to be a composer of genius, even if this assessment was not always shared by the world at large.

From a professional perspective, Schoenberg invested much energy and attention to detail in order to control most aspects of his publicly-presented image. Daniel Jenkins shows that “Schoenberg was keenly aware of the changing media landscape in his lifetime and its impact on the purposes of [audience] education and self-promotion.”

Like Liszt, Wagner and Richard Strauss before him, Schoenberg well understood that a key to achieving lasting impact in the world of Western art music is the active cultivation of fame and reputation. In today’s marketing terms, Schoenberg managed his public persona – “Arnold Schoenberg” – as a brand. Then, just as now, the maintenance and healthy survival of a personal brand depends upon tireless self-promotion, through all available means. In particular, throughout his career, Schoenberg made effective use of carefully-posed photographs, intended for publication, to ensure that his was one the most familiar faces on the avant-garde music scene. This was already true in the years before World War I, when Schoenberg was recognisable famous in the Vienna of 1911. As early as 1912, when Schoenberg was

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80 See, for example: *Style and Idea*, 100. Schoenberg often repeated that “in 50 years musicians and the public will understand me.” See Jenkins, *Schoenberg’s Program Notes*, 44 (also 7, 22, 66). Peter Franklin claims that Schoenberg saw himself as “the Great European Composer as a heroic subject, storing up his achievements in the course of a life designed for biographical celebration.” Peter Franklin, “Modernism, Deception, and Musical Others: Los Angeles circa 1940,” in *Western Music and Its Others: Difference, Representation, and Appropriation in Music*, ed. Georgina Born and David Hesmondhalgh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 152.


85 Muxeneder, “Arnold Schönberg’s image in print media.”

86 Therese Muxeneder quotes from a letter from Schoenberg to Emil Hertzka, dated 31 October 1911: “You have no idea how ‘famous’ I am here. … People everywhere know who I am. They recognise me from my pictures.” Ibid., 240.
still a relatively young 38 years of age, a celebratory Festschrift dedicated to him was produced by his students and friends (Fig. 9.10).  

Figure 9.10  Title Page & Frontispiece of Celebratory Volume Dedicated to Arnold Schoenberg (Munich: R. Piper, 1912).

Source: Author’s collection. Out of copyright.

Despite Schoenberg’s unwavering sense of overall life purpose, he was often troubled – indeed plagued – by feelings of self-doubt about his chosen direction as a music theorist and composer. There is a good argument to be made that, in order to better tell the personal truth about himself as a composer, he – just as Bowie was to do many decades later – adopted the mask of Pierrot, and sometimes inserted himself as an artistic identity into his works. In other words, Schoenberg sometimes shifted his own artistic identity – a matter never far from his professional attention – into the conceptual

90 This is Oscar Wilde’s “truth of masks” principle, discussed in Appendix M.


By January 1912, when Albertine Zehme first approached Arnold Schoenberg to set a selection of Hartleben’s translations of *Pierrot Lunaire* to music, staged performances of musical works featuring Pierrot had been commonplace for many years.\footnote{See the list given by Reinhold Brinkmann, “The Fool as Paradigm: Schönberg’s *Pierrot lunaire* and the Modern Artist,” in *Schoenberg & Kandinsky: An historic encounter*, ed. Konrad Boehmer (New York: Routledge, 1997), 137-67 (list on 163-6). Brinkmann’s list, which spans over three pages, includes some 38 works completed prior to 1912, the year that Schoenberg began to work on his own *Pierrot lunaire*.} Indeed,
some or all of Hartleben’s German versions had already been used by a number of other composers, including Ferdinand Pohl (*Mondrondels* (1891)), Max Marschalk (*5 Lieder*, Op. 14 (1901), Arthur Scholz ("Störche" ["The Storks"] (1911)) and Otto Vrieslander (*Pierrot lunaire* (1905), followed by four additional songs in 1911). Zehme had been publicly declaiming Hartleben’s verses to the piano accompaniment composed by Vrieslander, but was not satisfied with the music. Hence, on advice, she turned to Schoenberg for new accompaniments.

The evidence suggests that Schoenberg had probably not previously encountered Hartleben’s translations – or any of these earlier musical settings – prior to receiving the commission from Zehme. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that he would have been well-acquainted with the broader cultural phenomenon of Pierrot at that time. This can be safely concluded from the fact that Schoenberg had been the musical director and conductor for the short-lived Überbrettl literary café in Berlin, from December 1901 to its closure in May 1902. The opening night of the café – in January 1901, less than a year before Schoenberg’s appointment – included a Pierrot pantomime with improvised piano accompaniment by Oscar Straus. Also, in 1911, Schoenberg attended a performance of the pantomime *Der Schleier der Pierrette* (*The Veil of Pierrette*), a dark love triangle melodrama featuring the usual *commedia dell’arte*

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97 Brinkman, “The Fool as Paradigm,” 163-66. Brinkmann’s list is evidently incomplete, as it fails to include Arthur Scholz’s *Störche* (1911), cited in full in the preceding note.


characters of Pierrot, Pierrette, and Arlechino. In any case, in fin-de-siècle Berlin, in Schoenberg’s Vienna\textsuperscript{104} – indeed across all of Europe – the Pierrot craze had permeated every aspect of the arts and popular culture generally (Appendix J).\textsuperscript{105} Schoenberg could hardly have escaped it.\textsuperscript{106}

Against this background, Schoenberg’s affinity with the titular character of his \textit{Pierrot Lunaire} pieces has long been a question of interest to music scholars. A prevalent view is that, because the work was a commission, he approached it from a detached emotional distance, and invested little in the way of personal or autobiographical significance into its composition. Thus, Alan Lessem argues that in \textit{Pierrot Lunaire}, Schoenberg “holds himself aloof … [from] an authentic expression of a personal worldview.”\textsuperscript{107} Similarly, Joseph Auner states that Schoenberg had a “feeling of detachment from the project.”\textsuperscript{108} Some of the composer’s own statements lend support to such a view. For example, in a letter to Kandinsky, Schoenberg wrote that he had “perhaps no heartfelt necessity as regards its theme, its content (Giraud’s \textit{Pierrot Lunaire}), but certainly as regards its form.”\textsuperscript{109} Willi Reich, one of Schoenberg’s earliest biographers, states that Schoenberg had himself said that he sought to imbue the work with “a light, ironic satirical tone.”\textsuperscript{110} Such statements have led some scholars to concentrate \textit{only} on these aspects of the work, which – as Bryan Simms points out – are undoubtedly present:

… the score of Pierrot is pervaded with irony, sarcasm, and parody, as Schoenberg’s music very often comments rather than expresses itself directly.\textsuperscript{111}

However, Walter Bailey has convincingly demonstrated that programmatic elements – often with autobiographical overtones – are found in many of Schoenberg’s works.\textsuperscript{112}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{104} Brinkman, “The Fool as Paradigm,” 160.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} For example, actors in Pierrot costumes were a feature in the opening night of Max Reinhardt’s Sound and Smoke cabaret in Berlin on 23 January 1901. See Jelavich, \textit{Berlin Cabaret}, 66 (Fig. 7).
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Brinkman, “The Fool as Paradigm,” 160.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Alan Philip Lessem, \textit{Music and Text in the Works of Arnold Schoenberg: The Critical Years, 1908-1922} (Ann Arbor: UMI Press, 1979), 120.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Auner, “‘Heart and Brain in Music’,” 120.
  \item \textsuperscript{109} Letter from Schoenberg to Kandinsky, dated 19 August 1912, in Schoenberg/Kandinsky Letters, 54.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Reich, \textit{Schoenberg}, 74.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Simms, \textit{Atonal Music}, 130. Irony was undoubtedly a key trope in the Viennese zeitgeist of the Romantic and post-Romantic eras. Paul Klee wrote in his diary in 1906 that “No one has to get ironical about me, I see to that myself.” Quoted by Angela Lampe, “Paul Klee. Irony at Work,” in \textit{Paul Klee: Irony at Work}, ed. Angela Lampe (New York: Prestel, 2016), 25.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Bailey, \textit{Programmatic Elements}.
\end{itemize}
Although Bailey doesn’t single out *Pierrot Lunaire* for particular discussion, he shows that from the very earliest works such as *Verklärte Nacht (Transfigured Night)*, Op. 4 (1899) to final works such as the *String Trio*, Op. 45 (1946), Schoenberg was not averse to conceiving a programmatic dimension to his compositions. Bailey points out that Schoenberg expressly stated that he advocated an approach to composition which employed both “heart and mind”:

> It is not the heart alone which creates all that is beautiful, emotional, pathetic, affectionate, and charming; nor is it the brain alone which is able to produce the well-constructed, the soundly organised, the logical, and the complicated. … everything of supreme value in art must show heart as well as brain.\(^{113}\)

In light of such an avowal, it is perhaps not surprising that some authors have argued – correctly, in my view – that, in addition to a stance of ironic detachment on the part of the composer, *Pierrot Lunaire* also harbours a heartfelt and emotionally-invested personal “program.” This program – which mostly operates beneath the immediately apparent surface of the work – is nothing less than a paradigmatic and autobiographical self-portrait of Schoenberg himself.

At first glance, such an interpretation is not without difficulties. Specifically, there is the absence of any obvious hero connecting the narrative thread – as far as one can be discerned – of the twenty-one individual poems. Jonathan Dunsby observes that “in Pierrot there is no protagonist at all, no lucid relationship between the focus of attention, the woman reciter, and the focus of textual attention, Pierrot himself.”\(^{114}\) Something like this could also legitimately be said of Albert Giraud’s rondels, which constantly shift between different narrative points of view. But it is undoubtedly true of Schoenberg’s excerpted and re-ordered version.

Certainly, Schoenberg did not intend for the female narrator to be directly identified with Pierrot. Aidan Soder states that “Schoenberg was adamant that the Reciter should not dress in costume for *Pierrot Lunaire*, including the traditional Pierrot garb.”\(^{115}\)

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\(^{113}\) Schoenberg, “Heart and Brain in Music,” in *Style and Idea*, 75.


Nevertheless, it is very likely that Albertine Zehme was dressed as Pierrot for the premiere performance, “much to Schoenberg’s chagrin.” Stravinsky recalled that at the fourth performance – on 8 December 1912 in Berlin – Zehme “wore a pierrot [sic] costume and accompanied her epiglottal sounds with a small amount of pantomime. I remember that and the fact that the musicians were seated behind a curtain.”

Giraud’s original collection of fifty rondels includes several poems which are either explicitly or implicitly narrated by Pierrot – in the first person – as well as many more which are about Pierrot, as a third-person character observed by the narrator. However, in his adaptation of Giraud’s texts, via Hartleben, Schoenberg – with input from Zehme – eliminated any first person poems which would have strongly suggested that it is Pierrot who is speaking. Tellingly, the rondel “Bohemian Crystal,” which Giraud himself had placed last in the sequence of his original version, was omitted. This is the most revealing and confessional poem in Giraud’s sequence, in which the narrator finally admits that “Pierrot” is the symbol that truly expresses “all of himself.” So, the fact that Schoenberg chose not to use it shows again that, whatever else might be going on in his version of *Pierrot Lunaire*, he was not relying upon the lyrics to present an obvious self-portrait of himself, embodied – as it were ventriloquistically – in the voice of a reciter.

Being a commission from Zehme, Schoenberg’s *Pierrot Lunaire* had to be scored for a female voice. Zehme herself was involved in the preliminary selection of individual poems and their order in relation to each other. Above all else, the work needed to be able to be declaimed effectively, in live performance, by the actress. It is arguable that this constraint alone meant that Schoenberg would never imagine that the narrator of these pieces could serve as a disguised alter-ego for his own artistic persona.

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119 When it came to the performance of his scores, Schoenberg was far from indifferent to questions of gender and voice. For example, many years later, he was more than a little distressed when a recording of *Ode to Napoleon* was released – apparently without his authorisation – featuring a female voice in the lead part, and not a male as specified in the original score. See David H. Smyth, “Schoenberg and Dial Records: The Composer’s Correspondence with Ross Russell,” *Journal of the Arnold Schoenberg Institute*, 12, no. 1 (1989): 68-90.
Nevertheless, because the verses finally selected are all about Pierrot, or the moon, or poetry, they combine to form an indirect or reflected self-portrait of the composer, who remains hidden, as it were – along with the instrumental performers – behind the curtain. The fin-de-siècle persona of Pierrot was the consummate representation of the archetypically angst-ridden and alienated artist of the early Modern era. Richard Kurth aptly describes the Pierrot of those times as “image of the modern crisis of identity,” both “the master of mirage but also its servant.” For Kurth, the modern pantomiming Pierrot instantiates the type of artistic or aesthetic modernism in which the artwork self-consciously (and often ironically) questions its autonomy and unity, and calls attention to its alienated, artificial, conflicting, disruptive, and fragmentary qualities.

Such an image was perfectly suited as a proxy for Schoenberg himself. It echoes the characterisation of Pierrot given by Franz Blei in his foreword to the 1911 edition of Hartleben’s German translations of the original rondels. There, Blei describes Pierrot as the “moonstruck cynic who wears a black veil over his red heart, the last grandchild of romantic irony, the supplicant with the most fragile modesty, the most chaste of lechers.” Bryan Simms notes that Blei also drew attention to Pierrot’s Everyman qualities (presumably reflecting Blei’s term “Dilettantismus”). Schoenberg was hooked. He wrote in his diary on 28 January 1912: “Have read the preface, looked at the poems, am enthusiastic. Brilliant idea, absolutely to my liking. Would want to do this even without a fee.”

120 Susan Youens observes that “If Pierrot or the moon or poetry are missing, the poem is not included in Op. 21.” See Susan Youens, “Excavating an Allegory: The Texts of Pierrot Lunaire,” Journal of the Arnold Schoenberg Institute, 8, no. 2 (1984): 108.
121 As discussed above, in accordance with the pantomime conventions of the era, only the reciter Albertine Zehme was visible to the audience at the premiere performance. The instrumental players were concealed behind a curtain. Bryn-Julson and Mathews, Inside Pierrot Lunaire, 52.
122 Richard Kurth, “Pierrot’s Cave: Representation, Reverberation, Radiance,” in Cross and Berman, Schoenberg and Words, 205.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Otto Erich Hartleben, Albert Giraud Pierrot Lunaire, mit vier Musikstücken von Otto Vrieslander, [with foreword by Franz Blei] (München: Georg Müller, 1911). This must have been the edition seen by Schoenberg, because none of the earlier editions of Hartleben’s translations include a foreword.
127 Simms, Atonal Music, 123.
It is clear that many of the poems in Hartleben’s translation of *Pierrot Lunaire* resonated with Schoenberg. So much so that, as Alexander Carpenter puts it, Schoenberg “[assumes], *contingently*, the paradoxical guise of Pierrot himself.”\textsuperscript{129}

Carpenter goes on to say:

Indeed, I would argue that Schoenberg’s affinity for the Pierrot commission stems from the fact that he himself is a Pierrot at heart: a creature of both calculated outward gestures and deep, even haunted introversion.\textsuperscript{130}

Drawing on Brinkmann,\textsuperscript{131} Carpenter suggests that “at certain moments in the melodrama, Schoenberg himself seems to *become* the poet/Pierrot [about whom the reciter is declaiming], *encoding himself into the work* through instrumentation, specifically the use of the cello, Schoenberg’s own instrument.”\textsuperscript{132} Specifically, the first entry of the cello, in the first poem “Mondestrunken” [“Moondrunk”], coincides with the first time the word “Dichter” [“poet”] appears in the lyrics (Fig. 9.11). Brinkmann points out that the cello simply doubles the tenor line in the piano. For Schoenberg, this was a “strange compositional strategy.”\textsuperscript{133}

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\textsuperscript{129} Carpenter, “‘Give a Man a Mask …’”, 10, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 10-11.


\textsuperscript{132} Carpenter“‘Give a man a mask …’”, 11, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{133} Brinkman, “The Fool as Paradigm,” 162.
Also, Brinkman¹³⁴ – and Carpenter after him¹³⁵ – have remarked upon the incongruous fragments of Viennese-style waltz which occasionally appear in *Pierrot Lunaire*. They interpret these as personally meaningful allusions, by Schoenberg, to Vienna, the city of his birth.¹³⁶

Such observations lend plausibility to the suggestion that Schoenberg identified personally with the Pierrot persona who is the titular subject – but not the reciter – of *Pierrot Lunaire*. This possibility is pushed towards certainty by virtue of a dedication, dating from December 1916, which Schoenberg inscribed on a copy of the score he presented to his friend, brother-in-law and teacher, Alexander Zemlinsky. The dedication reads, in full, as follows:

My Dearest Friend, It is banal to say that we [artists] are all moonstruck fools; what the poet means is that we are trying our best to wipe off the imaginary moon spots from our

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¹³⁴ Ibid., 160-62.
¹³⁵ Carpenter, “‘Give a man a mask ...’”, 11.
¹³⁶ On the importance of waltzes to the young Schoenberg, see also Severine Neff, “‘A Kernel from the Tree of Life’: Remarks on Schönberg’s Earliest Waltzes,” in *Der junge Schönberg in Wien/The Young Schönberg in Vienna* [= *Journal of the Arnold Schönberg Center*], 10 (2015): 63-78.
clothing at the same time that we worship our crosses. Let us be thankful that we have our wounds: With them we have something that helps us to place a low value on the matter. From the scorn for our wounds comes our scorn for our enemies and our power to sacrifice our lives to a moonbeam. One could easily get emotional by thinking about the Pierrot poetry. But what the hell, isn’t there more to life than the price of corn? Many greetings. Your Arnold Schoenberg.137

Here Schoenberg is concisely alluding to three of the individual poems included in Pierrot Lunaire. The first is “Mondestrunken” [“Moondrunk”], the poem which Schoenberg chose to open the work. It concludes with the stanza:

The poet, whom devotion drives,
grows tipsy on the sacred liquor,
to heaven turning his enraptured gaze
and reeling, sucks and slurps up
the wine that through the eyes is drunk.138

The second poem alluded to by Schoenberg is “Der Mondfleck” [“The Moonfleck”], number eighteen in the overall sequence. It describes Pierrot, who notices a fleck of moonlight on his coat; mistaking it for a speck of plaster, he tries in vain to wipe it

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137 Here I have mostly followed the English translation given by Bryan Simms, Atonal Music, 126. However, as Alexander Carpenter points out, Simms has mistranslated a German colloquialism – “zum Kuckuck” – in the final sentence of the inscription. Therefore, for that final sentence (italicised here), I have adopted Carpenter’s suggested translation. See Carpenter, “‘Give a man a mask …’”, 12. The full German text of this inscription is:


Viele Grüße. Dein Arnold Schönberg.


138 Translation by Andrew Porter, quoted in Dunsby, Schoenberg Pierrot Lunaire, 29. The corresponding section in the German version of Hartleben reads:

Der Dichter, den die Andacht treibt,
Berauscht sich an dem heiligen Tranke,
Gen Himmel wender er verzückt
Das Haupt und taumeld saugt und schlürft er
Den Wein, den man mit Augen trinkt.
away. Evidently, the moonlight – impossible to remove – represents the burden of the modern artist.

The third poem referred to by Schoenberg’s is “Die Kreuze” [“The Crosses”], the fourteenth in the series. It opens with the lines:

    Holy crosses are the verses
    whereon poets bleed in silence,
    blinded by a flock of vultures
    fluttering around in spectral swarms.\(^{139}\)

In light of these allusions, the meaning of Schoenberg’s inscription to Zemlinsky is plain. Schoenberg identifies both Zemlinsky and himself as visionary artists who are fated to pursue their art in the face of incomprehension from a hostile society. Zemlinksy perfectly understood Schoenberg’s meaning. He replied:

    Dearest Friend, Your score has given me great pleasure. And the inscription is fine and indeed very true! I also began to think that we ‘better ones’ share the fate of the one addicted to the moon: if we have distanced, raised ourselves from the earth, from the others towards the moon, the unearthly, then we will ultimately be called back by the earth and crash to the depths.\(^{140}\)

There are clues to other “hidden” personal meanings which \textit{Pierrot Lunaire} may also have held for Schoenberg.\(^{141}\) Most notably, it is very possible that the traditional

\(^{139}\) Translation by Andrew Porter, quoted in Dunsby, \textit{Schoenberg} Pierrot Lunaire, 58. The corresponding section in Hartleben’s German version reads:

    Heilge Kreuze sind die Verse,
    Dran die Dichter stumm verbluten,
    Blindgeschlagen von der Geier
    Flatterndem Gespensterschwarme!


\(^{141}\) To give just two further examples: (1) Kathryn Puffett points to “a complete Schoenberg cipher” in the canon subject in the first strophe of “Nacht.” See Kathryn Puffett, “Structural Imagery: ‘Pierrot Lunaire’ Revisited,” \textit{Tempo}, 60, no. 237 (2006): 2-22. (2) The structural centrepiece of the work – the eleventh poem in the sequence “Rote Messe” [“Red Mass”] – deals with “the self-sacrifice and self-destruction of the artist [i.e. Pierrot].” See Reinhold
commedia dell’arte love triangle – Columbine, Harlequin, and Pierrot – had particular significance for Schoenberg, whose wife Gertrud had an affair with his friend Richard Gerstl only a few years earlier. The affair ended tragically with Gerstl’s suicide, after it was discovered by Schoenberg and Gertrud returned to her husband. The extent that Schoenberg sought to draw a connection in Pierrot Lunaire between Columbine/Harlequin/Pierrot and events in his recent personal life is debatable.\textsuperscript{142} For my present purposes, it is a moot point. My main claim is secure regardless, viz. the absent Pierrot character in Schoenberg’s Pierrot Lunaire represents none other than Schoenberg himself and, by extension, all other misunderstood visionary artists.

Siglind Bruhn puts it well:

Schoenberg … recognise[s] in Pierrot the modern artist par excellence. Who experiences estrangement from society, is ridiculed or even despised. Who suffers under the overall incomprehension and lack of recognition. But who, at the same time, feels pride in the knowledge that the rejection of the masses is positive proof that he is fulfilling the self-assigned task: to reveal essential truths, if often in glaring colors and sounds.\textsuperscript{143}

Above all else, Schoenberg saw in Giraud/Hartleben’s Pierrot a reflection of himself, specifically his identity as an artist. To properly understand his landmark Pierrot Lunaire, it is important to recognise that Schoenberg portrayed this self-identity – indirectly – as the conceptual focal point of the work, albeit hidden behind the curtain.

9.5.1 Conclusion

The evidence adduced in this section, especially regarding the dedication to Zemlinsky, supports my central claim. Any analysis of Schoenberg’s Pierrot Lunaire would be incomplete or one-sided without a discussion of how Schoenberg’s self-understanding of his artistic identity has been woven into the work – and its associated paratexts – as a

\textsuperscript{142} For a discussion, see Carpenter, “‘Give a man a mask …’,” 12-13.
\textsuperscript{143} Bruhn, Arnold Schoenberg’s Journey, 278.
significant conceptual dimension. Thus, Bryan Simms is on safe ground when he states that “in his own arrangement of Hartleben’s poems, Schoenberg retained some elements of Zehme’s narrative progression from lightness, to darkness, to death, but he transformed them into a personalised narrative of the plight of the artist in society.”

Brinkmann’s important analysis of Pierrot Lunaire succeeds principally due to his close examination of Schoenberg’s self-identification with the character of Pierrot. Carpenter aptly sums it up: “Pierrot is … a paradoxical blend of both detachment and unmediated self-examination and self-expression.”

The notion that identity is key to a deeper understanding of “Arnold Schoenberg, composer and theorist” and at least some of his specific works should not be controversial. Schoenberg’s formative years in Vienna coincided with the growing influence of Freud and his promotion of personal identity as the central concern of the newly emerging field of psychology. As an amateur painter, Schoenberg was more interested representing his own facial image than at least some other artists of his generation, such as his friend Kandinsky. There are over seventy self-portraits, mostly of his face, amongst Schoenberg’s surviving paintings. Some commentators have even seen a similarity between Schoenberg’s early self-portraits, including the so-called “gaze” paintings, and the white-mask make-up of the standard Pierrot mime artists of the era. This seems debatable to me, and is perhaps a step too far. However, there is no doubt that issues of identity had taken centre stage for the young artists and composers in Schoenberg’s Vienna.

In music and the arts generally, the period of early modernism elevated composers and artists to the status of extraordinary individuals endowed with a far-sighted vision and creative genius which was liable to lead to their exile as outsiders in society. Moments of self-doubt and crises of artistic identity were a natural by-product of the resultant

144 Simms, Atonal Music, 125.
146 Carpenter, “‘Give a man a mask . . .’,” 14.
150 Max Hollein, ed., The Visions of Arnold Schönberg: The Painting Years (Berlin: Hatje Cantz, 2002).
pressures. Schoenberg fitted easily into this stereotype. Indeed, it could be said that, publicly and privately, he actively cultivated precisely this image.

In a pattern which recurred more than once throughout Schoenberg’s career, it is almost as if he wanted future generations of scholars to discover the deeper layers of self-expression, self-questioning and personal conceptual meanings that he had woven into his works.\textsuperscript{152} To aid them in such endeavours, he left enough documentary clues in the historical record to enable precisely such discoveries to occur. As Joseph Auner has commented, Schoenberg seemed to have at least one eye directed towards posterity in almost everything he ever committed to paper or shared with friends and acquaintances.\textsuperscript{153} Whatever the case, there is no doubt that issues of artistic identity were never far from the extra-musical or conceptual centre of several of Schoenberg’s most important works, including \textit{Pierrot Lunaire}.

\textsuperscript{152} Another case in point is the well-known “secret” – and highly autobiographical – program associated with the \textit{String Trio}, op. 45, already briefly mentioned in Chapter 6. Bailey, \textit{Programmatic Elements}, 151-57, gives a detailed discussion. Schoenberg had divulged to various people, including author Thomas Mann, his friend and neighbour, that the piece was a musical representation of his near-death heart attack and recovery in 1946. Through Mann, this information was soon disseminated, firstly disguised in the novel \textit{Doktor Faustus} (1947) and two years later as a biographical anecdote about Schoenberg, included in Mann, \textit{Story of a Novel} (1961), 217. It was first published in German in 1949. After that, it was no longer possible for any well-read person to listen to this piece without an awareness of the programmatic links to Schoenberg’s own life. As is well-known, Mann’s disguised portrait of Schoenberg in \textit{Doktor Faustus}, caused a rift between the two friends. However, this was due more to the overall picture Mann painted of his dissolve hero Leverkühn (aka Schoenberg), rather than any particular annoyance which Schoenberg may have had because Mann had indiscreetly revealed the personal program behind the \textit{String Trio}. On the contrary, in 1949, Schoenberg himself also produced a document outlining the programmatic elements of the work. There he happily admitted that he had “told many people that it [the \textit{String Trio}] is a ‘humorous’ representation of my illness. Schoenberg’s own account of the connection between the \textit{String Trio} and his heart attack – which he “jokingly refer[red] to as ‘my fatality’” – is included in Jenkins, \textit{Schoenberg’s Program Notes}, 418-20. For further background see: Michael Cherlin, \textit{Schoenberg’s Musical Imagination} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 299-339; Jo-Ann Reif, “Adrian Leverkühn, Arnold Schoenberg, Theodor Adorno: Theorists Real and Fictitious in Thomas Mann’s \textit{Doctor Faustus},” \textit{Journal of the Arnold Schoenberg Institute}, 7, no. 1 (1983): 102-112.

9.6 Summing Up

The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate – through the detailed discussion of two case studies – that, at least in these examples, it is eminently plausible and exegetically useful to consider identity as an important dimension or mode of conceptualisation which helps to explain how these works have been intentionally crafted by their creators. In other words, by focusing on the dimension of identity, it has been possible to develop interpretations of these works which are, to use Kramer’s vocabulary, both exuberantly insightful and yet satisfy the criterion of verisimilitude.¹⁵⁴

Through these case studies, an important proposition emerges – the identity of the artist(s) always matters. The answer to the question “Who is speaking?” is an irreducible dimension of any artwork which is being presented to an audience. Sometimes, our knowledge of the speaker’s identity – and the defining characteristics of that identity – becomes central to any subsequent interpretation of the work placed before us. To put it another way, in countless cases, popular and/or critical interest is aroused in a particular new work mainly – or solely – because it is associated with a particular name or identity which has already attained sufficient “brand name recognition” so that anything released under that “brand” is worthy of audience consideration.

In many cases – including the examples discussed in this chapter – the plausible answers to questions of identity may not be immediately obvious. Indeed, they may have been deliberately obscured or problematised, for example, through the use of masks, which “both confer and take away power and identity.”¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, at a conceptual level, in these works the dimension of identity is pivotal to any well-rounded interpretation, perhaps to the point of over-riding the material particularities of what is being presented.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ See Chapter 1.
¹⁵⁵ Sheppard, Revealing Masks, 243-44. Sheppard insightfully explains that “To appreciate the power attributed to masks in ritual performance, one must first accept the premise that the human face is the center of personal identity and expression.” (26-27). He also observes that, while the connection to the human face is fundamental, masking is not necessarily only a visual phenomenon. It can also be used in relation to altering or disguising the sound of an individual’s voice. (32-35).
¹⁵⁶ Many other cases could be adduced. I have already mentioned Banksy. Questions of identity are central to any study of any artists – such as Andy Warhol, Jeff Koons, or Marina Abramović – who achieve celebrity status.
Indeed, we have come to see that it is impossible to completely eliminate the dimension of artistic identity from the presentation of artwork, at least in the Western artworld tradition. The signaled existence of an artwork, no matter how abstracted or minimal, in an artworld context, carries with it the necessary presumption of human agency at least at some originating point in the creative process.

In the same way that all works of music involve an irreducible conceptual dimension, artistic identity is a necessary and irreducible sub-dimension of the conceptual. There is always an artistic identity associated with a work. This is true even of works in which the dimension of identity is concealed, obfuscated or fictionalised. Identity can be individual or collective, real or imaginary, truthful or fictional. Even anonymous or works are always presumed to have an originating author. No amount of effort to deliberately negate or eliminate artistic identity – and thereby responsibility – can completely succeed. Instead, all that can be accomplished through such strategies is concealment or masking. Having said this, there are some works in which the sub-dimension or mode of artistic identity has been elevated to such a position of prominence that any attempt to interpret the work while ignoring questions of identity would be compromised or blinkered. Such works are examples of what I have labelled conceptual music.
<table>
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Adolf Wölfli – St. Adolf Giant Creation |
| **identifying** [identity] (Chapter 9) | David Bowie – “Ashes to Ashes”  
Arnold Schoenberg – Pierrot Lunaire |
Chapter 10

Mode of Signifying – Signs as Concept

10.1 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to a discussion of signifying, i.e. the second of the five modes in the typology of conceptual music proposed in Chapter 8. As with the other chapters in Part III, my aim is to demonstrate that this particular mode of musical conceptualisation can be clearly identified in – and is pivotal to a well-rounded understanding of – a range of real-world examples. Such a demonstration is needed to justify my claim that the mode of signifying – the shifting of conceptual attention to the “signs of a work” – is a plausible and useful category in my overall interpretive model for conceptual music. I proceed in two main stages.

Firstly, in Section 10.2, I discuss the distinction between signs and their meanings. This distinction helps to explain why the mode of signifying is more likely to be found in conceptual works which do not use conventional systems of musical notation. It leads me, in Section 10.3, to briefly review different approaches for classifying alternative notational approaches and graphic scores in experimental and avant-garde music.

Secondly, in Sections 10.4 to 10.6, I discuss three specific examples1 in which the mode of signifying is a prominent feature of a musical work –

- León Schidlowsky, Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen [Germany, a Winter’s Tale] (1979)2 (Section 10.3);
- Dieter Schnebel, MO-NO: Musik zum Lesen/MO-NO: Music to Read (1969)3 (Section 10.4);
- Adolf Wölfli, St. Adolf Giant Creation (1908-1930)4 (Section 10.5).

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1 My choice of these three examples is somewhat arbitrary. There are literally hundreds, if not thousands, of other potential examples of alternative, non-standardised graphic scores which would have been equally as useful in order to support my key point.

2 Described as follows on the composer’s website: Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen (7 parts). (text: the composer, collage), for Choir, Speaker, Soloist, Piano, and percussion ensemble, 1979.
http://schidlowsky.com/Leon-Schidlowsky/.


It should be noted that the work of Adolf Wölfli (1864 – 1930), an important figure in the history of Art Brut and outsider art, is not normally considered, by musicologists, to contain examples of graphical music scores. Nevertheless, I aim to show that the lifework of Wölfli – a schizophrenic inmate of a mental asylum – is a good example of the type of conceptual music which is the focus of this chapter, i.e. conceptual music principally concerned with the signs of a work, not necessarily with how it sounds.

At this point, the main argument of this chapter will have been established, i.e. that the signs of a work are indeed the principal – perhaps the sole – conceptual focus of many musical works.

10.2 Signs, Signifying & Meanings

When engaging with familiar, highly conventionalised sign systems – such as the Latin alphabet – we rarely focus on the signs themselves. Instead, without much conscious effort, we swiftly and efficiently translate or decode the signs into their established meanings, and then just as quickly move on to consider or respond to those meanings.

Similarly, in different musical cultures, the function of signs – as signs, prior to being “translated” into music – has largely become routine and highly standardised. In much Western music, the primary mode of signifying is through the use of visual signs, typically notated on paper scores, sheet music, and so on. Other genres and cultures may use different visual signs (e.g. physical gestures) or perhaps aural cues which simultaneously govern and are integral to the musical outcome (e.g. call and response in African, liturgical, gospel and blues music).

For trained musicians in the Western art music tradition, the act of interpreting/translating – from conventional musical notation, as typically found in a printed score, to narrowly specified sonic outcomes – can become virtually an automatic and sub-conscious process. In such situations, the qualities of the signs themselves, and the underlying signifying processes involved in the translation of signs into sounds,

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recede into the attentional shadows. They become almost invisible as entities and processes in their own right, retaining only a subliminal presence associated with tacit knowledge. We rarely pause to consciously consider them. In any case, the signs – e.g. scores – used in the making of this type of music, at least in a live performance, are customarily kept “behind the scenes.” As perceptual objects (Chapter 1) associated with a musical work, they are generally not made “public,” at least not in the widest possible sense. Rather, the signs – and the scores on which they are inscribed – are used as intermediate and ultimately dispensable enabling tools by the conductor and performers, and perhaps also by scholars and critics. They are usually not actively presented or made accessible to general audiences.

In contrast, in various experimental, avant-garde and other contexts, the signs of a musical work are often intentionally shifted – as signs – into the conceptual spotlight. In some cases, this occurs when the sonic dimension of the work has been deliberately obscured, under-determined or eliminated entirely (except perhaps in the imagination). In other cases, the sonic dimension of the work remains prominent and may also be quite precisely determined, but is nevertheless so deeply entangled with the prominently highlighted signs of its presentation that both the signs and the sounds must be accounted for in an exegesis. Importantly, in both cases, such experimental and avant-garde works typically eschew or depart (often radically) from conventional music notation standards. Instead, they rely on unfamiliar or idiosyncratic means of representation.

Arguably, it is easier to observe the mode of signifying – wherein signs, and not their meanings, are shifted into the conceptual spotlight – in works which use alternative or innovative approaches to signifying. That’s because the use of unfamiliar or ambiguously-defined signs disrupts or pauses the usual processes of sub-conscious and instantaneous translation into meanings. If these alternative signs are prominently presented to an audience, as an important feature of the overall work, then the

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7 Of course, the distinction between performers and audiences can be blurred (Chapter 1). My primary focus is on conceptual dimensions of a work made accessible, in principle, to all likely audiences, not restricted to performers.
audience’s attention is more likely to be directed towards and linger on the nature of the signs – and the signifying processes which they prompt – rather than quickly jumping, without any conscious reflection, to obvious or well-known meanings. In such cases, we have works of conceptual music in which the mode of signifying is prominent. In view of the importance of musical scores to the mode of signifying, the next section briefly reviews the different types of scores used to convey the signs of music.

10.3 A Typology of Musical Scores

The claim that musical signs – almost always presented visually, for example as scores or packaging – can assume as much importance in the appreciation of a work as any of its audible manifestations is hardly new. A case in point is the so-called “eye music” of the Renaissance, in which notated music is laid out in shapes – such as circles or crosses – intended to have significance for the performers. Nevertheless, the twentieth century saw an unprecedented level of interest in publicly presenting the printed signs of a musical work for audience and critical attention, not just as tools intended only for the use of performers. In particular, an upsurge in the production of so-called graphic scores occurred as part of an experimental stance towards musical notation associated with the post-World War II avant-garde. However, there were several earlier precursors. For example, Erik Satie’s Sports et Divertissements (1914) was originally published as a collector’s album, designed at least as much for visual appreciation as a printed artefact, as for its functionality as a performable musical score. It features elaborate calligraphic musical notation and texts in Satie’s own hand, and is liberally illustrated by Charles Martin.

The number of artists and composers who have, at some point in their careers, published alternative or graphic scores is difficult to quantify. It is undoubtedly large. This can be inferred from the two main surveys of the field – both generous in their coverage –

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John Cage’s *Notations* (1969)\(^\text{10}\) and Theresa Sauer’s *Notations 21* (2009).\(^\text{11}\) Approximately 250 composers are included in the archive which Cage collected in preparing his book.\(^\text{12}\) Sauer includes examples submitted by over 100 international practising composers. However, she points out that this is “only a small sampling of the [available] evidence.”\(^\text{13}\)

Despite the prolific body of potential source materials, the academic study of alternative scores is still an under-developed field.\(^\text{14}\) It is not necessary to attempt a full-fledged study of the topic here. However, some preliminary remarks on the different types of alternative sign systems in music are warranted. For the sake of simplicity, I shall use the term “score” to refer to any method of conveying the signs of a work to an audience. Traditionally, scores were printed as paper artefacts. Today, of course, scores can come in many forms, e.g. projected as film or video images, or delivered electronically on computer screen. For my purposes, the method of delivery is unimportant. My primary concern is with the different types of signs and signifying content being conveyed.

There is no universally agreed typology for the classification of musical scores. Indeed, no single typology would be adequate for all conceivable analytical purposes. In his pioneering study, Erhard Karkoschka\(^\text{15}\) adopts a classificatory framework, which covers both extended conventional and experimental graphic approaches, based on the level of determinacy or precision associated with a score or notational system.\(^\text{16}\) This refers to the extent that specific sonic outcomes can be unambiguously predicted from the written and graphical content of the score. Many composers have, of necessity, invented their own idiosyncratic notational systems in order to specify intended sonic

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\(^{11}\) Theresa Sauer, ed., *Notations 21* (New York: Mark Batty Publisher, 2009).


\(^{15}\) Karkoschka, *Notation in New Music*.

\(^{16}\) Most musical works involve multiple audio layers. Therefore, it is possible that different layers or aspects of a work may be placed at different locations along the determinacy/indeterminacy spectrum. For example, the spoken text of a piece may be quite precisely determined, while its instrumental background textures may be largely improvised or indeterminate.
outcomes which would be difficult to accurately represent in conventional Western musical notation. However, such idiosyncratic scores are often intended as highly **determinate** prescriptions, intended to reliably and repeatedly achieve a precise audible result from the performers interpreting the score. In such cases, the score is typically still seen as an intermediate tool for achieving a musical end, rather than a visual element intended as an integral aspect of the publicly presented work. **Indeterminate** scores, on the other hand, often take on the character of visual artworks. Their sonic outcomes are difficult, if not impossible, to predict in advance of any given performance. Nevertheless, they are often **intended to be perceived** and appreciated, by audiences as well as performers, as an integral aspect of a performance.

A number of other authors have also proposed typologies for the classification of scores on the basis of their different sign systems. Sandeep Bhagwati claims that “all written music notation can be interpreted as a combination of four broad types: neumic, symbolic, graphic and verbal.” 17 Brian Inglis 18 has proposed a three-fold typology of graphic scores, consisting of (1) graphics lacking musical signs, (2) graphics incorporating some musical signs, and (3) graphic elements hybridised with conventional signs/meaning. Virginia Anderson divides scores in alternative notation into **graphic scores** (divided into two sub-groups: **symbolic** and **pictorial**), **text scores** (divided into two sub-groups: **instruction scores** and **allusive scores**). 19 She also notes the possibility of hybrid scores which mix elements of both, and perhaps aspects of common practice notation. 20

When it comes to **conceptual music**, the key issue is not the degree of determinacy or indeterminacy, or indeed any of the other classificatory distinctions surveyed above. Rather, the pivotal distinguishing criterion is whether or not the **signs** – through which the music is represented – are intentionally shifted into the **conceptual spotlight** (Chapter 4), to become an indispensable aspect of the **publicly presented work**, intended for all potential audiences, not just performers (Chapter 1).

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18 Inglis, “Analytical approaches.”
20 Ibid., 133.
I shall refer to scores which are specified by the composer to be essential aspects of the \emph{intended} aesthetic experience – for all audiences – as \emph{presentational scores}. Such scores may be any combination of visual and graphic elements, always remembering that some of these may also be textual (i.e. typographical), or even use conventional musical notation. I distinguish \emph{presentational} scores from \emph{non-presentational} scores, i.e. those which are \emph{not} intended for audience attention as part of the public presentation of a work. In principle, scores of any of the classificatory sub-types proposed the authors reviewed above could fall into \emph{either} the presentational or non-presentational group. For example, in Fig. 10.1, I have merged Anderson’s categorisation within my two-fold distinction. In practice, the majority of scores in conventional Western notation are not intended as \emph{public perceptual objects} integral to the presentation of a work, and are therefore non-presentational. Therefore, conventional scores are shown with a dashed line in the presentational branch of Fig. 10.1.
In the rest of this chapter, I discuss three examples of presentational scores which can be categorised as *graphic scores*, as distinct from *text scores*. That’s because, as discussed in Section 10.2, it is harder to focus conceptual attention on the *qualities* of textual signs (e.g. typography, layout, etc.), *as signs*. Text scores use the familiar signs of written language, i.e. letters of the alphabet, words in standardised spelling. As we perceive these signs, we tend to *read*, not merely look. Our mental attention quickly goes to what those signs *mean*, semantically (and contextually, or pragmatically).

Putting it another way, in many text scores – also known as *event scores*\(^\text{21}\) or *word pieces*\(^\text{22}\) – the essential artistic or musical content is intended to be *semantic* and/or *pragmatic*. Often, the *visual appearance* of the communicated text is secondary or unimportant, even if the text score is intended for public viewing.\(^\text{23}\)

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\(^{21}\) Lely and Saunders, *Word Events*.

\(^{22}\) Liz Kotz, “Post-Cagean Aesthetics and the ‘Event’ Score,” *October* 95 (2001), 54-89.

\(^{23}\) For example, most of the pieces included in Lely and Saunders, *Word Events* are intended for viewing by general audience and performer(s) alike. Similarly, a collection of Yoko Ono’s “word pieces” was published as a book, *Grapefruit* (2000 [1964]).
When the semantic content of text scores is *instructional* (Fig. 10.1), the composer’s aim is to specify certain actions, thoughts or gestures which performers and/or audience members are invited to execute in order for the intended aesthetic events to occur and be experienced. Thus, from this perspective, such text scores are more appropriately associated with particular “ways of making” a work. This is true regardless of whether the instructions are aimed only at performers (= non-presentational scores), or both performers and audience (= presentational scores). For this reason, I shall consider instructional text or event scores in Chapter 11.

Of course, as always, there are many shades of grey between any two of the categories discussed above. For example, predominantly “graphic” scores may still contain a substantial textual component – or conventional musical notation\(^{24}\) – which includes instructions for the “making” of the work. *Concrete poetry*, which usually involves only textual elements – such as individual letter forms, words, and phrases – is nevertheless essentially bound to the visual appearance and spatial arrangement of those elements. The possibility of a wide gamut of hybrids is acknowledged but is not important for my purposes. As previously discussed, it is entirely possible – indeed, probable – that multiple modes of conceptualisation are present in any given work of conceptual music.

Any simple typology of scores is likely to be strained or inadequate when confronted by the unruly complexity and hybridity of real-world cases. We should expect that different typologies would be optimised to support the investigation of different problems. However, the key argument in this chapter is not dependent on the formulation of any particular typologies. Rather, in what follows, I merely argue that graphic scores (as broadly defined) perfectly exemplify a mode of conceptual music in which the signs of a work become as essential to the understanding of the work as any of its audible traces. The only proviso is that the artist or composer has intentionally “shifted” the signs of the work – as signs – into the conceptual spotlight. I now turn to consider three examples of where this is exactly what has occurred.

\(^{24}\) For example, George Crumb’s *Makrokosmos I & II* are based on conventional musical notation, but their layouts (e.g. circles, spirals) are designed as beautiful calligraphic artefacts, fully intended for appreciation by general audiences as well as performers.
10.4 León Schidlowsky, Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen (1979)

León Schidlowsky (b. 1931) is a Chilean-Israeli composer and painter. He was born in Santiago, Chile, and has lived in Israel since 1968.\textsuperscript{25} Amongst his prolific output of musical compositions is a large group of works which he refers to as “graphic music.” Schidlowsky mostly created graphic music throughout the earlier years of his long career,\textsuperscript{26} less so in recent decades. The seven pieces which comprise the suite Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen were composed in 1979. The title of the overall work is a reference to the satirical epic poem of the same title by Heinrich Heine (1797-1856). According to Daniela Vidella, this work represents “a culminating point of Schidlowsky’s creative development,” a collage and multimedia gesamtkunstwerk.\textsuperscript{27} A recording of a performance from 2006 has been released on CD.\textsuperscript{28} The work is a seven-part composition for choir, speaker, soloist, piano, and percussion ensemble. Each of the seven parts has a different collage – created by the composer – which serves as its graphic score (see Fig. 10.2 (a), for Part 1).\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{25} For further biographical information, see www.schidlowsky.com.

\textsuperscript{26} A retrospective exhibition, up to 1979, is documented in the catalogue León Schidlowsky: Musikalische Graphik (Stuttgart: Staatsgalerie Stuttgart, 1979). A more recent overview is given in David Schidlowsky, ed., León Schidlowsky: musikalische Grafik – graphic music, bilingual text in German/English (Berlin: WVB Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Berlin, 2011); published in Spanish translation as León Schidlowsky: Gráfica musical (Santiago: RiL editores, 2012).


\textsuperscript{28} Various artists, Leon Schidlowsky zum 75. Geburtstag: Werke von 1952 bis 2005, 3CDs (musik art ingo schutz, ma 34, 2006).

\textsuperscript{29} The graphic scores for all seven parts are illustrated in the booklet accompanying the CD recording, a PDF of which is available at www.e-zebra.de/PDF%20Dateien/Schidlowski.pdf. The seven graphic scores are also available online at www.emmaus.de/ingos_texte/wintermaerchen.html and in Schidlowsky, musikalische Grafik – graphic music, 166-79.
(a) Collage for Part 1, “Du sollst nicht” [“You should not”]. Original ca. 110 x 73 cm. Reproduced with kind permission of León Schidlowsky.

(b) Performance in 2006, of “Du sollst nicht,” with projection of collage behind performers


Figure 10.2 León Schidlowsky, Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen (1979)
The spoken texts are not all included in the collages, and come from a number of sources, including August Stramm, Bertolt Brecht, magazine clippings, and the composer himself, albeit without any associated rhythmic or pitch notation. A number of other indications to the performers are presented in the collage-based graphic score. Some minimal guidance on certain aspects of interpretation can be divined from various details in these images. However, most of the sonic outcomes are left up to the performers to improvise in response to the graphic score. As a consequence, each execution will vary.

Videla states that “the musical conception of the work is practically inseparable from its visual quality.” Thus, in the 2006 performance, the graphic score for each part was projected onto a screen behind the performers (Fig. 10.2 (b)). In other words, Schidlowsky’s Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen is a work in which the seven-part graphic score becomes a visual centrepiece of audience attention in the multimedia work.

The key idea or concept that this visual co-presentation inevitably highlights is the nature and limits of musical scores – what are they and what can they be? The projection of the graphic score on the screen behind the performers foregrounds the processes involved in translating these visual elements into audible interpretations. In live performance, the interpretation of the images presented in the collage scores – the signs of the work – is a kind of ekphrasis, i.e. the (mis)translation of a “text” presented in one medium (images) into a new text in another medium (audible sounds). Schidlowsky is not the only artist/composer to explore the blurred boundaries between visual art and musical notation. However, his work Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen is an excellent example of a musical work in which the signifying elements presented in

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30 See the details in Schidlowsky, musikalische Grafik – graphic music, 166-79.
31 Videla, “La música gráfica”.
32 Ibid., 24.
33 Ibid., 21, my English translation. The original Spanish reads “La concepción musical de la obra es prácticamente inseparable de su calidad visual.”
34 There is also a socio-political theme present in the work. See Videla, “La música gráfica,” 31. However, in my view, this a secondary feature, and is not relevant to the present discussion.
35 An open question – one which I shall not explore further in this thesis – is how humans process visual images and what mechanisms come into play when these images are “translated” into other cognitive modes of information processing. This ties into the current debate in the cognitive sciences around mental imagery. For an overview of the topic see Stephen M. Kosslyn, William L. Thompson, and Giorgio Ganis, The Case for Mental Imagery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
the visual dimension of the work are shifted into the conceptual spotlight, for both performers and audiences to contemplate.

10.5 Dieter Schnebel – MO-NO: Music to Read (1969)

If Schidlowsky’s graphic scores leave the sonic outcomes largely indeterminate, then – a decade earlier – Dieter Schnebel’s MO-NO: Music to Read (1969) had already gone several steps further. Indeed, with MO-NO, Schnebel took the notion of graphic scores to an “absurd” limit, by intending no audible consequences whatsoever.

In retrospect, MO-NO is an atypical work in Schnebel’s overall oeuvre. The majority of his other musical and operatic works have an audible dimension and are intended to be performed and listened to as sonic experiences. In contrast, MO-NO was presented only as a printed book (Fig. 10.3), to be read in silence. It was designed as “music to read; more precisely: music for a reader. The reading of the book is intended to stimulate music in the listener’s head. In reading the music he is alone: mono; as such he becomes the performer of the music, makes music for himself.”


38 Schnebel, MO-NO, cover blurb.
Nikša Gligo gives a detailed synopsis of the various graphic, notational and textual elements included across the 213 individual pages of *MO-NO*. Such details are not important here. Suffice to say that the book encompasses a diverse spectrum of text (in German and English), conventional musical notation, graphic notation typical of musical graphic scores of the era and photographs and pictures. Fig. 10.4 shows a selection of these elements. The significant presence of textual elements – occasionally with an instructional flavour (e.g. Fig. 10.4 (a)) – means that *MO-NO* is perhaps more accurately described as a hybrid, rather than a “pure” graphic, score. However, overall, it bears all the defining hallmarks of a graphic score. Specifically, the typography, calligraphy and page placement of all elements – including the textual – are evidently aspects of the book’s overall design, and as such are fixed in all printed copies of it. As an imaginary or conceptual musical work, *MO-NO* is inseparably linked to the physical artefact – a *public perceptual object* in the form of a book – through which it is made manifest.

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Figure 10.4  Sample Pages from Dieter Schnebel, MO-NO (1969)

Source: Author’s collection. Reproduced with kind permission of Prof. Dr. Dieter Schnebel.
In other words, the book as a whole is presented as a meta-sign – communicated by means of a book – which is offered for (musical) interpretation. Any sonic dimension associated with the work is entirely imaginary, and must inevitably be unique to each individual reader. Therefore, the focus of attention cannot help shift to the nature of the signs presented on each page. This is undoubtedly an artefact “to be looked at.” However, many of the signs in the book are sufficiently similar to conventional or avant-garde musical notation, to constantly remind the reader that the book is also intended as music, albeit “music for reading.” This point is reinforced by the inclusion of some loose printed sheets containing two silent compositions and commentaries – including quotations from John Cage’s essay “Indeterminacy” – on the artistic intention behind the work.

Summing up, *MO-NO* is a work of conceptual music, as I have defined it. It is concerned predominantly with the idea of music and its ability (or not) to be conjured – as an imagined aesthetic experience – out of printed signs on the pages of a book. By design, any physically audible dimensions are eliminated, as far as practicable. They are relegated to secondary importance, remaining in the ambient background (just as in John Cage’s 4’33”). As a consequence, the focus of a reader’s attention defaults to the visual signs of the work (and, to a lesser extent, the tactile presence of a printed book). The central concept conveyed through these public perceptual objects is that the signs being presented are intended to stimulate an imaginary music in the minds of readers. Whether or not they succeed in doing so is entirely a decision for each individual reader. However, for all readers who engage with the book, the invitation to experience a conceptual work of music – by interpreting its associated signs – is unmistakable.

40 The two loose-leaf compositions are titled *Umrisse I: Komposition für Silencen* and *Umrisse II: Komposition von Systemen und Proportionen*.

10.6 Adolf Wölfli - *St. Adolf Giant Creation* (1908-1930)

The normally “invisible” processes of signifying (Section 10.2 above) are thrown into sharper relief when the communication of meanings is disrupted, distorted or subverted for some reason. This is particularly evident in the work of Adolf Wölfli (1864 – 1930). Wölfli was a sad and tragic figure. Orphaned and brutalised as a child, he was imprisoned in 1890 for the attempted sexual assault on two young girls. From 1895 until his death, he was institutionalised for schizophrenia in Waldau Psychiatric Clinic, near Bern, Switzerland. During this time, he produced some 25,000 pages containing written texts (both prose and poetry), pencil illustrations, collages and musical compositions, all conceived to parts of his own alternative personal history. In this gigantic work, which he titled *St. Adolf Giant Creation*, he developed a fabulous and labyrinthine mythical narrative. In it he recounts his beautiful childhood, and tells how he eventually creates the world and goes on to occupy the entire universe. Wölfli divided his imaginary autobiography into five parts, working on it sequentially throughout his lifetime –

1. From the Cradle to the Grave (1908-1912)
2. Geographic and Algebraic Books (1912-1916)
3. Books with Songs and Dances (1917-1922)
4. Album Books with Dances and Marches (1924-1928)
5. Funeral March (1928-1930)

The story of Wölfli’s discovery by the artworld and his subsequent canonisation as the archetypical outsider artist – by figures such as Art Brut founder Jean Dubuffet and surrealist Andre Bréton – is well-known, and need not be repeated here. For my purposes, the key point is that Wölfli conceived of “his whole oeuvre as a big musical composition.” Numerous sheets in the vast collection of his papers contain what is clearly a kind of musical notation. However, Wölfli’s musical illustrations depart from

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conventional Western notational practice in various idiosyncratic ways, so much so that they cannot be reliably interpreted as musical scores. For example, he often used staves with six ledger lines (rather than five), with reversed or unconventional note flags (Figs. 10.5 and 10.6).

Figure 10.5  Adolf Wölfli – Countess Saladine (1911)
Source: Von Ries (1946), 61 (Fig.35), author’s collection. Out of copyright.

Despite the obvious difficulties, various approaches to sonically interpreting Wölfli’s musical illustrations – as musical notation intended for performance – have been attempted over the years. Kjell Keller and Peter Streif analyzed some manuscripts, and concluded that they could be converted into conventional Western notation. Some of these transcriptions were subsequently performed and recorded, by a trio comprised of clarinet, accordion, and fiddle, sounding like off-kilter folk waltzes and polkas. Baudouin de Jaer has put forward his own analysis of Wölfli’s “musical cryptograms,” and performed some thirty short pieces on solo violin with mute.

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In 1986, Graeme Revell (b. 1955) – founder of industrial/electronic group SPK and subsequently a successful film composer – released a recording of his own and other musicians’ interpretations of some of Wölfli’s musical drawings. The other two artists included on the record – Nurse With Wound and Déficit des Années Antérieures (DDAA) – adopted an “intuitive or ‘free form’ interpretation” of Wölfli’s illustrations. However, Revell himself treated Wölfli’s scores as a more or less intelligible cryptogrammic system with its own internal codes and conventions. For several tracks, he sought to create a faithful decipherment as far as possible. In the booklet accompanying the LP, Revell explains some of the principles he applied in interpreting Wölfli’s idiosyncratic musical notation. Indeed, some aspects of the system – if that’s what it is – are sufficiently similar to conventional standards to enable plausible assumptions to be made regarding their translation into common practice notation. Revell stated that

in order to do this project the justice it deserves, I have tried to complete the picture of Wölfli the composer by reading his music in the classical sense (at least in 3 of my pieces). … Thus I gave to the COUNTRESS SALADINE a straightforward pianoforte representation using the system outlined … and generating a consistent rhythm by treating Wölfli’s own spatial arrangement of notes as its rhythm.

On other tracks, however, Revell adopted a more flexible approach.

For NECROPOLIS, AMPHIBIANS AND REPTILES (1911) I took the fragmentary chord progression and expanded it using classical inversions etc. I used violin as the solo instrument because this is the instrument most often visually represented in his paintings. The other elements of the piece: rooks/toads/bells [sound effects] are all ornamental features of nearly all Wölfli’s works.

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48 Various artists, Necropolis, Amphibians & Reptiles - The Music of Adolf Wölfli (Musique Brut – BRU 002, 1986). Graeme Revell’s pieces on this album were re-issued on CD on Graeme Revell, Musique Brut Collection (Mute Brut 1 CD, 1994). The track “Necropolis” was also included, in a different version, on the SPK album Zamia Lehmanni: Songs of Byzantine Flowers (Side Effects Records SER09, 1986).


50 Streiff and Keller are steadfast: “We also refuse to admit that Wölfli’s musical notes and tones lack all musical relation.” Streiff and Keller, “Adolf Wölfli, Composer,” 86.

51 Graeme Revell, in [Booklet accompanying Necropolis, Amphibians & Reptiles LP], 8, capitals in original.

52 Ibid.
This interpretive flexibility acknowledges that several aspects of Wölflı’s musical notation – such as the repeated use of a symbol resembling the number nine – remain a mystery. Therefore, Revell emphasises that his recordings of Wölflı’s compositions are “but ONE interpretation and the major importance of Wölflı’s work is that its pictorial framing and peculiar formation render the possibility of many, if not unlimited, interpretations.”

For Revell, Wölflı’s music “is process rather than product (a process of documentation).” I agree, and see this as a particularly sympathetic way for us to make sense of it. There is no doubt that Wölflı was mentally ill. Nevertheless, it also seems reasonably clear that he consistently envisaged an audible dimension represented in his musical drawings. Streiff and Keller point out that “various passages of his narrative work prove clearly that Wölflı intended his music to be interpreted.” It is impossible to now – or ever – be precisely sure how Wölflı imagined that his musical notations should sound. All that remains is the vast collection of papers that he produced. Given the sheer quantity involved, it seems unlikely that they will ever be published in their entirety. And, even if they are, who would have the capacity and resources to attempt anything resembling a comprehensive decipherment or analysis?

Nevertheless, there is no good reason not to accept Wölflı’s magnum opus as “music,” albeit music as conceived in the mind of a mentally ill individual, and documented by him as a lifelong enterprise. Perhaps this work – titled St. Adolf Giant Creation – could only ever have existed securely in Wölflı’s head alone. Alternatively, perhaps the music being transcribed by Wölflı on hundreds and thousands of individual paper sheets was being forgotten by him just as rapidly as he wrote down its notes, fading almost immediately into vague memories lost in the recesses of a schizophrenic mind. For the rest of us, wherever it might be said to exist, St. Adolf Giant Creation is only able to be comprehended and interpreted as musical work by virtue of the material traces – the signs of the work – left behind by Wölflı. We can agree that St. Adolf Giant Creation is music, just as Wölflı always insisted that it was. But, despite various efforts to translate some of these material traces into conventional notation and the audible realm, the work

53 Ibid., 5, emphasis in original.
54 Ibid., 6, emphasis added.
itself remains – for us – stubbornly conceptual. For example, in an interview, composer Terry Riley confirms his view that “Wölfli’s work, if not the first, is at least the greatest conceptual music [he has] ever encountered.”

More so than even Schnebel’s *MO-NO, St. Adolf Giant Creation* exemplifies, *par excellence*, the abstracted *idea* – rather than the audible reality – of a musical work. Fundamentally, the work exists beyond our ability to reliably interpret it as sound, despite its apparent visual invitation for us to do so. In this way, it is completely cut off from the need to be heard by an audience. Instead, it becomes a profoundly silent work about a lifelong *process of creating a musical work*, as a vast and magnificent alternative fantasy world, intended to replace a desperately grim and awful reality (a reality which is similarly beyond the comprehension of most people). All that we – as an audience – can do is focus our aesthetic and critical attention on the enigmatic signs of the work. They serve as the documentary evidence that such a creative process did once occur, concentrated in the mind of a sick and damaged human being. But we’ll never be able to know what it was supposed to sound like.

**10.7 Summing Up**

With these three case studies, I hope to have demonstrated the central argument of this chapter, i.e. that there exist examples of conceptual music in which the *signs* of the work are intended by the artist/composer to be the focus of conceptual attention.

The signifying dimension of music can never be entirely dispensed with or eliminated. It is present – at least to some minimally residual degree – in all music. Otherwise, it would not be possible to make the invitation to or availability of a musical experience known to a prospective audience. In other words, all music unavoidably retains at least some irreducible traces of the *signs* through which it is able to become manifested as a musical work. Lawrence Kramer discusses the inescapable presence of the musical symbols in a written score, a presence which persists even within the aesthetic constellation of works that require “self-effacement from the performer.”

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If the score is symbolic writing, it is symbolic writing that erases itself as it is read. But the erasure is never complete, and the score’s unspoken presence as symbolic form is indelible.58

Musical signs may be presented to performers and the audience through the vehicle of a printed score, whether of the graphic variety or not. The signs may also presented in other ways, for example, as photographic images and textual information. In conceptual music, the signs are intentionally shifted into the attentional spotlight associated with the public presentation of the work.

The possibility of using sensory modalities other than vision in order to creatively (re)present the signs of a music-based work is, to the best of my knowledge, largely unexplored. However, in view of the growing body of scientific research on the cross-modal interactions between the senses in human subjects,59 such a possibility seems ripe for artistic experimentation. For example, there is clear evidence for implicit associations between taste and pitch.60 Thus, it seems to me that it is probably only a matter of time before an artist presents a musical work as a selection of foods and drinks served to performers – as a “score” – for their subsequent interpretation as sounds.61 Similar cross-modal “scores” can be readily imagined with respect to other sensory modalities, for example, tactile scores, or olfactory scores.62 The employment of bodily movements and gestures as inputs for controlling sound-producing devices is already an area of active experimentation in musicology.63 Thus, a musical score could be constructed as a series of symbols specifying bodily gestures or dance movements.

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58 Ibid., emphasis added.
61 Of course, such works would further blur any residual distinctions between conceptual music and conceptual art.
These are all conceivable approaches for deploying different sign systems as the primary basis of a work of conceptual music. There is also the possibility that one set of sounds or aural signs may be used to specify – or act as an “audible score” – for a musical work (which in itself may or may not (yet) be audible). A simple example is the case of spoken instructions to performers. Another example is Peter Ablinger’s *Letter from Schoenberg – reading piece with player piano* (2007). This work uses an archival recording of Arnold Schoenberg reading a letter and transmutes this audio source into signals which are used as instructions for a computer-controlled electro-mechanical player and a piano.\(^\text{64}\)

In principle, musical works may be instantiated by a variety of sign systems which can be presented as public perceptual objects, for apprehension by performers or audience members, using any or all human sensory modalities. However, there is no doubt that by far the most active field for artistic and creative experimentation in foregrounding the role of signifying systems in music has been – and continues to be – the relationship between sight and sound.

The key point in this chapter is that whatever mode of signification is adopted, it may itself be shifted into the conceptual spotlight by artists and composers. When that occurs, we are dealing with a work of conceptual music which relies on the mode of conceptualisation I have labelled *signifying*.

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\(^\text{64}\) For a detailed discussion of this work, see Barrett, *After Sound*, 96-115.
### Mode of Conceptual Music

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Adolf Wölfl – *St. Adolf Giant Creation* |
| identifying [identity] (Chapter 9) | David Bowie – “Ashes to Ashes”  
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### Parts

- **Part I**
  - Establishing the Problem & Its Context  
  (Chapters 1 to 3)

- **Part II**
  - Methodology – Developing an Interpretive Model  
  (Chapters 4 to 8)

- **Part III**
  - Conclusions & Directions for Further Research  
  (Chapter 15)

- **Part IV**
  - This chapter [summary]

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- **Part I**
  - Establishing the Problem & Its Context  
  (Chapters 1 to 3)
Chapter 11

Mode of Crafting – Technē as Concept

11.1 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to a discussion of the mode I have labelled crafting – or ways of making [technē] – of musical works. All works of art and music must involve a “way of making,” regardless of how assiduously some artists or composers may seek to intentionally downplay, randomise or eliminate all traces or consequences of their technique or presence. In this sense, the irreducibility of technē is inseparably bound up with the impossibility of completely eradicating intentionality from works of art.¹ In some works of conceptual music, the processes or ways of making – what I have labelled technē – that are unavoidably associated with (or “embedded in”) the work may be foregrounded as a focal point of attention. Indeed, the processes may have as much or greater aesthetic importance as any of the work’s audible or sonic aspects.² In such cases, the mode of crafting is being deployed.

In contemporary avant-garde and experimental music, examples which shift their ways of making to centre stage are plentiful. Many works of John Cage cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of the verbal texts and combinatorial devices that he specified as instructions for their realisation.

In this chapter, I select three case studies by other composers for detailed discussion –

- In Section 11.2, I consider John Cage and the pivotal and influential role of technē in many of his works. I single out Europera 5 (1991)³ for closer examination.

- In Section 11.3, I discuss Peter Ablinger’s Weiss/Weisslich series, especially 31e Membrane, Regen (1996-2002).

¹ See Appendix N.
In Section 11.4, I turn my attention to *Viento* (2014), a recording by Lawrence English comprised of two tracks, “Patagonia” and “Antarctica.” I submit that these tracks can only be fully appreciated once the method of their making – the *technē* – is known and appreciated as an integral aspect of the overall work.

Finally, in Section 11.5, I sum up the main argument defended in this chapter, viz. that there are many works of conceptual music in which a significant or principal mode of their conceptualisation involves their way(s) of making, or *technē*.

### 11.2 John Cage

A number of authors and composers identify John Cage as an archetypical composer of “conceptual music” (Chapter 3). In the expanded definition of *conceptual music* introduced in Chapter 3, his pivotal position remains secure. This is especially true as far as Cage’s later works are concerned, where he was principally concerned with ideas and concepts. To support this claim, we need look no further than Cage’s own words. Writing in the Foreword to *X* (1983), Cage states:

> I have more and more written my texts in the same way I write my music. … to find a way of writing which comes from ideas, is not about them, but which produces them.\(^5\)

He used almost identical words in a 1988 interview:

> I’m going to continue my work, which is to find a way of writing that comes from ideas but is not about them but produces them.\(^6\)

To be clear, on both occasions Cage was referring to his written texts, as opposed to his music scores. Indeed, the passage from the 1988 interview quoted above refers to

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Cage’s books, such as *Themes and Variations* (1982) and the six Norton lectures at Harvard University (which were subsequently published as *I-VI*). However, elsewhere, we find Cage using similar language about his compositional process with regard to music:

> In writing my ‘literary’ texts, I essentially make use of the same composing means as in my music.

With quotations such as these in view, the claim that Cage was a composer of conceptual music, as I have defined it, can hardly be doubted. Recall that the sonic dimension of conceptual music may be of secondary importance, or may even be entirely imaginary (Section 1.4). Thus, the distinction between written text and audible music may be heavily blurred, as it often is with Cage. However, we must introduce a caveat. Importantly, towards the end of his life, in 1991, Cage expressly disavowed the assumption that his aim was to communicate.

> I could not accept the academic idea that the purpose of music was communication, because I noticed that when I conscientiously wrote something sad, people and critics were often apt to laugh. I determined to give up composition unless I could find a better reason for doing it than communication. I found this answer from Gira Sarabhai, an Indian singer and tabla player: The purpose of music is to sober and quiet the mind, thus making it susceptible to divine influences.

Here, as is so often the case with Cage, we have a paradoxical claim. He is concerned with the *production* of ideas that come from ideas, but is not about them, and is not intended to *communicate* them. This reflects Cage’s well-known anti-intentional stance regarding the production of artworks (see Appendix N). He went to great lengths to eliminate all traces of his own agency in the works that, nevertheless, are presented to the public under his name. In a classic postmodern gesture consistent with Barthes’

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7 John Cage, *Themes and Variations* (Barrytown: Station Hill Press, 1982). A poem in five sections about Cage’s friends and heroes, intended to be read out loud. Each section is to be read in 12’00”, with the complete poem lasting precisely 60’00”. The poem is also included as a separate chapter in John Cage, *Composition in Retrospect* (Cambridge, MA: Exact Change, 1993), 55-171.


9 John Cage, *For the Birds: John Cage in Conversation with Daniel Charles* (London: Marion Boyars, 1981), 55. Indeed, the similarities between his texts and musical scores mean that, with Cage, the boundaries between the two types of work are often blurred.

“death of the author,” Cage famously remarked that he “has nothing to say,” seeking to shift the burden of interpretation and meaning-making entirely to the audience.

From this preliminary discussion, two observations may be made.

Firstly, for Cage, at least in his later years, the creation of written texts was an activity closely related – if not equivalent – to the composing of music. Indeed, for the majority of his mature works, Cage’s musical scores are essentially written texts of instructions of what performers should do, with hardly any conventional Western musical notation to be found. Any distinction between “work” and “exegesis” becomes elusive. This meant that much of Cage’s work is not amenable to analysis in the traditional musicological sense. This is something he well realised.

In an insightful essay, Jann Pasler portrays Cage “as consciously working to invent a tradition that reflected the way he made, discovered, invented music, that is, a tradition based on the same principles and methods he used in his music.”

Secondly, we see that Cage was perhaps just as – or more – interested in how a musical work might be made as he was in its audible manifestations, which in any case were invariably different from performance to performance. Throughout his life, Cage energetically explored many different avenues in his mission to carve out an approach to music-making which had hitherto been little explored – if not entirely unknown – in

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Western art music circles. One of the approaches which interested him most of all was the notion that a work of music could be essentially specified in terms of the rules or instructions to be enacted in order to produce audible consequences, which in most respects were largely indeterminate or left unspecified. The logical consequence of this way of thinking about music was that critical and exegetical attention must be diverted away from the outcomes able to be heard at the audible surface of the work. Instead, aesthetic attention and analysis must be directed towards the underlying rules or instructions – the technē – which Cage viewed as answers to motivating questions (what would happen if?), and which invisibly govern (or unrestrainedly permit) everything else that is going on at the sonic level. For this reason, authors such as David Cope point to Cage as a precursor of what has since come to be known as generative or algorithmic music. In these genres, the generative rules or algorithms that result in an audible outcome are just as aesthetically interesting – or perhaps more so – than anything able to be heard. Indeed, there may be no particular need to listen to any resulting sounds at all.

Europera 5 is an example of a Cage work which depends on the execution of very specific instructions by each of the performers. There is no master score, only a separate part for each performer and some instructions for the director. None of these parts is necessarily shown or presented to the audience. However, Europera 5 is also a work where – in accordance with the composer’s instructions – a number of key “ways of making” are indeed made prominently visible to the audience. In this way, they become conceptually central to its interpretation. The next sub-section discusses this aspect of Europera 5 in more detail.

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16 Wooller, “A framework.” [111].
17 As far as I am aware, the performance parts or instructions have not been presented to the audience (e.g. in program notes) in any of the performances of Europera 5 to date. However, I have been unable to locate any program notes or booklets made available to audiences at any performances of Europera 5, so this is a speculation on my part. Nevertheless, there seems to be no explicit statement by Cage on whether or not these materials could be shown to an audience. My guess is that Cage would not object. That’s because the program booklet for the premiere performance of Europeras 1&2 – which I have been able to consult – does include various illustrations (mostly miniature) which are apparently extracts from performers’ parts, as well as a number of substantial essays on the works and how they were created by the composer. See John Cage, Europeras 1 & 2 [Program for premiere performance by Oper Frankfurt, 12 December 1987] (Frankfurt am Main: Oper Frankfurt, 1987).
11.2.1 Europera 5 (1991)

Europera 5 was intended by Cage to be “a completely portable piece that you can take on the road.”\textsuperscript{18} The resources required to stage a performance are relatively modest. In the printed instructions for the director, Andrew Culver specifies:

Texts for Europera 5 include performance parts for a pianist, two singers (the second chosen by the first), a Victrola player, a sound designer/performer and a light director/performer, as well as this document, which provides the staging requirements, details about material needs, and an overview of the production. The director should be familiar with all of them.\textsuperscript{19}

A number of stage properties and audio sources are also specified, including a radio, television, the so-called “Truckera tape,”\textsuperscript{20} a DAT playback desk (for the Truckera tape), a VHS VCR (for a “Europeraclock”), two head and shoulder animal masks for the singers, three old lamps, three old tables, and five old chairs.

To date, as far as I am able to ascertain, the following performances of Europera 5 are all that have been staged –

- Premiere: 12 April 1991, Slee Hall, State University of New York at Buffalo, New York
  - An audio CD of the dress rehearsal has been released.\textsuperscript{21}

- 6 November 1999, Zeitgenössische Oper Berlin, Hebbel-Theater
  - Video excerpts (12’15” duration) posted on YouTube by Kadmos Productions.\textsuperscript{22}


\textsuperscript{19} Andrew Culver, in \textit{John Cage, Europera 5 [score]}, [1].

\textsuperscript{20} Cage’s “Truckera tape” is a pre-recorded collage of 101 layered fragments of European operas, available on rental from C. F. Peters. It is also used in \textit{Europeras 1&2} and \textit{Europeras 3 & 4}. The name “Truckera” was bestowed because the resulting sound of 101 sonic layers is similar to the rumble of trucks passing by. See Fetterman, \textit{John Cage’s Theatre Pieces}, 170-71.

\textsuperscript{21} John Cage, \textit{Europera 5}, mode records 36, 1994, compact disc. Martha Herr (soprano), Gary Burgess (tenor), Yvar Mikhashoff (piano), Jan Williams (Victrola, 78-rpm), Don Metz (“Truckera” tape). Composer supervised recording.

\textsuperscript{22} Available at \url{https://youtu.be/SZAVfoPrIxE}. 
• 24 June 2012, Ostravské Centrum Nové Hudby, The Antonín Dvořák Theatre, Ostrava, Czech Republic
  - No audio/video documentation appears to be readily available.

• July 2012, Rustbelt Salon, Milwaukee
  - A video of the full performance posted by New Dissonance (a blog associated with composer Ben Johnston) on YouTube.²³

Two audio recordings of *Europera 5* exist (although they fall short of conveying the full impact of the work, due to the absence of a visual dimension²⁴) –

- a complete recording of a dress rehearsal performance supervised by the composer;²⁵
- one partial excerpt (of 15’01’’ duration) of a studio recording included on the CD included with *Musicworks* magazine.²⁶

The duration of *Europera 5* is specified at precisely 60 minutes. However, by design, all performances will be considerably different from each other, even if performed by the same individuals in the same space. That’s because the detailed instructions include a randomising process for any given performance, involving a grid of 64 stick-on numbers laid out on stage, which governs the relative spatial placement of performers, instruments, and props.

Many aspects of the work are left indeterminate by the composer. For example, the choice of the six 78rpm recordings of operatic arias to be played on the Victrola machine is left up to the operator/performer, provided only that they are “antique,”²⁷ or as “old as possible.”²⁸ Similarly, the choice of arias to be performed by the two singers is left up to them, with the following guideline: “Choose your own arias from those in

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²⁵ Cage, *Europera 5*, mode 36, CD.
²⁷ *Europera 5*, instructions for Director, text by Andrew Culver. The aim appears to have been to ensure that the recordings and publishing rights were in the public domain, a specific point discussed in the parts for Singers 1 and 2.
²⁸ *Europera 5*, part for Victrola player, text by Andrew Culver.
the repertoire that suit your voice; both music and lyrics must be in the public domain, or permission to use them must be obtained.” 29 All performers “may wear whatever you wish.” 30

On the other hand, some aspects of each performance are precisely specified, such as the start times of each performer’s segments, or the exact stage locations of the singers. The important point is that, as was typical of Cage, the considerable indeterminacy which he allowed for many aspects of the work – e.g. sonic, visual – was always designed to unfold within a prescribed framework of other tightly constrained parameters. Because the performance instructions are kept “back stage,” many details of this constrained framework remain hidden from the audience. Yet, nevertheless, it is perfectly evident to an audience that everything that happens in a given performance – on and off the stage – is far from completely random. Rather, whatever is happening reflects only what has been specified or allowed as permissible by the composer. Joan Retallack aptly states that “Cage’s lifelong project was one of dislodging cultural authoritarianism (and gridlock), inviting surprising conjunctions within carefully delimited frameworks and processes.” 31 In other words, what an audience experiences in a given performance of Europera 5 is the interplay between indeterminacy and a tightly specified framework of precise instructions. Thus, even from this perspective, the instructions for the making of the work – even though they are not made directly visible to the audience – become a central focus of the work. There is little doubt that the otherwise apparent randomness is an intentional outcome possible within the rules prescribed in the hidden instructions. Inevitably, during the performance, members of the audience – at least those with any familiarity with Cage’s previous work – are left to speculate on exactly what Cage specified as permissible in this work, and what has been allowed to remain indeterminate or completely unspecified.

There is another, more important, way in which ways of making are placed squarely into the primary conceptual spotlight of Europera 5. This emphasis on technē is achieved by virtue Cage’s specification of the Victrola machine as a prominent and striking visual element and source of audio in every performance (Fig. 11.1). By 1991 (when

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29 Europera 5, parts for Singer 1 and Singer 2, text by Andrew Culver.
30 This final note is included on all performers’ parts.
Cage was writing), 78 rpm records – and machines on which to play them – were long obsolete. The Victrola is an acoustic playback machine, pre-dating the invention of electrical equipment. In this respect, therefore, we could say that it is doubly antiquated and obsolete.

Famously, Cage insisted that his own works were antithetical to being effectively captured on recordings. Nevertheless, he declared that the sound produced by a needle on a scratchy record was “beautiful.” Indeed, besides the Europeras, Cage incorporated the sounds of recordings into a number of works, including Imaginary Landscape No. 1 (1939), Imaginary Landscape No. 5 (1952), and Credo in Us (1942). However, in these early works, the use of recordings and turntables as primary sound sources was not highlighted to audiences to anywhere near the same degree as in the Europeras. On the contrary, for example, Cage characterised Imaginary Landscape No.1 as “a piece of proto-musique-concrète,” i.e. a piece intended to de-couple the audible sounds presented to an audience from any obvious connections to their originating sources. Indeed, the work was expressly intended only “to be performed as a recording or [radio] broadcast.”

David Grubbs observes that “the Imaginary Landscapes series separates aural experience from the visual experience of the production of its source sounds.”

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34 Grubbs, Records Ruin the Landscape, 57.
36 Grubbs, Records Ruin the Landscape, 57.
Figure 11.1 Stills from Two Performances of John Cage, Europera 5

(a) Zeitgenössische Oper Berlin 1999.
Source: https://www.youtube.com/SZAVfoPfkE. Permission to reproduce requested, no reply received.

(b) July 2012, Rustbelt Salon, Milwaukee.
With this in mind, a comparison between *Imaginary Landscape No. 1* and *Europera 5* becomes instructive. In contrast to the acousmatic, *musique-concréte* ethos of *Imaginary Landscape No. 1*, most – but not all – of the sound sources used in *Europera 5* are visually prominent on stage. They encompass conventional classical music forces (singers, piano) and technological sources (radio, Victrola, and the soft rumblings of the Truckera tape). By virtue of its antique appearance, dominated by the visually-striking presence of an acoustic horn, the Victrola is a curious and intriguing on-stage attraction. Here, the connection between mechanical sources and the resulting sounds is made visible and unmistakable. At six precisely specified times, the Victrola operator is required to begin playing one of the six 78rpm recordings. While the operator is asked to “Perform with great care,” her/his actions to regularly change the shellac records throughout the performance inevitably become a primary point of focus for the audience.

For David Metzer, the use of a Victrola as a focal theatrical device in *Europera 5* is one of several ways in which Cage calls attention to the erosion of live opera as a viable genre in the age of mechanical reproduction.

*Europera 5* stages a paradox by inviting listeners to the concert hall to hear recordings. The scratchy discs played there offer desiccated opera, arias that sound not only ageworn but also hollow and anonymous. However, these recordings – uninterrupted, un-'shadowed' and featuring full orchestral accompaniments – are the most complete operatic experiences in the work. If opera is to be found in the shadow-world of *Europera 5*, then it is to be found in recordings.

Other aspects of the work serve to reinforce the focus on loss and decay.

With each link of Cage's historical chain, there is less opera: the loss of voice and theatricality in the piano fantasies, the elimination of the body and dimming of the aura by the Victrola, and the disappearance of the genre with the television and radio.

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37 Record 1 at 5:00, Record 2 at 14:30, Record 3 at 25:00, Record 4 at 29:00, Record 5 at 50:30, Record 6 at 55:30. In *Europera 5*, part for Victrola player, text by Andrew Culver.
38 “If the sixth ends before 60:00, play it again, stopping at 60:00.” Ibid.
39 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 107.
William Fetterman considers *Europera 5* to have a “nostalgic, sentimental, elegiac quality.” He explains in the following passage:

I find *Europera 5* to be particularly sentimental not from the use of antique opera but in the use of technology, which at hindsight perhaps is a semi-autobiographical record of the social changes that occurred during Cage’s lifetime. The Victrola dates from Cage’s childhood. I remember once arriving at his loft in the late 1980s for an interview. … I asked him if his parents had a Victrola at home when he was a little boy. Yes they did, he replied.

Fetterman extends this nostalgic interpretation to the other items of changing technology used in the work, including radio, television, and the computer. He concludes that “With *Europera 5* Cage came full circle, and was able to make a chance-determined collage of conventional art through a selective microcosm of audio and visual technology from throughout his lifetime.”

Both Metzer’s and Fetterman’s readings of *Europera 5* are valid and insightful. However, in light of the main argument of this thesis, it is apparent that they both depend initially on the need to engage with a primary and pivotal creative choice made by Cage in the overall design of the work, viz. to foreground the different ways (technical, instrumental, vocal) in which sounds can be made – or may fail to be made – in live performance of an “opera.” In other words, before any further metaphysical or autobiographical interpretations become possible, both Metzer and Fetterman must first address the core concept which Cage has placed squarely into main spotlight of this work. This core concept is the paradoxical and transitory nature of the ways of making – or, technē – in music. Heinz-Klaus Metzger says of *Europeras 1 & 2*, “it is above all the techniques of composition that are separated from the material.” If we include performance in the notion of “composition,” the same statement could just as aptly be applied to *Europera 5*.

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42 Fetterman, *John Cage’s Theatre Pieces*, 186.
43 Ibid., 186-87.
44 Ibid., 187.
At its conceptual heart, *Europera 5* is a work about different techniques for the making – or refraining from making – of musical sounds at a point in history when the ossified conventions of an operatic tradition in the final stages of decay had all but conceded defeat in their century-long confrontation with modern technology. From this perspective, the specific audio content of the recordings and arias selected by the performers for a given performance was of secondary importance. The content is filtered and fragmented through the primary lens of technē, in order to highlight the paradoxical qualities of technē itself, on the one hand apparently omnipotent and irresistible, yet on the other hand surprisingly fragile and transitory, also vulnerable to constant change and inevitable obsolescence.


According to Aaron Cassidy, Peter Ablinger (b. 1959) “has arguably done more to challenge what we mean by ‘music’ than any composer since John Cage. … At its core the work is about how we listen: about challenging the conventions of the perception of sound, and about questioning the procedures and practices and historical customs of European/Occidental music-making.” In some cases, Ablinger’s work are presented as nothing more than a title.

Cassidy goes on to explain the over-arching concerns of Ablinger’s compositional practice:

> His work has been organized into several strands of parallel investigation. These strands are neither cycles or collections, as such, but are instead defined primarily through a central question or a particular compositional or technical method (though in some cases the pieces do share some surface-level sonic characteristics as well).  

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48 Ibid., emphasis added.
From this characterisation, we can safely conclude that Ablinger is a composer of conceptual music, as I have defined it. More specifically, many of Ablinger’s works are principally concerned with the technical method – i.e. the technē of their production. This is certainly true of many of the individual pieces included in the series Weiss/Weisslich [White/Whiteish], sometimes inaccurately dated (1980-99).49 This extensive series is described on Ablinger’s website as “a cycle of works in various media: instruments, installations, objects, electro-acoustic pieces, reference pieces, prose pieces, music without sounds.”50 Within the overall cycle there are thirty-six numbered and four unnumbered works, many of which themselves consist of multiple individual pieces.

The work Weiss/Weisslich 31, Membrane, Regen was commenced in 1996. It includes five individual pieces, as follows –

31a: Regenunterstände auf öffentlichen Plätzen [Rain Shelters in Public Places] (1996)
31c: Regenschirm [Umbrella] (1999)
31e: konzertante Installation mit 8 Glasröhren [Concert installation with 8 Glass Tubes] (2002), ca. 18’.

In this section I shall focus on Weiss/Weisslich 31e, Membrane, Regen. Performances have been documented on CD,51 vinyl LP,52 DVD, and a number of internet video sources.53 A score is available in both German and English versions.54

49 However, as Cassidy points out, “further realizations/manifestations continued through 2011.” Ibid.
50 http://ablinger.mur.at/werke.html
51 Adam Weisman, performance of Weiss/Weisslich 31e in 2011, included on Wittener Tage für Neue Kammermusik 2011, 2CDs and DVD (WDR …); Lukas Schiske*, percussion, performance of Weiss/Weisslich 31e, unknown date (2009?), included on CD accompanying Auftakt, [Katalog und CD] (Burgrieden-Rot: MuseumVilla Rot, 2009). *Note that the performer is not identified by name in the catalogue; however, his name is given at http://ablinger.mur.at/cds.html.
53 Lukas Schiske, performance of Weiss/Weisslich 31e, recorded at acoustic field festival sound art exhibition, ESC im Labor, graz, 11 June – 2 July 2010. Available at https://vimeo.com/14451786
The instructions for performing Weiss/Weisslich 31e are detailed and, in many respects, quite precise. The work is specified to be for “8 horizontal glass tubes in any non-equidistant tuning, 20c to 270c – intervals, microtonal or diatonic.” Instructions are given for set-up, miking and amplification, as well as for the wetting, hanging up and taking down of kitchen wipes which are supposed to drip onto the glass tubes, thereby creating the sonic surface of the piece. As with John Cage’s Europera 5, there is no expectation that the information contained in the score is made available to the audience. However, given the ready availability of the score on Ablinger’s website, there is obviously no wish to actively prevent anyone who might be interested in seeing it from doing so.

In any case, reference to the score is not needed in order to grasp the essence of the work. This essence is made abundantly clear by virtue of the visible presence of the technical method through which its audible manifestation is created. The visual “theatre” of a performer carefully manipulating kitchen wipes to cause drops of water to drip constantly onto horizontal glass tubes is a highly unusual method of performing “music.” It focuses an audience’s attention on the physical processes involved in creating the sounds of the work (Fig. 11.2).

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55 Ibid, 1.
Figure 11.2  Two Performances of Peter Ablinger, Weiss/Weisslich 31e, Membrane, Regen (2002).

(a) Lukas Schiske, Unidentified performance [possibly at Shut Up and Listen! 2014 (SUAL 2014), Friday, 28 November 2014, Vienna.]
Source: https://vimeo.com/14451786. Reproduced with kind permission of Peter Ablinger and Lukas Schiske.

(b) Percussionist Berndt Thurner performing at BA-CA Kunstforum, Vienna, 2005.
Source: http://ablinger.mur.at/ww31.html. Reproduced with kind permission of Peter Ablinger.
Just as we saw with Cage’s *Europera 5*, the technical means of music-making in *Weiss/Weisslich 31e* are shifted by Ablinger into the conceptual spotlight of the work. In both cases, this conceptual highlighting is achieved through the simple – but effective – tactic of prominently presenting an unusual and visually-interesting sound-making device or mechanism literally on centrestage. Stephen Di Benedetto points out that “the power of novelty to capture our spotlight of attention is useful to theatre practitioners.”\(^{56}\) Also, in both cases, the *physical movements* of the performers – in changing the records or in manipulating the kitchen wipes – are not regular or predictable, thereby further retaining the attention of audience members.\(^{57}\) In other words, with *Europera 5* and *Weiss/Weisslich 31e*, the invitation to contemplate *technē* as concept is conveyed *directly*, integrated in the performance event itself, through the use of novel props\(^{58}\) and stagecraft.\(^{59}\)

In the next section, I turn to consider an example of conceptual music, in which audience awareness of *technē*, as significant concept, is established *indirectly* – albeit intentionally – through the use of paratextual information made available by the artist in addition to the primary perceptual object(s) associated with the work (in this case an audio recording).

### 11.4 Lawrence English – *Viento* (2014)

Lawrence English is an artist, writer, curator and composer of electronic and field-recording works.\(^{60}\) Based in Brisbane, he operates the Room40 record label and a substantial mail order service,\(^{61}\) offering CDs, vinyl records, downloads, and other items related to his own work, and by other artists he admires.

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\(^{58}\) For a useful academic study on the use of props in theatre, see Eleanor Margolies, *Props* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). As the blurb for the book aptly puts it, “Props are moving objects of attention.”

\(^{59}\) The foregrounding of *technē* in this way is reminiscent of Mauricio Kagel’s music theatre (*musiktheater*) pieces, such as those included in his *Journal de théâtre*. See Heile, *Music of Mauricio Kagel*, 52-54. The example of Bertolt Brecht is also pertinent (note 46 above).

\(^{60}\) [http://www.lawrenceenglish.com](http://www.lawrenceenglish.com)

\(^{61}\) [http://room40.org](http://room40.org)
The field recording titled *Viento* – the Spanish word for “wind” – was released on the Taiga label in 2014.\(^{62}\) It was available both as a vinyl LP, in two different packaging variants, as well as in digital form (download, streaming). The information provided on the cover of the LP is sparse. It gives the names of the two tracks on the album – “Patagonia” and “Antarctica” – each taking up one full side of the LP. Importantly, however, one other piece of paratextual information is provided after the track titles: “Recorded on location in the southern summer of 2010.”\(^{63}\) In other words, we are given to understand that the track titled “Patagonia” was recorded in Patagonia, and “Antarctica” was recorded in Antarctica. This apparently small step immediately differentiates *Viento* from the acousmatic tradition of *musique concrète*, in which the *sources* and *causes* of the audible sounds are deliberately obscured and are deemed to be an obstacle to *reduced listening*.\(^{64}\)

Indeed, with *Viento*, English takes a number of steps to ensure that the circumstances and sources of these field recordings are made readily apparent to any interested listener. Besides the track titles, a generous amount of information about the recordings is provided his internet site. For example:

> The Antarctic recordings were made during two blizzards at Marambio and Esperanza bases. During the blizzard in Marambio, the temperature dropped to -40 degrees centigrade (with windchill) which made recording particularly challenging. The wind battered the bases structures and telecommunications equipment, making a range of unusual tonal phase drones, which you can hear in these recordings. The blizzard at Esperanza was mild by comparison, but still strong enough to coat penguins in [a] layer of snow as they huddled together during the worst of the wind storm.\(^{65}\)

Location photographs of the artist, and of the recording equipment used to capture these field recordings, have been published on the internet (Fig. 11.3).

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\(^{62}\) Lawrence English, *Viento*, TAIGA records, TAIGA 29, 2014, LP.
\(^{63}\) Ibid., back cover text.
\(^{64}\) “Reduced listening” is a term coined by Pierre Schaeffer, and refers “to the listening mode that focuses on the traits of the sound itself, independent of its cause and of its meaning.” See Michel Chion, *Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen*, ed. and trans. Claudia Gorbman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 29. Of course, it is entirely possible for field recordings to be appreciated solely for the sonic qualities of their audio content, with minimal concern regarding the specific circumstances of their recording. See, for example, Steven M. Miller, “Aesthetics and the Art of Audio Field Recording,” *Trebuchet Magazine* (5 November 2013). Available at [http://www.trebuchet-magazine.com/aesthetics-art-audio-field-recording/](http://www.trebuchet-magazine.com/aesthetics-art-audio-field-recording/)

\(^{65}\) [http://www.lawrenceenglish.com](http://www.lawrenceenglish.com)
Figure 11.3  Location Photographs of Lawrence English Field Recordings for Viento

(a) Microphone Set-Up at Esperanza Base, Antarctica.

(b) Lawrence English at Marambio Base.
Reproduced with kind permission of Lawrence English.
English also reveals his personal connection with the recordings:

Listening back to these recordings I am struck by the sheer physicality of the wind. It’s rare that you feel physically reduced by the motion of air, but in both Patagonia and Antarctica that is just how I felt. A small speck of organic dust in a howling storm.66

These texts and associated photographs mean that Viento is the antithesis of recordings where the sound sources are not disclosed and are intended to remain a mystery. On the contrary, this work exhibits an attitude of disclosure – indeed, self-disclosure – which is fully consistent with English’s over-arching philosophy of field recording. In his view:

Not all field recordings are affecting. I think anyone who has probed the seemingly endless digital archives of field recordists out there will be struck by just how utterly unremarkable a great deal of the recordings are. Now, to be fair, it’s not so much the recordings that are unremarkable, it’s our relationship to them. Some recordings are just for ourselves, they don’t need to be shared or published, they are there for us to recognize some personal memory, a place, a feeling or an individual moment that was somehow best immortalised in sound.67

English believes that another reason that some field recordings fall short is a failure to bring two distinct horizons of listening into a meaningful relation with each other. The first horizon is the organic ear. The second is “an external, technological horizon of listening manifest by the other set of ears, the microphone.”68 He states that

it’s up to us, as recorders of our listening, to bring these two horizons into some kind of alignment. … I call this theory relational listening, because what I seek through my field recording is a relational condition between my listening within a given horizon and that of the microphones. To me, a successful field recordist is one who can transmit something of themselves in a particular place/time and that something is their listening.69

68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. English’s use of the term “relational” has resonances with Nicolas Bourriaud’s notion of relational aesthetics. According to Bourriaud, relational art creates “relations outside the field of art (in contrast to relations inside it, offering it its socio-economic underlay): relations between individuals and groups, between the artist and the world, and, by way of transitivity, between the beholder and the world.” Nicolas Bourriaud, “Relational Aesthetics:
The relationship between technology and individual agency which English stresses in the passages quoted above brings to mind Aristotle’s discussion (quoted in a different English translation in Chapter 6) of *technē* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

> Every technical expertise [*technē*] is concerned with coming into being, that is, with the practice and theory of how to bring into being some one of the things that are capable of either being or not being, and the origin [*archē*] of whose coming into being lies in the producer and not in the thing being produced. (1140 a10-14)

Aristotle’s word *archē* is usually translated as “origin” or “cause.” In other words, for Aristotle, the perceivable outcome or product of *technē* reveals the necessary existence of a producer or artist as ultimate *cause* of what is produced. As Janet Atwill puts it, “technē is inseparable from the subject it enables, and, reciprocally, the intervention enabled by technē redefines that subject.”

This relational quality of *technē* is reminiscent of the remarks by Lawrence English, quoted above, on relational listening and the type of field recordings which warrant public release. Putting it in Aristotelean terms, I take English to mean that field recordings worthy of release should simultaneously reveal the prior operations of a *technē* (in this case, microphones and recording equipment) and the causal actions of a human agent present at a given time and place, intentionally listening to and capturing the sounds of that spatio-temporal moment.

There is another way in which *technē* manifests the causal presence of human agency in *Viento*. This arises through its public presentation as a substantive material artefact, in the form of a vinyl LP recording. Of all the contemporary formats available for the

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dissemination and reproduction of music, vinyl records involve the greatest degree of hands-on effort necessary to achieve an audible result. Other physical formats, such as CDs, and current digital distribution methods, such as downloads and streaming services, are far less demanding of specific end-user actions required to simply establish and maintain a listening experience. However, despite the greater effort required of the listener, LPs have made an unexpected “comeback” as an increasingly attractive and desirable mode of music packaging and consumption.\(^{75}\) Indeed, the heightened physical and tactile involvement in listening to an LP record is routinely identified as one of the main reasons\(^{76}\) for the recent resurgence and continuing growth in vinyl record sales.

Ultimately, it’s that ritual of playing the music that appears to be behind vinyl’s comeback. Unsheathing the record, placing the stylus, flipping to the B-side – all this requires a certain amount of devotion, representing a homage to those who created the performance, even [to] the music itself.\(^{77}\)

Such remarks remind us that (artistic) media are never neutral.\(^{78}\) Indeed, the use of vinyl artefacts as a medium for manifesting an artistic work may be a creative decision with special significance. Emily Chivers Yochim and Megan Biddinger discuss four ways in which collectors attribute to vinyl records “human qualities” that are not matched by digital media, such as CDs, and certainly not present in digitally-streamed or downloadable formats – (1) a connection with past places and people, (2) the claimed warmer sound of analogue sound, (3) the tactile qualities of records and their


\(^{76}\) Mark Katz argues that part of the reason for the revival of analogue formats such as vinyl is the symbiotic relationship which they have evolved with digital (e.g. download codes packaged with many vinyl LPs). See Mark Katz, “The Persistence of Analogue,” in *Musical Listening in the Age of Technological Reproduction*, ed. Gianmario Borio (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 275-88.


technological simplicity, and (4) the aesthetics and size of album cover art. They observe that these individuals are “strongly asserting that vinyl connects them to other people.” Importantly, “the simplicity of records allows respondents to associate more closely with the sound emanating from them.”

With these observations in mind, I suggest that the presentation of Viento – as a limited edition vinyl LP – is another way in which the artist, Lawrence English, enlists technē in order to offer an end-to-end “relational listening” experience. More than in its digital audio formats, the vinyl form of Viento embraces – indeed, depends upon – an individual listener’s performative and embodied actions as an essential and visceral stage in the overall chain of production. In other words, all other things being equal, Viento packaged as vinyl LP arguably focuses more aesthetic attention on the technē of the musical experience, than would the same audio content packaged or delivered through an alternative method. Therefore, for a work such as Viento, the vinyl version inevitably highlights the importance of technē at the final stage of production, and therefore perhaps points to role of technē in earlier stages too. In any case, the preceding discussion has outlined an interpretation of Viento which identifies the relationship between technē and artistic agency as a significant dimension of what the work is about, one of its primary conceptual concerns.

There are other aspects of conceptualisation also identifiable in Viento (e.g. a reflection on the power of nature). However, for my purposes, the key idea presented in this work is the revealing – through the use of paratexts and material packaging – of technē as the essential (but often-hidden) enabler of all human creative action. The importance of technē during the field recording process – and its central place in English’s philosophy

79 Emily Chivers Yochim and Megan Biddinger, “‘It kind of gives you that vintage feel’: vinyl records and the trope of death,” Media, Culture & Society, 30, no. 2 (2008): 188.
80 Ibid., 189.
81 Ibid., 190.
82 Even with digital formats, the active consumption of music requires some minimal degree of intentional behaviour on the part of the listener. My point here is simply that vinyl records are qualitatively more demanding – and therefore potentially more aesthetically satisfying – in this respect than other modes of music packaging and distribution.
83 The same comment could just as well be applied to any vinyl recordings compared to alternative formats.
of relational listening – is made evident through the ample written and photographic documentation of the project available at several internet locations. The subsequent material manifestation of Viento in the form of a vinyl artefact invites the listener to participate in the same relational listening aesthetic that was pursued by the artist at the original moments of its gestation.
Figure 11.4  Two Different Packaging Versions of Lawrence English, Viento (2014)

(a) Black vinyl, with grey cover. Pressing of 300 copies.

(b) “Melting blues” vinyl, with black & blue split fountain cover. Pressing of 100 copies.

Source: https://www.taigarecords.bigcartel.com/product/lawrence-english-viento-lp

Reproduced with kind permission of Lawrence English.
11.5 Summing Up

The purpose of this chapter has been to provide evidence in support of the proposition that there exist works of music for which the dimension of technē – ways of making – is a significant and useful aspect of their conceptual underpinnings. This evidence has been presented in the form of three exegetical case studies, in which I consider specific works by John Cage, Peter Ablinger and Lawrence English.

Three ancillary observations have also emerged from this discussion.

Firstly, technē is fundamentally intertwined with human agency. Thus, any explicit or heightened manifestation of technē is also a manifestation, or revelation, of the causal presence and actions – perhaps otherwise implicit or hidden – of the artist.

Secondly, the case studies discussed in this chapter have highlighted the central importance of rules, instructions and methods in conceptual music which is concerned with technē. Thus, it becomes apparent that much of the vast corpus of avant-garde works which are grouped under the label word events or event scores may be also be classed examples of conceptual music in the technē mode. From this perspective, the works of artists such as George Brecht, Yoko Ono, Dick Higgins and the Fluxus movement are further evidence – if it were needed – that the mode of technē is widely encountered in the field of conceptual art and music. Indeed, it is arguably the dominant and defining mode of Conceptual Art (capitalized), at least in its formative years. Sol LeWitt remarked upon this:

In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work. When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine that makes the art.90

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85 Lely and Saunders, Word Events.
86 Fischer and Robinson, George Brecht: Events.
87 Yoko Ono, Grapefruit.
89 Hannah Higgins, Fluxus Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
90 Sol LeWitt, “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art [1967],” in Alberro and Stimson, Conceptual Art, 12, emphasis added.
Extending this line of thought, we can observe that at least some works of algorithmic and generative music are as concerned with the rules and instructions for making music, as they are with any particular audible outcomes. Such, for example, applies to “procedural composition.”91 In the absence of seeing and aesthetically engaging with the algorithms behind the sounds, works in this genre would hold little independent interest – as sonic artefacts – for composers-programmers and their audiences.

Thirdly, as we have already seen in Chapter 10, many – perhaps most – works of conceptual music involve more than one of the modes of conceptualisation proposed in the interpretive model developed in Part II of this thesis. This is hardly surprising, given that we have already argued that all five modes are present – at least residually – in all works of music. Specifically, all music betrays at least minimal traces of its technē, or ways of making – and therefore also of the human agency – through which it has come to be created and manifested as a musical work. If this were not the case, then the perceptual objects placed before an audience could not be recognised as music. Instead, they would remain inert to being interpreted as music, and would perhaps be assumed to be naturally occurring, circumstantial or random entities in the environment.

The main argument of this chapter has been amply demonstrated. Technē is irreducibly present in all music. In countless cases of conceptual music, it has been elevated to a pre-eminent position of aesthetic importance. Without recognising and engaging with this mode of conceptualisation, any exegetical interpretation of such works would be diminished.

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91 Wooller, “A framework,” [111].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Conceptual Music</th>
<th>Main Composers &amp; Works Discussed</th>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>Ilmar Taimre – Works in accompanying creative portfolio</td>
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| worldmaking [world of a work] (Chapter 13) | Harry Partch – Delusion of the Fury  
Rohan Kriwaczek – The Art of Funerary Violin  
Ragnar Kjartansson (feat. The National) – A Lot of Sorrow |
| referring ['other(s)’ of a work] (Chapter 12) | Beck – Sea Change  
Arnold Schoenberg – Verklärte Nacht (Transfigured Night)  
Gavin Bryars – The Sinking of the Titanic |
| crafting [technē] (Chapter 11) | John Cage – Europera 5  
Peter Ablinger – Weiss/Weisslich  
Lawrence English – Viento |
| signifying [signs of a work] (Chapter 10) | Lein Schidlowksy – Deutschland, ein Winternärcchen  
Dieter Schnebel – MO-NO  
Adolf Wölfl – St. Adolf Giant Creation |
| identifying [identity] (Chapter 9) | David Bowie – “Ashes to Ashes”  
Arnold Schoenberg – Pierrot Lunaire |
Chapter 12

Mode of Referring – “Other(s) of a Work” as Concept

12.1 Introduction

A lasting legacy of twentieth century critical theory is the fundamental truism that all works of art, literature and music – i.e. all “texts” – are related to other texts (Chapter 7). In principle, therefore, the “other(s)” of a work – and the nature of the relationship between that work and its “other(s)” – could be intentionally shifted into the conceptual spotlight. Such a move mirrors what we have already seen is possible with identity (Chapter 9), signs (Chapter 10), and technē (Chapter 11). In other words, an artist or composer may deliberately choose to present a work’s relationship to “other(s)” as an important focus of attention. Implicitly or explicitly, this dimension is declared – by the artist – to be an essential ingredient to any satisfactory understanding of what the work is about. Therefore, it must be considered as part of any exegesis.

In this chapter, I consider specific examples to demonstrate that this approach to creating works of conceptual music is not only possible in principle but is indeed one that has been – and continues actively to be – used by numerous practising musicians and artists. Indeed, as a mode of conceptualising, referring encompasses a vast array of citational and quotational approaches which came to prominence in music, literature and the arts during the latter half of the twentieth century. Some continue to flourish in the present era. Entire musical genres automatically fall within the definitional boundaries of this mode of conceptual music. In Section 12.2, I explain why this is so, and why this is unproblematic with respect to my definition of conceptual music.

In Section 12.3, I draw upon ideas from Paul Ricoeur to sketch the outlines of a simple two-dimensional typology. This typology enables me, in the subsequent sections, to make some finer-grained distinctions regarding the different ways that a work may conceptually foreground its other(s). Specifically, I shall distinguish between the different types of intertextual relationships which may be established between a work and its other(s).
In Sections 12.4 to 12.6, I turn to a discussion of three case studies of conceptual music in which the dimension of a work’s relationship to its other(s) is intentionally presented as a prominent feature of the overall work. This dimension is therefore a key to its aesthetic appreciation and interpretation. The artists and works I shall consider are –

- Section 12.4 – Beck
  - *Sea Change* (2002), especially three tracks “Paper Tiger,” “Round the Bend,” and “Lonesome Tears.”

- Section 12.5 – Arnold Schoenberg

- Section 12.6 – Gavin Bryars
  - *The Sinking of the Titanic* (1969 - )

These case studies demonstrate that a musical work’s “other(s)” may be musical (Beck), literary (Schoenberg), or indeed any “entity” drawn from the cultural universe, or semiosphere (Bryars). Finally, in Section 12.7, I sum up the discussion presented in the preceding sections and consider the implications for the interpretive model for conceptual music proposed in Part II.

### 12.2 Citational Musical Genres as Conceptual Music

Several musical genres are fundamentally *defined* by the criterion that, in some pivotal way, works falling within the genre depend upon or are related to antecedent “other(s).” Individual works from these genres cannot be interpreted or analysed in any meaningful way without giving careful attention to the “other(s)” of those works. Examples of such musical genres include: *cover versions*,1 *mashups*,2 *remixes*,3 *arrangements*,4 and

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1 Plasketes, *Play it Again.*
recompositions.⁵ Adopting some terminology from Marko Juvan, apt shorthand labels for these different musical practices are intertextual or citational genres.⁶ Patrick Greaney adopts quotational practices.⁷ Several of these genres are, at least in their present-day form, highly technology dependent. However, the intertextual impulse in music has existed for as long as music itself.⁸ Thus, for example, it was common for nineteenth and twentieth-century Western composers to produce arrangements, recompositions and transcriptions (usually for piano) of their own and other composers’ works.⁹ In early music, newly composed layers were often added to a cantus firmus taken from a previous work.¹⁰

From a definitional perspective, a work from any of the citational genres listed above is, by default, potentially also a work of conceptual music (as defined in Chapter 1). There are two provisos. Firstly, the conceptual relationship of a work to its “other(s)” must be significant, in some respect, to its interpretation(s). Secondly, the existence of this conceptual relationship must be made evident to a target audience. That’s because this is the essential point of citational genres. That point is lost if the connection to “other(s)” has been so thoroughly concealed or obscured that it is no longer possible to readily recognise that these works are indeed intended to be cover versions, mashups, and so on.¹¹ In other words, the generic status of these works – i.e. as belonging to a particular citational genre – fundamentally depends on (eventual) audience awareness of the aesthetic idea that they are significantly related or connected, in some manner, to one or more other works.¹² If there is no audience recognition of this link whatsoever, the generic classification fails.

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⁹ See, for example: Jonathan Kregor, Liszt as Transcriber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
¹¹ Even here, paratextual inversions can subvert the apparent presentation. For example, previously covert, hidden or obscure citations can be subsequently revealed – by the artist or by others – thereby shifting a work’s future reception into the conceptual realm. For a discussion of this approach to quotational practices in music, see Sean Lowry, “The After-Party: The Retreat and Concealment of Strategic Appropriation in Contemporary Art,” PhD diss., University of Sydney (2003).
Of course, as always with classificatory systems and definitions, there are grey areas. For example, a cover version may include sufficient audible markers of its relationship to an original to be recognisable as a cover only by a handful of expert listeners. However, such markers may be so slight or obscure that, without additional paratextual information, the work may remain undetected as a cover by most people. The issue hinges on cultural competencies. Linda Hutcheon has pointed to the key role of shared cultural competencies in her discussion of parody.

For parody to be recognized and interpreted, there must be certain codes shared between encoder and decoder. … if the receiver does not recognize that the text is a parody, he or she will neutralize both its pragmatic ethos and its doubled structure. … in all cases the decoder’s competence is involved. So too is the inference of intent.13

Such scenarios are fluid and can quickly change. Once any formerly obscure or “hidden” intertextual references have been detected and correctly identified by even one scholar or critic, it is possible for this knowledge to be published and become available to the wider discourse community (e.g. in the form of commentaries, keys, etc.). When this occurs, the additional information effectively enters into “the world of the work,” altering the way it is received and interpreted from that time onwards.14

Once we allow for the generalised possibility of a work’s relationship to “other(s)” to also involve cultural “texts” external to the artworld – i.e. located anywhere in the wider semiosphere (Chapter 7) – the definitional ambit of conceptual music expands even further. Again, entire genres potentially fall within its compass, e.g. program music, concept albums, protest songs, or indeed any music which aims – or claims – to be the representation of something.15 Appropriate labels for this more generalised form of musical intertextuality might be referential or representational practices and genres. These apply to musical works which cannot be fully appreciated and interpreted without

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13 Hutcheon, Theory of Parody, 27, emphasis added
14 Precisely this type of reception history has occurred with authors such as James Joyce and W. G. Sebald, whose major works are replete with a myriad of obscure allusions. These have been thoroughly researched and documented by literary scholars and are now readily available to any interested readers. See, respectively, Crispi and Slote, How Joyce Wrote Finnegans Wake, and Schmucker, Grenzübertretungen.
taking into account the aspect(s) of the external world that they are intentionally referencing or representing. In order to prevent the definition of conceptual music from spiraling out of control into ever-broader domains, the same two provisos noted above continue to apply – the conceptual relationship must be artistically pivotal or significant to the interpretive process, and its existence must be made evident.

12.3 Types of Intertextual Relationship

Numerous researchers have considered the different types of relationship which are able to occur between cultural texts and their others. At the highest level, we could simply observe that all intertextual relations are varieties of interpretation or (mis)translation (Appendix E). Indeed, as Lotman argued, intertextuality – i.e. the dialogic processes of (mis)translation – is the fundamental sustaining principle of the semiosphere (Chapter 7). Every “text” – in order to be received and acknowledged as a valid text within a given culture – must, by definition, be implicitly or explicitly recognised to be in some form of dialogic relation with one or more of its “other(s).”

The sheer ubiquity of intertextual practices across all the arts, including music, has forced scholars to come up with various de-limiting strategies, in order to narrow the scope of their study to manageable proportions. For example, citing T. J. Clark, David Metzer orients his book on quotation in twentieth-century music towards “limit cases,” which he defines as “pieces in which … a practice is pushed to a breaking point, where that practice will either fall apart or take on new forms.” Others have sought to impose some semblance of a higher-level order into the terminological undergrowth. In any case, some of the terminology which predominated during the heights of the postmodern era – e.g. appropriation, parody, even intertextuality – seems to be slightly waning in recent academic usage. My impression is that these terms have given way to

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16 Of course, these are still variations on intertextuality, where the “texts” in question may be located either within the present artworld, or momentarily beyond it (to be inducted into the artworld through the creative act of intertextual citation or referencing). This definitional openness would also include within its scope countless multimodal works in which a musical dimension is intimately bound up with an extra-musical conceptual dimension (e.g. narrative) which is typically presented primarily in another medium (e.g. voice narration, film, video).

more contemporary labels such as *mashup*\(^{18}\) and *remix*.\(^{19}\) Importantly, these latter terms are increasingly being used as umbrella categories applicable to all the arts (i.e. not just to music). However, they encompass more or less the same territory as several of the earlier terms that they appear to be displacing.

A pertinent methodological question is whether there are terminological frameworks that enable us to usefully distinguish between different types of intertextual relationships, rather than lumping them all together into a single category labelled “interpretation/translation.” I think the answer to this question is a qualified “yes.” Within genres, various authors have proposed typologies aimed at elucidating some of the finer distinctions observed in practice.\(^{20}\) The caveat is that all such schemas can be expected to have a limited range of heuristic usefulness, beyond which they will reveal discomfitting departures from real-world evidence.

One of the most insightful contributions to this methodological issue is from Linda Hutcheon, in her influential book *A Theory of Parody* (1985). There, Hutcheon argues that *parody* is a particularly appropriate label for an approach to intertextual relations prevalent in literature and the arts at the time she was writing, i.e. during the heights of postmodernism. She defines *parody* “as repetition with critical distance, which marks difference rather than similarity,”\(^ {21}\) or, more succinctly, “as repetition with critical difference.”\(^ {22}\) In her view:

> A critical distance is implied between the background text being parodied and the new incorporating work, a distance *usually signaled by irony*. But this irony can be playful as well as belittling; it can be critically constructive as well as destructive.\(^ {23}\)

She also highlights the importance of artistic intentions and their recognition.


\(^{22}\) Ibid., 36.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 32, emphasis added.
While all artistic communication can take place only by virtue of tacit contractual agreements between encoder and decoder, it is part of the particular strategy of both parody and irony that their acts of communication cannot be considered completed unless the precise encoding intention is realized in the recognition of the receiver.\footnote{Ibid., 93.}

In short, “parody demands that the semiotic competence and intentionality of an inferred encoder be posited.”\footnote{Ibid., 37.}

Hutcheon’s arguments are still valid as far as they go. Of course, as a single category, parody is hardly an adequate umbrella term for the different varieties of intertextual relationships which are encountered in the artworld. Indeed, Hutcheon acknowledges as much. Her definition of parody places the trope squarely within broader approaches to intertextuality, imitation and appropriation.\footnote{Ibid.} However: “Unlike imitation, quotation, or even allusion, parody requires that critical ironic distance.”\footnote{Ibid, 34, emphasis added.}

In the mid-1970s, Paul Ricoeur also considered the topic of intertextuality, as part of his broader analysis of the philosophical problem of imagination. Some of this work was left unpublished, in an underdeveloped or transitional state. This was because Ricoeur’s thinking soon shifted in emphasis, away from linguistic questions of reference and predication, to themes such as identity, narrative and his three-stage model of mimesis (eventually to be presented in *Time and Narrative* (1984-88/[1983-85])). The most extensive exposition of Ricoeur’s views on imagination in the 1970s is found in the still unpublished *Lectures on Imagination*, delivered in 1975. These *Lectures* make up one of the two main documents setting out Ricoeur’s philosophy of imagination during the middle period of his career.\footnote{George Taylor identifies two sets of lectures – *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* and *Lectures on Imagination* – delivered at the University of Chicago in 1975 as “Ricoeur’s principal reflections on a philosophy of imagination.” See George H. Taylor, “The Phenomenological Contributions of Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Imagination,” *Social Imaginaries*, 1, no. 2 (2015): 14.}

In his final works, Ricoeur undoubtedly developed more nuanced and balanced positions on many of his central concerns, sometimes arguing against or adjusting his
earlier views. However, George Taylor\textsuperscript{29} and others\textsuperscript{30} have persuasively argued that Ricoeur’s middle period writings on imagination remain valuable (even while recognising that some of them are not definitive texts sanctioned for publication by Ricoeur).\textsuperscript{31} In what follows, I draw upon some published extracts from \textit{Lectures on Imagination} which are currently available in the secondary literature. I have not had pre-publication access to the full text of the \textit{Lectures}. Those who are familiar with full text of \textit{Lectures on Imagination} have commented that they are, in parts, “cryptic,”\textsuperscript{32} “underdeveloped,”\textsuperscript{33} with “apparent contradictions [that] remain unresolved.”\textsuperscript{34} For this reason, the discussion in the remainder of this section should be regarded as preliminary, subject to validation once the \textit{Lectures} are published in full.\textsuperscript{35} Nevertheless, there is already enough tantalising material publicly available to warrant consideration here.

From his reading of Sartre and Kant, Ricoeur articulated a distinction between \textit{productive} versus \textit{reproductive} imagination. This was a recurring theme in several of Ricoeur’s writings during the 1970s.\textsuperscript{36} It is a key distinction in his \textit{Lectures on Imagination}. In those \textit{Lectures}, Ricoeur also expands upon a second opposition, between “critical distance” and “non-critical involvement.” With these two polarities in mind, Martijn Boven has proposed a two-axis framework for diagrammatically representing Ricoeur’s model of the different types of imaginative relationships between cultural texts and their referential others. This is illustrated in Fig. 12.1.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} Vlacos, \textit{Ricoeur, Literature and Imagination}; Venema, \textit{Identifying Selfhood}.
\item \textsuperscript{31} George Taylor considers that Ricoeur’s late period writings have occasionally blunted the incisiveness and far-reaching implications of his earlier thoughts, sketchy and only partly formed as they may have been. He discusses a shift which occurred in Ricoeur’s language between the mid 1970’s and the early 1980’s. Specifically, Taylor points to a greater “modesty” in Ricoeur’s later works – such as \textit{Time and Narrative} – where he seems to have pulled back from “the stronger claims [in the earlier \textit{Lectures on Imagination}] of productive reference … changing or shattering reality.” See George H. Taylor, “Prospective Political Identity,” in \textit{Paul Ricoeur in the Age of Hermeneutical Reason: Poetics, Praxis, and Critique}, ed. Roger W. H. Savage (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 133.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Taylor, “Phenomenological Contributions,” 16.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Saulias Geniusas, “Against the Sartrean Background: Ricoeur’s \textit{Lectures on Imagination}.” \textit{Research in Phenomenology}, 46 (2016): 111.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 115.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ricoeur’s \textit{Lectures on Imagination} are being co-edited for publication by George Taylor. Their publication is presumably imminent, originally scheduled for 2016. See Taylor, “Phenomenological Contributions,” 14.
\end{itemize}
Figure 12.1  A Model of Productive & Reproductive Imagination

Notice that the vertical axis of this framework uses precisely the same term – “critical distance” – which subsequently played such a pivotal role in Hutcheon’s theory of parody. Apparently, Ricoeur also referred to the opposition represented on this vertical axis as “critical consciousness” [= critical distance] versus “fascinated consciousness” [= non-critical involvement].

Boven proposes locations on the grid for different genres in the literary and visual arts, as shown in Fig. 12.1. Such an approach cannot be unequivocally accepted, without major clarifications or caveats. For example, some sub-genres of novel, such as non-dystopian fantasy or science fiction, could reasonably be positioned somewhere in the

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38 Although I am not aware of any conclusive evidence on this point, it seems possible that Hutcheon adopted the term “critical distance” due to Ricoeur’s direct influence. Ricoeur was a visiting professor at the University of Toronto in the early 1970’s, during the same period that Hutcheon was a doctoral student there (her doctorate was awarded in 1975). See Martin L. Friedland, The University of Toronto: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 482. Certainly, two of Ricoeur’s publications are cited in Hutcheon’s list of references. The first edition of the English translation of The Rule of Metaphor was published by the University of Toronto Press in 1977.


40 Of course, such caveats and clarifications might be included in the full text of the Lectures.
productive/non-critical quadrant of Fig. 12.1, rather than in the productive/critical zone. Part of the difficulty here is undoubtedly a consequence of the simplifying limitations of any two-dimensional typology. But perhaps it also reflects a dialectical tension between the critical hermeneutics of suspicion, which was the focus of Ricoeur’s early and middle period writings, and the hermeneutics of recovery (or retrieval), which is the hallmark of his final works. Alison Scott-Baumann insightfully contrasts the second and third stages in the development of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy as follows:

The second phase is … experienced in critical exegesis (containing hermeneutics of suspicion, and potentially a stage at which we may become stuck in ironic disbelief, as Cavell describes). Thirdly and finally we develop philosophical anthropology leading to second naivety, a state of mind in which we are able to judge and choose ethically … This third stage is the culmination of the hermeneutics of recovery; it must include all the preceding stages and is by definition unstable.

In her view:

The hermeneutics of recovery (or retrieval) is Ricoeur’s attempt to answer the question of how we can become wiser and more compassionate as a result of guilt, loss and disappointment, and this is a counterbalance to suspicion.

With these insights in mind, I propose that it might be heuristically useful to modify Fig. 12.1, by retro-fitting some key themes from the final phase of Ricoeur’s philosophy. Specifically, I propose that the labels at the bottom end of the vertical axis – “non-critical involvement” and “fascinated consciousness” – are too unforgiving in light of the later evolution of Ricoeur’s thought. I suggest that we look to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of recovery for more appropriate labels. However, before doing so, it is important to not misconstrue the notion of “second naivety” which Scott-Baumann

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43 Ibid, emphasis added.

refers to above. This is not a simplistic return to a “first naivety” that has somehow been lost. “Second naivety” should not be equated with any form of simple-minded acceptance, non-critical submission or blind nostalgic return. Rather, a critical intelligence continues to function in the hermeneutics of recovery as it also does in the hermeneutics of suspicion. However, in the hermeneutics of recovery, critical intelligence is primarily motivated by a spirit of recognition and appreciation, rather than one of opposition and rejection. It is an intelligence informed by the type of intimate knowledge and understanding that comes from proximity and closeness, rather than from detachment and distance. It is more likely to be signaled by empathy, rather than irony. To re-emphasise, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of recovery does not do away with the hermeneutics of suspicion. Both are essential aspects of a healthy critical intelligence. What emerges from Ricoeur’s final philosophy is the culminating proposition, motivated by compassion and the desire for wisdom, that both hermeneutical attitudes – of suspicion and recovery – should be ethically deployed in an appropriate balance.

If the general direction of this excursus is accepted, then I propose that the two-dimensional grid of Fig. 12.1 may be re-labelled as shown in Fig. 12.2. Of course, such a simple framework could hardly encapsulate all the complexities likely to be encountered in many real-world cases. Nevertheless, if we keep in mind its potential limitations, I suggest that Fig. 12.2 could be a worthwhile heuristic tool for comparing and contrasting different approaches to establishing intertextual relationships between an artistic text and its other(s). Specifically, it may serve to prompt an explicit consideration of why works which clearly exhibit one shared trait – i.e. of conceptually foregrounding relationships to their “other(s)” – may still seem radically different in most other respects.
In closing the discussion of this section, two additional observations may be useful.

Firstly, referring to Fig. 12.2, it is consistent with Ricoeur’s mature philosophical inclinations to interpret the labels as end-points of a continuous spectrum of possibilities, rather than as dialectically or irreconcilably opposed categorical dichotomies. From this perspective, all artistic texts will involve a mixture of reproductive and productive aspects, as well as a blend of critical distance and proximity.

Secondly, any temptation to pass blanket judgements on the relative axiological or aesthetic value of different locations on the two-dimensional grid should be resisted. For example, as a wellspring of new worlds and systems, productive imagination

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45 Johann Arnason holds a similar view. He suggests that “fascinated consciousness and critical consciousness are not as sharply opposed as he [Ricoeur] wants to suggest (it is true that he implicitly admits this when he talks about an axis rather than a stark contrast).” Arnason, “Reason, imagination, interpretation,” 159.
perhaps might, at first glance, appear to be inherently preferable when compared to a tendency towards stasis associated with reproductive imagination. However, Ricoeur was well aware that productive imagination is not necessarily always a good thing. It can also be bad, indeed "pathological." Similarly, critical distance – from the reality of the world (which of course includes the accumulated legacy of pre-existing artistic tradition) – may often be a necessary pre-condition for the ability of new music and art to critique and resist the status quo and open up a space for the creative exercise of productive imagination. However, a one-sided critical engagement only from a detached distance may easily slide into – and become habituated as – a debilitatingly corrosive and institutionalised cynicism, unless also tempered with the compassionate wisdom which is the hallmark of ethical retrieval.

Thus, we could imagine that the creative identity of an artist – as manifested across the course a lifetime's work (as distinct from any single work) (Chapter 9) – might follow a hermeneutical arc which traces a personal narrative journey or exploratory path through all four quadrants of the "map" illustrated in Fig. 12.2. There is an inescapable ethical responsibility attached to the freedoms associated with the making (poetics) of artistic identity. Richard Kearney has suggested that Ricoeur's later writings offer "a glimpse" of a flexible but necessary divide between the poetical imagination (where all is permitted and 'passion for the possible' reigns supreme) and the ethical imagination (answerable to the suffering and action of real human beings)? Such a boundary would serve as a frontier post, where imagination exchanges the immunity of poetic license for a sense of responsibility to others – dead and living, present and past – towards whom we carry an irremissible debt.

The full implications of Riceour’s ethical imperative range far beyond the narrow confines of the artworld. However, it seems to me that it can also be read as an

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46 Taylor, “Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Imagination,” 99-100.
47 In Roger Savage’s words “the epoché that the work introduces into the heart of reality is also the condition of the work’s critical bite.” Roger W. H. Savage, “Aesthetic Experience, Mimesis and Testimony,” Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies, 3, no. 1 (2012), 176.
48 Referring to Adorno’s negative dialectics, Savage asks: “We might wonder whether a mode of truth that invariably assumes this negative dialectical cast ever exceeds the work’s determinate negation of reality.” Ibid.
invitation to artists to maintain an ethically responsible stance towards the tradition(s) and context(s) in which they are constantly refiguring history and reinterpreting their own narrative identity.

I am now ready to turn to a discussion of individual works in which the conceptual dimension of the works’ “other(s)” is pivotal to their intended meaning.

12.4 Beck – *Sea Change* (2002)\(^50\)

At one level, Beck’s album *Sea Change* (2002), could be taken by casual listeners as simply a commercially successful popular music album, to be filed under the “alternative” label. However, no adequate musicological interpretation of this recording is possible without recognising that several tracks on it are archetypical examples of conceptual music, as I have defined it. These are tracks in which the conceptual dimension of “the other(s) of the work” has been shifted squarely into the presentational spotlight. Specifically, *Sea Change* includes three tracks which are easily recognisable – at least by reasonably knowledgeable popular music audiences and critics – as closely mimicking the styles of orchestral arrangement found on Nick Drake’s *Five Leaves Left* (1969)\(^51\) and Serge Gainsbourg’s *Histoire de Melody Nelson* (1971).\(^52\) The relevant arrangements on these earlier albums are:

- Nick Drake – *Five Leaves Left* (1969), with string arrangements by Harry Robinson (on “River Man”) and Robert Kirby (on “Way to Blue”, “Day Is Done”, “The Thoughts of Mary Jane” (flute and strings), and “Fruit Tree”).

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The three tracks on *Sea Change* which “cite” the orchestrations\(^{53}\) from those two original albums are –

- “Paper Tiger”, which bears an unmistakable resemblance to “Melody,” the opening track of Gainsbourg’s *Histoire de Melody Nelson*, especially in its distinctive use of “stabbing” strings;\(^{54}\)
- “Round the Bend”, which has an orchestral arrangement reminiscent of Nick Drake’s “River Man”;\(^{55}\)
- “Lonesome Tears”, which evokes Robert Kirby’s string arrangements on Nick Drake’s albums in general, but certainly those on *Five Leaves Left*.\(^{56}\)

In other words, these *Sea Change* tracks are in an intertextual *dialogue* with the nominated tracks from the two earlier albums. This network of relationships is illustrated in Fig. 12.3.

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\(^{53}\) The orchestral arrangements on *Sea Change* were created by David Campbell a well-known arranger, composer, and conductor (also Beck’s father).


\(^{56}\) Fricke, “Beck”; Chris Jones, “Again and again, Beck’s words reflect the cynicism born of betrayal and longing ...” [= Review of *Sea Change*], *BBC* website (20 November 2002). Available at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/music/reviews/bdmq](http://www.bbc.co.uk/music/reviews/bdmq). In addition to the Robert Kirby allusion, this song also includes a fairly close homage to the famous orchestral climax at the end of The Beatles’ “A Day in the Life,” the final track on *Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band* (1967).
The intertextual references in *Sea Change* are conscious and deliberate, as distinct from “subconscious” or “unintentional” imitations. Indeed, Beck has explicitly acknowledged that the above-mentioned tracks from his album were modelled on *Five Leaves Left* and *Melody Nelson*. For example, in interviews, Beck has talked openly about the connection between “Paper Tiger” and *Histoire de Melody Nelson*:

I've been listening to Gainsbourg for years and I've always wanted to do something influenced by him. To me, a record like *Melody Nelson* has so many possibilities.

But when we were making the record, I wanted to do something with strings that was very dramatic. And we were listening to that. And (he chuckles) we ended up with something that sounded exactly like it (Melody Nelson). I didn't intend that. But we did it and it came out so good, in my opinion, it sounded like a tribute. But it transcended that. And it was a good song. … But yeah, I love the way Gainsbourg uses
the orchestras. It's not afraid to be dramatic and bold and emotional. There's something really cool about the sound too.”

Elsewhere, Beck has stated that *Histoire de Melody Nelson* is “one of the greatest marriages of rock band and orchestra I’ve ever heard.”

Beck’s allusions cannot be classed as parodies, in Linda Hutcheon’s sense of “parody” as “repetition with critical distance.” Instead, they may be characterised as homages, i.e. repetitions which seek to emulate and imitate. If we were to consider where *Sea Change* might best be placed on the grid shown in Fig. 12.2, then I would suggest a location somewhere in the “reproductive proximity” quadrant (Fig. 12.4). That’s because –

- The similarities between Beck’s tracks and their inspirational originals are strong enough to involve a significant degree of “reproductive imagination” in the mix.
- The relational attitude between Beck and his chosen others is one of knowledgeable and respectful homage – almost reverence – being paid to some classic recordings from an earlier era. I detect little or no traces of irony, one of the hallmarks – according to Hutcheon – of a parodic imitation.

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57 http://www.whiskeyclone.net/ghost/songinfo.php?songID=369
At this point, one pertinent question remains unanswered. Why are we entitled to consider Beck’s *Sea Change* – anchored by the three hallmark tracks that I have highlighted – as a particularly interesting work of conceptual music? Put simply, why does *Sea Change* warrant the level of attention I have accorded it here? Besides the fairly obvious point that *Sea Change* has a connection to several earlier recorded works, is there something more conceptually interesting being conveyed by the idea of intertextual homage that Beck has specifically highlighted here?

I suggest that the answer lies in Beck’s own comments – quoted above – regarding his intentions. Beck stated that he “wanted to do something with strings that was very dramatic.” He is clearly in admiration of earlier artists who have achieved precisely this goal, specifically Serge Gainsbourg and Nick Drake in their landmark albums. Presumably, this admiration was partly formed in conversations with his father David.
Campbell, the orchestral arranger who Beck used on this album. Beck has provided several signposts – in the music itself and in the various paratexts associated with *Sea Change* – as to where he wishes to direct our conceptual attention. To me, the point which Beck seems to be foregrounding with these tracks is that, to hear excellent examples of “marriages of rock band and orchestra,” we should look to the work of Serge Gainsbourg and Nick Drake. More precisely, Beck is inviting (or reminding) us to listen to the work of the *orchestral arrangers* who these artists engaged in creating their iconic recordings – Jean-Claude Vannier (by Serge Gainsbourg), and Robert Kirby and Harry Robinson (by Nick Drake). I consider that this is an important *music-related proposition* or *idea* which is being communicated – principally through the presentation of practical examples – by Beck’s homages in *Sea Change*. If this is accepted, then the target audience for this proposition consists of knowledgeable or curious listeners, musicians, and critics who have more than a passing interest in the use of orchestral arrangements in contemporary pop/rock music.

From a musicological perspective, this is a non-trivial idea, one worthy of closer study. Traditionally, arrangers in popular music have largely been “invisible.”60 The difficulties of successfully integrating the sounds of a classical orchestra with rock/pop recordings are well-known. When attempted, the results are often less than satisfying, if not downright “cheesy.” Three tracks recorded during the *Five Leaves Left* sessions – “Thoughts of Mary Jane,” “Day Is Done” and “Magic”61 – are excellent case studies for illustrating the difficulties. Originally, the orchestral parts for these three tracks were arranged by Richard Hewson, a young but already reputable arranger. For example, he had created the arrangements for the Mary Hopkin hit single “Those Were the Days” (1968),62 James Taylor’s self-titled debut (1968),63 and went on to work on several sessions with The Beatles.64 However, neither Nick Drake nor Joe Boyd (the producer) were happy with Hewson’s arrangements for the *Five Leaves Left* session. At Drake’s suggestion, Robert Kirby – who had no prior studio recording experience – was invited

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61 One track – “Magic” – was left off the *Five Leaves Left* album, only finding official release on the compilation *Time of No Reply* (1986) (mistitled as “I Was Made To Love Magic”).


64 For example, Hewson worked on The Beatles' tracks “Across the Universe” (1969) and “The Long and Winding Road” (1970).
to develop new orchestrations for the session. Kirby’s arrangements for four of the album tracks are generally regarded as immeasurably superior to those by Hewson. For music scholars today, it is possible to compare the Kirby’s arrangements for “The Thoughts of Mary Jane” and “Day Is Done” with Hewson’s (which have found their way onto various bootlegs). Pete Paphides is accurate when he states that

Hewson’s arrangements are far from without merit. If anything, they suggest that he’d heard Nick described as an ‘English chansonnier’ and placed the songs in a setting that teased out those similarities. Hewson’s versions were perfectly pretty – but they were created at something of a disadvantage: he had never seen or spoken to Nick.

Less diplomatically, Joe Boyd described Hewson’s arrangements as “sweet, corny and cute.”

Paphides identifies the reason why Kirby’s arrangements are universally considered to be better than Hewson’s:

Unlike Hewson, Robert Kirby’s arrangements made no concessions to accepted notions of what the components of a pop song should be. As a ‘mad Beatles freak since 1963,’ he noted the way that George Martin fashioned the uncompromisingly stark setting for ‘Eleanor Rigby’ (1966). … it was the Beatles song that emboldened him to do something similar on ‘Day Is Done.’ ‘The cellos had the rhythm part,’ he recalled, ‘which was an unashamed homage to George Martin.’

So what? In the preceding paragraphs, I have been following a somewhat circuitous train of thought. It began with Beck’s Sea Change and ended up winding its way through a digression into the arcane recording details of some Nick Drake tracks. I did so in order to add some substance to my initial high-level suggestion, i.e. this is precisely where Beck has invited us to go, by foregrounding the relationship of the orchestral arrangements on his Sea Change album with their acknowledged “other(s).”

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66 For example: Nicholas Rodney Drake, Time Has Told Me [no other release data, bootleg], two CDs.
68 Joe Boyd quoted in ibid., 156.
69 Ibid., 157.
If we, as listeners, are curious about what makes an orchestral arrangement succeed or fail, or the arrangers who have so significantly influenced the sound of *Sea Change*, Beck has shown us exactly where we should look. I have sketched enough of the relevant detail here to show that such an investigation is likely to be musicologically interesting.

One final point merits a brief digression. The network of relationships shown in Fig. 12.3 is part of a larger network which continually evolves in time. To see how this occurs, consider Goldfrapp’s *Seventh Tree* (2008). This album also includes some tracks which clearly pay homage to the orchestral arrangements on *Five Leaves Left* and *Histoire de Melody Nelson*. Specifically –

- the string arrangement on “Clowns” is strongly reminiscent of the orchestration used in Nick Drake’s “River Man,” a connection which Alison Goldfrapp and Will Gregory have themselves acknowledged as a premeditated artistic goal;

- to knowledgeable listeners, the “thwacking wooden bass” and “agitated strings” or “signature stabbing strings” used in “Cologne Cerrone Houdini” are a clear reference to *Melody Nelson*.

Therefore, with the release of *Seventh Tree*, these tracks can be said to have “intruded” into the earlier network of relationships shown in Fig. 12.3. This expanded network is shown in Fig. 12.5.

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73 Roca, “Goldfrapp: *Seventh Tree*.”

More recently, Beck’s album *Morning Phase* (2014) is widely regarded to be a “spiritual follow-up”\(^\text{75}\) to *Sea Change*. Thus, we could also legitimately introduce *Morning Phase* into the network of relationships illustrated in Fig. 12.5. It is safe to assume that such processes of referential accretion will inevitably continue, without ceasing, into the future. What this means for the analyst is that, in an open-ended, infinite, and constantly evolving semiosphere, there is unavoidably a practical requirement to bracket the scope of the analysis, either synchronically, or diachronically, or both, in order to keep things manageable. The choice of what to focus on, and what to leave out of consideration, will be guided by the exegetical point(s) which the analyst seeks to establish. In other words, such choices regarding

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scope and content are themselves a performative aspect of the exegesis. The same standards of verisimilitude and exuberant understanding, discussed in Chapter 1, apply.

12.4.1 Conclusion

There is an undeniable relationship of allusion and imitation – an intertextual dialogue with specific “others” – which exists for the three tracks I have singled out from Beck’s Sea Change album. This salient point holds true regardless of precisely where Sea Change might be claimed to best fit in any typologies or grids, such as the one in Fig. 12.4. Importantly, the intertextual relationship is intentional. It is foregrounded and made prominent, not just through the strong audio resemblances (which are self-evident to knowledgeable listeners), but also openly acknowledged in artist interviews.

Therefore, it is not possible to present a well-balanced exegesis of these tracks from Sea Change without taking full account of the central place which Five Leaves Left and Histoire de Melody Nelson occupy in their conceptual formation and subsequent reception. Importantly, such an account would need to be considerably more than a superficial comment or passing footnote. It must be sufficiently detailed and well-argued to be able to reasonably aspire to – and hopefully achieve – the interpretive aim of “exuberant understanding” (Chapter 1). This is what I have attempted to do in this section. Whether or not the various details of my interpretation are accepted, contested, or rejected is not of paramount importance, as long as the efficacy of the interpretive attempt has been demonstrated. If so, the main claim of this thesis is shown to be valid. The case of Beck’s Sea Change demonstrates that practising artists do indeed sometimes create works in which the relationship of these works to their “other(s)” is shifted into the conceptual spotlight, becoming an essential consideration in how they should be interpreted.
12.6 Arnold Schoenberg – Verklärte Nacht (Transfigured Night), Op. 4 (1899)

In the Sea Change tracks discussed above, Beck’s interpretations remained faithful to their original references. Thus, in Roman Jakobson’s threefold classification of translation types (Appendix E), we could describe these as “intralingual translations.” In this section, I turn to discuss an example of intertextual reference which falls into Jakobson’s third type of translation, i.e. “intersemiotic translation.” This involves a transmedial – or ekphrastic – translation between two different semiotic codes or media. The example I have chosen to discuss is Arnold Schoenberg’s Verklärte Nacht, Op. 4 (1899).

Verklärte Nacht is perhaps better thought of as a close-knit family of works, rather than a single composition. In terms of musical scores created by the composer, it exists in two versions –

- Verklärte Nacht, Op. 4, for string sextet (2 violins, 2 violas, 2 cellos) (1899)
- Verklärte Nacht, Op. 4, arranged by Schoenberg for string orchestra (1917)
  - Revised by Schoenberg in 1943

There is also an arrangement for piano trio by Eduard Steuermann, who was once Schoenberg’s student –

- Verklärte Nacht, Op. 4, arranged for violin, cello and piano by Eduard Steuermann76 (1932).

All three versions adhere to the same overall structure. The premiere performance, of the sextet version, was given in Vienna on 18 March 1902.77 In this section, I will refer to this version.

76 Eduard (later Edward) Steuermann was Schoenberg’s pupil and staunch advocate. Schoenberg considered him to be one of “the best” of his pupils. See Auner, Schoenberg Reader, 285. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Schoenberg was aware of, or ever saw, Steuermann’s arrangement of Verklärte Nacht. Even though the arrangement was completed in 1932, the first printed edition was published in 1979, long after Schoenberg’s death in 1951. See Paul Scheepers, “[Booklet included with Osiris Trio, Arnold Schönberg Verklärte Nacht/Karl Weigl Piano Trio],” trans. Bruce Gordon (Challenge Classics CC72614, 2013), Compact disc, 9. Nevertheless, the arrangement has entered into the “standard” Schoenberg repertoire, which is why I have included it in this list.

For my purposes, the key starting point is that Schoenberg’s *Verklärte Nacht* is a musical interpretation – a purely instrumental one, without any sung vocal part – of the poem of the same name by German poet and writer Richard Dehmel (1863-1920). Dehmel’s poem first appeared in *Weib und Welt* (*Woman and World*) (1896). It was also later incorporated into his verse novel *Zwei Menschen* (1903), after which it was no longer included in subsequent editions of *Weib und Welt*. The poems in *Weib und Welt* – “a largely autobiographical work” – deal with themes of marriage infidelity, sexual liberation and erotic love. Indeed, the original publication of *Weib und Welt* was controversial. Dehmel was required to defend himself against charges of blasphemy and immorality. The court ruled that one poem – “Venus Consolatrix” – be “excised from all unsold copies and eliminated from further editions.”

For Schoenberg, the poems in *Weib und Welt* proved to be a spur to renewed creativity. They enabled him to re-engage with music composition after the “relatively fallow year” of 1898. Walter Frisch lists no less than nine works or fragments composed by Schoenberg in 1899 which were based on material from *Weib und Welt*. He argues that

Schoenberg’s involvement with this volume in 1899 was so intense that I believe it can be said that his remarkable development that year, culminating in the sextet *Verklärte Nacht*, grew directly out of his search for a musical language appropriate to the poetry of *Weib und Welt*.

On 12 December 1912, after hearing a performance of the sextet version, Dehmel wrote a letter of thanks to Schoenberg, effusively praising the composer for having created such as “wonderful” musical interpretation of his verses. Schoenberg replied the next day, acknowledging his debt to Dehmel:

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82 Ibid., 80.
83 Ibid., 79, emphasis added.
Your poems have had a decisive influence on my musical development. It was because of them that I was for the first time compelled to seek a new tone in lyric writing. That is, I found it without having to look, by reflecting in music what your poems stirred up in me.\textsuperscript{85}

In later years, Schoenberg described Dehmel as one of “the foremost representatives of the ‘Zeitgeist’ in poetry” at the end of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{86}

The printed score of Schoenberg’s \textit{Verklärte Nacht} includes the text of Dehmel’s poem.\textsuperscript{87} This indicates the importance which Schoenberg attached to it as an indispensable element of the overall work. Nevertheless, some analyses of Schoenberg’s \textit{Verklärte Nacht} concentrate on the music alone, and pay little attention to its relationship to Dehmel’s text. Siglind Bruhn considers that Walter Bailey’s otherwise careful musical analysis of Schoenberg’s \textit{Verklärte Nacht} is weakened because “it is superficial with the regard to the text, [and] short-changes Dehmel’s poem.”\textsuperscript{88}

Bruhn herself has done much to redress this imbalance, with her own analysis of the relationship between Schoenberg’s \textit{Verklärte Nacht} and the words of Dehmel’s poem.\textsuperscript{89} She argues – correctly in my view – that the relationship between the two is one of intimate \textit{ekphrasis},\textsuperscript{90} where Schoenberg’s music represents and responds to the structure


\textsuperscript{87} There are minor variations between the text of the poem given in the score, and the text as given in the first edition of \textit{Weib und Welt} (Berlin, 1896). See Frisch, \textit{Early Music of Arnold Schoenberg}, 111 for a transcription of the \textit{Weib und Welt} text. These small textual differences do not alter my argument in this section.


\textsuperscript{89} Bruhn, \textit{Arnold Schoenberg’s Journey}, 33-48; an earlier version is in Bruhn, \textit{Musical Ekphrasis}, 149-72.

\textsuperscript{90} I concur with the definition proposed by Bruhn, who describes \textit{ekphrasis} as “a representation in one medium of a text composed in another medium.” Bruhn, \textit{Musical Ekphrasis}, 8. This definition radically broadens the classical scope of \textit{ekphrasis}, by dispensing with the requirement – still insisted upon by some – that an ekphrastic representation is always verbal. For example, Peter Wagner surveys the different definitions of ekphraseis, and concludes by suggesting that the term be extended “to encompass ‘verbal representation’ in its widest sense, including critical writing.” See Peter Wagner, “Introduction: Ekphrasis, Iconotexts, and Intermediality – the State(s) of the Art(s),” in \textit{Icons, Texts, Iconotexts}, ed. Peter Wagner (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 14. Of course, Bruhn’s definition effectively re-locates \textit{ekphrasis} into the realm of \textit{intersemiotic translation} (to use Roman Jakobson’s framework of three types of translation). This re-location, in turn, links \textit{ekphrasis} with other terms of contemporary critical importance, such as adaptation, transformation, transmedialization, and so on. Lydia Goehr adopts a similar position in “How to Do More with Words. Two Views of (Musical) Ekphrasis,” \textit{British Journal of Aesthetics}, 50, no. 4 (2010): 389-410. Her main interest is also musical ekphrasis. Goehr defines ekphrasis, at its most general level, as a “work-to-work relation ... challenging the assumption that ekphrasis is performed only
and detailed content of Dehmel’s original. The main outlines of this relationship were first given by Egon Wellesz, in his 1912 biography of Schoenberg. Wellesz’s proposed correspondence between the overall structure of Schoenberg’s music and Dehmel’s poem is still widely accepted. It is shown in Fig. 12.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dehmel</th>
<th>Schoenberg</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stanza I</td>
<td>narration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stanza II</td>
<td>woman’s speech</td>
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<tr>
<td>stanza III</td>
<td>narration</td>
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<tr>
<td>stanza IV</td>
<td>man’s speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stanza V</td>
<td>narration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.6 Verklärte Nacht – Structural Correspondences Between Dehmel’s Poem and Schoenberg’s Music

Source: Adapted from Bruhn, Arnold Schoenberg’s Journey, 39. Reproduced with kind permission of Siglind Bruhn.

Bruhn agrees that this “structural layout … remains convincing; it honors the poetic source, although it does not … account for all there is to Schoenberg’s transmedialization.” For this reason she aims “to account for the musically significant features in Schoenberg’s composition and interpret these in view of the poetic structure and message.” Indeed, Bruhn gives a virtuoso analysis of the detailed ekphrastic relationships which she discerns between Schoenberg’s music and the lyrical and narrative content in Dehmel’s poem.

through the medium of words” (389). I agree with the bias towards generality in Goehr’s in formulation. However, even allowing for the difficulties involved in making hard-and-fast distinctions between media and semiotic systems, I think it is useful to retain Bruhn’s stipulation that the art-to-art translation involved in ekphrasis only includes any “possible relationships between art forms that express themselves in different sign systems.” Siglind Bruhn, “Introduction,” in Sonic Transformations of Literary Texts, ed. Siglind Bruhn (Hillsdale, NY: Pendragon Press, 2008), 7, emphasis added.

93 Bruhn, Musical Ekphrasis, 160.
94 Ibid.
Importantly, these relationships were not merely the result of inspired intuition or happy accidents on Schoenberg’s part. Mostly, Schoenberg worked quickly, completing the entire work in three weeks. However, when necessary, he was perfectly willing to devote painstaking effort in order to effectively represent what he found in Dehmel’s text. This is illustrated by an anecdote from his famous essay “Heart and Brain in Music (1946)” included in Style and Idea. There Schoenberg gives an account of one measure in Verklärte Nacht on which he “had worked a full hour, though I had written the entire score of 415 measures in three weeks.” He explains that “this measure is indeed a little complicated since, according to the artistic conviction of this period (the post-Wagnerian), I wanted to express the idea behind the poem, and the most adequate means to that end seemed a complicated contrapuntal combination: a leitmotiv and its inversion played simultaneously.”

At that point, in both editions of Style and Idea, the following musical example is printed:

![Musical Example](image)

Figure 12.7  Musical Example from Schoenberg, Verklärte Nacht (mm. 161-62). This is the excerpt printed in Style and Idea (1975), 56.

Public domain in Australia.

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95 Schoenberg, “Heart and Brain in Music,” in Style and Idea, 55. (The same anecdote appears in the first edition of Style and Idea, 155.)

96 Ibid., emphasis added.
Mark Doran points out that the musical example in Fig. 12.7 cannot possibly be said to accurately match the musical material Schoenberg describes in the text of the essay, i.e. a single bar of music containing “a leitmotiv and its inversion played simultaneously.” Doran argues that this musical extract must have been used in *Style and Idea* by mistake. He observes, however, that “the composer’s anecdote provides a perfectly accurate description of what happens somewhere else in the score, i.e. in bb. 165-166 (repeated in bb. 167-68).” This part of the score is shown in Fig. 12.8, with the leitmotif and inversion indicated by the red rectangles, played by first violin and first viola in m. 165, shifted to second viola and first cello in m. 166.

![Figure 12.8](image)

Figure 12.8 Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht*, Op. 4, for string sextet, mm. 165-66, with leitmotif and simultaneous inversion marked by red rectangles.

Public domain in Australia.

I find Doran’s argument – and his proposed solution to the puzzle of the musical quotation printed in *Style and Idea* – to be entirely convincing.

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His conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that Schoenberg immediately – and exactly – repeats mm. 165-66, as mm. 167-68. Repetition and close variation of musical material in Verklärte Nacht occurs quite often. We can safely assume that these repetitions were not undertaken lightly by the composer. In his later years, Schoenberg did come to view exact repetition in music as banal, and employed the technique of “developing variation” in order to avoid it. For example, in an essay from about 1930, Schoenberg discussed the topic of repetition, asserting that “Substantially, I say something only once, i.e. repeat little or nothing.” While this assertion is a fair description of his later works, it is not true of Verklärte Nacht, where exact repetition of contiguous sections occurs in a number of places. In any case, even in the same essay just quoted, Schoenberg acknowledged that “the more easily graspable a piece of music is to be, the more often all its sections, small or large, will have to be repeated.”

In 1899, some of the compositional techniques employed by Schoenberg in Verklärte Nacht were considered to be unacceptable departures from the conventions of common-practice tonality. So, at the time, repetition of the musically complex material in mm. 165-6 would, at the very least, have assisted audiences in understanding it. However, I propose that the exact repetition of these measures – rather than the developing variation which Schoenberg frequently used elsewhere in the work – also served an important artistic purpose, viz. to emphasise a moment of high drama in the musical/textual narrative. That this is a possibility might be suspected from Schoenberg’s refusal, as late as 1943, to agree to conductor Bruno Walter’s suggestion that other somewhat repetitive material be cut from the score of the string orchestra version. This indicates that whatever repetitive features are present in the work, Schoenberg considered them to be essential to the artistic integrity of the work.

In the remainder of this section, I aim to show that this initial suspicion gains considerable weight once we carefully consider the intertextual relationship between these four measures of music and the corresponding text of Dehmel’s poem.

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99 For example, m. 29 repeated as m. 30, m. 46 = 47, m. 55 = 56, etc.
100 Schoenberg, “New Music: My Music,” in Style and Idea, 103.
101 For example, Schoenberg famously used an inverted ninth chord in Verklärte Nacht which was, according to music theory of the time, not supposed to exist. See Arnold Schoenberg, Theory of Harmony, trans. Roy E. Carter. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 345-46.
102 See Frisch, Early Works of Arnold Schoenberg, 130-34.
In Siglind Bruhn’s view, this part of Schoenberg’s score – which represents the woman’s voice of the poem – continues the fraught passage which spans mm. 132-153, but “whose color imprint lingers well into the staggered motif-10 inversions in mm. 162-166.” She suggests that what Schoenberg seems to paint here [i.e. in mm. 132-153, extending to mm. 162-166] is an impression of the internal state of a woman riddled by feelings of guilt and regret, a woman who trembles in anticipation of the possibly devastating consequences her previous actions might bring about.

Bruhn does not associate individual lines in Dehmel’s poem with specific measures in Schoenberg’s score. However, it is evident that her interpretation, quoted above, broadly corresponds to ll. 14-16, which read as follows:

```
 da ließ ich schaudernd mein Geschlecht
 von einem fremden Mann umfangen,
 und hab mich noch dafür gesegnet.
```

[So, shuddering, I let my sex
 Be embraced by a stranger
 And even blessed myself for it.]

This approximate correspondence between music and text also consistent with the relative durational proportions of Schoenberg’s score vis-à-vis Dehmel’s stanzas.

Bruhn notes that the “German adjective fremd means strange or foreign, in the sense of ‘not belonging’. However, she doesn’t pursue the interpretive potential of this intriguing observation any further. I propose that a lot more can plausibly be read into it than perhaps might initially be suspected. Specifically, I suggest that the conjunction of

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103 Bruhn, *Arnold Schoenberg’s Journey*, 46. “Motif-10” refers to the tenth of 10 motifs which Bruhn identifies in the music associated with the “woman’s speech” section of the score. See ibid., 41.
104 Ibid., 46
105 German text and English translation both from Bruhn, ibid., 34.
106 Ibid, n.6.
language and music at this intertextual point of contact between Dehmel’s and Schoenberg’s works is more than a coincidence. That’s because the term *fremd* is also found in German music-theoretical treatises, and has a particular meaning. It is part of the word *harmoniefremde*, which means “non-harmonic.”

Indeed, even the chapter translated as “Non-Harmonic Tones” in Schoenberg’s *Theory of Harmony* is titled “‘Harmoniefremde’ Töne” in the German text. The following passage from that chapter sums up Schoenberg’s views on the dissonant harmonies produced by two musical lines moving in parallel:

> All the same, we should not really speak of accidental harmonic structures. For, in spite of all arguments to the contrary, they are not accidental – because the two agents (*Ursachen*) that produce them both move along according to law; because it is not accidental, but necessary, that these two agents operate simultaneously; and because we can not only predict the occurrence of such harmonies from the nature of the whole, we can even calculate in advance precisely what they will be.

In this passage, Schoenberg does not mention his composition *Verklärte Nacht*. Nevertheless, it resonates with the later passage from “Heart and Brain in Music,” also quoted above, about the “leitmotiv and its inversion” in *Verklärte Nacht*, over which he laboured so intensely. Both passages describe an attitude of careful deliberation (i.e. “not accidental”) involved in positioning “two agents [to] operate simultaneously” so that “both move along according to law.” A similar resonance can be discerned a few pages later in *Theory of Harmony*, when Schoenberg gives a simple example of the “harsh” non-harmonic chords that can be formed when “two voices execute a C-major scale in contrary motion” against the sustained harmony of a C major triad.

Against this background, I propose that, in mm. 165-66, Schoenberg was deliberately reflecting the musical connotations suggested by the word *fremde* in Dehmel’s text, by treating it as a prompt to ekphrastically represent – in music – the poet’s words about a forbidden sexual union, between a pregnant married woman and a man “who doesn’t

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belong” (fremden Mann). Two times in mm. 165-66, and two times again in mm. 167-68, the leitmotif of the woman is combined with its inversion, which I speculatively suggest might represent the man. Some of the resulting harmonies are, in passing, conventionally “harsh.” But, as Schoenberg repeatedly argued in *Theory of Harmony*, “There are no non-harmonic tones whenever one discovers [the underlying] principles.”

12.6.1 Conclusion

Schoenberg sums up his assessment of the two measures shown in Fig.12.8 as follows:

> This combination was not the product of a spontaneous inspiration but of an extra-musical intention, of a cerebral intention. The technical labour which required so much time was in adding such subordinate voices as would soften the harsh frictions of this combination.

In other words, Schoenberg deliberately set out to musically combine two opposites – a leitmotif and its inversion. Under conventional harmonic rules, these do not belong together. However, Schoenberg took pains to musically “soften the harsh frictions,” thereby undermining the prescribed order of things. The attempted justification of a relationship (in this case, sexual) which, according to the rules of conventional society at the time, was forbidden, is precisely what Dehmel has also done in his poem. As far as I am aware, Schoenberg’s ekphrastic representation, in mm. 165-168, of the contradictory emotions and moral ambiguities portrayed in ll. 14-16 of Dehmel’s verse has not been previously noticed. I offer it here as an attempt at achieving the type of “exuberant understanding” in musical hermeneutics advocated by Kramer (Chapter 1).

In her exegesis of *Verklärte Nacht*, Bruhn gives several other examples of ways in which “musical reminiscences and allusions … mirror corresponding poetic echoes in Dehmel’s text.”

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111 Ibid., 319.
112 Schoenberg, “Heart and Brain in Music,” 56, emphasis added.
between the two works, where Schoenberg has ekphrastically represented Dehmel’s text in music. Bruhn’s interpretations are plausible and insightful.\(^{114}\) However, the details need not concern us here. The essential point is simply that, without a careful and sensitive engagement with the intertextual “other” of Schoenberg’s *Verklärte Nacht* – i.e. Dehmel’s poem of the same name – any exegesis of the work would be blind-sided, falling short in some essential respects.\(^{115}\)

Finally, we might ask where an ekphrastic work such as Schoenberg’s *Verklärte Nacht* could be usefully positioned on the two-dimensional grid of Fig. 12.2. I’d suggest that the appropriate location is in the lower right “productive proximity” quadrant, distinguishing it from the conceptual approaches to intertextuality found in Beck’s *Sea Change*.

\(^{114}\) Of course, other readings of the relationship between music and text in Schoenberg’s *Verklärte Nacht* are also conceivable, and need not necessarily be antagonistic to those proposed by Bruhn or myself. For example, Julie Pedneault-Deslauriers plausibly interprets the work as a critique of patriarchy. See Julie Pedneault-Deslauriers, “Dominant Tunnels, Form, and Program in Schoenberg’s *Verklärte Nacht,*” in *Formal Functions in Perspective: Essays on Musical Form from Haydn to Adorno,* ed. Steven Vande Moortele, Julie Pedneault-Deslauriers, and Nathan John Martin (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2015), 345-72.

\(^{115}\) Indeed, Bruhn considers that Walter Bailey’s otherwise careful musical analysis of Schoenberg’s *Verklärte Nacht* is weakened precisely because “it is superficial with the regard to the text, [and] short-changes Dehmel’s poem.” (Bruhn, *Musical Ekphrasis*, 150, referring to Bailey, *Programmatic Elements*, 27-38.)
12.7 Gavin Bryars – *The Sinking of the Titanic* (1969 - )

The two preceding case studies are examples in which the “other” of a work is a “text” already recognised as a “work” in the world of art, literature and music. However, the “other(s)” of a work do not need to be limited to artworld texts. That’s because literally anything from the broader semiosphere can be introduced by artists into the artworld at any time, even if – prior to that point – it had not previously been regarded as art (Chapter 7). Archetypical examples of the unlimited absorptive capacity of the artworld include Marcel Duchamp’s *Fountain* (1917) and Andy Warhol’s *Brillo Box* (1968).

Similarly, any and all historical events, narratives and fictions are, in principle, able to be appropriated, referenced, interpreted or adapted by visual artists, film-makers, writers and composers. All that is required is execution of artistic intent by way of a
publicly perceptible gesture which announces to audiences that, at the artist’s “invitation” and from that moment forward, some new entity has been inducted into the world of art. In this way, any and all external cultural “texts” can be translated and woven into the fabric of a work, to be put forward as new ideas or concepts for membership of the ever expanding and endlessly voracious world of art. In music, if such externally-introduced ideas and concepts are of primary importance to an audience’s reception and interpretation of the overall work, then these works fall into the category I have labelled conceptual music.

The process of referential appropriation can be as effortless – and superficial – as the choice of an evocative title. A work titled 8’37” sets up a domain of potential interpretations which is qualitatively very different from a work titled Threnody for the Victims of Hiroshima. And yet, as discussed in Chapter 6, both titles referred – at different points in time – to precisely the same musical score by Krzysztof Penderecki. Nevertheless, I would argue that, under its revised title, Threnody for the Victims of Hiroshima qualifies as a work of conceptual music. That’s because it can no longer be properly interpreted apart from its now artistically well-established connection to the historical event – or concept – known as “Hiroshima.”

Other composers have adopted more thoroughly researched and a priori (as opposed to post facto) approaches for incorporating aspects of a historical event – as a significant “other” essential to interpretation – into a work of conceptual music. An excellent example is Gavin Bryars’ The Sinking of the Titanic (1969 - ).

The Sinking of the Titanic is one of Gavin Bryars’ best known works. He describes it as an “open semi-aleatoric” work, which continues to evolve and present in different instrumental combinations and formats. To date, versions of The Sinking of the Titanic which have been exhibited, printed, performed or released as recordings include –

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• A conceptual piece presented as a single sheet of A4 paper with typed instructions, included in an exhibition held in 1969 to support art students at Portsmouth.\(^{117}\)

• Extracts from Bryars’ notes about the piece, published in 1975 in *Soundings* magazine,\(^{118}\) which “constitute a score.”\(^{119}\)

• A recording made in 1975 especially for release on Brain Eno’s new record label Obscure, and re-issued several times since then on LP and CD.\(^{120}\)

• A CD of a live performance in April 1990 at Le Printemps de Bourges.\(^{121}\)

• A new CD version,\(^{122}\) edited from a number of different performances\(^{123}\) and released in 1994 to coincide with an exhibition at the National Maritime Museum in London of artefacts recovered from the recently discovered wreck of the Titanic.

• A CD of a live performance at the 49th International Festival of Contemporary Music at The Venice Biennale, 1st October 2005 at the Teatro Maliban.\(^{124}\)

• A string quartet version recorded by the Smith Quartet, released on CD in 2007.\(^{125}\)

• A CD mixed from live recordings from the “2012 Centenary Tour,”\(^{126}\) including audio elements from earlier performances, and performed with visual projections of historical images by Bill Morrison and Laurie Olinder.


\(^{118}\) *Soundings*, 9 (Summer 1975).


\(^{123}\) “This new recording includes elements taken from performances in other acoustic spaces: the water tower at Bourges and an art nouveau swimming pool in Brussels for example.” Gavin Bryars, CD booklet included with Point Music, 446-249-2. The same text is printed – in a much more readable format – in the Point Music press kit issued to promote this CD.

\(^{124}\) Gavin Bryars/Philip Jeck/Alter Ego, *The Sinking of the Titanic (1969-)* (Touch Tone 34, 2007), audio CD.

\(^{125}\) Gavin Bryars, “The Sinking of the Titanic,” included on The Smith Quartet, *Ghost Stories* (Signum Records, SIGCD088, 2007), audio CD.

\(^{126}\) Gavin Bryars Ensemble, *The Sinking of the Titanic: Recorded live on 2012 Centenary Tour* (GB Records, BCGBCD21, 2013), audio CD.
• A printed score, published in 2013, arranged for string quartet, with pre-recorded CD.\textsuperscript{127}

Other variants also exist. Bryars explains that “there have been versions that bear little aural resemblance to these recordings, notably at the Lucy Milton Gallery, London in May 1975 by myself, John White and Christopher Hobbs playing a combination of cello, tuba, reed organs and percussion, in which the hymn tune … does not appear at all.”\textsuperscript{128}

This partial survey of versions and performances reinforces the point made above, viz. \textit{The Sinking of the Titanic (1969 - )} is an open work, in a constant state of evolution. The durations of different versions vary widely, ranging from 15 minutes to an hour.\textsuperscript{129} Nevertheless, the different variants share some basic features. Most obviously, there is the connection to the tragic event which gives the work its title. Across all versions of the work, Bryars has meticulously incorporated a number of historical elements, sometimes including newly discovered information into subsequent variants. Most versions of the work reflect the well-known story that the ship’s band played a hymn-tune in the final moments of the ship’s sinking. Bryars cites the reported recollections of the surviving wireless operator Harold Bride, and their re-telling by Walter Lord in the best-selling book \textit{A Night to Remember} (1956),\textsuperscript{130} to explain why he incorporates the hymn-tune “Autumn” into many versions of his work.

This Episcopal hymn, then, becomes a basic element of the music and is subject to a variety of treatments. Bride did not hear the band stop playing and it would appear that the musicians continued to play even as the water enveloped them. My initial speculations centred, therefore, on what happens to music as it is played in water. On a purely physical level, of course, it simply stops since the strings would fail to produce much of a sound (it was a string sextet that played at the end, since the two pianists with the band had no instruments available on the Boat Deck.) On a poetic level, however,

\textsuperscript{127} Gavin Bryars, \textit{The Sinking of the Titanic, Version for String Quartet and Pre-Recorded Material} (Schott Music ED13473, 2013). Written for the Smith Quartet. The score includes a reprint of 34 pages of the composer’s research notes originally published in \textit{Soundings}, 1975. This version has been performed on several occasions. See \url{https://en.schott-music.com/shop/the-sinking-of-the-titanic.html}

\textsuperscript{128} Gavin Bryars, CD booklet included with GB Records, BCGBCD21.

\textsuperscript{129} CD packaging notes for Touch Tone 34.

the music, once generated in water, would continue to reverberate for long periods of
time in the more sound-efficient medium of water and the music would descend with
the ship to the ocean bed and remain there, repeating itself over and over until the ship
returns to the surface and the sounds re-emerge.\(^{131}\)

Bryars also explains the sources of other sounds incorporated in the work:

This hymn tune forms a base over which other material is superimposed. This includes
fragments of interviews with survivors, sequences of tunes for the hymn on other
instruments, references to the different bagpipe players on the ship (one Irish, one
Scottish), miscellaneous sound effects relating to descriptions given by survivors of the
sound of the iceberg impact, and so on.\(^{132}\)

Bryars acknowledges that there has been an ongoing debate – unlikely to ever be
conclusively settled – regarding the exact tune which the band was playing in the final
moments as the ship sank. Specifically, he notes that the hymns “Nearer My God to
Thee” and “Aughton” have also been put forward as alternative candidates. Bryars
points out that “the question remains open, and all possibilities remain to be included in
the piece.”\(^{133}\) For the 2012 version, Bryars states that he “allude[s] to various other
identifications of the hymn in the piece, while not giving them the prominence of
Autumn.”\(^{134}\) It is outside my scope to pursue the details here.\(^{135}\) The key point is that,
according to reliable historical accounts, the band on the Titanic was indeed playing
music – whether a hymn or a popular tune is uncertain – until the final moments of the
ship’s sinking. This evocative fact – a final musical performance in the face of
imminent drowning – becomes the conceptual centerpiece of Bryars’ open-ended work:

\(^{131}\) Bryars, Point Music press kit (cited above), n.p. [1].

\(^{132}\) Ibid, n.p [2].

\(^{133}\) Gavin Bryars, CD booklet for LTMCD2526, 1990 (revised 2009), emphasis added.

\(^{134}\) Gavin Bryars, CD booklet for BCGBCD21, 2013. Bryars has also noted in passing that, instead of a hymn, a
light popular piece – “Autumn” or “Songe d’Automne,” composed in 1908 by Archibald Joyce – is sometimes
suggested as the one played by the Titanic band in those fateful moments. See Soundings, 9 (Summer 1975). The
case for this possibility is argued by no less an authority than Walter Lord in The Night Lives On: New Thoughts,
Theories, and Revelations About the Titanic (Harmondsworth: Viking, 1987), 135-43. However, Bryars does not
pursue this particular angle in his own work.

\(^{135}\) For a discussion, see Linda Maria Koldau, The Titanic on Film: Myth versus Truth (Jefferson, NC: McFarland
The hymn tune was played between 2.15 and 2.20 am, the last five minutes of the sinking, and this unit becomes the building block of the music.\(^\text{136}\)

This Episcopal hymn, then, becomes the principle [sic] element of the music and is subject to a variety of treatments and it forms a base over which other material is superimposed. I do, though, allude to various other identifications of the hymn tune in the piece, while not giving them the prominence of Autumn.\(^\text{137}\)

The very first public presentation of Bryars’ *The Sinking of the Titanic* was as a single typewritten sheet of instructions, displayed on a gallery wall, with no sonic dimension whatsoever. As far as I am aware, no reproduction of this item has ever been published. According to Robert Barry, it consisted of

> a single page of typed A4 paper suggesting various ways that one might go about creating a piece of music about the sinking of the Titanic. It referred to an account by the ship’s wireless operator which claimed that the band carried on playing even as the boat sank beneath the waves. It also speculated about the distorting effects that submersion would have on the sound of this music.\(^\text{138}\)

Importantly, Barry adds: “As far as Bryars was concerned that single page of text was the work. It was to exist as just that, a set of hypothetical instructions, a musical score only *in potentia.*”\(^\text{139}\)

At the time, Bryars was actively involved in the Conceptual Art movement. He later recalled the genesis of *The Sinking of the Titanic*:

> The piece originated in a sketch written for an exhibition in support of beleaguered art students at Portsmouth in 1969. Working as I was in an art college environment I was interested to see what might be the *musical equivalent of a work of conceptual art.*\(^\text{140}\)
In other words, *The Sinking of the Titanic* was intended, from the outset, to be a work of conceptual music, as I have defined it. All subsequent presentations of it are continuations of the original idea or concept. In one note, Bryars also states that the “piece … has always been envisaged as a multi-media event.”\(^{141}\) Of course, this does not diminish its status as a conceptual work (Chapter 2).

Bryars suggests a metaphoric reading of *The Sinking of the Titanic*. He says that everything in the piece is “related to the time of sinking. This sinking is then a metaphor for the failure of modern technology, of the paradox of modernity, the fact that a super-technological vessel could have been sunk by an iceberg.”\(^{142}\) Such a reading is no doubt plausible. However, for my purposes, the most interesting aspect of the work is its conceptual reliance on a historic-cultural “other” – i.e. the sinking of the *Titanic* in 1912 – and, more specifically, the attested historical fact that the ship’s band played until its final moments. Prior to Bryars’ first presentation of his work in 1969, this historical event and its associated details had formed the basis for various books,\(^{143}\) lantern slide shows and films,\(^{144}\) over a hundred popular songs\(^{145}\) and parlour music compositions.\(^{146}\) However, to the best of my knowledge, Bryars was the first artist/composer to “induct” this particular historical “text” into the contemporary artworld of the late twentieth century. That he did so initially as a work of conceptual art underscores its essential status as a work of conceptual music. Without a general knowledge of its historical “other,” any viable interpretation of the work’s meaning would be impossible. This is why all public presentations of the work listed above include ample paratextual material regarding the historical information necessary to understand it as the composer intended. The fact that the string quartet score, published

\(^{141}\) CD booklet included with LTMCD 2525, n.p. [3].

\(^{142}\) CD packaging for Touch Tone 34, 2007


\(^{145}\) Some examples include: Paul Pelham and Lawrence Wright, “Be British! Descriptive Song and Recitation” (London: The Lawrence Wright Music Co., n.d. [1912]), which was accompanied by a set of illustrative coloured lantern slides available for hire from the publisher; Mark Beam (words) and Harold Jones (music), “The Band Played ‘Nearer My God to Thee’ as the Ship Went Down” (New York: Joe Morris Music Co., 1912); Edith Maida Lessing (words) and Gibson and Adler (music), “Just as the Ship Went Down” (Chicago: Harold Rossiter Music Company, 1912). Solomon Goodman compiled several unpublished lists of popular music published as tie-ins to the Titanic disaster. See https://www.nypl.org/blog/2012/04/12/titanic-music.

\(^{146}\) At least three “descriptive compositions” or “musical sketches” for piano solo were published under the title “The Wreck of the Titanic” – one composed by Jeanette Forrest (Chicago: Frank K. Root & Co., 1912), one composed by William Baltzell (Chicago: Aubrey Stauffer & Co., 1912), one composed by Haydon Augarde (London: The Lawrence Wright Music Co., 1912).
by Schott in 2013, includes a complete facsimile of Bryars’ 34 pages of handwritten research notes on the Titanic disaster, first published in 1975,\textsuperscript{147} indicates that the relationship between the work and the historical event is pivotal, regardless of any particular future variations. Indeed, the editors of the score say as much:

Bryars’ ‘research notes’ are reproduced in this publication as reference material for the performers. The Sinking of the Titanic has always been an open piece in the sense that the material and relations between them are not fixed. The material that is produced here, other than the research notes, are effectively Bryars’ realisation of the work, though not its definitive or only form. Should a quartet wish to develop ideas for performance from elements in the research notes [and] incorporate these into their own performance, this would be encouraged.\textsuperscript{148}

12.7.1 Conclusion

Gavin Bryars’ *The Sinking of the Titanic* is as an archetypical example of the sub-type of conceptual *referring* which, in its initiating gesture, looks beyond the immediate artworld to a referential “other” located in the broader semiosphere.\textsuperscript{149} Of course, as soon as the referential link was established and became absorbed into artworld discourse, all future musical appropriations of the historical Titanic episode must contend with Bryars’ work as a well-known (and still evolving) work in their own potential universes of candidate “others.”

12.8 Summing Up

Of all the five modes of conceptual music which I have proposed in this thesis, the mode that I have labelled “the other(s) of a work” is, arguably, the one which resonates most loudly with the terminology of contemporary critical theory. The claim that all works of music, literature and art – indeed, cultural texts in general – are always

\textsuperscript{147} *Soundings*, 9 (Summer 1975).


\textsuperscript{149} For this reason, the grid of intertextual relationships (Fig. 12. 2), which refers to different types of relationship *within* the artworld, is not applicable in this case.
“speaking” with, and of, their “other(s)” is not controversial. Rather, it is simply a statement of the near-axiomatic principle of intertextuality, (re-)discovered by the pioneers of postmodernism, such as Bakhtin, Kristeva, and Eco. As a cultural principle, it continues to hold true in our present post-postmodern era. Indeed, in the arts, it is – if anything – being manifested more vigorously than ever before, with the rampant proliferation of citational genres, such as remix and mashup, into all forms of media and multimedia.

Within this vast proliferation, I have singled out three musical works – Beck’s Sea Change (2002), Arnold Schoenberg’s Verklärte Nacht (1899), and Gavin Bryars’ The Sinking of the Titanic (1969 -). I have presented detailed exegetical interpretations of these works to illustrate the central claim of this thesis, viz. a rounded understanding of these works cannot be achieved without careful attention to specific intertextual relationship(s) with their “other(s).” That’s because the artists responsible for these works have intentionally shifted those same intertextual relationships into the conceptual spotlight, making them an essential aspect of the work as a whole.

Even if the finer points of the interpretations presented in this chapter are debated or contested, my main claim is secure. In a range of music-based works, intertextual relationships to other “texts” – which are already in the artworld or may be instantaneously inducted into it from the wider semiosphere by the composer’s intentional gesture – are deliberately foregrounded, as an abstracted or conceptual dimension, essential to a proper understanding by the intended audience. This conceptual dimension is just as, or more, important to the intended aesthetic experience as any perceptible surface manifestations.
### Part I

Establishing the Problem & Its Context  
(Chapters 1 to 3)

### Part II

Methodology – Developing an Interpretive Model  
(Chapters 4 to 8)

### Part III

Referring ["other(s)" of a work]  
(Chapter 12)

- Beck – *Sea Change*
- Arnold Schoenberg – *Verklärte Nacht* (Transfigured Night)*
- Gavin Bryars – *The Sinking of the Titanic*

- John Cage – *Europera 5*
- Peter Ablinger – *Weiss/Weisslich*
- Lawrence English – *Viento*

### Part IV

Conclusions & Directions for Further Research  
(Chapter 15)

### Mode of Conceptual Music

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Chapter 13

Mode of Worldmaking – World of Work(s) as Concept

13.1 Introduction

In the four preceding chapters I have discussed four different ways in which composers of conceptual music can seek to focus audience attention on a particular dimension of a work’s formation and configuration. These dimensions may otherwise remain implicit or unnoticed, except that they have been intentionally “shifted” out of the productive and presentational shadows and into the conceptual spotlight of the work’s world. Putting it another way, these first four modes of conceptualisation all involve a self-referential foregrounding of processes and relationships that are irreducibly involved with a work’s making or coming into being, i.e. in the creative act itself.

In this chapter, I turn to consider the fifth mode of conceptualisation which I have posited in my interpretive model, i.e. the mode of worldmaking. In one sense, this mode is also self-reflexive, as it is concerned with the artistic capacity for the making of worlds. This capacity is inescapably exercised in the creation of all works (Chapter 6). However, in the mode of worldmaking, the focus shifts to a higher, meta-referential level, of the world overall, and away from the individual works which reside within it. In other words, the mode of worldmaking shifts conceptual attention to the existence of a cohesive, self-contained world into which the audience is invited to become immersed. Individual works and experiential encounters serve as “entry portals” into this world.

I shall consider two composers for whom worldmaking, as a mode of conceptualising, is strongly in evidence. Explicit recognition of this aspect of their practice enhances our interpretive understanding of their individual works and the world in which they exist. The composers and main works that I shall consider are –

After discussing these two composers, I observe that “What is a world?” requires further examination. In order to develop a partial answer to this question, from an artistic and musical perspective, I discuss the case of a recent post-conceptual work in which it is emphatically problematised, viz.


Before I turn to a discussion of these three case studies, in the next sub-section I first briefly consider the notion of *worldmaking* – as an art form – in more detail.

### 13.2 Worldmaking as Art Form

The contemporary use of modern technology to create virtual and imaginary worlds, immersive theatre, and large-scale multimedia installations may obscure the fact that worldmaking is a primordial aspect of symbolic behaviour, found in all human cultures. It is as ancient as the Lascaux Caves, and as universal as the practice of story-telling. Of course, the specific technologies available at a given point in history provide the *means* for certain types of worldmaking activity, enabling new and different approaches and possibilities in different eras.

The term *worldmaking* was coined by Nelson Goodman – in his influential book *Ways of Worldmaking* (1978) – to refer to his thesis that, in both the sciences and the arts,

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multiple \textit{versions} of worlds are \textit{made} by humans, through the manipulation of symbolic systems manifested in prior world versions. His debt to Ernst Cassirer’s work on symbolic forms was openly acknowledged.\footnote{Ibid., 1.} For more background on Goodman, see Appendix K. Recent years have seen a revival of interest in the notion of worldmaking. This has been fueled by its relevance to the analysis of \textit{multimedia} and \textit{transmedia} environments, where interactive, networked and non-linear hypertexts often mean that traditional narratological approaches are inadequate. Specifically, the spatial metaphor implicit in the term “world” is well-suited to modeling the “cognitive spatiality” of transmedia storytelling.\footnote{Maarja Saldre and Peeter Torop, “Transmedia space,” in \textit{Crossmedia Innovations: Texts, Markets, Institutions}, ed. Indrek Ibrus and Carlos A. Scolari (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 25.} Maarja Saldre and Peeter Torop point out that several key insights found in the work of Juri Lotman and the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics are especially congenial to the spatial paradigm of multimedia textual analysis. They explain that Lotman

\begin{quote}
developed a holistic understanding of culture which is based on the complementarity between two types of primary cultural languages – human language and the structural model of space. … The spaces represented in artistic texts are not exhausted in a mimetic relationship with the space of the extratextual world, but bear a semiotic, \textit{meaning-generating} function.\footnote{Ibid., 28, emphasis added.}
\end{quote}

This is simply a re-statement of Lotman’s key insight discussed in Chapter 7, i.e. new meanings can only ever emerge through a process of \textit{translation} between at least two languages or, more precisely, between two \textit{semiotic modelling systems}. In other words, the potency of artistic texts which establish a “world” before them – as indeed all artistic texts do (Chapter 6) – derives from the meaning-generating function which is automatically activated in the process of translating (or interpreting) those texts into the “language” of the “extratextual” world of an interpreting audience. This potency is maximally heightened whenever the conceptual spotlight is directed primarily onto the \textit{presence of the artistic world} itself, and only secondarily onto any individual works which exist within it. For an audience, the interpretive or translational task is more intensive – and, therefore, potentially more fertile in new meanings – when confronted by the full expanse of an informationally rich and complex world, than it would be
when attempting to make sense of the more limited content of an individual text.\textsuperscript{12} From this perspective, it is not surprising that some critics have turned to consider worldmaking as the essential \textit{sine qua non} of the artistic enterprise.

In a thought-provoking paper, James DiGiovanna argues that \textit{worldmaking} can be thought of as specific type of art form.

Those who engage in worldmaking as art form, seeing the world as the object of the art form, are inherently interested in the answer to virtually any question about their world, whereas for those works of art where world is an element, most potential questions are irrelevant. So worldmakers seek to make more complete worlds, often at the expense of narrative economy in works of fiction. \ldots worldmaking is where the artist is more concerned with creating the truth conditions for fictional texts than with the creation of texts.\textsuperscript{13}

He suggests that one reason for relative paucity of critical attention to artworks concerned, first and foremost, with \textit{worldmaking} is that they are often collaborative projects, and therefore run counter to the still-prevalent view of individual artistic genius.\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, in recent years, there has been a growing renewed interest in the topic. Authors who have discussed the notion of worldmaking – as art – include Terry Smith,\textsuperscript{15} Amelia Barikin,\textsuperscript{16} and the authors included in the volume edited by Alberto De Campo \textit{et al.}\textsuperscript{17} In particular, Barikin points to the parallels between worldmaking – as artistic practice – and the views of Nicholas Bourriaud.\textsuperscript{18} She argues that “contemporary art works can offer possible \textit{models} of inhabitation which, importantly, can be carried across from the immediate environment of the art work and

\textsuperscript{12} Saldre and Torop remind us that “In the case of transmedia text, it becomes less clear where the text begins and ends. The subtexts of transmedia wholes might function as autonomous wholes themselves, possessing all the characteristics of a whole text yet belonging to a higher level whole via specific relations.” Ibid., 31.


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 121.


\textsuperscript{17} Alberto De Campo, Mark-David Hosale and Sana Murrani, eds., \textit{Worldmaking as Techné: Participatory Art, Music, and Architecture}, foreword by Roy Ascott (Cambridge, Ontario: Riverside Architectural Press, 2017).

subsequently applied to the real business of being and living in the world.”

The resonances between this formulation and Lotman’s emphasis on *translation* between two semiotic modeling systems are clear.

In literature, DiGiovanna points to J.R.R. Tolkein as the “paradigm case of a well-known worldmaker … who sketched out in great detail his world long before he wrote the novels that occur in it.” He readily admits that there are grey areas between works of this type and the vast domain of fictions, narratives and imaginary realms presented in all the arts – “to some extent, all novel writing involves worldmaking.” This echoes the position I have put forward, i.e. that all works are associated with a “world,” which may be more or less emphasised in their presentation to – or interpretation by – an audience.

 Appropriately, DiGiovanna does not limit worldmaking to literature, pointing out that visual artists such as Odilon Redon and Heironymous Bosch “created multiple works in the same fictive realms.” However, he doesn’t explicitly discuss musical works or the music-related topic of *Gesamtkunstwerk*. Nevertheless, his general argument is equally applicable to music-based worlds.

DiGiovanna offers a list of “symptoms” which can used to test whether “worldmaking is a goal of an artwork or series of works.”

In the ideal case, there will be a series of works which use [the] same world.
That world should differ noticeably from ‘our’ world.
That world should have a geography and a history of its own.
Further, that world can be enhanced in its difference by having physical laws different from our own…

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19 Barikin, “Making Worlds,” 2, emphasis added.
20 DiGiovanna, “Worldmaking as Art Form,” 117.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Several scholars were quick to recognise that Goodman’s notion of worldmaking was applicable to music. See, for example, Jens Kulenkampff, “Music Considered as a Way of Worldmaking,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 39 (1981): 254-58.
25 Ibid.
Citing Goodman (see Appendix K), he goes on to also offer two “symptoms” which are required to bolster the validity of created worlds, viz. *coherence* and *repleteness* (where “every aspect of it [the world] counts as part of the artwork”\(^{26}\)). The notion of repleteness brings to mind a remark made by Umberto Eco, i.e. “to tell a story you must first of all construct a world, furnished as much as possible, down to the slightest details.”\(^{27}\) In other words, for an artist to create a world which is compelling (e.g. to warrant and sustain the suspension of disbelief), a high degree of detail, both significant and circumstantial, must be in place. This is so regardless of whether the created world is realistic or not. Much of this detail may be known only to the artist, and may never be directly perceivable or visible to an audience. DiGiovanna puts it well:

> The imagined construct, the world, has a sense of *repleteness* to it. It is nearly *inexhaustible*, and every aspect of it counts. Since some of it never appears, what counts is partially conceptual; that one assumes that there is more to the world, or that it has a completeness to it, is part of this artwork, and the repleteness lies in this sense ...\(^{28}\)

Barikin argues that qualities of *inhabitation* and *immersion* distinguish such *worlds* from individual *works*\(^{29}\). This emphasis on inexhaustibility and repleteness sets worlds of this type apart from traditional story-telling and narrative. Mark Wolf emphasises the importance of this distinction:

> Recognizing that the experience of a *world* is different and distinct from that of merely a *narrative* is crucial to seeing how worlds function apart from the narratives set within them, even though the narratives have much to do with the worlds in which they occur, and are usually the means by which the worlds are *experienced*.\(^{30}\)

If we extrapolate from the notion of literary “narrative” to include any temporal sequence of embodied perceptions, as experienced by individual human agents (e.g. audience members at a performance or large-scale installation), then the distinction – between a *world* and any *experiential encounters* with it – carries over naturally into all types of artistic worldmaking. Indeed, the difference between artist-created *worlds* and

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\(^{26}\) Ibid., 120.
\(^{27}\) Eco, *Postscript*, 23.
\(^{28}\) DiGiovanna, “Worldmaking as Art Form,” 120, emphasis added.
\(^{29}\) Barikin, “Making Worlds,” 1.
\(^{30}\) Wolf, *Building Imaginary Worlds*, 11, italics in original, underlined emphasis added.
the individual works which “inhabit” them is key to understanding the distinction between worldmaking and the other four modes of conceptualisation discussed in previous chapters. In essence, individual works serve as samples of the expansive worlds from which they have emerged. Jens Kulenkampff highlights this point:

The composer – the artist in general – may now finally be understood as a creator in the true sense of the word, and not as before merely as a creative imitator. Making a world means nothing more, however, than just producing a sample of it. Neither the artist nor the critic can know this world, except through one or more samples they have of it. Accordingly, it also follows that every work of art presents the task of exploring that world which it makes known by being a sample of it. In order that the task be fulfilled, one has to find out what that work exemplifies. Alternatively, the artist has to try to produce other fitting examples, so that in the end his entire oeuvre can be designated as creating his world.31

There is a parallel here between the minimal requirement for a world to be instantiated by works (and their associated paratexts), and for even the most abstracted or de-materialised works to be initially presented in the form of at least one public perceptual object (Chapter 2). This leads to the realisation that not only “works,” but indeed any kind of public perceptual object – which could include embodied experiences – can serve as an “entry portal” into an artist-created world, no matter how real or imaginary that world might otherwise be.

I now turn to a discussion of three case studies, each of which exemplifies a primary conceptual concern with the artistic enterprise of worldmaking.

31 Kulenkampff, “Music Considered as a Way of Worldmaking,” 257.
### 13.3 The World of Harry Partch – *Delusion of the Fury*

#### 13.3.1 Introduction

Few contemporary composers have gone to the extraordinary lengths taken by Harry Partch throughout his lifetime in order to create his own self-contained and cohesive world for the composition and performance of his various musical and multimedia works. He devised his own theory of music, based on a just intonation tuning system which he derived from the first principles of acoustics and his reading of ancient Greek authors. He constructed and named a collection of unique and visually striking instruments – each with its associated notational conventions – designed to play the notes of the 43-pitch microtonal scale which formed the basis of his system. He incorporated an idiosyncratic mix of unusual themes based on his eclectic reading, as well as his personal experiences as a hobo, into the spoken and sung texts of his compositions.

In a tribute published shortly after Partch’s death in 1974, Peter Garland put it well: “the realization one constantly comes back to, is that *Partch created a world.*” Indeed, the term “world” appears often in descriptions of Partch’s lifework. For example, in a review of performances of Partch’s works at the Whitney Museum in 1968, Paul Zimmerman describes Partch as “an American visionary and stubborn individualist … [who] has *built his own musical world* out of microtones, hobo speech, elastic octaves and percussion instruments made from hubcaps and nuclear cloud chambers.”

In one sense, it is not possible to gain a well-rounded appreciation of the world created by Partch without engaging with a broad spectrum of the many recordings, films and other surviving documentary traces which serve as “samples” of that world. Such an

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33 Peter Garland, [Tribute to Harry Partch], *Soundings* 9 (1975): n.p. [8], emphasis added.

undertaking would require a monograph-length study of its own, and falls outside my present scope. In any case, all studies of Partch’s works face certain difficulties with the documented sources. That’s because the composer was often deeply dissatisfied with the end results of some of his collaborative projects. Thus, not all surviving sources provide a reliable window into the Partch’s artistic intentions.

To keep this section to a manageable length, I shall focus my discussion on *Delusion of the Fury* (1965-66, rev. 1967). This is generally considered to be Partch’s masterwork, one in which all elements of his aesthetic world were intended to come together within the span of a single multimedia performance. With the kind of hyperbole typical of sleevenotes from the era, Eugene Paul states that

> In his long-awaited masterwork, ‘Delusion of the Fury,’ he [Partch] rises above all attempts at descriptive containment and becomes quite simply heroic. ‘Delusion of the Fury,’ proceeding from tragedy to comedy, is nothing less than the full, ritualistic expression, in vocal, instrumental and corporeal terms, of the reconciliation by the living both with death and with life. It is a total Partch statement, incorporating voices, mime, his celebrated instruments, dance, lighting and staging, all working to express this philosophical concept.³⁵

Making allowances for the rhetorical excesses, this statement aptly reflects the essential point, i.e. *Delusion of the Fury* was the culmination of Partch’s creative lifework. The fact that initial pressings of the Columbia Masterworks recording of the work were accompanied by a “bonus record” on which “Harry Partch describes and demonstrates his unique and fascinating instruments,”³⁶ reinforces the point. In other words, *Delusion of the Fury* serves as an important “entry portal” into the conceptual world which Harry Partch had constructed throughout his lifetime.

It turns out that *Delusion of the Fury* is also an excellent example of several of the main problems and analytical challenges addressed in this thesis. There are two main reasons for this.

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³⁶ Blurb on promo sticker found on early sealed copies of Partch, *The Delusion of the Fury*. 
Firstly, against all expectations which prevailed at the time, Delusion of the Fury has been presented in two new theatrical productions since Partch’s death in 1974. The most recent is the continuing series of performances which premiered in 2013, under the direction of Heiner Goebbels (b. 1952), a leading composer and multimedia artist of the present era. The only production ever staged during Partch’s lifetime was deemed by the composer to be unsatisfactory on several fronts. Arguably, the new production directed by Goebbels goes a long way to redressing the shortfall. Therefore, we are justified in considering Delusion of the Fury to be a view into Partch’s conceptual world, but also as an “open” work. In the fullest sense of the term first coined by Umberto Eco, this particular “open” work is still “live” and continues to be re-interpreted in the artworld today. An attitude of explicit openness to continual re-interpretation is, it hardly needs to be said, a recurring device in the creative approaches of many contemporary artists and composers today.

Secondly, it is by no means clear exactly what information, materials or artefacts – i.e. public perceptual objects (Chapter 2) – should form the basis of any valid interpretation or analysis of Partch’s “masterpiece.” It is easy to agree that a “work” known by the name Delusion of the Fury, composed by Harry Partch, exists in contemporary culture and is orbited by an increasing accumulation of material traces. However, many of these traces were expressly disavowed by the composer in his lifetime. Since his death, many other associated documents, performances and manifestations have emerged. All of these variables serve to make Delusion of the Fury a constantly evolving entity which defies any simplistic attempts to pin down its specific definition or precise “location.” Indeed, Delusion of the Fury is, in many respects, an archetypical example of a work which – even despite, or perhaps partly because of, recent new performances – remains primarily and stubbornly conceptual. Arguably, what matters most about Delusion of the Fury is the nature of the conceptual world which it was intended to

37 Partch himself considered it unlikely that his works would continue to be performed after his death. See Harry Partch, [Letter to Betty Freeman, dated May 26, 1969], in Enclosure 3: Harry Partch, ed. Philip Blackburn (Saint Paul, MN: American Composers Forum, 1997), 421.
38 For performance information, see www.heinergoebbels.com.
40 Eco, Open Work, 7.
represent, rather than the surface appearances of most of its documentary traces. The elevated importance of the conceptual dimension is another defining hallmark of a wide range of contemporary artworks, including many which are associated with an extravagant exuberance of material artefacts (Chapter 2).

Before turning to a detailed discussion of Delusion of the Fury, it is useful to review some of the biographical context relevant to the world to which it belongs.

13.3.2 Harry Partch – A Brief Biographical Sketch

Harry Partch has been variously described as an American maverick, iconoclast, and musical outsider. Such characterizations are undoubtedly valid up to a point. However, Partch was far from being musically naïve or unschooled. He played music for silent films while still in high school, composed popular songs, one of which was published under a pseudonym, and was enrolled at the University of Southern California Music School between 1920 and 1922. For many years, he ran his own cottage record label – Gate 5 – to sell recordings of his works by mail-order.

Nevertheless, it is fair to say that, in many respects, Partch did not fit the stereotype of an avant-garde composer. By virtue of his personality, circumstance and choice, he pursued a highly individualistic path, largely independent of academic and institutional affiliations. His hitchhiking and hobo experiences during the 1930s featured prominently in his lyrics and librettos, lending them a cachet of bohemian authenticity and highlighting his status as an “outsider”. His homosexuality remained largely a

41 Michael Broyles, Mavericks and Other Traditions in American Music (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
43 See, for example, the film Musical Outsiders: An American Legacy. Harry Partch, Lou Harrison, and Terry Riley, DVD, New York: Michael Blackwood Productions, 1994 [DVD published in 1995]. The term “outsider” is used in a wide range of senses in the fields of art and music. At one extreme, it has been taken to mean naïve, unschooled or even clinically insane practitioners. At the other end of the spectrum, the label has been applied to sub-cultures which sit outside the “mainstream.” In this thesis, I will use the term in the second sense, to indicate art and music from the margins, without the necessary implications of naivety, autodidactism or madness. For entry points into the literature see, for example, Metcalf and Hall, The Artist Outsider; Hal Foster, “Blinded Insights: On the Modernist Reception of the Art of the Mentally Ill,” October, 97 (2001): 3-30.
44 His pseudonym was “Paul Pirate”. See Gilmore, Harry Partch, 60.
45 Gilmore, Harry Partch, 42
private matter for Partch, even as attitudes to sexuality changed dramatically during the 1960s. However, this was no doubt another factor that contributed to his sense of not belonging. Partch’s eclectic interests – ranging from Japanese Noh theatre, African storytelling, Indonesian gamelan, to ancient Greek tragedy and musical theory – were all explicitly incorporated somewhere into his aesthetic world. Above all, it was his idiosyncratic use of a 43-pitch microtonal scale, playable only his unique collection of instruments (see Fig. 13.1), all specially adapted or invented by himself, which made Partch’s music seem intriguing and unusual.

Figure 13.1. Harry Partch with some of instruments on the set of "The Dreamer That Remains," 1972.

These various aspects of Partch’s profile resonated well with the hippie and counterculture ethos of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Certainly, they were exploited by Columbia Records in their promotion of the two Partch recordings in their catalogue: The World of Harry Partch (MS 7207, released in 1969) and Delusion of the Fury (M2

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46 Ibid., 30-32.
47 Partch did not consider his music to be revolutionary. In a passage written in 1940, he states: “I had never thought of my work as revolutionary, but only as evolutionary.” Harry Partch, Bitter Music: Collected Journals, Essays, Introductions, and Librettos, ed. Thomas McGeary (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 5.
30576, released in 1971). For example, the sleevenote blurb on a 7” promotional EP, titled *The Wild Sounds of New Music* (BTS 17, released in 1969), describes Partch as a “hobo/inventor/genius who couldn’t find the sounds he wanted in our music, so he made his own.” At that point, Partch was far from a novice when it came to matters of self-promotion. Throughout his career, he had invested considerable time and effort into promoting his own identity and status as a modern American composer. He published essays in various little magazines devoted to literature and arts. He contributed to early issues of *Soundings*, the California-based journal for new music edited by Peter Garland, and *Source*, edited by Larry Austin. He gave numerous interviews to music and arts papers, including *Rolling Stone*.

Leading up to and following the release of the Columbia recordings, Partch achieved a level of fame that had eluded him up to that time. This did not lead to any substantial improvement in his financial situation, which remained as precarious as always. Nevertheless, his late career reputational success was further boosted in the final year of his life, with the publication of a second, enlarged edition of his book *Genesis of a Music* in 1974 (first published in 1947). The book has been readily available since, and has no doubt helped to sustain academic and cult popular interest in Partch in the decades since his death.

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48 For example, in the album notes included with the original Columbia Masterworks release of *Delusion of the Fury* (M2 30576), Eugene Paul states: “Harry Partch is the living embodiment of the religion of Doing Your Own Thing. If there is a doyen hippie, he is it, so completely that he doesn’t even recognize it.”

49 Anonymous, sleevenote on *The Wild Sounds of New Music* (Columbia Masterworks BTS 17, promotional record, released 1969). In addition to an excerpt from *Castor and Pollux*, taken from *The World of Harry Partch* (MS 7207), this promotional record includes five other tracks, by Terry Riley, Steve Reich, Conlon Nancarrow, Luciano Berio and Lasry-Bachet. The sales “pitch” to the youth market is unabashed:

> Under thirty? Are you getting bored occasionally with Jimi Hendrix, maybe a little put off by Jim Morrison? Jaws tired of ‘bubble gum music’? Want to broaden your horizons without getting trapped in that square symphony and opera stuff? Good news! There’s an area of new music growing that you can listen to without your friends accusing you of selling out to the other side.

50 For example, Partch’s essay “Show-horses in the concert ring,” appeared in *Circle*, [Berkeley], 10 (Summer 1948), 43-51. Reprinted in *Bitter Music*, 174-180; also in *Soundings*, 1 (December 1970).


Recent years have seen something of a Partch renaissance. Since the turn of the new millennium, the two Columbia recordings have been reissued in audiophile quality pressings, Partch’s original instruments have been restored and duplicated, and new recordings of Partch compositions have been released. Most remarkably, several of Partch’s works have been performed on restored original and new replica instruments. The instruments are also being used by other composers and artists.

### 13.3.3 Delusion of the Fury – Performances & Documents

Until recently, *Delusion of the Fury* had only ever been presented on stage – in full – in a single production, over four consecutive performances staged at the UCLA Playhouse on 9-12 January 1969. As discussed above, a high-quality studio recording of this production, supervised by the composer, was issued on the Columbia label in 1971 (and has also been transferred to a CD released in 1999). A 75-minute film based on this production was also released in 1971, and subsequently on VHS tape and DVD.

Unfortunately, much of the extant historical documentation does little to enhance, and may even hinder, apperception of the work which Partch intended. Specifically, contrary to any easy assumptions, the film version of *Delusion of the Fury* has a debatable status as a primary source. To be sure, it is based on live scenes filmed during dress rehearsals of the 1969 performances. However, even by the standards of the day, the final product is compromised and unsatisfying. The live performance footage concentrates almost entirely on the dancers, rarely showing the musicians in action. Worse, the edited film is interspersed with several mediocre outdoor segments.

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56 The World of Harry Partch, Columbia MS 7207, reissued on 180 gram vinyl, by Scorpio Records [2010]; Harry Partch/Delusion of the Fury, 2LPs, reissued on 180 gram vinyl, by Hi Horse [2010].
57 Notable new releases of Partch compositions include Harry Partch: Plectra and Percussion Dances, CD (Bridge 9432), released in 2014; Harry Partch: Bitter Music, 3CDs (Bridge 9349 A/C), released in 2012.
58 For example: Dean Drummond, Congressional Record, from Harry Partch/Dean Drummond, Newband, innova 561, 2002, compact disc; Paul Simon, Stranger to Stranger, Concord Records CRE-39780-02, 2016, compact disc.
60 Partch, Genesis of a Music, 473.
(some involving one of the main performers in costume) and numerous still photographs. Partch himself was very disappointed in the film. Writing in 1972 to long-time collaborator Madeline Tourtelot, who produced and directed it, he stated

> Any film on my work ought … ought not to misrepresent it. The present film of Delusion represents it hardly at all, and misrepresents it frequently. … The soundtrack of the present Delusion is simply not my music. Every pianissimo section is brought up to forte, and every dramatic climax or sudden accent is destroyed, submerged, or squelched. The Columbia records of Delusion are at least good, if not excellent, because again I sat at their elbows and insisted.\(^{64}\)

It is clear that Partch did not see the film as an acceptable representation of his work.\(^{65}\) It could perhaps be argued that, for present-day researchers, having any film documentation of what was, for many decades, the only performance of Delusion of the Fury, is better than nothing at all. However, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that Partch would have preferred that anyone wishing to appreciate Delusion of the Fury should avoid ever seeing the film version. Certainly, in an unpublished interview, Partch expressly recommended against anyone seeing a film version of Daphne of the Dunes, which he also considered to be “very bad.”

It was not only the film version which failed to meet Partch’s expectations. Many of the production values of the staged performance also received a scathing assessment from him, as detailed in the same letter to Madeline Tourtelot already cited. After castigating the “cliqué-ridden modern dance” and a “treacherous and pedestrian costumer,” Partch goes on to say that “As with both The Bewitched and Revelation, Danlee [Mitchell] and I were concentrating on getting a good performance of the music. We did that, and it is capable of standing alone, thank heaven.”\(^{67}\) Thus, even those who

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\(^{65}\) Philip Blackburn notes that some of the problems with the film itself were due to last minute changes to the original shooting schedule. In fairness, it should be noted that these changes were apparently outside Tourtelot’s control. Nevertheless, they meant that close-ups of the musicians in live performance, which both Partch and Tourtelot had envisaged, were not available for the final editing. It is also possible that Partch was somewhat over-reacting in this letter, due to the mood swings associated with his state of health. Thus, Blackburn states that the letter in question is “typical of the many unpredictable outbursts that characterized Partch in the seventies, some of which may have related to his deteriorating health …” See Blackburn, Enclosure 3, 514. See also Gilmore, Harry Partch, 347-52 for an account of the difficulties and compromises associated with the production and Tourtelot’s film.

\(^{66}\) Brian Timothy Harlan, “One Voice: A Reconciliation of Harry Partch’s Disparate Theories” (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 2007), 199, n. 15

attended one of the live performances of the original 1969 production did not experience a satisfactory presentation of the full work, at least as viewed from Partch’s perspective.

In 2002, a complete facsimile of Partch’s autograph score of *Delusion of the Fury* was issued for the first time, by the prestigious music publishing firm Schott.\(^{68}\) I discuss the score further below.

A stage revival of *The Delusion of the Fury*, consisting of four performances, was hosted by the Japan Society, New York, on 4, 6, 7 and 8 December 2007. Several reviewers tended to be critical, while still being thankful for the rare and unexpected opportunity to hear Partch’s instruments and music in live performance.\(^{69}\) An 80-minute DVD video document of this production is listed in some library catalogues.\(^{70}\) But it appears to have had a very limited release and I have been unable to obtain a copy for viewing. Also, any video excerpts which were once available on the internet appear to have been withdrawn.

In a recent development, Heiner Goebbels has worked with Ensemble musikFabrik and a complete replica set of Partch’s instruments, to stage a newly-produced version of *Delusion of the Fury*. At the date of this writing (mid-2017), 17 performances have been staged, as follows –

- 23 and 24 July 2015, Lincoln Center Festival, New York City Center, New York, USA
- 29 and 30 August 2014, Edinburgh International Festival, Edinburgh, UK
- 10 and 11 June 2014, Holland Festival, Amsterdam, Holland
- 28 and 29 March 2014, Opera Genève / Bâtiment des forces motrice, Genève, Switzerland


\(^{70}\) [https://beta.worldcat.org/archivegrid/collection/data/235988318](https://beta.worldcat.org/archivegrid/collection/data/235988318)
• 12 September 2013, National Theatre, Oslo, Norway
• 23, 24, 30 and 31 August 2013; 1, 6, 7 and 9 September 2013, Ruhrtriennale, Jahrhunderthalle, Bochum, Germany (premiere series)

Although various photos, reviews and interviews associated with this production are readily available,\textsuperscript{71} no complete video or audio of any of these performances has been officially released (nor, to my knowledge, is unofficially available on the internet).

Finally, we should not overlook the existence of Partch’s own writings and statements in relation to \textit{Delusion of the Fury}. \textit{Genesis of a Music} devotes several pages to this work. An unedited audio interview with Partch after a dress rehearsal of \textit{Delusion} has survived and was released on CD in 2000.\textsuperscript{72} A number of other texts are dispersed across the Partch bibliography, and will be cited appropriately below. In view of the tenuous status of much of the other sources, Partch’s \textit{own voice} – documented in his writings and interviews – is least as important to the formation and understanding of his creative world as any of the other material traces which he produced.

\textit{13.3.4 So … Where is the Work?}

Despite the still growing accumulation of available primary and secondary source materials, there are a number of major difficulties facing any commentator interested in undertaking an analysis or exegesis of \textit{Delusion of the Fury}.

Most importantly, there is no doubt that, as far as Partch himself was concerned, the work in its fullest form was conceived as a live theatrical performance. For example, the following statement by Partch is included in both the album notes included with the Columbia LPs and as a typescript note on the first page of the holograph score:

\begin{quote}
Words cannot proxy for the experience of knowing – of seeing and hearing. The concept of this work inheres in the \textit{presence} of the instruments onstage, the \textit{movements}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{71} www.heinergoebbels.com.
of musicians and chorus, the *sounds* they produce, the *actuality* of the actors, of singers, of mimes, of lights; in fine, the *actuality* of truly integrated theater. These introductory pages consist largely of technical data. They contain no argument, no exposition. I feel that the only investigation which has genuine integrity is the seen and heard performance.  

In *Genesis of a Music*, Partch concludes his synopsis of *The Delusion of the Fury* by saying

> A synopsis cannot in any way proxy for an actual production. *Only theater will bring the concept to life.* And I must emphasize the fact that these verbal descriptions are intended merely as a small intimation of the art that I envision.

In view of Partch’s clear intentions, any full analysis of *Delusion of the Fury* would ideally give ample recognition to his theatrical conception and the interaction of all the different media components in the work as whole. However, the materials available for this type of analysis are limited. At best, they are incomplete. Arguably, some of the available sources are even to be disregarded.

Certainly, Partch’s opinion of the sole production staged in his lifetime was harshly critical. His assessment of the film version was, if anything, even more scathing. As noted above, the performances hosted by the Japan Society in 2007 received several poor reviews. So, it would perhaps be justifiable to simply exclude these from any corpus for analysis. However, this is a moot point because, regardless of their potential relevance, any audio or video documents of these performances appear to be effectively unavailable. The Goebbels production is, by all accounts, excellent. Of course, we cannot ever know what Partch himself might have made of this version. However, again, only short excerpts have been made available on the internet. So this version is

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73 See *Delusion of the Fury* score (Schott ED 9334), 1; *Delusion of the Fury*, Columbia Masterworks M2 30576. The same statement also reprinted in Partch, *Bitter Music*, 445.

74 Partch, *Genesis of a Music*, 357, italics added.

75 I discuss the much-debated question of artistic intention and the “intentional fallacy” in Appendix N.


77 Ibid.


79 For example: [https://youtu.be/TKUOJK5vZ7c](https://youtu.be/TKUOJK5vZ7c).
also largely inaccessible, except to those who few audience members who have been able to attend one or more of the live performances.

To summarise, a full theatrical performance of Delusion of the Fury unequivocally endorsed by the composer was never realised in Partch’s lifetime. Audiovisual documentation of all subsequent productions and performances since Partch’s death is mostly nonexistent or unavailable, effectively precluding any attempt at multimedia or multimodal analysis in the usual sense.\endnote{80}

It could be argued that an alternative analytical strategy might be to focus solely on the musical dimension of Delusion of the Fury, relying on the Columbia recordings, and perhaps the published score. Recall that Partch ran his own recording label and was a pioneer in using this medium to disseminate his work. To be sure, Partch once wrote that the recorded performance of the music of Delusion of the Fury “is capable of standing alone.”\endnote{81} However, we should note that this comment was made in the context of a letter expressing his sore disappointment with virtually all other aspects of the premiere performances. Partch’s relief that the Columbia recordings were not also as deeply flawed as all other elements of the production should not be extrapolated into a radically revised conception of Delusion of the Fury as consisting only of the music. Ben Johnston has discussed Partch’s occasional ambivalence regarding the potential of recordings to become the “definitive art work.” He concludes that just about everything Partch composed is not only music but also theater. Although he did some films, most of his works are for the stage. They are heavy on the visual side, and not only because of the instruments, themselves works of sculpture, but as total visual theater. Their impact is not received simply by listening to the music. You do get something, but less even than from an opera you have never seen.\endnote{82}

\endnote{80}{Analytical methods for multimodal texts – such as multimodal transcription – are described in Anthony Baldry and Paul Thibault, Multimodal Transcription and Text Analysis: A Multimedia Toolkit and Coursebook with Associated On-Line Course, rev. ed. (London: Equinox Publishing, 2010). This is fast growing and rapidly expanding area of research. See, for example, the contributions in Janina Wildfeuer, ed., Building Bridges for Multimodal Research: International Perspectives on Theories and Practices of Multimodal Analysis (Bern: Peter Lang, 2015).


\endnote{82}{Ben Johnston, “The Corporealism of Harry Partch,” Perspectives of New Music, 13, no. 2 (1975), 85, emphasis added.}
Nevertheless, there is perhaps still a case to be made for analytical engagement with Partch’s music score in isolation. No doubt, researchers today are able to study the score of *Delusion of the Fury* at their leisure. But it is doubtful that Partch himself would have recommended such an approach. Indeed, besides the comments already quoted, he stated that “the scores themselves do not help at all; they are simply cryptic notes, or cryptic ratios.”

Paul Earls observes that Partch’s “notational system is almost meaningless to anyone not willing to study his scale construction and the construction of the various instruments. The uninitiated can only follow rhythmic patterns without reference to pitch, and even that parameter looks puzzling through Partch’s frequent use of repeat abbreviations and parentheses for the end of gliding tones.”

See Fig. 13.2 for an example the score.

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Figure 13.2  A Page from the Score of Delusion of the Fury.
Acknowledging the opacity of Partch’s original scores, Brian Harlan legitimately asks “Can Partch’s music be analyzed?”\textsuperscript{85} He answers in the affirmative and describes a workable – albeit arduous – approach, dependent on the transcription of Partch’s original scores into Ben Johnston’s notational system for just intonation.\textsuperscript{86} Harlan, as well as Johnston himself,\textsuperscript{87} have demonstrated that such approaches do yield results. At the very least, they confirm that there is a coherent musical logic to Partch’s compositional methods.

However, based on his own sample analysis of “By the Rivers of Babylon,” and after reviewing the handful of other musicological studies of Partch works, Harlan reaches a somewhat deflationary conclusion. According to him, “Partch’s compositions are strikingly simple, and even more so when considered among the complexity of other twentieth-century music.”\textsuperscript{88} Daniel Wolf states something similar:

Partch’s harmonic language is well within the late romantic in that his chordal vocabulary is based upon stacked thirds, emulating an extended harmonic series (and indeed, in Partch’s just intonation the emulation was even closer than that made by composers working with temperaments), with frequent use of non-harmonic suspensions.\textsuperscript{89}

James Tenney’s investigations into just intonation suggest that human aural perception is tolerant when it comes to small differences in pitch.\textsuperscript{90} In other words, we are not necessarily able to precisely recognise – in audible sound – many of the complex mathematical relationships which Partch notated on paper. This is especially true of many of Partch’s custom-built instruments which, due to their percussive or plucked-and struck-string timbres, were – paradoxically – not well-suited to the articulation of subtle microtonal interval relationships.\textsuperscript{91} Indeed, despite the daunting technical

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
intricacies of Partch’s harmonic theory, the primary tonal development of his works is almost like folk music in its simplicity.\textsuperscript{92} György Ligeti observed that Partch’s music was like “the folk music of a people which consists of a single individual, simply of Harry Partch.”\textsuperscript{93}

So where does all this leave us? To a greater or lesser extent, virtually all of the contemporaneous materials that we have available for gaining some kind of “access” to 	extit{Delusion of the Fury} – the score (only published in 2002), the film, the premiere performance (for those who were able to experience it live), Partch’s own written comments – were considered by Partch himself to be insufficient. Indeed, in Partch’s view, some elements, such as the film and premiere performances were unfaithful, if not misleadingly treacherous, representations of his work. Perhaps the only exception is the audio recording released by Columbia. While it is obviously only a limited window into the theatrical production that he had envisaged, Partch did concede that the recording “is capable of standing alone.” Besides this, the only other dependable source materials for interpreting the work are to be found in Partch’s own words, published in 	extit{Genesis of a Music} and various shorter pieces. However, in using such sources, Partch’s reservations regarding the usefulness of program notes and synopses must be borne in mind.

In view of this, it follows that a “close-up” approach to analyzing 	extit{Delusion of the Fury}, focused on one or two selected primary sources, may be problematic. Indeed, as we have seen, there are insurmountable obstacles which preclude even the establishment of an authoritative or complete corpus of source materials to start with. That is not to suggest that detailed scrutiny and close readings of individual primary sources are of no use whatsoever. On the contrary, as Harlan and others have shown, such detailed analyses can yield useful insights into Partch’s work. However, these are insufficient for a well-rounded understanding or interpretation of a work such as 	extit{Delusion of the Fury}. It is as if we need to simultaneously look at and beyond the specificities of

\textsuperscript{92} Harlan, “One Voice,” 167, 185.
individual source materials, seeking to also apprehend the conceptual dimensions of a work that has only ever been elusively put before us.

The extensive discussion in this sub-section has served to strengthen my original claim, viz. an insightful interpretation of *Delusion of the Fury* might be best attained by not viewing it as a stand-alone “work” at all. Rather *Delusion of the Fury* should be approached as a conceptual *Gesamtkunstwerk* which serves an “entry portal” into his overall aesthetic *world*.

13.3.5 Delusion of the Fury as a Gateway into Partch’s World

At heart, *Delusion of the Fury* – like many other works by Partch – was always conceived of as total artwork, a *Gesamtkunstwerk* (to use a term that has been rejuvenated in recent years, having cast off its undeservedly pejorative Adornian cloak). Partch actively resisted conventional divisions between the performing arts. Anthony Sheppard rightly observes that Partch “consistently and rigorously explored the possibilities of a genuine *Gesamtkunstwerk*.”

Certainly, as discussed above, Partch frequently stressed the fundamentally multimodal, theatrical conception of *Delusion of the Fury*.

A fundamental difficulty for would-be analysts is that the work was never fully realised to Partch’s satisfaction, certainly not in his lifetime. Furthermore, any realisations since Partch’s death – while welcome – remain largely inaccessible to most enquirers, even in this era of ubiquitous audiovisual documentation and universal internet distribution. Thus, we have the curious situation of an unconsummated and open-ended *Gesamtkunstwerk* which, in some respects, has more in common with ambiguously-specified conceptual art than with live performances of multimodal music theatre.

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Brian Harlan argues that a convincing interpretation of Partch’s works and the different theories that he articulated, can be found in Partch’s theory of “One Voice,” which was the process by which Partch projected his self image through his works. In doing so, he created a model that aimed to inspire others toward individual expression and artistic investigation.  

In this respect, we could say that one of the modes of conceptualisation underpinning the *Delusion of the Fury*, not to mention most of Partch’s other works, is identifying. While this is valid, I would argue that *Delusion* is more than simply the self-portrait of an individual. Another observation is that, through his custom-built instruments, which were intended to be appreciated for their visual and corporeal qualities in performance, Partch was as much concerned with the conceptual mode of crafting as some of the composers discussed in Chapter 9. Similarly, Partch’s adoption of a wide range of cultural references in his work, indicates that the mode of referring is yet another conceptual dimension operating in many of his pieces, certainly in *Delusion of the Fury*. Thus, we can conclude that each of these modes of conceptualisation plays a non-trivial role in a work such as *Delusion*. However, considered separately, they fail to capture the full conceptual force of this or any other Partch composition. Partch intended *Delusion of the Fury* to be a comprehensive portrayal of the complete aesthetic world – or, more precisely, the idea of a world – which, starting from first principles, he had painstakingly created throughout his career. Regardless of his subsequent disappointments with some aspects of its documented realisation, Partch undoubtedly considered *Delusion of the Fury* to be an opportunity to present the culmination of his life’s work within the span of a single magnum opus. This claim is supported by four observations.

Firstly, *Delusion* is the Partch work which includes the maximum number of his custom instruments in the score. Throughout his lifetime Partch had designed and refined some twenty-six unique instruments (excluding small hand-held percussion) for the performance of his music. All of these except one - the Adapted Viola – are included in the ensemble specified for *Delusion*. Indeed, some new small instruments were

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designed, and other existing ones adapted, specifically for use in the performance of this work. In other word, Delusion was to be a showcase for almost the entire “orchestra” – consisting of twenty-five main instruments – which forms the centrepiece of Partch’s musical world. Partch stated that “My work takes its character from the instruments I have built, played competently, and from my ideas and attitudes.” In the libretto for Delusion, he expressly states that “the instruments are the [stage] set.” Partch’s custom instruments were always more than merely utilitarian devices for producing the distinct pitches and intervals required in his system of just intonation. They were also deliberately designed to be essential visual elements of an overall multimodal theatrical experience.

Secondly, Partch’s preparations for the composition and detailed orchestration of this work were particularly thorough. Fourteen small studies released as a separate work – And on the Seventh Day Petals Fell in Petaluma – were considered by him to be “studies in preparation for Delusion of the Fury.” Knowing that this was likely to be one of the last opportunities he would ever have to present a major work for public performance, he took great pains to bring it to successful fruition.

Thirdly, in Delusion – more so than in earlier works such as The Bewitched – Partch intended the musicians also perform as “actors and dancers, moving from instruments to acting areas as the impetus of the drama requires.” In doing so, he envisaged Delusion to be a “move toward a sealing of the theatre arts.” In other words, Partch’s constant striving towards a vision of a corporeal and theatrical Gesamtkunstwek was to be consummated in this final major work. Recall Partch’s adamant view, quoted above: “Only theater will bring the concept to life.”

Finally, Partch “squeezed” an unusually rich mixture of his many acknowledged influences into the content of the final scenarios he prepared for Delusion, including a Japanese story, an African tale, concepts of ancient Greek theatre and farce, and the

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98 Gilmore, Harry Partch, 335, 341.
99 Partch, Genesis of a Music, 196.
100 Partch, Delusion of the Fury [score].
101 Partch, Genesis of a Music, 348. Also, Gilmore, Harry Partch, 334-35.
102 Gilmore, Harry Partch, 324-27, 334-35.
103 Ibid., 351.
104 Ibid.
105 Partch, Genesis of a Music, 357, italics added.
character of a hobo, just to list some. It was almost as if he was trying to encompass the entire corpus of his various interests within the compass of a single work. These various elements are woven together across two acts linked by a common theme, i.e. “delusory nature of human anger,” as indicated by the title of the work. Gilmore speculates, not without justification, that this theme could be viewed, autobiographically, as “a gesture of self-admonishment” by Partch. However, I suggest that it would be misleading to read too much of a “message” into Delusion. On more than one occasion, Partch expressed a distinct hostility to any simplistic conclusions or abstractions in relation to his works. For example, in the recording of one of his final works The Dreamer That Remains – A Study in Loving (1972), Partch personally declaims his answer to the question “What’s our message?” – “No message! Too many messages! No message!” In a 1962 essay, he stated that “it is not only difficult to define my theater concepts as a whole – it is impossible. Even if one of them is adequately pinned down for the moment, the next will very likely fail to fit into the prescribed mold.”

Comments such as these suggest that, for interpretive purposes, it might be more profitable to stand back from individual works, except insofar as they provide a window into Partch’s overall aesthetic and ethical worldview. According to Philip Blackburn, “shortly before his death in 1974, Harry Partch remarked to his friends that he … considered his life’s work to be a kind of letter to the world.” In that sense, taken together, his works may be viewed as a kind of personal diary, reflecting his various interests and concerns over time. Despite Partch’s admonition to be wary of overly simple or holistic definitions, it is evident that there is a constant thread running through the entirety of his works. This thread is, of course, the constant presence and foregrounding of Partch’s uniquely-imagined world, consisting of his musical system and associated theories, the growing orchestra of instruments he built for the performance of his compositions, and – most importantly – the voice (and often image) of Partch himself in performances and recordings. Bob Gilmore puts it well:

106 Gilmore, Harry Partch, 326.
107 Ibid., 327.
110 Philip Blackburn, Booklet notes to Enclosure Two: Harry Partch (innova 401), emphasis added. This remark is an imitation of one made by Anais Nin, regarding her multi-volume diaries. Nin was an acquaintance of Partch’s.
During his lifetime (and beyond) Partch was not known to the world at large for any one particular work. Unlike, say, Cage with 4’33”, or Jack Kerouac with *On the Road*, Partch was never associated in the public imagination with a single earth-shattering, epoch-defining masterwork. His impact and influence, even during his lifetime, was less due to his actual work than to the idea of his work. … it was rarely a particular Partch performance or recording that made a profound, life-changing impact on those individuals who responded, but most often the whole fact of his endeavor (the closest was perhaps *Genesis of a Music*, which indeed portrays and describes that work as a whole).111

Partch was well aware that live concert performances of his works were only ever likely to be few and far between. Thus, he actively embraced the technology of recording as a means of making his works available – in some form – to those who might be interested. Unlike John Cage’s much-quoted disdain for recordings,112 Partch embraced the medium with a series of self-released recordings on his own Gate 5 label. In a 1961 interview, Partch proclaimed that “I have something that even Johann Sepervirens Bach couldn’t count on: phonograph records.”113 Indeed, Partch’s Gate5 recordings were for many years his primary source of income.114 In a booklet note presumably written by Partch himself, the origin of the name he gave his record label is explained as follows:

GATE 5 was not picked out of a hatful of the most unlikely names … Beyond the prosaic fact that Partch lived, wrote music, built instruments … [in a building near Gate 5 of the Sausalito shipyards] … GATE5 carries an occult meaning in sundry ancient mythologies. In ancient pictographs the city, the center of culture, has four pedestrian gates. These are tangible; they can be seen; physical entrances can be shown. But the city also has a fifth gate, which cannot be shown because it is not tangible, and can be entered only in a metaphysical way. This is the gate to illusion.115

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111 Gilmore, “Climate,” 31, italics in original.
115 [Harry Partch], “In Explanation of ‘Gate 5’,” in “Photographs of Instruments Built by Harry Partch and Heard in His Recorded Music.” [=16 page booklet included with some issues of Gate 5 recordings] (date unknown, *ca.* 1957), 16. Booklet from author’s collection, included with a copy of *The Wayward*, Gate 5 Records, Issue B.
Some variants of Partch’s original Gate 5 releases have a logo design which explicitly refers to the connotation of “illusion” (Fig. 13.3).

![Design Used on Rear Cover of Some Variants of Gate 5 Releases](image)

**Figure 13.3** Design Used on Rear Cover of Some Variants of Gate 5 Releases


Photograph by the author. Used courtesy of the Harry Partch Estate / Danlee Mitchell.

### 13.3.6 Conclusion

Partch’s body of work consistently features his unique collection of instruments and his own role as the composer and, frequently, performer. An eclectic range of unusual cultural sources are liberally incorporated into his compositions. Thus, we can argue that identifying, crafting and referring are all discernible modes of conceptualisation operating in works such as *Delusion of the Fury*. However, while these individual modes are apparent – and may be legitimate points of departure in analysing the work – they fall short of capturing its significance when considered in the broader context of Partch’s lifetime dedication to the idea of a world. The unifying theme which pervades the entirety of Partch’s output is a single-minded artistic imperative to create an aesthetic world which, radically and somewhat ostentatiously, breaks free of the shackles of prevailing conventions. On more than one occasion, Partch railed against the stultifying conservatism he found everywhere in the established institutions of contemporary music. For example, in a 1948 essay titled “Show Horses in the Concert
Ring,” he despairs of the lack of curiosity and death of individual creativity endemic in the prevailing practices of “serious” music. To him, the antidote was obvious.

If I were to choose a single dominant adjective to describe human beings, that adjective would be creative. If we are human, we are also creative, unless – of course – we are educated into interprepoops (sic) – into show horses, and I for one would feel less apprehensive for a future world in which everyone would be a creator in realms artistic or intellectual.¹¹⁷

For a composer, the injunction involves no less than the task of worldmaking.

When the student finds that these things – the human ways he inherited and the usages of the subject closest to his heart – are alien to him, he has only one choice – to short-circuit as many of the obnoxious specialties as he possibly can in one lifetime … In the process he may succeed in designing a musical world that is not alien to him – a physical world, because music is a physical art.¹¹⁸

To adopt the language of Partch’s Gate 5 logo (Fig. 13.3), major works – such as Delusion of the Fury – serve as gateways into his world of illusion. But, individually, they do not define that world or stake out its limits. The most important aspect of Partch’s musical world was never definable in terms of the rich and idiosyncratically eclectic content of any individual works. Rather, it is the fact that, by personally exemplifying the stubbornly determined root-and-branch creation of his own musical world (as most faithfully documented in his recordings and writings), Partch highlights the creative capacity for worldmaking present in every human individual. For him, this was the very essence of being human.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 177, italics in original.
¹¹⁸ Ibid., 179-80, emphasis added.
In 2006, a curious book was published under the intriguing title *An Incomplete History of the Art of Funerary Violin* (Fig. 13.4). Its author – one Rohan Kriwaczek (Fig. 13.5) – claimed to trace the lost history of an almost forgotten genre, viz. *funerary music*. He recounts his discovery of – and induction into – the little-known Guild of Funerary Violinists, whose motto is “Nullus funus sine fidula” [“No funeral without a fiddle”].

Figure 13.4  *Front Cover of Rohan Kriwaczek, An Incomplete History of The Art of Funerary Violin (2006).*

Reproduced with kind permission of Rohan Kriwaczek.

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The book contains sketchy biographical histories and portraits of various guardians of the funerary music tradition over the centuries. It includes transcriptions of twenty-three short pieces for solo violin, which have amusing titles such as “The Erroneous Dirge of George Babcotte” and “The Dizzy Flight of Death.” A separate volume of musical scores, containing a larger selection of forty-eight solo violin pieces was also published, available by mail order from the “Guild.” Four CDs of “archive recordings,” plus one CD of “contemporary recordings by members of The Guild” are also available. A vinyl LP of tracks selected from these CDs has been released.

Amongst the so-called “archive recordings,” are rarities such as “wax cylinder recordings” dating to 1913 – “from the collection of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France” – of compositions by Pierre Dubuisson (1785? – 1838?) (Fig. 13.6 (a)), played by his grandson Jacques Dubuisson. One full CD of these archive recordings, titled Sept Regards sur l’Esprit de la Mort is part of the complete set of materials released.

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120 Rohan Kriwaczek, compiler and editor, The Art of Funerary Violin, being a selection from those surviving scores so far discovered (Brighton: The Guild of Funerary Violinists, 2005).
121 For details see: http://www.rohan-k.co.uk/guildarchives.html.
by Kriwaczek (Fig. 13.6 (b)). The score to all seven pieces in this suite in included in
the main book as well as in the supplementary book of scores (Fig. 13.6 (c)).

Even before publication, Kriwaczek’s book was quickly and widely recognised to be a
fiction or “hoax,” albeit one which purportedly had his publisher Peter Mayer initially
fooled. However, even Mayer defended the book and claimed not to care whether or
not it is “probably fiction.” “I just thought, whether it is true or not true, it is the work
of some sort of crazy genius,” he said. “If it is a hoax, it is a brilliant, brilliant hoax.”

Kriwaczek himself claimed that the book – and its associated artefacts – were never
intended as a hoax. He stated that his aim was to “expand the notion of musical
composition to encompass the creation of an entire artistic genre, with its necessary
accompanying history, mythology, philosophy, social function, etc.” He also
suggested that the work is “a serious artistic statement” about the closed world of
contemporary classical music.” In that sense, he argues that the “book can be
perceived as a work of musical philosophy.”

13.4.1 Conclusion

Colin Dickey suggests that Kriwaczek’s Funerary Violin is part of a literary heritage
which can be traced through a long line books and essays – such as Daniel Defoe’s
Robinson Crusoe (1719) – that purport to be factual but are, in reality, partly or wholly
fictional fabrications. This is an apt observation. No matter what else might be
legitimately claimed about it, Funerary Violin is first and foremost an elaborately
constructed fictional world. It is made manifest to audiences through a rich panoply
of public perceptual objects, including a book, musical scores, a website, videos and

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124 Kriwaczek, Funerary Violin, 186-98.
125 Julie Bosman, “British Author Espies a Funerary Violin Vacuum and So Fills It,” New York Times (4 October
126 Peter Mayer, quoted in ibid.
127 Rohan Kriwaczek, quoted in Melissa Block, “Uncovering the ‘True’ History of the Funerary Violin,” NPR
makes a similar statement in “Funerary Violin,” ABC Radio National website (23 July 2007). Available at
Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/05/books.usa.
129 Ibid.
(22 March 2012). Available at http://tumblr.lareviewofbooks.org/post/24379364713/about-a-genre-john-dagata-and-
the-essay.
131 On fictional identities in music, see Kingston, “Composing (as) another.”
132 http://www.rohan-k.co.uk/guildvideos.html.
CD recordings. However, the “work” is not to be equated with any of these items. Instead, the “work” is the idea of a possible world, orbiting the central fiction of “funerary violin.” In other words, this is a post-conceptual work, which operates, above all else, as an archetypical example of worldmaking. Indeed, it is not necessary to be familiar with the entire corpus of material which is now offered as documentary evidence of the existence of this fictional world. In fact, even the line between fiction and non-fiction has is blurred. On his website, Kriwaczek advertises his services as a Funerary Violinist, and claims to have performed live “at more than 50 funerals throughout southeast England.” Other musicians have performed works from the funerary violin repertoire. In this respect, we can say that Kriwaczek’s invented world is an “open” work (Chapter 2). Over time, it is becoming an increasingly intricate web of fact and fiction.

133 http://www.rohan-k.co.uk/guildbookings.html.
134 Block, “Uncovering.”
Figure 13.6  (a) Claimed Portrait of Pierre Dubuisson (1785? – 1838?)  (b) Cover of Sept Regards sur l’Esprit de la Mort  (c) First page of score to “VI. Rêve – Enfin libre, pas sans tristesse, l’esprit s’envole,” from Sept Regards …

Reproduced with kind permission of Rohan Kriwaczek.
13.5 Ragnar Kjartansson and The National – *A Lot of Sorrow* (2013-2014)

### 13.5.1 Introduction

So far in this chapter, I have left the notion of *repleteness* – proposed by DiGiovanna as a defining characteristic of art primarily concerned with *worldmaking* (Section 13.2) – largely undiscussed. DiGiovanna uses terms such as “inexhaustible” and “completeness” to explain what he means by “repleteness.” I agree that these are perfectly apt descriptions of artistic projects which are best thought of as “worlds,” rather than as a series of individual works. Certainly, the examples of Harry Partch’s musical world (Section 13.3) and Rohan Kriwaczek’s creation of the genre of funerary violin (Section 13.4) can be described as “replete” in this sense. However, lurking in DiGiovanna’s argument, there is possibly an unexamined bias towards assuming that “worlds” default to a spatio-temporal scale which is similar to that “normally” experienced by humans. DiGiovanna insists artistic worlds “should differ noticeably from ‘our’ world,” preferably with “physical laws different from our own” (Section 13.2). However, without further reflection, his reference to “geography” and “history” could perhaps be too hastily interpreted to imply the usual human spans of space and time. In fairness, whether or not this is his intention is not clear, as he doesn’t consider the point.

However, it is evident that the spatio-temporal boundaries of “worlds” – whether scientific, socio-cultural, or artistic – are far from fixed or of uniformly similar scale and scope. For example, Antonie van Leeuwenhock (1632-1723) – referred to as the “Father of Microbiology” – pioneered the use of microscopes to reveal an entire world of organisms contained within a single drop of water. Similarly, telescopes and the instruments of space exploration have enabled us to grasp “worlds” which far exceed the geographical dimensions of our planet. The point is that scientific worlds which span orders of magnitude quite different to those we normally experience can nevertheless be made accessible to human perception. In a similar way, the spatio-temporal dimensions of artistically created worlds can be constrained, compressed, magnified or expanded, to extraordinary degrees which may be well beyond those normally encountered in day-to-day human experience. For example, the minimalist aesthetic typically restricts the content and boundaries of artistic worlds to focus
attention on qualities which may otherwise go unnoticed. Quoting William Blake,\(^{136}\) Brian Eno observed that “Minimalism sees the world in a grain of sand.”\(^{137}\) In music, genres such as drone and trance embrace this same aesthetic.\(^{138}\)

In this section, I examine a work in which spatio-temporal manipulation is undertaken to create an artificially limited world. In this case, the presented content and performative context are narrow and tightly constrained, albeit not at the extreme limits of minimalism. Nevertheless, through the use of an almost obsessive repetition and extreme temporal expansion – beyond the limits of usual audience attention spans – it achieves a quality of immersive repleteness and a sense of inexhaustibility.\(^{139}\) This work is *A Lot of Sorrow* (2013-2014), by post-conceptual artist and musician Ragnar Kjartansson,\(^{140}\) in collaboration with alternative rock group The National.

### 13.5.2 Description of the Work

In 2013, Icelandic artist Ragnar Kjartansson collaborated with alternative rock band The National to present a one-off performance/installation at MoMA PS1, New York,\(^{141}\) at which the band repeatedly played their song “Sorrow”\(^{142}\) for six hours without a break. It has been rightly characterised as a work in the *endurance* and *durational* traditions of performance art, exemplified by artists such as Marina Abramović.\(^{143}\)


\(^{138}\) Ibid.

\(^{139}\) For example, it could be argued that, in Arab cultures, music which aims to bring about tarab – an ecstatic state of timelessness and transcendent emotion – is a type of conceptual music, or at least involves a strongly conceptual dimension. Roger Savage points to tarab as an example of (non-Western) music in which “experiences of transcendence [are grounded] in music’s *worlding power*” (Roger W. H. Savage, “Being, Transcendence and the Ontology of Music,” *The World of Music*, 51, no. 2 (2009), 17, emphasis added), or “music’s power to create special worlds of time” (15, emphasis added). He argues that Western and non-Western music’s ability to convey a glimpse of “the mystery of time’s inscrutability” (13) is linked to listeners’ apprehension of a profound *aporia* which presents itself whenever musical time is experienced as a mimetic representation – inevitably imperfect – of eternity (i.e. its “other”). See also the examples of highly repetitive and drone-like musical forms discussed in his latest book, *Music, Time, and Its Other: Aesthetic Reflections on Finitude, Temporality, and Alterity* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 162-90.

\(^{140}\) Kjartansson has often involved music and musicians in his conceptual works. See Heike Munder, ed., *Ragnar Kjartansson: To Music/An die Musik* (Zurich: JRP Ringier, 2015). Note that *A Lot of Sorrow* (2013) post-dates the exhibition covered by this retrospective catalogue, and is not discussed in it.


\(^{142}\) “Sorrow” was originally included on the album *The National, High Violet*, 4AD, CAD 3XO3CD, 2010, compact disc.

As a song, “Sorrow” is “based on a four-note descending bass line A-G#-F#-E, which repeats endlessly throughout the song.” Bryce Dessner, guitarist with The National, observes that the descending four-note bass line is a common musical trope for representing sorrow and lament (although the band was not aware of this fact when they first composed the song.) Dessner suggests that cyclical pattern of the bass line meant that the song was well-suited to being endlessly repeated: “Ragnar intuitively knew that something which functions in this way could take on a timeless open form, like an Indian raga.”

*A Lot of Sorrow* has been documented in several forms, including –

- A sketch by the artist, on a single sheet, illustrating the idea underpinning the work (Fig. 13.10).
- Various official and unofficial video excerpts and still photographs of the original MoMA PS1 performance, published on the internet.
- A single-channel video of the performance – Ragnar Kjartansson and The National, *A Lot of Sorrow*, 2013-2014 (Fig. 13.11) – published in an edition of 10 plus two artist’s proofs (duration 6 hours, 9 minutes, 35 seconds).

This video has been exhibited at a number of galleries, including –

- Luhring Augustine Gallery, Brooklyn, from September 11 to December 21, 2014,
- König Galerie, Berlin, from 27 June to 23 August 2015,
- Musée d’art contemporain de Montréal, 11 February to 22 May 2016,

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145 Ibid., 75-76. See also Rosand, “The Descending Tetrachord.”
146 Dessner, “A whole lot of sorrow,” 75.
150 http://www.koeniggalerie/exhibitions/1661/ragnar-kjartansson-a-lot-of-sorrow/
152 http://artic.edu/exhibition/ragnar-kjartansson-and-national-lot-sorrow
• The audio of the entire original performance has been released as a limited edition vinyl package, consisting of nine 12” LPs.\textsuperscript{153}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig1310}
\caption{Ragnar Kjartansson, A Lot of Sorrow, sketch, 2013.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{153} http://alotofsorrow.com
Figure 13.11  Ragnar Kjartansson and The National, A Lot of Sorrow, 2013-2014
Source: Photographs by Elísabet Davids. © Ragnar Kjartansson and The National; Courtesy of the artists, Luhring Augustine, New York, and i8 Gallery, Reykjavik.
13.5.3 Artificially Limited Worlds as Mode of Conceptualisation

Unlike the examples of Harry Partch and Rohan Kriwaczek, \textit{A Lot of Sorrow} is not a particularly complex, expansive or diverse “world.” Nevertheless, precisely because it involves the deliberate creation of an artificially narrow and informationally sparse world, it is interpretively insightful to consider it as an example of post-conceptual \textit{worldmaking}. Of course, aspects of the other modes of conceptualisation are also present here, such as referring (e.g. to the original version of “Sorrow”), or identifying (e.g. of the artist(s)).

However, the essential (fictional) idea underpinning the foundations of the imaginary world of \textit{A Lot of Sorrow} is that the only thing that really matters – and therefore the only “thing” that this world ever needs to contain – is The National performing their song “Sorrow” in front of an audience. The song – in performance – \textit{is} the artificial world, into which the audience is invited and can come and go at will. The usual trappings of a rock music performance are all present – support crew, video camera operators, audience, and of course the band members.

Patrick Nickleson aptly invokes the spatial metaphor (Section 13.2) to describe this world:

\begin{quote}
\textit{A Lot of Sorrow} was, first and foremost, the concert made ‘sculptural.’ … That is, the music – in taking on such extensive duration and establishing the large-scale periodicity (the 3.5 minute pop song) – becomes spatial and sculptural in place of the transience and ephemerality typical of sonorous art. As a result, the music becomes \textit{a sonic-sculptural space} for conviviality …\textsuperscript{154}
\end{quote}

While this world had only a temporary duration – lasting six hours – its existence was (and in its video form is) long enough to create an environment in which it was possible to become immersed “as if” this world could conceivably continue without ever ending. In other words, the six-hour performance event – and subsequent screenings of the six-

hour video, or all nine LPs of the audio recordings – are the public perceptual objects (Chapter 2) which serve as “entry portals” into a highly-focused fictional world.

13.5.4 Summing Up

What is the meaning – for an observing audience – of the “world” represented by *A Lot of Sorrow*? The answer, of course, depends on which audience. For a *musicological* audience, Patrick Nickleson argues that *A Lot of Sorrow* problematises previously received notions of repetition and minimalism. In music and arts theoretical discourse, discussions of repetition have been largely coloured by critiques of late capitalism and mass production by such influential authors as Theodor Adorno and Jacques Attali. However, *A Lot of Sorrow* is problematic because it does not adhere to the strict patterns and small-scale cellular symmetries typically encountered in minimalist works. According to Nickleson

Kjartansson’s work uncouples itself, even at its most repetitive, from the twentieth-century’s cynical history of repetition. In its place, *A Lot of Sorrow* points out that a critic calling a work ‘repetitive’ is about as productive as labelling a performance ‘interesting.’ That is, new questions must be raised: Repetitive how? What content repeats? Towards what end? What effect does the repetition create? What is the basic unit of repetition? How did the content repeated function in its former (pre-repeating) context?

Certainly, the 108 versions of “Sorrow” which were performed at this event varied considerably from each other, and could hardly be described as *exact* repetitions. Nevertheless, the main thing that happens in this strange universe – its *reason* for existing – is the “pseudo-repetition” of a single song, over and over again. In other words, by focusing attention on such an extremely limited spatio-temporal world, *A Lot of Sorrow* – somewhat paradoxically – also shines the conceptual spotlight on received

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157 Ibid., 139.
158 Dessner, “A whole lot of sorrow,” 78.
assumptions regarding repetition, rarely examined, which are prevalent in the much larger world of musicological discourse.

13.6 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the mode of conceptualisation which I have labelled worldmaking. All artistic works involve the creation of a “world.” However, when the conceptual spotlight is aimed primarily on the existence of that world, we can say that worldmaking has been elevated to a conceptual prominence, or a “starring” role, above and beyond the presence of any individual works which serve as tangible manifestations of that world. The artist-created world is placed in a relationship with the “external” world of the audience. This elevates the importance and intensity of the meaning-making processes of translation and interpretation which inevitably occur between those two worlds. The three case studies discussed in this chapter demonstrate that worldmaking is indeed an operative principle of conceptualisation evident in the creative output of a range of artists and composers.
### Part IV

**Conclusions & Directions for Further Research**  
(Chapter 15)

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<tr>
<th>Mode of Conceptual Music</th>
<th>Main Composers &amp; Works Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>n/a (Chapter 14)</td>
<td>Ilmar Taimre – Works in accompanying creative portfolio</td>
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| worldmaking [world of a work] (Chapter 13) | Harry Partch – Delusion of the Fury  
Rohan Kriwaczek – The Art of Funerary Violin  
Ragnar Kjartansson (feat. The National) – A Lot of Sorrow |
| referring ["other(s)" of a work] (Chapter 12) | Beck – Sea Change  
Arnold Schoenberg – Verklärte Nacht (Transfigured Night)  
Gavin Bryars – The Sinking of the Titanic |
| crafting [technē] (Chapter 11) | John Cage – Europera 5  
Peter Ablinger – Weiss/Weisslich  
Lawrence English – Viento |
| signifying [signs of a work] (Chapter 10) | León Schidlowsky – Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen  
Dieter Schnebel – MO-NO  
Adolf Wölfli – St. Adolf Giant Creation |
| identifying [identity] (Chapter 9) | David Bowie – “Ashes to Ashes”  
Arnold Schoenberg – Pierrot Lunaire |

### Part III

**Methodology – Developing an Interpretive Model**  
(Chapters 4 to 8)

### Part II

**Establishing the Problem & Its Context**  
(Chapters 1 to 3)
Chapter 14

Exegesis of Portfolio of Original Works

14.1 Introduction

In this final chapter of Part III, I apply the interpretive model developed in Part II to the analytical interpretation of works of conceptual music selected from my own creative practice.¹ Full scores, scripts, internet links to audiovisual media, and other artefacts associated with the works I shall discuss are included in Appendix P. Recall that the original impetus for the theoretical component of this project was to develop a defensible analytical terminology – or language – for the exegesis of a diverse range of works which, despite their presentational and generic differences, are united by a primary concern with ideas and concepts.

In Chapters 9 to 13, I have shown that the five modes of conceptualisation proposed in Part II can be usefully invoked in order to add to our interpretive understanding of a broad spectrum of music-based works. I also observed that, in many cases, more than a single mode can play a significant role in any given work. Similarly, in the works I shall discuss in this chapter, more than one mode of conceptualisation is usually in evidence. However, in each case, it is possible to discern one mode which is pre-eminent.

Figure 14.1 summarises the individual works to be discussed in the remainder of this chapter, showing the dominant and supporting modes. The works listed here are arranged in approximately chronological order of composition. This sequence suggests that there has been a progression over time, from earlier works principally motivated by different approaches to the mode of referring, to later works in which other modes of conceptualisation are more dominant (albeit referring continues to play a secondary role). At first, I was not fully aware that such a move away from my earlier interest in referential, quotational and citational genres was progressively taking place in my creative work. However, before long, it became apparent that my tentative attempts to

¹ Internet locations for my creative works can be found at www.ilmartaimre.com and www.ghostofnothing.com.
interpret my creative practice *solely* in terms of a theory of reference or intertextuality would be unsatisfactory, except perhaps for some early works. This realisation led me to recognise and articulate “the exegetical problem of conceptual music” (see Chapter 1). Therefore, with this present chapter, I have come “full circle,” and set out to interpret my own creative work using the theoretical vocabulary developed and validated in prior chapters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of Work in Accompanying Creative Portfolio</th>
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<td>Chant funèbre transfigurée (2010)</td>
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<td>Koechlin Mix #1 (2010)</td>
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<td>[Untitled message] for The Voicemail Project (2010)</td>
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<td>Silences from 13 Felix Werder Recordings (2015)</td>
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<td>The Ghosts of Nothing (visual iconography) (2014 - )</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Memory of Johnny B. Goode (2014 - ) *</td>
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= primary mode  = secondary mode  * = collaborative work

**Figure 14.1**  *Summary of Works Discussed in this Chapter*

In the remainder of this chapter, I shall discuss the works in five sub-sections, grouped together under their primary mode of conceptualisation, as shown in Fig. 14.1.
14.2 Mode of Referring

In this sub-section, I shall consider four of my works in which the mode of referring is dominant. Each of them explores a different motivating idea or concept drawn from the broad spectrum of possibilities which are available under this mode. The four works are:

- *Austerlitz Fantasy* (2007)

14.2.1 Austerlitz Fantasy (2007)

This piece was the first new composition I worked on shortly after commencing my PhD research. My original aim was to experiment with some modal harmonies and textural qualities. Initially, the piece had no title. However, as it began to take shape I contemplated the question of precisely what to name it. This aspect of the creative process turned out to be more perplexing than I had anticipated. As I mentally played around with various options, it became increasingly clear how interpretively potent something as “simple” as a title could be, especially when linked to a work of “absolute music” which otherwise might offer few clues as to its meaning. On this point, see Section 6.5.1.

As the process of composition continued, I decided to name the piece *Austerlitz Fantasy*. This was a reference to the literary masterpiece by German author W.G.
Sebald, titled *Austerlitz* (2001). At the time, I had only recently encountered Sebald and his four extraordinary “novels,” a multimodal mix of fiction, non-fiction and travel writing, woven through with a rich tapestry of obscure intertextual references and presented in an exquisitely hypnotic prose. As I worked on *Austerlitz Fantasy*, I became interested in musically “translating” a little something of Sebald’s poetics and capturing its understated melancholy in my own composition. This motivating idea led me to investigate some of the rapidly expanding secondary literature on Sebald, in an effort to try to articulate some of the distinguishing hallmarks of a “Sebaldian poetics.” As a first step, and without claiming to have undertaken a comprehensive review of this literature (a huge task, well outside my scope), I collated the following list of ways in which scholars have attempted to sum up their view of Sebald’s poetics –

- “poetik der Erinnerung” [poetics of remembering]  
- “poetics of travel”  
- “poetics of ruins”  
- “poetics of history”  
- “poetics of suspension”  
- “poetics of historiography”.

This list – which is no doubt incomplete – made it clear that any attempts to tie down Sebald’s poetics to a single dimension are unlikely to do full justice to the rich complexity of his achievement. Arguably, then, a wiser course is to follow the lead of

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Lynn Wolff, who opts for the description “hybrid poetics” in the title of her monograph on Sebald.\textsuperscript{10}

Therefore, as a second step, I concluded that a more useful starting point might be to identify some the specific techniques or ways of making which collectively serve to define Sebald’s “hybrid” literary poetics. My aim was to think about how some of these techniques could perhaps be applied to – or translated into – my own creative work, which of course is not a literary endeavor, but rather takes place principally in music and the visual arts. With this in mind, I compiled a second list – again incomplete and in no particular order – of eight characteristics or qualities which a number of scholars have highlighted as hallmarks of Sebald’s technique. This list is given in Appendix O.

It was into this general context that I sought to locate my composition Austerlitz Fantasy. Of course, the essential action required to link my work to Sebald’s book was the simple choice of a title. Nevertheless, various compositional choices were consciously – and no doubt sub-consciously – made in order to musically support, or at least not undermine, the overall Sebaldian ethos which I invoke in the title. For example, the opening phrase (mm. 1-5 (part), Fig. 14.2) is quite long in duration (approx. 13 seconds). Through pseudo-repetition, it weaves a single, circuitously restless, “paragraph” which only comes to a clear full stop at m. 26. This reflects, musically, Sebald’s penchant for constructing unusually long and hypnotically flowing paragraphs. Austerlitz Fantasy contains other similarly lengthy excursions, without any intermediate clear stops, in mm. 52-64 and mm. 65-85.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{opening_phrase.png}
\caption{Opening Phrase of Austerlitz Fantasy, mm.1-5 (part)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{10} Lynn Wolff, W. G. Sebald’s Hybrid Poetics: Literature as Historiography (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014).
Structurally, *Austerlitz Fantasy* consists of a metonymic juxtaposition of “incompatible forms,” reflecting other qualities of a Sebaldian aesthetic, as listed above. Specifically, the march-like section of staccato chromatic clusters in mm. 65-85 (Fig. 14.3) is in stark contrast with the more melodic, languid feel the opening section (mm. 1-64). As an aside, this “march” could also be interpreted as a metaphoric allusion to the traces of World War II, the Holocaust and military destruction which constantly haunt the pages of *Austerlitz*.

![Figure 14.3 The Beginning of the Chromatic “March” Section, mm. 65-68.](image)

In the end, the extent of my success – or otherwise – in invoking the “spirit” of Sebald in *Austerlitz Fantasy* is a matter for each listener to decide. The key point I am making in this sub-section is that the piece was intended to refer to Sebald’s *Austerlitz*, as its principal “other” (Chapter 6). This intention is clearly signaled in the title. Perhaps the piece could still be appreciated, as absolute music, by listeners with no knowledge whatsoever of W. G. Sebald or his books, or if I had given it a more “neutral” title (e.g. *Piano Piece #1*). However, such scenarios would drastically impede the resulting interpretation of the “work” which I have sought to create.

To be clear, there is nothing particular about the music, considered in isolation, which compels a listener to form an association with W. G. Sebald or *Austerlitz*. Any such association depends principally on the title of the piece. Some of the above-mentioned qualities in the music make the association plausible, but no more than that. For this reason, I include paratextual information (e.g. on my website and in this thesis) wherever the work is likely to be publicly presented, to ensure that the intended reference to Sebald is apparent. In other words, paratexts such as *title* and additional
explanatory information (e.g. “program notes” such as those given in this sub-section) are prerequisite components of the work. They are included amongst the minimally necessary public perceptual objects associated with it. Along with the score and any audible performances (e.g. in live performance or the demo version included in the portfolio), these public perceptual objects are essential to the task of making an explicit connection to Sebald. They explain the motivating idea behind the piece, i.e. to reflect a Sebaldian poetics in musical terms. In other words, without the conceptual reference to Sebald made clearly evident to the audience, the presentation of the piece would be compromised and incomplete. In this way, this work employs the conceptual mode of referring in order to achieve its creative intent.

14.2.2 Lament Tango (2010)

<table>
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<th>Modes of Conceptualisation</th>
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<td>identifying</td>
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In Lament Tango, my aim was to “mash” together two musical ideas or genres which are generally not considered to be closely related, viz. the descending tetrachord bass sequence of the lament, and the rhythmic signature of the tango.

In Western music, the descending tetrachord, typically in the Phrygian mode11 (Fig. 14.4), is saturated with meaning.

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11 The conventional motif adheres to the notes of the diatonic minor scale, i.e. the Phrygian mode comprising two full tone descents, followed by a half-tone descent. However, a chromatic descent is also generally acknowledged as an expression of the lament topic. Thus, William Caplin maintains that “The lament schema is characterized by a bass line that descends stepwise from the tonic scale-degree to the dominant, thus spanning an interval of a perfect fourth.” See William E. Caplin, “Topics and Formal Functions: The Case of Lament,” in The Oxford Handbook of Topic Theory, ed. Danuta Mirka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 416. Most authors consider any step-wise descending tetrachordal progression to qualify as a variant of the lament trope. The definitive study is Peter Williams, The Chromatic Fourth During Four Centuries of Music (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). For examples of how the “lament” label is applied to different tetrachordal downwards progressions, see: Dessner, “A whole lot of sorrow,” 75; Timothy Koozin, “Musical gesture in the songs of Nick Drake,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Singer-Songwriter, ed. Katherine Williams and Justin A. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 155.
In music of the Baroque era, the descending tetrachord was a recognised rhetorical figure, or *topic*. It signified a sigh,\(^{12}\) death,\(^{13}\) and was the defining hallmark of lament as a genre.\(^{14}\) Most famously, it is found in “Dido’s Lament” from Purcell’s *Dido and Aeneas* (ca. 1677-88),\(^{15}\) and in Monteverdi’s *Lamento d’Arianna* (1607-08). In rock and popular music, it underpins countless songs, for example: The Beatles’ “While My Guitar Gently Weeps” (1968), Nick Drake’s “Fruit Tree” (1969),\(^{16}\) David Bowie/Iggy Pop’s “China Girl” (1977), and The National’s “Sorrow” (2010). Harmonised so that the final note is treated as the tonic of the key, the descending tetrachord progression is also common in flamenco and music for Spanish guitar,\(^{17}\) where it is sometimes referred to as the “Andalusian cadence.”\(^{18}\)

In *Lament Tango*, the musical topic of lament is announced in the opening measures as a descending tetrachord sequence in the bass (Fig. 14.5). It recurs intermittently throughout the piece, varied and transposed to different registers (e.g. oboe part, mm. 31-33, mm. 45-47). Later, it is also inverted, as an *ascending* tetrachord (piano part, mm. 57-60).

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\(^{16}\) Koozin, “Musical gesture,” 155.


As a musical genre, tango has a history spanning more than a century.¹⁹ Fuelled by the global tango crazes of the early twentieth-century, it evolved from its Argentine origins into a range of distinctive local variations. Thriving tango cultures now exist in such far-flung countries as Finland²⁰ and Japan.²¹ Of course, tango is more accurately described as a dance rather than simply a musical genre.²² Nevertheless, many twentieth-century composers – ranging from Stravinsky,²³ Milhaud,²⁴ Satie,²⁵ to such unlikely figures as John Cage²⁶ – have tried their hand at creating one or more tango-influenced compositions at some point in their career. Musically, the milonga rhythm –

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²³ Igor Stravinsky, Tango, for violin and piano (1940).
²⁵ Erik Satie, “Tango,” from Sports et Divertissements (1914).
a distinctive syncopated 2/4 pattern (Fig. 14.6) – is one of the most characteristic hallmarks found in many, but by no means all, tangos.27

![2/4 Milonga Rhythmic Pattern Found in Many Tangos](image)

**Figure 14.6** The Syncopated 2/4 Milonga Rhythmic Pattern Found in Many Tangos

From a musical perspective, the tango form was rejuvenated in the second half of the twentieth century. This was due in no small part to the revolutionary nuevo tango innovations of Astor Piazzolla,28 who fused elements of traditional tango with classical and contemporary art music, as well as jazz.

Tango is the archetypical dance of erotic passion. However, there is also an ever-present undercurrent of longing, loss and melancholy.29 Indeed, emotionally, the genres of tango and lament have much in common.30 From this perspective, it is not a large conceptual leap to bring the two together into a single composition. Certainly, I am not the first to have done so. For example, in his *Symphony No.1* (1989) – a work of mourning for victims of AIDS31 – John Corigliano employs the two musical gestures, metonymically. Specifically, a quotation of a piano tango by Albéniz features prominently in the first movement,32 and “descending half steps … [used as] a familiar gesture of lament”33 occur in the third movement.

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30 Link and Wendland, *Tracing Tangueros*, 33.
32 Ibid., 341.
33 Ibid., 349.
Lament Tango begins with a lament-inflected mood, which continues to m.58. This section is occasionally punctuated with dense chromatic clusters in the piano part, for example at mm. 34-42 (Fig. 14.7). Anticipating the tango elements yet to appear, this is an allusion to the music of Astor Piazzolla, who was fond of using similar dense clusters in his later works.34

![Figure 14.7](image)

Lament Tango – Piano Part, mm. 29-42, showing the first appearance of chromatic clusters (at mm.34-42)

The lament section moves into a transitional section which is marked by metrically displaced rhythmic accents on *pizzicato* cello in mm. 59-68 (Fig. 14.8). This rhythmic ambiguity eventually “morphs” into a full-fledged tango rhythm on piano, commencing m. 71 (Fig. 14.9) and continuing – with occasional punctuation – to m.103.

34 For example, tracks such as “Tanguedia III,” available on Astor Piazzolla, Tango: Zero Hour (American Clavé AMCL 1013, 1986, vinyl LP) and various live performances. On this piece, see Kacey Quin Link, “Culturally Identifying the Performance Practices of Astor Piazzolla’s Second Quinteto” (Master’s thesis, University of Miami, 2009), 6, 61.
As the tango section proceeds, lament-based gestures re-appear, such as the descending tetrachord in the piano right-hand at m. 82, and transposed at m. 83, now syncopated (Fig. 14.10).

**Figure 14.10** Lament Tango – **Descending Tetrachords in Piano Right-Hand, mm. 82-83.**
The closing section returns to an emphasis on lament elements. The double tetrachord descent of mm.82-83 is repeated, firstly in the oboe part at mm. 112-115, then on piano at mm. 117-120, and again at mm. 121-125.

This brief description of the musical design of *Lament Tango* highlights the key point I seek to establish in this sub-section. This is that any analysis of this piece would be severely compromised without a clear recognition that the motivating idea which underpins it is the “mashing” together of the two musical styles nominated in its title, i.e. lament and tango. This idea is just as – or arguably more – important to the intended reception of the work as are any detailed particulars of its audible execution. There is no deliberate parodic or comedic agenda involved here. Therefore, the notes written in the score are musically consistent with – and do not aim to subvert – the mimetic description announced in the title. However, a number of alternative executions of the motivating idea could easily be envisaged (e.g. as “remixes” or recompositions of the version presented here), without undermining – and perhaps even potentially enhancing, through multiple variants – the conceptual dimension of *Lament Tango*. In the terminology of the interpretive model developed in Part II of this thesis, the conceptual dimension of *Lament Tango* is primarily achieved through the mode of referring, i.e. to the musical genres of lament and tango. Any new meanings which are created (Chapter 7) in experiencing the work arise through the process of interaction – or translation – which unfolds, in the minds of knowledgeable listeners, between the juxtaposed and overlapping references to these two genres through the course of the work.

35 Any marked inconsistencies between title and musical styles would suggest an artistic intention to critique, parody or lampoon, which is not the case here.
14.2.3 Chant funèbre transfigurée (2010)

Chant funèbre transfigurée (2010) is another piece concerned with working through the possibilities of a single motivating idea located in the referring mode of conceptualisation. In this case, the central idea was simply to explore how I might approach one of Schoenberg’s early masterpieces – Verklärte Nacht (1899) (see Chapter 12) – as a recomposition. Unlike arrangements, recompositions – by definition – permit considerable freedom regarding the adaptation of musical materials from a source work.\(^36\) In particular, recomposition allows for the possibility of introducing entirely new elements into the recomposed work, i.e. elements which have no exact precedent in the original. Nevertheless, a significant connection to the source work must also be preserved – and remain fairly apparent to audiences – for a work to qualify as a recomposition.

In the world of classical music, the phenomena of mashup and recomposition gained wide exposure with the support and promotional efforts of the prestigious record label Deutsche Grammophon. To date, five releases\(^37\) have been issued under the banner of their ReComposed series (Fig. 14.11).

\(^{36}\) Generally, recompositions are based on a single source work. This, at least, is how Josef Straus uses the term in “Recompositions by Schoenberg, Stravinsky, and Webern,” The Musical Quarterly, 72, no. 3 (1986): 301-28. When two or more source works are used to create a new composition, the resulting work is probably better described as a mashup. Richard Beaudoin and Joseph Moore have proposed the term transdialection to apply to a range of approaches to musical transcription, encompassing recomposition. See Richard Beaudoin and Joseph Moore, “Conceiving Musical Transdialection,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 68, no. 2 (2010): 105-17. This suggests that terminology in this wide field of musical practices is far from settled. However, there is no need for me to go any further into the details of this terminological tangle.

\(^{37}\) See the Discography at the end of this thesis for full details of these releases.
Except for the work by Max Richter, these releases have been produced as *mashups* of existing audio recordings sourced from the Deutsche Grammophon vaults. The Richter piece is a *recomposition* in the traditional sense, inasmuch as it was produced as a written score\(^\text{38}\) based on motifs from Vivaldi’s *Four Seasons*, and subsequently recorded in performance by a soloist and orchestra.\(^\text{39}\) In each of these releases, the artists have taken considerable liberties with the source materials. For example, they include *additional performers* not included on the original recordings, or have radically manipulated the original source recordings using *digital processing and effects*.

*Chant funèbre transfigurée* has the typical characteristics of a recomposition. On the one hand, it quotes – exactly – many of the motifs and harmonies found in Schoenberg’s original. For example, the opening phrase for trumpet and trombone at mm. 4-7 (Fig. 14.12) is a replication of mm. 3-4 of the first viola and first cello parts of Schoenberg’s score (Fig. 14.12). This phrase is a key element which is repeated and varied throughout the piece (e.g. mm. 25-26, m. 32, m. 42, m. 51).

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Figure 14.12 Chant funèbre transfigurée, mm. 5-7, trumpet and trombone parts.

Quoted from Arnold Schönberg “Verklärte Nacht \(\text{für Streichorchester} \mid \text{op. 4} \)"

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Figure 14.13 Schoenberg, Verklärte Nacht, for string sextet, mm. 1-4, highlighting the viola and cello parts replicated in Fig. 14.12.

Source: Arnold Schönberg “Verklärte Nacht \(\text{für Streichorchester} \mid \text{op. 4} \)"

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On the other hand, Chant funèbre transfigurée also involves many elements not found anywhere in Schoenberg’s score for Verklärte Nacht. Indeed, from its opening measures, it reveals that this is a work which is both identical and different from its
“other.” Specifically, m.1 of the cello part in *Chant* is identical to m.1 of the second cello line in Schoenberg’s original (Fig. 14.14, c.f. Fig. 14.13). However, by m.2 of *Chant* there is already a departure from Schoenberg, with the cello no longer playing a repetition of m.1, as found in m.2 of the source.

![Figure 14.14](https://example.com/figure1414.png)

*Figure 14.14  Chant funèbre transfigurée, mm. 1-4, second cello*

As it proceeds, *Chant funèbre transfigurée* continues to develop this tension between similarity and difference. There are various close allusions to familiar elements of *Verklärte Nacht* (e.g. the key change sections at mm. 46-47 and mm. 53-56). But there is also significant incorporation of new material (e.g. the oboe melody at mm. 11-12, which is repeated on flute and clarinet at mm. 12-15, the trombone glissandos at mm. 29-31 and 33-35). By the time the piece reaches the closing section, in mm. 57-76, any residual traces of Schoenberg’s original have almost entirely disintegrated, leaving only the fragments of an unreconciled otherness at the end, in the form of dense, triple-forte, chromatic clusters on the piano (mm. 74-75).

The exegesis briefly sketched above would not have been possible without making constant comparisons between *Chant funèbre transfigurée* and Schoenberg’s *Verklärte Nachtw*. My composition is so intimately intertwined with Schoenberg’s original that its essential creative goal would be entirely missed unless the audience was aware of this fact and, ideally, had a working familiarity with the music of *Verklärte Nacht*. Otherwise, it would not be possible to appreciate the points of similarity or the points of departure in the music of *Chant funèbre transfigure*. In other words, *Chant* is fundamentally a work of conceptual music, based on the mode of referring. It is

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critically dependent on the unfolding of a single motivating idea, i.e. a constantly shifting – and ultimately unfaithful – relationship to *Verklärte Nacht*.

**14.2.4 Motet for Maitland (2014)**

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*Motet for Maitland* is a music video which I created for *Art and the Expanded Cover Version*, curated by Sean Lowry, and hosted at The Grotto Project, University of Newcastle, 23-24 May 2014. From a musical perspective, the soundtrack is an instrumental version – realised as a MIDI file for synthesised strings and choral textures – of the composition *Ecce lignum crucis/Crux fidelis* by Renaissance composer Adrian Willaert (c. 1490 – 1562). Willaert’s piece was originally included in *Motetta V vocum* [*Motets for Five Voices*], printed in 1539 by the prestigious publishing house of Girolamo Scotto.\(^{41}\) It is based on two traditional Gregorian chants from the Good Friday liturgy “The Adoration of the Cross.” Thus, Willaert’s motet is itself a kind of “cover version.” To the best of my knowledge, there are no commercial audio recordings of Willaert’s *Ecce lignum crucis/Crux fidelis*. At the peak of his career, Willaert was *maestro di cappella* at the chapel of St. Mark’s in Venice, a position he held for thirty-five years, from 1527 until his death in 1562. He was one of the earliest to use the innovation of split-choir polyphony, in which separate choirs (*coro spezzato*) faced each other in opposing choral lofts of the basilica, singing contrasting layers of a single musical work.\(^{42}\)


With *Motet for Maitland*, I created an oblique and unexpected juxtaposition of two semiotic modelling systems (Chapter 7), viz. (1) the Italian Renaissance musical world of Willaert’s motets, and (2) the circumstances of the so-called “Maitland Riots” of 1860, a little-known event in Australian local history over three centuries later. These two semiotic modelling systems are so widely separated in time and space that any relationship between them would normally seem incongruous and highly improbable. Nevertheless, as discussed further below, I chanced upon a tenuous connection between them, in an obscure pamphlet closely associated with the Maitland Riots. This was a published lecture by the local Presbyterian minister Rev. William McIntyre (1806-1870),\(^4\) titled “The Heathenism of Popery, Proved and Illustrated” (1860)\(^4\) (Fig. 14.15).

![Figure 14.15 McIntyre, The Heathenism of Popery (1860), title page](http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-52867774)

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\(4\) Rev. William McIntyre, *The Heathenism of Popery, Proved and Illustrated; a Lecture Delivered in Maitland, on the 12th April, 1860, and Published at the Unanimous Request of the Audience* (Maitland: Henry Thomas, 1860). A second, enlarged edition was also published later the same year.
From the outset, I was struck by the metaphorical resonance Willaert’s split-choir technique and the entrenched religious opposition between Protestantism and Catholicism, which fuelled the Maitland Riots of 1860. The detailed history of the riots need not detain us here, other than to note that they were sparked by a longstanding antagonism between the aforementioned McIntyre, and the Catholic priest Rev. Dean John Thomas Lynch (1816-1884). Their respective church buildings in Maitland were – and are still – located within a few minutes’ walk from each other. The key point of contention between these two men was the then-current debate regarding State Aid for Religion in schools. McIntyre was a fervent opponent; Lynch was a staunch advocate. Against this background, the proximate cause of the Maitland Riots was the announcement of McIntyre’s public lecture, scheduled to be delivered on 29th March 1860. The lecture itself was cancelled due to the violence which had erupted. It was subsequently re-scheduled to 12th April 1860, and delivered under the protection of 300 special constables. A few weeks later it was also published in the pamphlet referred to above (Fig. 14.14). During the riots on 29 March, McIntyre’s brother – Donald McIntyre – was severely injured. He never fully recovered and died on 2nd September 1860.

The link between Willaert and the Maitland Riots is extremely tenuous. It hinges on a remark made by McIntyre in his published lecture. On p.30 of The Heathenism of Popery, he quotes a description of the Catholic liturgy “The Adoration of the Cross” (Fig. 14.15). The full passage specifically refers to the choir singing Ecce lignum crucis, followed by Crux fidelis (which version is not stated).

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45 Boer, “An Early Clergyman.”
On the strength of this circumstantial connection, I decided to create an “expanded cover version” of Willaert’s *Ecce lignum crucis/Crux fidelis* in the form of “A Musical Riddle in Three Acts.” At the start of the video, the question posed to the audience is “What connects … A half-forgotten episode in the history of Maitland, NSW, and A masterpiece of Renaissance polyphony?” (Fig. 14.17).
As the video progresses, it uses various still images, mostly from old prints and postcards, and silent film-style title cards, to sketch the strands of historical narrative relevant to deciphering the puzzle. These come together at the end, in close-ups of McIntyre’s pamphlet (Fig. 14.18), to reveal the “impossibly obscure” answer to the riddle posed at the start.

Figure 14.17  Screen Shot from Motet for Maitland (2010) music video

Figure 14.18  Screen Shot from Motet for Maitland (2010) music video, showing close-up of McIntyre’s printed lecture
Motet for Maitland exemplifies two claims asserted more than once in this thesis, viz. (1) anything at all from the wider semiosphere can become art, able to be shifted into the conceptual spotlight (Chapter 7), and (2) anything can be (musically) related to anything else. Of course, it is highly unlikely that, on a first viewing, any audience member would be aware that there might be some arcane link between Adrian Willaert and the Maitland Riots. In itself, the immediate historical point is trivial, a non sequitur which – on the surface – is of antiquarian interest only and seems to go nowhere important. And yet, by focusing attention on this incidental item of minutia as the “solution” to a “musical riddle,” I suggest that there is an alternative way to “read” the work. By claiming to be about a very particular “riddle,” the work avoids a more direct representation of a historical truism, i.e. the ever-present destructive potential in “opposed voices,” when unrestrained by the norms of civilised society. Initially, in Act 1 of Motet for Maitland, this potential is sublimated, only hinted at in the close attention given to the “opposed voices” used in the split-choir innovations of Willaert. However, as Acts 2 and 3 progress, the history of the Maitland Riots is used to show that opposed and dissenting voices – especially in religious contexts – can inflame base human desires to suppress and silence, even if that desire leads to violence, or death. The revelation at the end of the video, i.e. that a reference to Ecce lignum crucis/Crux fidelis makes a circumstantial appearance in the ephemeral documentation of the Maitland Riots, can be read as a suggestive reminder of the essential paradox of “opposed voices.” This is that, in human interaction, difference and opposition contains within it two contrary forces, one directed towards a higher (musical?) synthesis, accommodation and mutual recognition, the other pulling away, towards irreconcilable fragmentation and mutual destructiveness.

Regardless of the specifics of this or any other interpretation, it can hardly be doubted that “opposed voices” is at least one of the significant themes – or concepts – which runs through all three acts of Motet for Maitland. The audiovisual presentation of this unifying theme is achieved primarily by employing the promiscuous capability of the mode of referring to draw upon literally anything from the wider semiosphere and shift into the conceptual spotlight of the “world of the work.” In this case, the cultural materials for representing “opposed voices” came from two disparate semiotic modelling systems, i.e. the musical world of Willaert’s motets and the religious differences behind the Maitland Riots. By juxtaposing the systems in close proximity...
to each other, the resonances between them become apparent through the processes of translation described by Lotman (Chapter 7).

14.3 Mode of Crafting

14.3.1 Koechlin Mix #1 (2010)

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My composition Koechlin Mix #1 (2010), for four double reed instruments, is included as a musical score in the accompanying creative portfolio. This work consists entirely of motif fragments drawn from the works of Charles Koechlin (1867 – 1950).\(^{50}\)

The overall idea was to assemble a new *polyphonic* composition from monophonic elements sampled from audio recordings of works by Koechlin. To preserve the recognisability of the individual elements, I decided to constrain the work to four independent parts. An additional self-imposed constraint was to create a piece which could, at least in principle, be performed by a quartet of human instrumentalists. All four instrumental voices were sampled from a single source CD, Charles Koechlin: Chamber Works for Oboe, performed by Lajos Lencsés.\(^{51}\) Specifically, all samples were taken from the following works included on that CD –


\(^{50}\) For many decades after his death, Koechlin languished in relative obscurity. However, in recent years, his music has deservedly been re-discovered. It is now better known and more readily available than at any other point in history. The standard English-language study is still Robert Orledge, *Charles Koechlin (1867-1950): His Life and Works* (Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1989). For a biography, in French, see Aude Caillet, *Charles Koechlin (1867-1950): L’art de la liberté* (Paris: Séguier, 2001).

In executing this idea, a set of self-imposed rules governed my method of working (Fig. 14.19).

**Rule 1.** Extract interesting samples *only* from the CD *Charles Koechlin: Chamber Works for Oboe*, only from the four pieces listed above.

**Rule 2.** Create a new composition from the individual samples extracted. Layer the samples, *in a playable manner*, across four stereo tracks (using Logic software on Apple Mac computer), *as if* the piece was being *performed by a quartet* consisting of the same instruments found in the source recordings (i.e. 2 oboes, 1 oboe d’amour, 1 cor anglais).

**Rule 3.** No effects or processing to be used to alter the basic instrumental qualities of any sample.

**Rule 4.** Only samples from the same instrument (e.g. oboe) used on the CD are to be assigned, without transposition, to that instrumental part (i.e. oboe) in the re-composed version.

**Rule 5.** Create a re-composed work from the selected samples as an audio “mash-up,” adhering carefully to the previously-stated rules. Bounce the completed piece to an audio “demo” in full audio quality, suitable for CD playback. (This demo is included in the accompanying creative portfolio, and is also uploaded with permission as an MP3 on my personal website.)

**Rule 6.** Transcribe the audio “demo” into conventional musical notation and individual parts playable by four suitably-skilled performers. (Score included in the accompanying creative portfolio. Note that the resulting transcriptions differ considerably from the published sheet music for

*Figure 14.19 Rules Governing the Composition of Koechlin Mix #1*
A simplified schematic of this workflow is illustrated in Fig. 14.20. A screenshot of the four layers of samples from the source CD is given in Fig. 14.21.

Figure 14.20 Re-Composition of Koechlin Mix #1 from CD Audio Samples

Figure 14.21 Screenshot of Digital Audio Workstation (Logic Pro) Showing the Four Layers of Audio Samples Used to Create Koechlin Mix #1
Koechlin Mix #1 is undoubtedly an example of the contemporary phenomenon of remix and “mash up” approaches to recomposition in music.\textsuperscript{52} Therefore, it might be questioned why I have chosen to discuss this work as an example of the mode of crafting, rather than referring. The answer lies in the fact that, unlike the relative freedom taken with audio source materials in most recomposed works (see Section 14.2.3), the creation of Koechlin Mix #1 was governed by the set of very prescriptive rules (Fig. 14.19).

In principle, Rules 2 to 5 could be applied to any source recording(s) of monophonic instrumental pieces, to create a polyphonic work for four voices. For example, these rules could be applied to one or more recordings J. S. Bach’s works for unaccompanied violin (BWV 1001-1006), cello (BWV 1007-1012), and the transcriptions of BWV 1007-1012 for viola, to create a Bach-inspired string quartet. Likewise, quite a different string quartet could be created by applying Rules 2 to 5 to source recordings of Max Reger’s pieces for unaccompanied violin (Op. 42, Op. 91, Op. 117, Op. 131a), viola (Op. 131d), and cello (Op. 131c). In other words, Koechlin Mix #1 is primarily a conceptual work defined by its “meta-score” of instructions. These instructions – which govern the creation of a conventional musical score – consist of Rules 2 to 5. Indeed, we could envisage a revised meta-score which also includes a generic version of Rule 1, where the choice of source recordings no longer explicitly mentions Koechlin, but simply specifies a generic requirement for compositions written for any four unaccompanied instruments by any composer. An additional rule could be added, to specify how the resulting recomposed works should be titled. Such a generic meta-score is given in Fig. 14.20.

Due to this post hoc act of explicit re-framing on my part, Koechlin Mix #1 has suddenly become one possible realisation – from an unlimited number of conceivable possibilities – of a new meta-composition, which I have titled Seven Rules for Composing a Homage Quartet (2017) (Fig. 14.22).\textsuperscript{53} Here, once again, we glimpse the unstoppable forces of recursion and meta-reference, once unleashed. For example, we


\textsuperscript{53} This is an example of the way in which new acts of signification can very quickly complicate the temporal unfolding of a “work,” as discussed in Chapter 5.
could envision increasingly higher-level abstractions of the meta-score just created, for example, a “meta-meta-score” setting out some kind of prescription for creating works of conceptual music involving precisely seven rules. In this way, the apparently innocuous seed of any particular mode of conceptualisation may be intentionally redirected inwards, to continue self-referentially feeding on itself. With minimal prompting, it can grow and expand recursively, in time and space, until it amplifies to the point that it almost completely dominates our immediate – but inevitably temporary – awareness and experience of a fugitive and fleeting artistic moment. Such is the diachronically fluid and indeterminate nature of post-conceptual art.
Koechlin Mix #1 is undoubtedly an example of conceptual music in which the mode of referring plays a non-trivial role (Fig. 14.1). However, the mode of conceptualisation which plays an even greater role is crafting. That is because – at a conceptual level – this work is more about the rules which governed its making rather than the particular details of its audible outcomes. Different realisations of the underlying meta-work (Fig. 14.22) could be produced, by applying the same rule-based compositional approach to completely different source materials of works by other composers. In other words, my choice of Koechlin’s pieces – and a specific CD recording – as the starting point for assembling the audio sources for this work was
somewhat arbitrary, albeit guided by my deep admiration for this prolific but still underappreciated composer.\textsuperscript{54}

It is the force and inflexibility of my self-imposed rules and constraints that makes Koechlin Mix #1 a study in the possibilities of technē, as much as – or more than – it is also a work which responds to its “other.” As with many, if not most, works of conceptual music, multiple modes of conceptualisation can be discerned in this work. However, in paratexts – such as this thesis, or program notes for any future realisations or performances – the technē deeply embedded in the making of Koechlin Mix #1 is made available to potential audiences. These paratexts thereby become important public perceptual objects (see Chapter 2) which are essential to a full appreciation of the conceptual dimensions of this work. Indeed, by specifying the meta-score shown in Fig. 14.22, Koechlin Mix #1 is no longer an “independent” work. It becomes one potential realisation of a higher level work of conceptual music titled Seven Rules for Composing a Homage Quartet (2017), which itself has blurred the distinction between a “work” and its exegesis.

14.3.2 [Untitled Message] for The Voicemail Project (2010)

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The Voicemail Project was curated by Sean Lowry as part of the Sydney Non-Objective (SNO) Contemporary Art Projects 58, 10-25 April 2010.\textsuperscript{55} It consisted of the playback of 23 voicemail messages sent by 23 contributing artists, all recorded between 24-29 March 2010, to an answering machine connected to a specified phone number.

\textsuperscript{54} Even Richard Taruskin’s monumental six volume Oxford History of Western Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) – two large volumes of which are dedicated to twentieth century music – contains only two fleeting mentions of Koechlin, neither of them about his music.

\textsuperscript{55} http://www.sno.org.au/exhibition-index#/sno58/. The Voicemail Project was, of course, an allusion to one of the most famous “exhibitions” of Conceptual Art, i.e. Art by Telephone (Chicago: Museum of Contemporary Art, 1969). See: https://mcachicago.org/Exhibitions/1969/Art-By-Telephone; Fabien Vallos and Sébastien Pluot, eds., Art by Telephone - Recalled (n.p.: éditions Mix, n.d. [2014])
My contribution to this project was a voicemail message created without the use of any human voice at all. Instead, the sound source for my message was a primitive theremin device,\footnote{My thanks to Karl Bertling for fabricating the theremin used in this work.} consisting of a small, battery-powered, circuit board and a flat circular disc of copper sheeting placed on top of a large beer glass (Fig. 14.23).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{theremin.jpg}
\caption{Theremin Used for The Voicemail Project, Photographed by the Author Against His Own Shadow}
\end{figure}

In this piece, I used the theremin to emulate some of the inflections of a highly garbled human voice as far as possible. May aim was to create an unsettling ambiguity as to whether or not the “message” was potentially intelligible as human language or not. Throughout the piece, the theremin was also used to create various whistling, swooping and hissing sounds, in imitation of a very noisy short-wave radio transmission. This created the impression that, regardless of whether it had a human origin or not, the
message potentially originated from a long distance away, perhaps even from outer space.

The main unit of sonic continuity in the message is the repetition of a “short-long” pattern of garbled noise. This pattern, with variations, appears frequently throughout the one-minute “transmission.” Sometimes it is quite distinct (Fig. 14.24) and sometimes it is more heavily distorted. In the absence of any other clearly discernible patterns, this “short-long” noise could be interpreted as the essential “content” of what otherwise would remain quite unintelligible.

![Figure 14.24 Spectrogram of [Untitled Message] for The Voicemail Project, Indicating Clear Instances of the “Short-Long” Noise Pattern Repeated Through the Work. A Number of Less Clear Versions of this Basic Pattern Are Not Indicated Above.](image)

Of course, the natural human impulse is to always try to make sense and attribute meaning to our sensory impressions. This is especially the case with this “voicemail” message, which is presented in a context where all the other artist-contributed messages did contain intelligible human language utterances. It is possible for listeners to “project” various plausible semantic meanings onto the audible patterns in this piece. However, there is no way to determine whether such projected meanings are “correct,” i.e. corresponding to the semantic meaning transmitted by the sender of the message. That’s because there is no linguistic content to be detected, merely some sonic patterns which could be mistaken for traces of language.
This piece is doubly dependent on the conceptual mode of crafting. Firstly, its production and presentation, as specified by Lowry as the curator of The Voicemail Project, are already tightly constrained to conform to a particular way of making, i.e. as a voicemail message to be sent to a specified answering machine. Secondly, my contribution was further voluntarily constrained in its techné, i.e. a “voice message” to be created without the use of a human voice. At the time of the exhibition, this second constraint was not made public. Thus, other modes of conceptualisation – which are also implicated in my contribution – would perhaps then have been more apparent, viz. signifying (is there a semantic meaning here?) and referring (by participating in the shared allusion to the famous Chicago “Art By Telephone” project). However, as we saw with my exegesis of Koechlin Mix #1 (Section 14.3.1), acts of interpretation can themselves become integral components of the conceptual “world of a work.” And so it is with my [Untitled Message] for The Voicemail Project. In the exegesis presented in this sub-section, I have divulged more information about its technical production than has previously been presented to any other audiences. By virtue of this action, I have highlighted a mode of conceptualisation – i.e. crafting – which was perhaps previously overshadowed or not fully appreciated. In this way, the present thesis has become a paratext indispensable to any future interpretations of the work.

14.4 Mode of Signifying

14.4.1 Silences from 13 Felix Werder Recordings (2015)

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In this section, I discuss my contribution to a group exhibition ‘_____’ [Blankness] presented at the Margaret Lawrence Gallery, Victorian College of the Arts, University
of Melbourne, 9 April – 16 May 2015. This is a conceptual work based on three main components, each presented as one or more publicly perceivable objects –

- An audio file, played on repeating loop in the gallery space.
- A program booklet in two formats: (1) a limited print edition of 100 numbered and signed copies, displayed as part of the installation and available to be taken free of charge by visitors to the exhibition (cover illustrated in Fig. 14.25, full copy included in thesis portfolio); (2) a PDF version available for download, with the download link included on the gallery label for this work.
- The physical display of the printed booklets, on a plinth in the gallery and as a cardboard box of booklets on the floor below, with associated title label on a wall next to plinth (Fig. 14.26). The gradual depletion of the supply of booklets during the course of the exhibition was intended as a dynamically changing visual and tactile symbol of the overall work.

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57 The exhibition catalogue is archived at http://bespoke-production.s3.amazonaws.com/vca/assets/91/746e0e33011e4a0cc198f8605629c/-Catalogue-web.pdf.
58 Included on the audio CD included in thesis portfolio. Also available for listening at www.ilmartaimre.com/page?/page5/.
59 http://bespoke-production.s3.amazonaws.com/vca/assets/92/dfbfb0e33011e4a0cc198f8605629c/Werder-Silences.pdf.
Figure 14.25  Front cover of program booklet for Silences from 13 Felix Werder Recordings, ‘_____’ [Blankness] Exhibition, Margaret Lawrence Gallery, 9 April – 16 May 2015. Dimensions: A5
Figure 14.26  Plinth and cardboard box displaying containing copies of program booklet for Silences from 13 Felix Werder Recordings, ‘_____’ [Blankness] Exhibition, Margaret Lawrence Gallery, 9 April – 16 May 2015.
Each of these three elements served as signs of a work which is ultimately about the idea of erasure, or the inevitable decay – moving ever closer to, but never attaining, complete eradication and inaudibility – of the material traces associated with musical works. More broadly, the work points to the theme of cultural forgetting. This interpretation is actively encouraged by virtue of the short explanatory essay which I presented as a preface to the printed booklet, titled “Blankness: The Endpoint of Cultural Forgetting.” There I position the work as a conceptualisation of blankness as “the silence that remains after the music has finished. … The audio being played in the gallery is made up of 13 edits of the ‘silent’ lead-in/lead-out tracks, each sampled on 1 March 2015 from the 13 different recordings listed in the program booklet.”\textsuperscript{60} All the recordings in question contain compositions by the German-born Australian composer Felix Werder (1922-2012).\textsuperscript{61} Once a well-known leading figure in the Australian classical and experimental scene, today he is now increasingly forgotten.

From an interpretive perspective, the essential signs of this work are presented principally in the limited edition printed booklet. Unlike the graphic scores discussed in Chapter 9, there is no use of conventional musical notation, or any similar symbols. As a metaphor for the idea of erasure, the physical presence and availability of the booklet itself steadily diminishes over the course of the five-week exhibition. To further suggest this theme, the typography of the cover has been deliberately designed to be printed in light-coloured inks which are barely legible. However, the most important signs contained in the booklet consist of a series of photographic images, accompanied by textual information consisting of detailed discographical entries and Australian library locations, all intended to document the material existence of thirteen vinyl recordings.

With one or two exceptions, recordings of Werder’s music are all very scarce or rare. Many later releases are not listed in the earlier biographical chapters written about the


For this reason, a complete discography would be difficult to definitively compile on the basis of visually sighted discs, but would probably include about twenty individual items. As far as I have been able to ascertain, no institutional libraries in Australia or overseas even have copies of all thirteen recordings used in my silent homage.

The scratchy audio “silences” being played on continuous loop in the gallery space were all genuinely sampled from the individual Werder recordings described in the booklet. However, this is a claim which audiences are asked to accept largely on trust, as there is no way for them to absolutely verify it. Certainly, without the detailed documentary information in the booklet, the audible dimension of this work would be indistinguishable from the “silences” of dozens of similar works. Thus, my inclusion of detailed documentation for each of these thirteen recordings serves as an indexical pointer, to their physical existence (at an unspecified location) and their apparent absence in the immediate gallery space. As I state in the program booklet, “my intention is to use this audible blankness to evoke an imaginary musical encounter which, in practice, few are likely to experience,” except through an engagement with the signs denoting existence, absence and inaccessibility.

The pivotal conceptual issue highlighted by this work is the problem of indirect knowledge, i.e. how can we know about something which is, in most practical respects, inherently not able to be perceived through direct personal experience. The answer, of course, is through the human ability to convey information and meanings through the use of signs. In this case, the most important signs are photographic images and written language printed on the pages of a booklet. These enable the listener to interpret the audio content of the work – also signs – in a particular way. Without the information contained in the booklet as explanation, it would not be possible to appreciate the intended connection between the scratchy audio sounds heard in the gallery and the

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62 Murdoch, Australia’s Contemporary Composers, lists only seven items in his discography; Radic, “Felix Werder,” lists ten items in hers.

63 There is no simple way for members of the audience to verify that the audio playing in the gallery has indeed been extracted from the Werder recordings, as claimed. However, the close-up photographs of each of the individual recording labels, and a second photo showing them all on the same turntable equipment, lend considerable support to the claim that I at least had direct access to physical copies of each of the documented items.

64 For an interesting compilation of “silent” music, see the Sounds of Silence: The Most Intriguing Silences in Recording History, ed. Patrice Caillet, Adam David, and Matthieu Saladin, alga marghen plana-VA alga046, n.d., vinyl LP.
composer Felix Werder. The pivotal nature of the booklet, as the “key” to understanding the overall work, draws attention to its signifying function. In other words, the physical booklet – the supply of which is steadily diminishing during the course of the exhibition – is placed firmly in the conceptual spotlight, emphasising its critical importance as a pointer to the intended interpretation of all public perceptual objects associated with the work, especially its audio dimension.

14.5 Mode of Identifying

14.5.1 Introduction – The Ghosts of Nothing

In this section and in Section 14.6, I shall discuss different aspects of the creative output produced under the overall “umbrella” project titled The Ghosts of Nothing, ostensibly the name of a band. This is a collaborative multimedia and multi-faceted art project conceived, created and curated by Sean Lowry and myself. The project first began development in late-2013, and is still continuing. Its first public presentation occurred in 2014. To date, under the overall umbrella, The Ghosts of Nothing have –

- released music, as physical CDs (an album and a single), as well as via the usual digital download and streaming sources (e.g. iTunes, AppleMusic, Spotify);
- advertised three stages of a multi-year “world tour” (involving a mixture of real and fictional performance dates) in the international arts magazine *Mousse*;
- aired a radio play in North America (archived online);
- produced a series of one-off live performances in collaboration with mime-based artists (with ten performances completed at the time of writing, all documented on video and available on YouTube).

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67 *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode: a radio play by The Ghosts of Nothing*, broadcast at 10pm, 6 December 2014 on Saturday Night Séance, WGXC 90.7 FM, New York and live stream at [www.wgxc.org](https://www.wgxc.org) (archived at [https://wavefarm.org/archive/z1ecr4](https://wavefarm.org/archive/z1ecr4)).
68 [https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCHZ23C9mYg5fhrn3g_qhg](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCHZ23C9mYg5fhrn3g_qhg).
• maintained an active website;\textsuperscript{69}
• presented a range of physical artefacts in two artworld exhibitions (in New Zealand and USA);\textsuperscript{70}
• presented at an academic conference;\textsuperscript{71} and
• prepared an academic paper accepted for publication.\textsuperscript{72}

Appendix P includes copies and images of a selection of these items, as well as full details of where further elements and documentation may be accessed on the internet. Documentation of the entire world tour series, together with associated artefacts and ephemera, will eventually form the basis of a retrospective exhibition at The Lock-Up in Newcastle, opening on July 7, 2018.

To date, the unifying centerpiece across our activities is the initial audio recording of \textit{In Memory of Johnny B. Goode – A Rock Opera}.\textsuperscript{73} However, as the list above shows, the overall work has expanded to encompass a diverse range of distinct elements and media. Taken together, the different artefacts, performances and other elements so far released or produced by The Ghosts of Nothing point to – but are not intended to themselves constitute – one continuous and continually-evolving post-conceptual work. The “work” is an immaterial process, not any particular object or group of objects. It is the shifting flux of ideas or concepts evoked by the material indices and traces associated with it. Of course, as discussed in Chapter 2, we unavoidably depend on the production of \textit{public perceptual objects} in order to indicate the potential availability of these ideas and concepts to an audience. From this perspective, \textit{In Memory of Johnny B. Goode

\textsuperscript{69} http://www.ghostsofnothing.com


\textsuperscript{72} Sean Lowry and Ilmar Taimre, “The Ghosts of Nothing: the world of a work of performance-framed-as-art,” to be published in \textit{What is Performance Art? Writings on Contemporary Australian Performance Art}, ed. Adam Geczy and Mimi Kelly (Sydney: Power Publications, forthcoming). An additional working paper is under development and has not yet been published: Sean Lowry and Ilmar Taimre, “Are We a Band?” (unpublished working paper, to be included as an essay in the forthcoming catalogue for \textit{In memory of Johnny B. Goode – World Tours Retrospective Exhibition}, The Lock-Up, Newcastle, July 2018). This paper is based on Lowry and Taimre, “Bandness.” Of course, once published, this paper will also be inducted into the overall “world of the work,” as an additional paratext.

\textsuperscript{73} However, we are already in the early stages of creating at least one newly recorded album, also to be released under “The Ghosts of Nothing” name. Just as with \textit{In Memory of Johnny B. Goode}, we envisage that the next audio recording will serve as a catalyst and focal point for a new continually expanding circle of multi-media and collaborative activity, which may or may not intersect with the world of \textit{In Memory of Johnny B. Goode}. 


B. Goode has been conceived by us to be its own artistic “world,” or a “world of the work” as discussed in Chapters 6 and 8. In Section 14.6, I shall discuss the essential hallmarks of the overall conceptual “world” of In Memory of Johnny B. Goode.

However, in addition to worldmaking, In Memory of Johnny B. Goode also relies significantly on two other modes of conceptualisation, viz. identifying and referring. In the next sub-section, I discuss identifying, which establishes the conceptual interpretation of “The Ghosts of Nothing, as the name of a “band.” The modes of referring and worldmaking will be discussed in Section 14.6.2.

14.5.2 The Ghosts of Nothing – Visual Iconography/Band Identity

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<th>Modes of Conceptualisation</th>
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<td>identifying</td>
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In Memory of Johnny B. Goode relies intimately on the establishment and maintenance of a “band identity” for The Ghosts of Nothing. This identity depends primarily on the “look and feel” of a range of visual and typographic elements incorporated into the different artefacts associated with the band. These elements have been designed by the present author, in contrast to most other aspects of the project, which have been produced collaboratively.

From the outset, band identity has been one of the principal – and creatively potent – themes at the conceptual heart of The Ghosts of Nothing and its first production In Memory of Johnny B. Goode. Band identity is, of course, a particular sub-type of collaborative identity. It certainly encompasses the different aspects of narrative identity, as discussed in Section 9.1 and illustrated in Fig. 9.1. But it is also de-limited or constrained – in ways we seek to explore and manipulate – by the culturally-dependent notion of being a “band,” or “bandness.” The permissible limits of

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74 Indeed, we set out to problematise the question “Are we a band?”.
75 Sean Lowry and Ilmar Taimre, “Are We a Band?”, unpublished working paper.
“bandness” are extraordinarily flexible. A “band” may be real or virtual. It could be partly or even entirely fictional. A band may have any number of members, who may or may not change over time. The name of a band may, or may not, remain stable. Almost every parameter typically associated with the notion of a “band” in contemporary culture turns out, on closer inspection, to be non-essential or highly unstable. Indeed, it is only the potentiality – but not necessarily the current actuality – of music-making that is the “vestigial minimum criterion of ‘bandness’ as generally understood today.”76 In other words, any entity which qualifies as a “band,” fictional or otherwise, must have the perceived “potential to produce music, even if that music has never been heard, may never be heard, and indeed may never be made.”77 Of course, “bandness” is itself a socio-cultural concept. Extrapolating from Strayer’s analysis of the minimal requirements for the instantiation of any work of conceptual art (Chapter 1), it is apparent that

the minimal requirements of “bandness” are –

- at least one public perceptual object (not necessarily musical);
- at least one perceiving subject;
- the subject’s awareness of a socio-cultural context that suggests or allows the possibility of interpreting the public perceptual object in terms of “bandness”, which at least includes the possibility that the “band” could make music.78

The presentation of one or more public perceptual objects is a mandatory first step in establishing the existence of any band to the intended audience. This first step is essential, no matter how conceptual or dematerialised a “band” might subsequently strive to remain. This is simply an application of Strayer’s general principle cited above, i.e. that a public perceptual object is always minimally required in order to instantiate any conceptual artwork. In the remainder of this sub-section, I examine how various public perceptual objects have been used to establish the identity of The Ghosts of Nothing, as a “band.”

76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
In Section 9.1, I discussed four broad areas through which an artist – in this case a “band” – is able to publicly present a collaborative identity to an audience –

- works, texts;
- name;
- embodied presentation (including voice, appearance, costume);
- signature objects and non-embodied material traces (including sonic markers).

In this respect, the presentation of artistic identity to an audience is similar to the launch of a new brand in business. In the commercial world, “The fundamental purpose of branding is to identify the source of the product or service. … Branding must have qualities that distinguish the brand from other competitors. One obvious characteristic is the brand name itself, which, by law, needs to be unique in its requisite field. There are also other distinctive elements that, as part of brand’s identity, can supplement or substitute for the brand name.”79 The key point is that, in art as in business, identity is introduced to an intended audience through the presentation of a name, plus various distinctive elements associated with public perceptual objects.

For this project, one of the earliest tasks to be undertaken was the choice of a name for the “band.” After considerable thought, debate and iteration, we settled on “The Ghosts of Nothing.” This has intended allusions to some contemporary concerns and iconic works in the history of the arts, such as the aesthetics of absence,80 the “spectral turn,”81 or John Cage’s 4’ 33”. The resonances to philosophical questions regarding “nothing”82 were also appealing.

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82 Conor Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of nothing and the difference of theology (London: Routledge, 2002).
The Ghosts of Nothing have deliberately refrained from presenting our physical embodied selves – e.g. in live or virtual performance, publicity images, media releases – as the public “face” of the “band.” Similarly, we do not include our natural voices in any consistently recognisable way on our audio recordings. The cases of David Bowie and Arnold Schoenberg (Chapter 9) demonstrate that the perceivable appearance of the artist – especially the face and voice – is one of the most effective means for establishing and maintaining a distinctive and recognisable identity in the public arena. Therefore, by deliberately avoiding these “mainstream” methods of publicly presenting identity, we are exploring and testing the limits of identity formation for a “band” in art-world contexts.

We set out to investigate [the limits of “bandness”] by forming a “band” in an intentionally expanded aesthetic realm where our conspicuous physical absence (in terms of conventional mass media or public presence), invites audiences to look into, beyond, or outside our “songs” to experience an intermedial “band-like” package operating more as an artwork than a conventional music industry product.\footnote{Lowry and Taimre, “Are We a Band?,” emphasis added.}

In this respect, “The Ghosts of Nothing” operates similarly to a de-personalised corporate brand, under which “products” of various kinds are released for public reception.\footnote{The parallels between band identity and brand identity have been discussed by Toni-Matti Karjalainen, Laura Laaksonen, and Antti Ainamo, “Design for b(r)and identity: Exploring visual concept building within the metal music genre,” paper presented at International Association of Societies of Design Research 2009 Conference, 18-22 October 2009, Seoul, Korea. Available at www.iasdr2009.or.kr.} Referring to Fig. 9.1, the elimination of the usual primary marker of band identity – embodied presence – shifts the initial burden of identity formation onto the remaining elements of works/texts, name, and signature objects/material traces. And these are precisely the elements deployed in launching the band and its first “work,” i.e. In Memory of Johnny B. Goode. I have already discussed the choice of band name. The remainder of this sub-section considers how I have introduced a number of distinctive and relatively stable features into the constellation of public perceptual objects associated with the works/texts and signature objects released by The Ghosts of Nothing. Again, the similarities to a commercial branding exercise are not coincidental.
Specifically, in designing a “style guide” for The Ghosts of Nothing identity, I have specified the following standards and principles, applicable to all typographic and visual aspects of any public perceptual objects presented to audiences –

- **typographic standards**
  - **Copperplate Gothic Light** font, mandatory for band name, preferred for other major typographical elements (e.g. names of tour phases, our names (Sean Lowry, Ilmar Taimre));
  - **Opera-Lyrics-Smooth** font, for major separately titled elements (e.g. scene names, episode names);
  - **Baskerville** font, for all other utility text required in graphic artefacts (e.g. CD packaging, posters, flyers, tour advertisements).

- **visual principles**
  - vintage-style silent film “card titles” with standard borders for video titles;
  - all pictorial images non-original, appropriated and manipulated from ephemeral out-of-copyright sources, primarily vintage postcards;
  - pictorial elements to be associated with historical mime tradition, primarily fin-de-siècle, Belle Époque and Art Deco Pierrot characters, occasionally extensible to clowns and similar images.

Examples of how these standards and principles combine in different public perceptual objects are illustrated in Fig. 14.27. Additional artefacts are included in Appendix P.

The actions described above serve the aim of introducing the “look and feel” of a distinctive identity in a public way. However, in order to ensure that the type of identity that is being formed in the public mind is inferred by the target audience to be

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53 A TrueType font created in 2007 by composer Dennis Báthory-Kitsz, based on 19th century opera scores. See: www.maltedmedia.com

56 Of course, this self-imposed constraint – of using only found images, predominantly postcards, as the technical means of creating the visual content of this work – introduces another significant conceptual dimension, one reliant on the mode of crafting. Further, it again involves the mode of referring, by invoking an entire genre of visual arts based on the manipulation of found images, especially the postcard works of artists such as Susan Hiller and Tacita Dean. See: Ann Gallagher, ed., Susan Hiller (London: Tate Publishing, 2011), 52-55; Tacita Dean, c/o Jolyon (Köln: Verlag der Buchhandlung Walther König, 2013). For an overview of the genre, see Jeremy Cooper, Artists’ Postcards: A Compendium (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), 141-68.
(probably) a band identity, some additional steps are required to clearly signal that the quality of “bandness” is contextually relevant. These additional steps are needed in order to narrow the otherwise wider range of potential interpretations of the name “The Ghosts of Nothing.” They involve the provision of specific cues and contextualising information which would allow a culturally-competent observer to recall aspects of their prior knowledge regarding notions of “bandness” in contemporary popular culture. In particular, to indicate that the “The Ghosts of Nothing,” as a name, involves the potential for music-making – as a “band” – we mimic some of the actions and artefacts which typically indicate the existence and agency of a rock band in popular culture (Fig. 14.28).
Figure 14.27  Examples of Typographical Standards & Visual Principles Used in Public Perceptual Objects Released by The Ghosts of Nothing


Specifically, we have used such actions as the manufacturing physical CDs of music (Fig. 14.27 (a), advertising a “world tour” (involving a mix of some real and mostly fictitious performances) in a magazine (Fig. 14.29), producing typical rock band promotional materials (e.g. flyers) (Fig. 14.27 (c) and (d)) and “merchandise” (e.g. T-shirts) (Fig. 14.30), making our music available on digital services such as Spotify and Apple Music. Even our choice of name – The Ghosts of Nothing – sounds like it could be the name of a band.
Figure 14.29  Advertisement for “In Memory of Johnny B. Goode – World Tour of Abandoned Music Venues 2014/2015,” as published the Italian art magazine Mousse #45 (October-November 2014).  Graphic design by Ilmar Taimre based on found postcard ca. 1904, original artist unknown, real and fictitious tour dates devised by Sean Lowry.  Copyright © The Ghosts of Nothing 2014.  Used with permission.
The interplay of all these elements suggests that the most likely – and, of course, intended – inference is that “The Ghosts of Nothing” is the name of a band identity. However, we purposefully undermine this apparently obvious interpretation, by often avoiding the usual contexts in which a “real” rock band would be expected to present these artefacts or perform these actions. Instead of the “music world” – with which we only occasionally engage (e.g. Spotify) – The Ghosts of Nothing deliberately and conspicuously adopt the “art world” as the main “stage” for our “appearances,” artefacts and performance activities. To date, our “world tour” advertisements have appeared only in the art magazine Mousse. Band artefacts and “merchandise” have only ever been publicly displayed – and never offered for sale – in art exhibition and gallery contexts. In other words, we maintain a constant tension between two different worlds

Figure 14.30  T-Shirt for “In Memory of Johnny B. Goode – World Tour 2014/2017”
Graphic design by Ilmar Taimre based on found postcard ca. 1904, original artist unknown. Copyright © The Ghosts of Nothing 2014. Used with permission.
– the artworld and the world of popular music – in which the *identity* of The Ghosts of Nothing *might* be meaningful. As a consequence, our identity – while foregrounded in the work – remains ambiguous, contextually uncertain, and potentially subject to unanticipated re-definition. In this way, The Ghosts of Nothing – and *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode* – exemplify a work of conceptual music in which the dimension of *identity* plays a pivotal role.  

Once launched into the public arena, the intertwined networks of meaning invoked by the “band” named The Ghosts of Nothing are no longer under the exclusive control of its originators and continuing curators, i.e. Sean Lowry and myself. While we continue to introduce new texts and artefacts into the overall conceptual world of the work, their combined meanings are now co-produced by the interactions of all other parties involved – whether as collaborators or audience – in the ongoing re-presentations and interpretations of its growing universe of elements. Again, in this respect, our “bandness” – whether as “art work” or “music industry product” – is no different from contemporary conceptions of *brand* in the commercial world. Nicholas Carah has aptly observed that brand-building – in business – is a social activity, “the product of constantly evolving social relations.” Similarly, the meaning of The Ghosts of Nothing as an artistic identity – or as a conceptual vehicle – will continue to evolve within a network of socially- and culturally-mediated relations and interconnections. The Ghosts of Nothing – and our “open work” *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode* – is a multi-faceted creative vehicle. One apt characterisation is that, taken together, they are an ongoing post-conceptual artwork – potentially without any fixed endpoint in time – self-consciously operating near the outermost limits of material excess. Another appropriate summation is that The Ghosts of Nothing seek to explore the creative possibilities of “bandness” as an art form, while testing the boundaries of what can be feasibly incorporated into the notion of “bandness” as music industry construct. At the same time, we also explore the limits of what is able to be *removed* from “bandness,” without the concept collapsing terminally in on itself. Regardless of any such high-

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87 *Identifying* is not the only mode of conceptualisation operating in this work. See note 105 above. I shall return to discuss other modes relevant to this work in the next sub-section.

level descriptions, the dimension of identity remains squarely in the conceptual spotlight of our ongoing investigation.

14.6 Mode of Worldmaking (+ Mode of Referring)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modes of Conceptualisation</th>
<th>identifying</th>
<th>signifying</th>
<th>crafting</th>
<th>referring</th>
<th>worldmaking</th>
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14.6.1 Introduction

In the previous sub-section, I singled out the mode of identifying and discussed its importance to the public presentation of The Ghosts of Nothing as a “band.” The artefacts used to establish and maintain the band identity have, to date, been almost entirely produced in association with the “open work,” In Memory of Johnny B. Goode (2014 - ). The conceptual content of this work is ultimately best characterised as an example of the mode of worldmaking. However, in order to create the myriad of artefacts which “furnish” its world, In Memory of Johnny B. Goode is also heavily dependent on the mode of referring. Therefore, before I discuss the worldmaking aspects of this work (Section 14.6.3), I shall first outline how the mode of referring serves as an essential foundation for forming the world which is presented to audiences.

14.6.2 Mode of Referring

In all works of music, all five modes of conceptualising are present and can be discerned to some degree. However, with In Memory of Johnny B. Goode, the mode of referring is used extensively. It is at least as dominant as the mode of identifying, which pervades the conceptual content of the work via the “band identity” of The Ghosts of Nothing (Section 14.5).
In its various audiovisual and physical manifestations, *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode* is woven through with an intricate mesh of references and cross-references. These references draw into the “world of the work” an eclectic and sometimes mutually incongruous or “dissonant” collection of cultural “others” (Chapter 7). Within this complex interplay of multiple semiotic modelling systems, two referential gestures are especially significant.

Firstly, the music tracks created for the original CD versions of the work are either directly acknowledged “cover versions” of, or heavily disguised allusions to, familiar pop/rock songs (Figure 14.31). All these musical references are made explicit in the paratextual information printed in the booklet included with the CD album packaging. In remixed versions of these album tracks, as used in the radio play or backing tracks for “world tour” performances (see below), the references to these “others” have been so completely obscured as to no longer be recognisable by most listeners.
**In Memory of Johnny B. Goode – A Rock Opera, Track Name on CD Album**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cover Version (C) or Allusion (A)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Act 1 – Rise &amp; Fall</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Johnny B. Goode</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. White Wedding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Into the Same Rivers We Step</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Mercedes Benz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Act 2 – Forgetting &amp; Remembering</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Rock Around the Clock</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Remembering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Johnny Surrenders to Excess</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Still Remembering</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Act 3 – Life &amp; Death</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. I’m So Excited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The True Confessions of an Addict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Johnny Dances Helplessly Into Despair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The Ending of Everything</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Curtain/Exit</strong></td>
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*Figure 14.31 References to Pop/Rock Songs in the Tracks Included on In Memory of Johnny B. Goode – A Rock Opera, CD Album*

Secondly, *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode* is fundamentally dependent on its referential connection to the *commedia dell’arte* tradition, especially the central character of Pierrot, the tragic artist/clown doomed in his hopeless love for Columbine. I have already discussed the importance of Pierrot in the works of Arnold Schoenberg and David Bowie (Chapter 9; see also Appendix J).
The pivotal referential gesture underpinning *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode* is the juxtaposition of – indeed, an assertion of equivalence between – two fictional characters and their worlds, i.e. Pierrot and Johnny B. Goode (Fig. 14.32).

![Diagram](image)

*Figure 14.32 The Referential Equivalence Between Two Fictional Characters Which Underpins the Dynamics of In Memory of Johnny B. Goode*

This equivalence is maintained across all instantiations – i.e. public perceptual objects – of *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode*. A sketchy and loosely specified narrative thread serves to connect them. It describes the rapid rise and inexorable decline – eventually towards suicidal death – of the Johnny/Pierrot character. The basic scheme of this narrative was articulated in the radio play version of *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode* (the script is included in Appendix P). The structure of the radio play consists of thirteen scenes, grouped into three acts (plus an epilogue), mirroring the track sequence and grouping of tracks on the CD album. The text of the radio play is itself fundamentally dependent on the conceptual mode of referring, metonymically juxtaposing a clichéd narrative thread with deliberate mistranslations of thirteen rondels from Albert Giraud’s *Pierrot Lunaire*, followed by Giraud’s French originals. Given the canonical status of Schoenberg’s *Pierrot Lunaire*, which used a different selection of thirteen Giraud’s rondels (in the German translation by Otto Hartleben), *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode – Radio Play* also establishes a referential relationship to Schoenberg’s famous melodrama (Fig. 14.33).
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original sequence</td>
<td>Hartleben’s German translations</td>
<td>Giraud’s originals &amp; new English mistranslations by the present author</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Théâtre
2. Décor
3. Pierrot Dandy 3. Der Dandy
4. Déconvenue
5. Lune au lavoir 4. Eine blasse Wäscherin
6. La sérenade de Pierrot 19. Serenade
7. Cuisine lyrique
8. Arlequinade
10. A Colombine 2. Columbine 3. For Columbine
11. Arlequin
12. Les Nuages
13. A mon cousin de Bergame 7. To My Crazy-Ass Cousin
15. Spleen
16. Ivresse de lune 1. Mondestrunken 5. Intoxicated by the Moon
17. La Chanson de la Potence 12. Galgenlied
18. Suicide 12. Suicide
20. Coucher de soleil 2. Sunset
21. Lune malade 7. Der kranke Mond
22. Absinthe 10. Absinthe
23. Mendiane de têtes.
25. Rouge et blanc
26. Valse de Chopin 5. Valse de Chopin
27. L’Église
29. Messe rouge 11. Rote Messe
31. Supplique 9. Gebet an Pierrot
32. Violon de lune.
33. Les cigognes
34. Nostalgie 15. Heimweh
35. Parfums de Bergame 21. O alter Duft
37. Pantomime
38. Brosseur du lune 18. Der Mondfleck
39. L’Alphabet
40. Blanchere sacrées
41. Poussière rose
42. Parodie 17. Parodie
43. Lune muqueuse
44. La Lanterne
45. Pierrot cruel 16. Gemeinheit!
46. Décor
47. Le miroir 6. The Mirror
48. Souper sur l’eau
49. L’Escalier
50. Cristal de Bohème 1. Bohemian Crystal

Figure 14.33 Selection and Sequential Order of Giraud’s Rondels in Schoenberg’s Pierrot Lunaire and in The Ghosts of Nothing In Memory of Johnny B. Goode
My “mistranslations” mostly remain faithful to Giraud’s rondels, with the important exception that all references to “Pierrot” in the originals are replaced with “Johnny.” For example, Giraud’s last verse in the rondel “Cristal de Bohème” is:

Par ce symbole est exprimé  
O ma très chère, tout moi-même:  
Comme Pierrot, dans son chef blême,  
Je sens, sous mon masque grimé,  
Un rayon de lune enfermé.

In my mistranslation, this becomes:

My dearest one, this is the symbol which truly captures who I am: Johnny the Clown, in a pale disguise. I feel, under my made up mask ... A moonbeam locked in.

The equation Pierrot = Johnny becomes a signpost for many other obscure or “hidden” allusions to popular/rock music which are also woven, in a Sebaldian manner (see Section 14.2.1 above), into the detailed fabric of the radio play script. To give just three examples –

1. The phrase “The far horizon turns starless and Bible-black,” in my English version of Giraud’s “Papillons Noirs” [“Black Butterflies”], is a passing reference to the title of an album and song by King Crimson, Starless and Bible Black (1974). This is itself an allusion to Dylan Thomas’ radio drama Under Milk Wood: A Play for Voices (1954).

2. The phrase “teenage wasteland,” used in the narrative preamble to “Suicide,” is an allusion to the song “Baba O’Riley” from the album Who’s Next (1971) by The Who.


In the same preamble to “Suicide,” the phrase “Have we all been here before?” is a slightly re-arranged reference to “We have all been here before,” from the chorus of “Déjà vu” (1970) by Crosby, Stills, Nash and Young.

Of course, once such allusions are revealed, they are no longer “hidden.” Instead, they become part of the explicitly referential texture of the continually evolving “world of the work.” Also, once audience members are alerted to the possibility that obscure references are contained in the work, they may be encouraged to search for more of them, guided by the Pierrot = Johnny formula, perhaps even finding new connections never consciously intended by the artists. Such gestures of referring – whether immediately apparent or only later revealed – introduce an unruly constellation of cultural “others” into the artificially conjoined world of Johnny/Pierrot. At the heart of this constellation is the principal – but perhaps apparently incongruous – connection established between the commedia dell’arte tradition at the fin-de-siècle and contemporary pop/rock since the fifties. Any initially puzzling incongruity between these two semiotic modelling systems is an invitation – to audiences – to question the artistic intent behind the gesture of bringing them into such close contact. In effect, it is an invitation to formulate their own interpretations, or intersemiotic translations (Appendix E), which may or may not partly reconcile the initial discordancy. From this central point of creative tension, various secondary relationships of referring radiate outwards in ever-widening spirals of association and farther degrees of separation. These secondary referential relationships include, for example: the indirect links, via Giraud’s rondels, to Schoenberg’s Pierrot Lunaire (Section 9.5); the work of artists, such as David Bowie, for whom Pierrot is a significant icon (Section 9.4); and the historical iconography of clowns and circus performers in the visual arts more generally.91

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14.6.3 Mode of Worldmaking

The equivalence \textit{Pierrot = Johnny} is a metonymic juxtaposition which, at least initially, is puzzling and disconcerting. So much so that it can become the primary focus of conceptual attention for audiences. Thus, on first acquaintance with \textit{In Memory of Johnny B. Goode}, people sometimes ask: “What is the connection between Pierrot and Johnny B. Goode?”\footnote{Lowry and Taimre, “Are we a band?”} Perhaps the most compelling answer is simply that “The connection is ours. The connection is our work.”\footnote{Ibid.} Putting it another way, and using the terminology developed in this thesis, we – the artists – have “made” this connection. It is what, above all else, \textit{defines} the expansive universe of the “world of our work.” In this sense, the simple formula \textit{Pierrot = Johnny} becomes the conceptual centrepiece of \textit{In Memory of Johnny B. Goode}. It is the defining \textit{worldmaking} principle of the work. Other modes of conceptualisation – identifying and referring in particular – are also in constant operation. However, the otherwise disparate and expanding accumulation of public manifestations and artefacts associated with this work are held together, in a collective orbit, by the gravitational force of this one core proposition or \textit{idea}, i.e. \textit{Pierrot = Johnny}. In other words, \textit{In Memory of Johnny B. Goode} is a conceptual work of \textit{worldmaking}, because it shifts the creative \textit{act of making a particular world} – and the artistically-imposed \textit{principle} which governs this act – into the conceptual spotlight. The work is consistently presented by us, to the public, as an ongoing exploration and investigation, by the artists and our collaborators, of how its worldmaking principle – \textit{Pierrot = Johnny} – “plays out” in different artworld processes and contexts.

Compared to the extraordinarily rich cultural history and iconography associated with Pierrot, the character of Johnny B. Goode is very thinly delineated – only emerging from the lyrics to Chuck Berry’s original song of the same name – as a guitar-playing anti-hero who “doesn’t read or write too well.” By grafting the expansive history of Pierrot onto the less clearly specified world of Johnny B. Goode, we aim to engender precisely the creation of new meaning which Lotman talks about taking place – through processes of translation/mistranslation – whenever two or more semiotic modelling systems come into contact (Chapter 7). At first glance, the relationship between Pierrot
and Johnny may appear tenuous. However, a closer study of the Pierrot tradition (Appendix J) reveals many resonances with the clichés often associated with the archetypical “rock star” figure, for example, substance abuse, addiction, excess, alienation, even suicide. Of course, just like Johnny B. Goode, Pierrot was also a musician, most commonly depicted as a guitar player.

Once such high-level parallels and similarities are revealed and highlighted (e.g. in the work of David Bowie), the processes of translation/mistranslation gain momentum and multiply. Eventually they become self-reinforcing and self-sustaining, so that the semiotic modelling systems – or “worlds” – of Pierrot and Johnny become partly intermingled, like the twin bodies in a binary star system (Fig. 14.34). The “world” of In Memory of Johnny B. Goode is, in fact, a creative coupling of two previously separate worlds, now conjoined.

![Figure 14.34 The Intermingling of Two Semiotic Modelling Systems as the Foundation of In Memory of Johnny B. Goode](image)

On this dialogic foundation of resemblances and resonances, In Memory of Johnny B. Goode grows into an elaborate edifice of re-mixes and re-interpretations. At the time of writing, it still continues to evolve through a series of real and fictional performances, as well as gallery installations and exhibitions. The overarching mode of conceptualisation which acts as the primary “genetic marker” of the work is worldmaking. All different aspects of this work come together in a kaleidoscopic and
heterogeneous parade of elements which – in combination – proclaim the existence of an expansive fictional world. Above all, it is this constantly evolving world which is presented as the work, for appreciation and interpretation by artworld audiences. This is a world that is rich in detail. Its wide-ranging and eclectic diversity is kept grounded – somewhat tenuously – by maintaining continuity across individual elements through the presence of a few key constants, especially of identity (Section 14.5.2) and a repeated return to a relatively small, specific collection of referential “others” (Section 14.5.3)

14.6 Conclusion

This chapter has tested the usefulness of the interpretive model developed in this thesis for the exegesis of my own creative works (Appendix P). Each of the five modes of conceptualisation has been considered in relation to one or more works in which they play a prominent role. My claim is that, using this model and its associated terminology, it has been possible in this chapter to develop insights into how such diverse works, which superficially may appear to have little in common, are nevertheless unified by a shared primary concern with the presentation of ideas and concepts. From this perspective, I conclude that the original motivating impulse behind this thesis – to develop one proposed solution to the exegetical problem of conceptual music – has been dealt with in a defensible and aesthetically satisfying manner.
Part IV

Conclusions & Directions for Further Research
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Conceptual Music</th>
<th>Main Composers &amp; Works Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n/a (Chapter 14)</td>
<td>Ilmar Taimre – Works in accompanying creative portfolio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| worldmaking [world of a work] (Chapter 13) | Harry Partch – Delusion of the Fury 
Rohan Kriwaczek – The Art of Funerary Violin 
Ragnar Kjartansson (feat. The National) – A Lot of Sorrow |
| referring ["other(s)" of a work] (Chapter 12) | Beck – Sea Change 
Arnold Schoenberg - Verklärte Nacht (Transfigured Night) 
Gavin Bryars – The Sinking of the Titanic |
| crafting [technē] (Chapter 11) | John Cage – Europera 5 
Peter Ablinger – Weiss/Weisslich 
Lawrence English – Viento |
| signifying [signs of a work] (Chapter 10) | León Schidlowsky – Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen 
Dieter Schnebel – MO/NO 
Adolf Wölfli – St. Adolf Giant Creation |
| identifying [identity] (Chapter 9) | David Bowie – “Ashes to Ashes” 
Arnold Schoenberg – Pierrot Lunaire |

Part I

Establishing the Problem & Its Context
(Chapters 1 to 3)

Part II

Methodology – Developing an Interpretive Model
(Chapters 4 to 8)

Part III

Part IV

Conclusions & Directions for Further Research
(Chapter 15)
Chapter 15

Conclusions & Directions for Further Research

15.1 Introduction

In this final chapter, I deal with four final tasks required to bring this research project – which, from my perspective at least, is inherently continuing and open-ended – to some kind of interim closure.

Firstly, in Section 15.2, I review the main conclusions arising from the research presented in this thesis. The exposition required to reach each of these conclusions has involved me in the consideration of a wide-ranging spectrum of issues. The primary and secondary literature which has been traversed is correspondingly expansive. Nevertheless, as the different pieces of my investigative puzzle came together and crystallised into an overall interpretive model, it became apparent that some key findings of my research could be succinctly summed up in four “artist statements,” or propositions.¹ My arguments in support of these statements have been developed and discussed in detail throughout the course of thesis. Rather than reprise these arguments here, I shall simply indicate where, in previous chapters, they are mainly elaborated.

Secondly, in Section 15.3, I stand back to give my overall assessment of the usefulness of the interpretive model developed in this thesis, for the purpose for which it was intended, viz. to address “the exegetical problem of conceptual music” (Chapter 1).

Thirdly, in Section 15.4, I step back even further, to consider how my interpretive model compares to possible alternative approaches which are aimed at introducing some kind of critical order into the unruly landscape of conceptual music. While I am not aware of any directly comparable alternative models, I turn to Hal Foster’s “paradigms of practice,” presented in his recent book Bad New Days (2015),² as a useful – and recent – point of reference for detailed comparison.

¹ The term “proposition” is appealing because it carries the Peircean connotation of always remaining open to further validation and, as and when required, continual refinement.
Fourthly, in Section 15.5, I discuss some potential directions for further research. I do not attempt a comprehensive survey of all the many and varied future research questions which might be suggested in relation to the topics covered in this thesis. Instead, I nominate three specific areas which are of particular interest to me and are “natural” extensions of the lines of enquiry I have been pursuing here. I suggest that these three areas also merit further investigation due to their relevance to contemporary concerns in post-conceptual arts theory and criticism.

Finally, in Section 15.6, I bring the thesis to completion with some concluding remarks.

15.2 Four Propositions Emerging from this Study

The sometimes wide-ranging and detailed discussion given in earlier chapters can be distilled into four main statements or propositions. Taken together, they may be viewed as a high-level theoretical framework, or manifesto, which informs and underpins much of my own creative practice.

Chapters 1 and 3 define conceptual music. They discuss my first proposition:

\[ \text{Proposition #1 – What is “Conceptual Music”?} \]

“Conceptual music” is defined as music which is principally concerned with the articulation and communication of ideas and concepts, above and beyond any audible or perceptible layers of its presentation. There is an irreducible conceptual dimension in all music. However, in a work of conceptual music, recognition and appreciation of its conceptual elements is essential to any adequate understanding or analysis. This is a cohesive and coherent exegetical category which has not previously been recognised explicitly in the musicological literature.
In Section 1.3 (with the context of Appendix C), I present the case for my second proposition:

Proposition #2 – What Are Ideas and Concepts?

In their most general form, concepts are not eternal, idealised Platonic entities, forever frozen in time or abstracted space. Instead, concepts are dynamic, temporal processes, constantly evolving in a real-world context of human agents. Individuals continually seek to interpret and re-interpret the “representations,” “ideas,” or “imperfect forms” [Vorstellungen] that they have “grasped,” constantly testing them in discourse with others. As thoughtful, embodied agents, participating and acting in a socio-cultural world, these individuals dialectically refine and re-interpret their subjective and personal experiences, until they arrive at a shared understanding of inter-subjectively verifiable and more or less stable “concepts” [Begriffen]. “Ideas” (or “representations”) [Vorstellungen] are at the individual, personal, subjective, end of the spectrum of human thought [Gedanke] (Fig. 15.1). “Concepts” on the other hand, are “ideas” that have been refined and accreted with layers of meaning, perhaps over a considerable period of time, to the point that they have become socio-culturally accepted as legitimate and relatively stable entities (albeit not necessarily eternally unchanging).³

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³ This does not preclude the possibility that some concepts may – at the limit – come close to approaching the Platonic ideal of an eternally fixed essence. See Section 1.3.1.
A consolidation of the discussion in Chapters 2, 4 and 7 can be summed up in my third proposition:

*Proposition #3 – What Is a Work of Art?*

An artwork is none other than the meaning that emerges, in the mind of perceivers (artists and audiences), as the product of a translation process (or experience) involving at least two semiotic systems, and the perception of one or more public perceptual objects.

**Discussion of Proposition #3**

Mirroring the process-oriented ontology underpinning Proposition #2, artworks also are not eternally unchanging or idealised entities. On the contrary, they are processes in a perpetual state of flux. Like all process-based categories, artworks have “fuzzy” boundaries. They are changeable in space-time, able to influenced by context and the temporal unfolding of events. Moreover, in order to exist at all, artworks must be *experienced* by one or more individuals. Further, these individuals need to *recognise* their experience as occurring – and to be made sense of – in an *artworld context.*

Importantly, artworks are not hermetically sealed off from their reception history. In principle, every response to an artwork experience can itself become part of the evolving world of the work. Of course, some responses – e.g. widely shared and influential critical essays and interpretations – will have more impact on the evolutionary path of a work’s world than others.

In Chapters 8 to 14, I present and test my fourth proposition:

*Proposition #4 – Five Modes of Conceptualisation*

Conceptual music shines a “spotlight” on the extra-musical “world of a work” (Fig. 15.2). Literally anything in the entire universe of signs (*semiosphere*) can be “shifted” into this conceptual “spotlight,” including the capacity for worldmaking itself. Five distinct modes of conceptualisation are discernible in
the works of a range of artists and composers. These are defined in terms of the types of entities [specified in square brackets] which are presented in the extra-musical domain –

- identifying [identity];
- signifying [signs of a work];
- crafting [technē];
- referring [“other(s)” of a work];
- worldmaking [world of a work].

Figure 15.2 Interpretive Model – Conceptual Music Shines a Spotlight on the Extra-Musical World of a Work (= Fig. 8.3)
15.3 Validity of the Interpretive Model Assessed

In this thesis (Chapters 1 to 8), I have proposed an interpretive model for conceptual music. It is anchored to five key terms or modes of conceptualisation – identifying, signifying, crafting, referring, and worldmaking. In Chapters 9 to 13, I considered each of these modes in turn. There, I nominated specific music-based works – selected from modern, postmodern and post-postmodern eras of Western music and art history – in order to:

(1) highlight the significant conceptual dimension(s) embedded in them; and
(2) show that the five-mode framework which I have proposed enables a robust and insightful exegetical discussion, or interpretation, of the conceptual dimension(s) of these works.

In Chapter 14, I directed the resources of this interpretive model to the exegesis of my own creative works (some developed collaboratively).

I conclude that the exegetical case studies presented in these chapters provide ample evidence for the plausibility and viability of this model. In particular, I claim that the five modes of conceptualisation located at the core of my interpretive model provide a potent terminological framework which can be effectively leveraged to articulate an “exuberant understanding” (see Section 1.7.2) of an otherwise diverse range of works.

15.4 An Alternative Approach Compared & Contrasted

The question might be asked: “Why five modes?” “Why not more? Or less?” Indeed, one could ask: “Why attempt such distinctions in the first place?” In Bad New Days (2015), Hal Foster rightly observes that “contemporary art is so vast, so diverse ... as to frustrate any historical overview.”4 Also, he expressly rejects the over-simplifying rigidity of paradigms. Nevertheless, he does offer five key terms – abject, archival, mimetic, precarious, and post-critical – which in his view, describe some of important

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4 Foster, Bad New Days, 1.
“strategies” and “predicaments” observable the post-1989 art of Western Europe and North America. Foster explains that, in using these terms, he wishes to retain a few connotations of the paradigm. Like paradigms, these terms have served as guidelines for some artists and critics, and in this way they imply that art is not merely a matter of disconnected projects. Put more strongly, they suggest that, even if art is not driven toward any teleological goal, it still develops by way of progressive debate, and this means – why not say it? – that there is art that is more (and less) salient, more (and less) significant, more (and less) advanced.5

In passages such as this, Foster shows that he is well aware of the delicate balance which must be maintained in any project involving categorising, classifying, labelling or systematising. On the one hand, such tasks depend upon the identification and crystallisation of differences. These are fundamentally destructive acts, in the sense that they inevitably rend the fabric of a previously unified whole, and divide it into separated and reduced parts. As the epigram from Goethe’s Faust (quoted at the start of this thesis) states:

Who would study and describe the living, starts
By driving the spirit out of the parts:
In the palm of his hand he holds all the sections,
Lacks nothing, except the spirit’s connections.6

Something is always lost or left out once the enterprises of categorising, naming and model-building have begun. In order to say “something” – anything at all – we are also required to not say an infinity of other possible somethings. This is the unavoidable concomitant of all acts of analysis, criticism, or indeed of any interpretive or ontological undertaking.

5 Ibid., 1-2, emphasis added. This intersubjective process of “progressive debate,” involving relative value judgements about different works of art, resonates with the Peircean notion of abduction (see Section 1.8.2).
On the other hand, without venturing to discern – and give name to – observable patterns and differences, discourse is doomed to languish is a solipsistic swamp of untestable assertions. In other words, classifying and model-building are ways of making sense, of imposing (as gently as possible) some kind of provisional order, no matter how loosely or fuzzily demarcated, over what would otherwise be an ungraspable morass of multiplicity. This, at least, has been the motivating principle underpinning the project described in this thesis. The five modes of conceptualisation discussed in this thesis are offered as “a way of making sense” of at least some works – including some of my own – in which a concern with ideas and concepts has been paramount.

Foster is not concerned with music, a topic which he scarcely mentions. Nevertheless, Foster’s terminology is, to some extent, resonant with the model I have proposed. For example, his labels mimetic and archival undoubtedly involve degrees of referentiality, thereby suggesting a family connection to my mode of referring. Foster’s discussion of process and actuality has occasional resonances with what I have written, for example on works and concepts as process, or the mode of signifying. That there are various such resonances between the interpretive model proposed in this thesis, and the writings of contemporary critics and theorists on contemporary art and music is hardly surprising. That’s because, as Peter Osborne has persuasively argued (Chapter 1), all (worthwhile) contemporary art is post-conceptual. Thus, any careful consideration of trends and themes in contemporary art and music is likely to be sensitive to at least some of the dimensions which I have isolated in an interpretive model intended for the exegesis of conceptual music.

However, in Bad News Days, Foster’s principal concern is not with ideas and concepts, at least not at the generic level. Rather, his orientation is towards certain attitudes and approaches, specifically towards strategies, guidelines and predicaments which, he argues, recur across the practices of a number of contemporary artists. Undoubtedly, some of these attitudes and approaches are also associated with specific concepts (e.g. the archival impulse) or lead directly towards certain ways of making (technê), such as performance art and participatory works. Nevertheless, Foster’s taxonomy is primarily

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7 Foster, Bad News Days, 127-40.
8 Ibid., 1.
descriptive, rather than theorising or systematising. His aim is simply to give a name to some of the shared concerns and characteristics discernible in contemporary art, and “to test them on pertinent practices and vice versa, in the hope of clarifying a little of what is at stake in recent art and criticism.” Foster expressly disavows any attempt at historicising or theorising.

My project … is a provisional attempt to come to terms with some of this work [discussed in his book]; not to apply theory, much less to impose it, but to extract some concepts embedded in some practices, and when appropriate to point to parallels in other disciplines along the way.

While he unequivocally eschews historicising, Foster leaves the door open to theorising. “It is too early to historicize this art, but perhaps not too early to theorize it.” Indeed, he almost seems to be offering his descriptive terminology as an initial – or “provisional” – first step towards a more substantive theory-building project. However, if so, it is a project which he does not consummate in his book.

The approach I have taken in this thesis is somewhat different. My proposed terminology of five modes of conceptualisation is not solely descriptive, although its individual terms can and do function as such. However, unlike Foster’s taxonomy, my terminology is also grounded in a particular theoretical model. This model specifies a structured relationship between the five individual terms. These are arranged within a three-level hierarchy, in conformance with the principles of non-reductionist model-building established by Stanley Salthe (Section 1.9). Purely descriptive taxonomies – such as Foster’s discussed above – typically make no claims or assumptions about how the individual terms are inter-related. This may reflect a lingering trace of the deconstructionist antipathy towards models, structures and hierarchies which prevailed during the postmodern era (Appendix H). However, some kind of hierarchical or relational structure between categories is, by definition, an essential characteristic of all anti-reductionist ontologies. In other words, my commitment to anti-reductionism (Chapter 1) carries with it an obligation not only articulate different categories, but also to specify the structured relationships which hold between them.

9 Ibid., 2.
10 Ibid., 3, emphasis added.
11 Ibid., 3.
I am not suggesting that these five modes proposed in my model encompass “the full story” of different ways of making and interpreting conceptual music. Likewise, I claim no *a priori* superiority for my interpretive model and its categories, i.e. compared to any other classificatory schemes or alternative models which might also be plausibly devised to tackle “the exegetical problem of conceptual music” presented in Chapter 1. This is not the same as suggesting that all models will have equal validity. Like Foster in the passage quoted above, I consider that some approaches to model-building and interpretation will inevitably be more salient, significant, and advanced than others. However, at the time of this writing, I am not aware of any other authors who have attempted to formulate a model or classificatory scheme directed towards the interpretive understanding of (post-)conceptual music. Thus, there are no obvious alternatives available for *direct* like-for-like comparison.

### 15.5 Some Potential Directions for Further Research

The various topics and themes which have coalesced into the main argument presented in this thesis have taken me along many investigative paths and by-ways. At different points in my travels, a number of alternative research avenues have suggested themselves. Signposts and pointers to some of these have been occasionally given in the footnotes and appendices. However, they have not been systematically pursued. Other potentially fruitful lines of enquiry have simply been bypassed without explicit comment, because they were not essential to the formulation and justification of the interpretive model which I have developed.

Three areas, in particular, seem to me to be fertile domains for extending the lines of enquiry pursued in the present thesis. These are –

- Axiological aspects of post-conceptual art and music
- Cultural dynamics of post-conceptual artworld systems
- Signifying processes in post-conceptual art and music.

In the next three sub-sections, I shall briefly discuss each of them more fully.
15.5.1 Axiological Aspects of Post-Conceptual Music and Art

In earlier chapters,\(^\text{12}\) I have noted that there is an ineluctable axiological dimension – some would say an obligation – associated with all creative acts. In simple terms, we cannot avoid asking whether how, what, why, where, when – and, importantly, who – we are creating, as artists and composers, is good or bad? These are questions of value, the central concern of the branch of philosophy known as axiology. A traditional classification identifies ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy as the three main subdivisions of axiology (Fig. 15.3).\(^\text{13}\) Of course, as many have observed, the boundaries are blurred.\(^\text{14}\) For example, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein famously declares that “Ethics and aesthetics are one.”\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{12}\) See, for example, Sections 6.4.1 and 7.3.1.

\(^{13}\) There is no universal agreement about how philosophy should be divided into branches or sub-disciplines. This is because the branches of philosophy “are all interwoven, and it is difficult to pursue a question in any one field without soon finding yourself in the others, too.” See Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, The Big Questions: A Short Introduction to Philosophy, Eighth ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2010), 7. The division of philosophy into six main branches, as illustrated in Figure 15.2, follows Roger Scruton, A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein, second revised and enlarged ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 5. For my purposes, this division is sufficient and, probably, fairly uncontroversial. Some classifications of philosophy’s subdivisions include other branches, such as the philosophy of religion or phenomenology. There is no need to debate the matter here.


Axiological issues are implicit in virtually every part of the argument I have developed in this thesis. However, I have refrained from considering them in any detail. This was not due to any residual allegiance on my behalf to a postmodern reluctance to make normative judgements. Rather, it was due to the practical limitations on the space and time available for bringing the present research to a close. Thus, one obvious area for further research is to pursue some of the axiological dimensions left largely unexplored in the present thesis.

Of course, when it comes to making value judgements, it is vital to tread carefully and to always maintain an open-minded and hospitable attitude (see also Section 1.8). The twentieth-century witnessed some horrific acts of artistic repression imposed by various totalitarian regimes. These are too well-known to need recounting here. Such oppressive acts were invariably justified in terms of value judgements which were deemed, by those in power, to be self-evident and unquestionable. Thus, when it comes

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to the arts, resisting the temptation to rush to judgement is undoubtedly a wise principle. If nothing else, it is grounded in the lessons of history. On the other hand, a surrender to complete relativism has shown itself to be a philosophical dead end. Thus, despite the acknowledged risks, recent decades have seen a renewed willingness amongst artists and critics to engage with ethical\textsuperscript{17} and aesthetic\textsuperscript{18} issues. (Interestingly, a willingness to engage with politics has remained a prominent characteristic of the arts throughout the twentieth century and into the new millennium.\textsuperscript{19})

Rather than adopt a completely new orientation, arguably a more “natural” extension would be to continue with some of the primary authors I have already relied upon, such as Ricoeur, Peirce, Lotman, and perhaps Hegel. Ricoeur’s deep concern with ethical matters is well-known, and has already been noted.\textsuperscript{20} His relevance to aesthetics is bound up with his philosophy of imagination.\textsuperscript{21} Always central to Ricoeur’s thought, creative imagination is likely to receive renewed scholarly attention once his Lectures on Imagination are finally published (see Section 12.3). Peirce came late to the study of ethics\textsuperscript{22} and never wrote extensively on aesthetics.\textsuperscript{23} Nevertheless, imagination and human creativity play a central role in Peirce’s philosophy. Douglas Anderson observed that “there is an implicit theory of artistic creativity in Peirce’s system which needs to be brought forward.”\textsuperscript{24} Recent authors who have pursued this topic include John

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\textsuperscript{17} See, for example, the readings in Walead Beshty, ed., \textit{Ethics} (London: Whitechapel Gallery, 2015); Levinson, \textit{Aesthetics and Ethics}.


\textsuperscript{20} See, for example, Section 6.4.1.

\textsuperscript{21} Ricoeur, “Arts, language and hermeneutical aesthetics”; Vlacil, \textit{Ricoeur, Literature and Imagination}.


Kaag, Nicholas Guardiano, Richard Kenneth Atkins, and Martin Lefebvre. In my view, the application of Peirce’s theory of imagination – specifically to issues in contemporary and post-conceptual arts theory – is ripe for closer examination. Lotman’s relevance to contemporary cultural and political problems, not to mention ethics and even aesthetics, has been argued more than once. Hegel is well-known for his work on aesthetics. However, it is only in recent years that Hegel’s own views are being properly disentangled from the overlays imposed by his posthumous editor. As a result, there is a renewed interest in considering what Hegel’s aesthetic philosophy may have to offer arts theory and criticism in the present era.

In summary, each of the authors I have singled out in this sub-section represent promising starting points for the further investigation of the axiological dimensions of contemporary post-conceptual art and music.

15.5.2 Cultural Dynamics of Post-Conceptual Artworld Systems

A potentially interesting line of enquiry can be thought of as shifting the focus of analytical attention upwards by one layer, to what was previously the higher, systems-
level of my three-layered interpretive model (Chapter 1). In other words, the focal level of analysis now becomes the system dynamics of the artworld itself (Fig. 15.4).

Various approaches to studying such a system-focused analysis can be envisaged. For example, as illustrated in Fig. 15.4, we might tentatively divide the artworld level into three sub-domains which mirror the domains previously adopted at the discourse level. This approach proceeds from the observation that the three-part schema developed in Chapter 6, to differentiate aspects of making and interpreting at the discourse level, could – for heuristic purposes – be plausibly extended into the socio-cultural level of the artworld. Specifically, the sub-categories of identity, technē, and world of a work,

\[\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{identity} & \text{technē} & \text{worlds of works} \\
\hline
\text{e.g. heroes, myths, movements, schools, styles} & \text{e.g. methods, genres, clichés, topics, music-theoretical systems} & \text{e.g. canon formation, founding texts} \\
\hline
\end{array}\]

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35 Here it worth recalling the discussion of “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness” in Chapter 5. The categories that I have posited at each level of the overall interpretive model represent a heuristic device or model, intended to be useful for analysis and exegesis, but not necessarily a literal description of physical or scientific reality.
each have “natural” interpretations – or analogues – at the socio-cultural level of analysis.

Firstly, consider identity. It is commonplace to talk of the “identity” of social, cultural and national groups and sub-groups. In a musical or artworld context, such socio-cultural identities are manifested in – and constantly sustained by – the recognition of heroes, the re-telling of shared “myths,” allegiances to movements, “schools,” and styles.

Secondly, all cultures are partly defined by their technologies, or ways of making. Again, in a musical context, the notion of technē at the socio-cultural level can be found everywhere, in the widely accepted and prevailing methods and techniques of music-making. Even in the highly fragmented post-millennial world, there are still several dominant codified “systems” and established bodies of musical knowledge which are perpetuated in the creative practice of large groups of composers, artists and performers. Examples include: various music-theoretical systems (e.g. common practice tonality in Western popular music, the Lydian-Chromatic Concept in the jazz world36), tightly-specified genres and forms (e.g. the blues), clichés, conventions and “topics.”

Thirdly, and finally, the “music” of all cultural groups and sub-groups is often defined in terms of the works which are held to be exemplary by members of those groups. Such “canonical” works, along with their associated “texts” (e.g. revered performers, iconic performances, oft-repeated back stories), form “worlds of works” which collectively become the musical culture of the group under consideration.

Recalling Stanley Salthe’s principles for the modeling of real-world systems (Chapter 1), shifting the focal level of our analysis to artworld dynamics also requires us to specify a higher level of the requisite three-layer hierarchy. In this case, it is a straightforward step to treat the artworld as one of a myriad of human semiotic modelling systems (Chapter 7) which are continually interacting and evolving in the

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overall *semiosphere* (Fig. 15.4). In other words, the higher level in our model is the overall domain of *human culture*.

This move, in turn, suggests the possibility of studying the system dynamics of the *post-conceptual* artworld by engaging with the thought of Ernst Cassirer, arguably the most important philosopher of culture in the modern era. In particular, Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms – somewhat neglected during the postmodern era – is increasingly being recognised as overdue for re-assessment for its relevance to a range of contemporary concerns. For example, J. Tyler Friedman and Sebastian Luft claim that “Cassirer’s philosophy, an express *philosophy of culture* certainly has the potential to play a vital role in today’s world, both within the academy as well as – as Cassirer would have insisted – in the broader world of culture.”

Certainly, in recent years, there has been a marked revival of interest in the work of Cassirer. This is due in part to the continuing publication of letters, papers and lectures from his vast literary estate. These new materials have served to reinforce and elucidate – for a new generation of scholars – the richness and sophistication of Cassirer’s philosophy, especially in the mature stages of its development.

It is beyond my scope to develop this topic any further here. Suffice to say that, it promises to be a particularly insightful way of looking at some of the *socio-cultural dimensions* of post-conceptual art and music which I have not had the time and space to consider in this thesis.

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15.5.3 Signifying Processes in Post-Conceptual Art & Music

Mirroring the suggestion proposed in Section 15.5.2 above, another potentially interesting line of enquiry can be thought of as shifting the focus of analytical attention downwards by one layer, to what was previously the lower, process-level of my three-layered interpretive model. In this case, the focal level of analysis becomes the dynamics of signifying processes associated with the creation – and reception – of works of contemporary artists (Fig. 15.5).

As illustrated in Fig. 15.5, I suggest that Jakobson’s famous polar opposition between metaphor and metonymy is a particularly fertile domain for further investigation (see also Appendix G).\(^{40}\) In particular, the nature of metonymy remains poorly studied in

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comparison to metaphor, especially in non-linguistic contexts. Over seventy years ago, Jakobson considered that “the question of the two poles is still neglected, despite its wide scope and importance for the study of any symbolic behavior.”\textsuperscript{41} He diagnosed the reason for this neglect as follows:

Similarity in meaning connects the symbols of a metalanguage with the symbols of the language referred to. Similarity connects a metaphorical term with the term for which it is substituted. Consequently, when constructing a metalanguage to interpret tropes, the researcher possesses more homogeneous means to handle metaphor, whereas metonymy, based on a different principle, easily defies interpretation. Therefore nothing comparable to the rich literature on metaphor can be cited for the theory of metonymy.\textsuperscript{42}

Remarkably, this historical diagnosis would turn out to also be prophetic. For the next half-century or more, metaphor dominated research programs across a range of disciplines, while metonymy continued to languish. In linguistics, is only in recent years that a number of scholars have actively taken up an interest in metonymy.\textsuperscript{43} In literature, the trope of metonymy has also received renewed critical attention.\textsuperscript{44} It is recognised as a hallmark of the poetics of leading contemporary authors, such as W. G.
Sebald and Raymond Carver. However, when it comes to signifying processes in art and music, metonymy still continues to be a somewhat neglected topic. To be sure, there are exceptions. To name just three examples –

- Julia Friedman considers the role of metonymy in the work of Cézanne.
- The conceptual artist Charles Gaines has expressed his “suspicion” regarding the trope of metaphor, which he argues “can certainly be abused [by individuals and institutions] … to escape critical scrutiny.”
- The visual artist Denise Green identifies metonymy as a “new paradigm,” in her own practice and that of others.

In pursuing any enquiry along these lines, an important caution should be noted. David Lodge demonstrated long ago that the distinction between metaphor and metonymy is a slippery one. Indeed, depending on context, the labels assigned to specific items of analytical interest can be reversed. This is a point echoed by current scholars. It recalls Terrence Deacon’s important observation that Peirce’s three types of sign – icon, index, and symbol – are not fixed with regard to any given entity, and may change dynamically over time or depending on context (see Section 5.8). Thus, any analysis which attempts to securely and permanently attach “metaphorical” or “metonymical” – as static labels – to any signifying entities is likely to be suspect. Putting it another way, the contextual and temporal instability of the metaphor-metonymy distinction requires a dynamic, process-oriented approach to any analytical attempts at description or interpretation. Process-oriented models of the world are inherently incompatible with analytical approaches that rely on the static identification and classification of

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49 Denise Green, Metonymy in Contemporary Art: A New Paradigm (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).


51 Littlemore, Metonymy, 14.
discernible differences. No sooner has a process-based category been tentatively identified and defined, that its contents are prone to shift uncontrollably in space and time. It is as if process-based categories are constantly at risk of slipping through the fingers of our intellectual grasp, always poised to escape the fuzzy and porous boundaries of their initial conception.

Nevertheless, with this caveat in mind, I suggest that temporally-oriented studies of signifying processes in post-conceptual music and art are a fruitful field for further exploration. Peirce’s writings would, of course, be an essential primary source. Other key process-oriented philosophers whose work might also be expected to yield valuable insights here include Henri Bergson and Alfred North Whitehead.

15.6 Summing Up

Peirce’s doctrine of fallibilism maintains “that all knowledge claims, including those metaphysical, methodological, introspective, and even mathematical claims … remain uncertain, provisional, merely fallible conjectures.” What we know is perpetually subject to refinement, revision or refutation in the light of new discoveries or changing circumstances. Rather than being fixed for all time, the meaningful content of all epistemological claims has a temporally-evolving dimension.

Like Peirce, I hold that claims to knowledge, including those presented in the present thesis, are fallible and may need to be revised in time. Nevertheless, at this point in the development of my theoretical and creative investigations, my claim is that the interpretive model developed in this thesis – and exemplified in the accompanying

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52 An example of the type of diachronic approach I have in mind is Kelly Parker’s study of John Coltrane’s A Love Supreme, briefly discussed in Section 5.7. See Parker, “Normative Judgement in Jazz.”


portfolio – is a novel, robust, cohesive and coherent framework for the exegesis of a hitherto unrecognised category of music-based works, viz. conceptual music.
Appendices

Ancillary Arguments, Related Topics & Original Works
Appendix A

Scope & Limitations

A.1 Not a Comprehensive Study of Peirce, Ricoeur, or Lotman

In Chapter 1, I highlight the names of three key scholars – Charles Sanders Peirce, Paul Ricoeur, and Juri Lotman. I draw extensively on their ideas in this thesis. Anyone familiar with their work would be aware that each of them was a prolific author who wrote on a wide range of topics.

Lotman has over 800 published articles and books to his name, mostly written in Russian and many still not available in English translation.¹

The state of Peirce’s written corpus is, if anything, even more daunting. The writings that Peirce himself published in his lifetime amount to some 12,000 printed pages.² However, much of his work remained unfinished and unpublished at his death. Despite two major publication projects, one still continuing, many important Peirce manuscripts still remain unpublished. In 1997, the known total of Peirce manuscripts spanned over 100,000 handwritten pages (of which over half are said to be of philosophical interest).³ Microfilm copies of Peirce’s manuscripts in the Houghton Library at Harvard University are held by a number of libraries worldwide⁴.

Finally, Ricoeur’s published output is also enormous, amounting to almost forty books and nearly 1,000 articles,⁵ most originally in French, but generally well-served by

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³ Joseph Ransdell, “Some Leading Ideas of Peirce’s Semiotic (Ver. 2.0 of November 20, 1997).” Available at http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/LEADING.HTM.
⁴ See Electronic version of the Richard Robin Catalogue to the Charles Sanders Peirce papers, 1787-1951 (MS Am 1632, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.), with annotations/corrections by Christian Kloesel. Available at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/46646176. According to Worldcat, the only Australian library to hold a set of the Peirce papers on microfilm is the Fryer Library at University of Queensland.
English translations. 6 Ricoeur’s unpublished essays and lectures are also important, and are increasingly being used for insightful studies on previously neglected aspects of his thought. 7

The secondary literature relevant to each of these three figures is even more immense and continues to grow every year. 8 Obviously, then, in the space of a single thesis, I cannot hope to do justice to the full body of material that is available. Instead, I have been forced to be highly selective, focusing on material directly relevant to my core argument. Within this constraint, I have sought to review as much of the primary and secondary literature as I could manage. However, experts in Lotman, Peirce or Ricoeur will soon discover that my discussion of these prolific and wide-ranging scholars inevitably leaves out much more than it includes.

A.2 Alternative Theoretical Approaches to Multimedia & Multimodal Studies

In recent decades, multimedia and multimodal 9 studies have emerged as substantial academic disciplines, associated with rapidly growing bodies of literature. Not surprisingly, there are a number of different theoretical paradigms associated with the field. A good overview of the alternative theoretical approaches is given by Alison Gibbons. 10 Most of these are outside the direct scope of this thesis.


7 For studies that make good use of Ricoeur’s unpublished papers and lectures see, for example, Alison Scott-Baumann, Ricoeur and the Negation of Happiness (London: Bloomsbury, 2013); George H. Taylor, “Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Imagination,” Journal of French Philosophy, 16, nos. 1/2 (2006): 93-104.

8 For example, one of leading scholars on Lotman and translation semiotics is Peeter Torop, with close to 300 publications to his name as at 2012. Elin Sütiste, “Preface. On the paths of translation semiotics with Peeter Torop,” Sign Systems Studies, 40, Nos. 3/4 (2012): 270.

9 These two terms are related by not synonymous. I agree with Alison Gibbons who defines multimodality as “the coexistence of more than one semiotic mode within a given context.” She goes on to state that “Multimodality is a broader phenomenon, related to the coexistence of semiotic modes, whereas multimediacy is created through the combination of media technologies.” See Alison Gibbons, Multimodality, Cognition, and Experimental Literature (New York: Routledge, 2012): 8, 19. Yet another related term is intermediality. Here the emphasis is the crossing of media borders. See Irina O. Rajewsky, “Border Talks: The Problematic Status of Media Borders in the Current Debate About Intermediality,” in Media Borders, Multimodality and Intermediality, ed. Lars Elleström and Jorgen Bruhn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 51-68. Also, Gabriele Rippl, ed., Handbook of Intermediality: Literature – Image – Sound (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015).

10 Gibbons, Multimodality, Chs. 2 and 3.
Firstly, I do not follow approaches to multimodal and multimedia analysis that are based on \textit{linguistic paradigms}. The best-known examples are perhaps M. A. K. Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics model,\textsuperscript{11} the visual grammar approach proposed by Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen,\textsuperscript{12} and John Bateman’s Genre and Multimodality model.\textsuperscript{13} There are a number of objections to applying a linguistic orientation to multimodal works that are not primarily composed of natural language elements. For example, such objections include (1) the problem of segmenting non-linguistic texts and of finding analogues to the well-known units of linguistic analysis – phoneme, word, sentence, and so on; (2) the problem of “reading paths” in non-linguistic modes.\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, I am not suggesting that such approaches fail to be useful for certain types of analysis. I am simply saying that their focus is on \textit{syntactic} and \textit{semantic} relationships, rather than on the \textit{conceptual} and context-dependent (or \textit{pragmatic}) processes of meaning that I am primarily concerned with in this thesis.

Secondly, I do not pursue the \textit{social semiotics} model presented in the later work of Kress\textsuperscript{15} and van Leeuwen.\textsuperscript{16} Their model is oriented towards socially shared artefacts in general, rather than the creation and reception of artworks in an artworld context. Its emphasis on supra-individual forces and ideological critique\textsuperscript{17} leaves little room for the creative and interpretive acts by individual agents that remain central to my project. As discussed in Chapter 7, Juri Lotman’s approach to \textit{cultural semiotics} is better suited to the types of problem that I tackle in this thesis. With its key ideas regarding translation, asymmetry, and peripheral exchange, Lotman’s model is readily scalable. It is equally applicable to discourse events involving individuals on end of the spectrum, to those between the largest cultural groupings at the other. For this reason, Lotman offers more flexible framework for my purposes than do Kress and van Leeuwen,


\textsuperscript{14} See Gibbons, \textit{Multimodality}, 13-20 for a discussion.


\textsuperscript{17} See Anna Maria Lorusso, \textit{Cultural Semiotics: For A Cultural Perspective on Semiotics} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 40.
Finally, the *transcription-oriented approach* of Anthony Baldry and Paul Thibault is another avenue not explored in this thesis. This approach has been criticised by Alison Gibbons as a “case of cataloguing the multimodal make-up of a text … [becoming] in places both clinical and overzealous in its undertaking to identify the semiotic resources at work, resulting in a lack of consideration of the effect such multimodal semiosis has upon the recipient.” I tend to agree with Gibbons’ general criticism. In any case, transcription-oriented approaches lose their efficacy for the analysis of works, such as those studied in this thesis, in which the textual corpus itself is only weakly-defined or temporally unstable.

### A.3 Not a Study in Conceptual Metaphor Theory

This thesis is not intended to be a study of the theories of *conceptual metaphor theory* or *conceptual blending theory*, or of the field of *cognitive poetics* more generally, as applied to music. Certainly, the theories of Lakoff and Johnson\(^\text{20}\), and Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner\(^\text{21}\) have been successfully applied to the analysis of music-text relations, and multimodal works.\(^\text{22}\) Important contributions include book-length studies by Alison Gibbons\(^\text{23}\) and Lawrence Zbikowski.\(^\text{24}\) I acknowledge the usefulness of these approaches, and shall make passing reference to them in the theoretical model developed in Part II, as well as the analyses presented in Part III. However, the line of enquiry that I pursue in this thesis traces its principal heritage to the disciplines of semiotics and philosophy. It is informed, but not dominated, by insights from the cognitive sciences.

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\(^{19}\) Gibbons, *Multimodality*, 17.


\(^{23}\) Gibbons, *Multimodality*.

Appendix B

Poetics & Music?

B.1 Introduction

In this Appendix, I review the relevance and prior uses of the term poetics in relation to music. Despite a chequered history, “poetics” – as a way of making – is, I shall argue, perfectly applicable to music as much as to any of the non-linguistic creative arts.

In both the Politics and the Poetics, Aristotle includes music in his list of the mimetic arts. Yet, from Aristotle’s time to the present day, poetics is a term not often encountered in theoretical or academic writing about music. This is especially the case if “music” is intended to be understood in its most general sense, to refer both to wordless instrumental music, such as absolute music, and to music with words, such as opera and song.

Famously, Stravinsky used poetics prominently in the title of his Charles Eliot Norton Lectures, delivered in French at Harvard University in 1939-40, and published in 1942 as Poétique musicale. These lectures were translated into English as Poetics of Music in the Form of Six Lessons (1947).25 However, this sudden appearance of poetics with reference to music (undoubtedly intended by Stravinsky to include instrumental music), is noteworthy for its singularity. At the time, there were virtually no historical precedents for a “poetics of music,” the main exception being the somewhat obscure composers of musica poetica in sixteenth and seventeenth century Germany.26

Stravinsky justifies his usage as follows:

And it is no secret to any of you that the exact meaning of poetics is the study of work to be done. The verb poiein from which the word is derived means nothing else but to

25 Igor Stravinsky, Poetics of Music, in the Form of Six Lessons, preface by Darius Milhaud, transl. Arthus Knodel and Ingolf Dahl (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1947). For the French text of these lectures see Igor Stravinsky, Poétique musicale. These lectures were translated into English as Poetics of Music in the Form of Six Lessons (1947). See also D. Bartel, Musical Poetics: Musical-Rhetorical Figures in German Baroque Music (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997).

26 Dietrich Bartel, Musica Poetica: Musical-Rhetorical Figures in German Baroque Music (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997).
do or make. ... The poetics of music is exactly what I am going to talk to you about; that is to say, I shall talk about making in the field of music. 27

Stravinsky – or perhaps it was Roland-Manuel, the ghost-writer of these lectures 28 – seems to have been motivated to use the word poetics not because of any associations in the history of Western music, but to emphasize its secondary meaning as a way of making, in order to help validate, post facto, the recent appointment of Stravinsky to a prestigious university chair of poetry. Certainly, Stravinsky’s well-publicized usage did not catch on with musicologists at the time. It would be many decades before the terms poetics and music were again seen together in respectable company.

B.2 Poetics & Critical Theory

Although not concerned with music, Gaston Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space (1958/1964) 29 re-introduced poetics into the discourse of critical theory. 30 With this move, Bachelard could be said to have cut loose the term from any obligation to remain exclusively faithful to its previously literary connotations.

In the seventies, poetics emerged as a pivotal term for the structuralists, such as Tzvetan Todorov, 31 Jonathan Culler, 32 and Algirdas J. Greimas, to name a few. But, despite the freedom implicitly granted by Bachelard’s usage, poetics was still generally conceived of as referring to linguistic and literary texts, primarily those in written (i.e. not spoken) form.

27 Stravinsky, Poetics of Music, 4, italics in original.
In musical contexts, Carl Dahlhaus revived the term in his essay “Schoenberg's Poetics of Music”, an essay first published in German in 1976, appearing in English translation in 1987.\(^{33}\) It is clear that Dahlhaus was not limiting his scope only to Schoenberg’s vocal works.

In the English-speaking world, Linda Hutcheon should be credited with elevating \textit{poetics} into the jargon of postmodern critical theory, firstly in a review article from 1983, and then to widespread impact with her highly influential book \textit{A Poetics of Postmodernism} (1988).\(^{34}\) Throughout the book, Hutcheon repeatedly affirms that \textit{poetics}, in her usage, is applicable to all cultural forms and branches of the arts – literary, visual, architectural and musical – each of which is to be considered as producing “texts” suitable for critical analysis.

For example, she quotes the following passage from Ziolkowski –

\begin{quote}
As early as 1969, Theodore Ziolkowski had noted that “new arts are so closely related that we cannot hide complacently behind the arbitrary walls of self-contained disciplines: poetics inevitably gives way to general aesthetics, considerations of the novel move easily to the film, while the new poetry often has more in common with contemporary music and art than with the poetry of the past.”\(^{35}\)
\end{quote}

And yet, in the discussion that immediately follows, Hutcheon betrays a lingering devotion to the literary and language-based associations of the term \textit{poetics}. True, she does cite, mostly in passing, the works of composers George Rochberg\(^{36}\) Karlheinz Stockhausen, Luciano Berio\(^{37}\), Frederic Rzewski and Christian Wolff\(^{38}\) (not to mention the blues of Robert Johnson\(^{39}\)) and includes music in the list of arts in which quotation, parody, and other typically postmodern techniques, can be identified.\(^{40}\) In the end,


\(^{34}\) Linda Hutcheon, \textit{A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction} (New York: Routledge, 1988)

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 9.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 11, 88.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 93.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 182.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 118.

\(^{40}\) For example, ibid., 26, 35.
however, Hutcheon admits that, for her, postmodern poetics is to be investigated most rewardingly in the realm of literature.

If I keep coming back to the literary and the fictional, however, it is not only because of my particular competences and interests. The self-consciously linguistic, narrative and historical nature of postmodern fiction raises, for me, more issues than any one of these other art forms does individually.\(^{41}\)

### B.3 Poetics & Popular Music

Despite this somewhat unpromising history as far as music is concerned, the new millennium has seen the publication of three academic books on popular music which proclaim *poetics* in their title – Adam Krims’ *Rap Music and the Poetics of Identity* (2000),\(^ {42}\) Albin J. Zak III’s *The Poetics of Rock* (2001),\(^ {43}\) and William Echard’s *Neil Young and the Poetics of Energy* (2005).\(^ {44}\) In each case, the author justifies his use of the term by referring to the interplay of compositional choices and aesthetics or values.

While Krims’ book is, not surprisingly, primarily concerned with the *words* in popular music (specifically rap), the same is not true of Zak and Echard.

For Echard, “the core concept [of poetics] is aesthetic, signalling an interest in the interface between compositional choices (understood mostly with respect to their structural traces) and broader value systems.”\(^ {45}\)

Zak holds a similar view. After quoting the same passage from Stravinsky’s *Poetics of Music* that I have also quoted above, he goes on to say that his own book too

is “about making in the field of music”. It is an exploration of musical composition in the recording studio – cutting tracks, making records. The title’s resonance with

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 182.


\(^{45}\) Ibid., 6.
aesthetics is fitting, for the aesthetic stances of those involved in the record-making process are inseparable from the compositional choices that they make.  

Both Echard and Zak assert that compositional choices (which are, of course, ways of making) are inseparable from aesthetic considerations. I agree. Indeed, it is not only aesthetics, but also the other axiological dimensions of ethics and politics, that are bound up in acts of a genuinely creative poetics. This is because what is being created in the making of an artwork involves more – potentially a lot more – than its sensory and perceptual components. Or, to invert Marshall McLuhan’s famous dictum, the message (what is being said) is – in some cases at least – of greater interest and importance than any specifics to do with the medium (how it is said).

B.4 Conclusion

In this Appendix, I have reviewed the use of the term poetics. Based on contemporary usage, I claim that, in the arts, it is equally applicable to non-linguistic works – or “texts” generally – as it is for works involving natural language, spoken and written. Poetics is simply a “way of making.”

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46 Zak, Poetics of Rock, xvi, italics added.
Any discussion of “concepts” and “ideas” must eventually encounter the turbulent history of these terms in both philosophy and psychology. The topic is huge. Indeed, the debates have become so laden with inconsistencies and misunderstanding that some scholars, such as Edouard Machery and Jay Lemke, suggest that the term “concept” is now too damaged to be of much use in disciplined discourse.

Machery sums up his argument as follows:

> The common wisdom in the philosophy of psychology and in the philosophy of mind is that theories of concepts in philosophy and in psychology share the same goals and should be evaluated according to the same criteria. … this common wisdom is mistaken.

Machery concludes that “the notion of concept should be eliminated from contemporary psychology.” Not surprisingly, his argument has been criticised by some. Few cognitive psychologists see the need to go quite as far as Machery proposes. Instead, concepts remain an important area of contemporary research in psychology, with various theories competing to explain an ever-expanding corpus of empirical data.

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50 Machery, Doing Without Concepts, 50.

51 Ibid., 5.


53 For a collection of recent views, see the essays in Margolis and Laurence, The Conceptual Mind.

For my purposes, it is not necessary to review the current state of the art in the cognitive sciences, or to adjudicate between competing positions. I shall simply accept the widely-held view that humans are able to grasp, hold and refine “ideas” and “concepts,” and to participate in meaningful discourse about them with others. The specific cognitive and neurological processes that underpin these natural human capabilities are outside the scope of this thesis.

C.2 Plato’s Theory of Forms

Concepts and ideas are at the centre of one of the most fundamental disputes in the history of Western philosophy, going back to the Classical era. This dispute involves the differing views of Aristotle and Plato, regarding the latter’s theory of ideal forms, sometimes also referred to as Plato’s theory of ideas. In summary, it is generally held that Plato conceived of a duality between two distinct universes. One is an abstract and eternal universe of idealised forms, which are perfect and perpetually unchanging. The other is the limited world of human understanding in which mere mortals strive, at best, to imperfectly glimpse ideal forms in their mundane experience. The issue is complicated by the fact that Plato never systematically set out his philosophy of forms. Therefore, his theory – which may or may not have evolved over time – needs to be inferred from a number of different Platonic dialogues, and partly re-constructed from Aristotle’s commentaries on the subject.

The terminological aspect of this topic is in itself daunting, involving a number of different words in the original Greek, not to mention questions of translational equivalence in English. Christoph Helmig gives a long list of Classical Greek words
that can stand for “concept” in the Platonic tradition. Amongst them is eidos, usually translated in English as “idea”, “essence” or “form”. Plato’s metaphysics has attracted the attention of a number of specialist scholars and I shall not attempt to pursue it here.

The key point to notice is that debates regarding “concepts,” “ideas,” and “forms”, as well as associated definitional and terminological issues, have a long history stretching back to the dawn of Western philosophy.

C.3 A Hegelian Perspective – Vorstellung, Begriff, Gedanke, Idee

C.3.1 Vorstellung, Begriff, Gedanke

In more recent times, certain Western philosophers have considered some or all of these terms to be more or less synonymous, i.e. implicitly or explicitly, they have accepted the equation: concept = idea = form. Such a view has been attributed, for example, to Heidegger. Charles Sanders Peirce evidently used “idea” and “concept” interchangeably.

Others, however, maintain important distinctions between some or all of these terms. Famously, Frege insisted on a clear opposition between “ideas” [Vorstellungen] – which he regarded as essentially private – and “concepts” [Begriffen], which he viewed as

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64 See, for example, his essay “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878), in EP I: 124, where “conceptions” and “ideas” are used synonymously. Peirce often used “conception,” but he did not distinguish that term from “concept.” One of the fullest definitions of “concept” in Peirce’s writings is found in EP II: 447-88. It should be noted that, in both the cognitive sciences and philosophy, some authors argue for a distinction between “concept” and “conception”. See, for example: Carey, *Origin of Concepts*, 489ff; James Higginbotham, “Conceptual Competence,” *Philosophical Issues*, 9 (1998): 149-62; Maite Ezcurdia, “The Concept-Conception Distinction,” *Philosophical Issues*, 9 (1998): 187-92. There is no need to enter into the details of this point here. In this thesis, I shall simply take “concept” and “conception” to be synonyms.
logical entities. In this thesis, I use the term “form” as qualitatively different – albeit related – to “ideas” and “concepts” (see Section 3.5). However, the distinction between “ideas” and “concepts” is less clear cut, but nevertheless worth exploring more closely.

In Hegel’s philosophy, as set out in such notoriously opaque works such as the *Science of Logic*, the terms “idea” [*Idee*] and “concept” [*Begriff*] undoubtedly refer to different aspects of thought, with entire separate chapters devoted to each. But Hegel does not keep these terms as clearly separated from each other as does Frege. Instead, he considers them to be profoundly and fundamentally inter-related. Thus, for example, according to Hegel, “the idea [*Idee*] ... alone is the unity of the concept [*Begriff*] and reality”. Elsewhere, Hegel stated “that philosophy does nothing but transform representations [*Vorstellungen*] into thoughts [*Gedanken*] – and, indeed, beyond that, the mere thought into the concept [*Begriff*].”

In seeking to reconcile – or at least carefully compare – these various viewpoints, we encounter another terminological tangle, complicated by alternative translations, principally those from German to English. Observe that in the original German of both Hegel and Frege, the pivotal terms under discussion are *Begriff, Vorstellung*, and *Gedanke*. For Hegel, we must add *Idee* (which I will discuss separately in the next subsection). Each of these words can carry connotations of “idea,” “notion,” and “conception.” Different English translators have made different choices.

*Vorstellung* is particularly problematic, without a precise equivalent in English. Depending on the German text being translated – for example those by Kant, Hegel, or

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Frege – *Vorstellung* has variously been rendered in English as “imagination,”70 “picture thinking,”71 “figurative thinking,”72 “representation,”73 “notion,”74 or “idea.”75 In his study of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, Stanley Rosen discusses the literal meaning of *Vorstellung*, referring “to place before, in other words to make into an object.”76 He opts for “representation” as an acceptable translation, highlighting the connotation of *repräsentation*, “that is, to re-present something that has presented itself antecedently, where ‘antecedently’ may refer to logical or chronological order. A representation of exteriority is thus an artefact of consciousness.”77 In other words, Rosen takes *Vorstellung* – in Hegel, at least – to refer to an “object” that is “placed before” or enters into consciousness.

A similar interpretation is developed by John Burbidge. He prefers to translate *Vorstellung* as “idea,” although he also acknowledges “representation” as a valid alternative.78

Burbidge has given a useful analysis of the differing views of both Frege and Hegel, regarding *Vorstellungen* and *Begriffe*. He argues – I think convincingly – that “we will not need to follow Frege in placing ideas and concepts in two different realms, one in the human mind and the other in a Platonic heaven.” Instead, he endorses Hegel’s process-oriented philosophy, briefly mentioned above, in which “one can actually move, by way of something he [Hegel] calls thoughts [*Gedanken*], from mere ideas [*Vorstellungen*] to concepts [*Begriffe*].”79 For Burbidge, interpreting Hegel,
concepts as well as ideas are the result of psychological processes. [However, we] can draw a significant distinction between them: ideas happen and respond to unnoticed influences; concepts are the result of careful reflection and disciplined observation. Mediating between ideas and concepts lies the realm of pure thoughts. ... these are distinct from concepts. Pure thoughts are those words and senses that are separated from both the images of our normal ideas and from personal meanings. As such, they can be imprecise and vague – raw material for investigation and experiential application, but as yet too inchoate to be objective; they are amenable to refinement. Concepts, in contrast, are determinate enough that we can draw precise implications from their meanings. Because they have emerged from disciplined reflection, public discourse can identify and justify their components and internal relations.80

According to Burbidge:

What is misleading in Frege’s analysis, then, is not its sharp distinction between the relativism of ideas and the universality of concepts. It is that the distinction becomes a barrier that requires quite different intellectual operations on its two sides. What I have presented ... as an alternative is the picture of a continuum that stretches from inarticulate immersion in personal experience to the reflective articulation of thoughts that capture and structure the accumulated experience of generations ... “Ideas” and “concepts” name the two extremes of this dynamic field, extremes that interact reciprocally to maintain a constant tension.81

Quentin Lower puts it this way:

[Hegel’s] meaning is that Gedanke may be either in the form of Vorstellung or Begriff, but only the latter is the form of Denken in the fullest and most precise sense of that term.82

These insights form the basis of my own definition in Chapter 1.

80 Burbidge, Ideas, Concepts and Reality, 94-95, emphasis added.
81 Ibid., 153.
82 Lauer, Hegel’s Concept of God, 35.
C.3.2 Idee versus Begriff in Hegel

The term Idee – or Idea (capitalized) – is the culmination of Hegel’s system, as expounded in the Science of Logic. It appears more than once in the same passages in which Begriff also appears. For example, in a separate chapter on “The Idea” in the Science of Logic, Hegel defines idea [Idee] as the unity of the concept [Begriff] with reality. The same definition is found in Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics. Thus, at first glance, Hegel’s own usage appears to cast doubt on Burbidge’s preference to translate Vorstellung as “idea.” However, the difficulty is readily resolved, if we maintain a careful distinction between “idea” (uncapitalized) as defined in Section 3.2.3, and “Idea” (capitalized), as a specialized term in Hegel’s system.

Burbidge himself clarifies it as follows:

Hegel uses this term [Idea, Die Idee] for the intellectual operations that grasp the way thought’s subjective concept can unite with objective actuality. [...] In most translations this term is translated with a capital; and it should be carefully distinguished from the ‘ideas’ of John Locke and David Hume, which Hegel calls representations [Vorstellung].

Glenn Magee explains: “To clear up one misunderstanding ... there is nothing personal of ‘subjective’ about [Hegel’s] Idea; it is not, in other words, ‘my idea’, and it is not confined to the minds of individuals.” He continues:

The whole of the Logic has served as the argument for Idea, and it is with Idea that Hegel’s articulation of the whole or the Absolute is completed. In fact, Hegel tends to treat ‘the Absolute’ and ‘the Idea’ as interchangeable terms. If we think of the Idea merely as a category, or division, of the Logic, this will seem confusing, as Hegel also refers to the Absolute as ‘the whole’. This confusion vanishes, however, once we know that Hegel understands all the preceding categories of the Logic as immanent within

83 Examples include Encyclopedia: Part I: Science of Logic, # 236 (p. 299).
84 Science of Logic, 671-72.
86 John W. Burbidge, The A to Z of Hegelian Philosophy (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 91-92, bold face in original.
Absolute Idea, since all the earlier categories are, again, the argument for it. Idea, properly understood, is the whole itself (at least it is the whole of the Logic, which identifies, in a sense, the ‘formal structure’ of all of reality.  

With this distinction in mind, Hegel’s writings – obscure as usual – become a little clearer.

The idea is the adequate concept [adequate Begriff], the objectively true, or the true as such. ... The expression ‘idea’ [Idee] has otherwise also often been used in philosophy as well as in ordinary life for ‘concept’ [Begriff], or even for just a ‘representation’ [Vorstellung]. ... If we now reserve the expression ‘idea’ for the objective or real concept [Begriff] and we distinguish it from the concept itself [Begriff selbst] and still more from mere representation [Vorstellung], then we must also even more definitely reject the estimate of it according to which the idea is something with no actuality, and true thoughts [Gedanken] are accordingly said to be only ideas. If thoughts are something merely subjective and contingent, then they certainly have no further value.

Burbidge gives an excellent discussion of Hegel’s “absolute idea”:

With this we have a reciprocal relationship which is complete in itself, and can be collapsed into a new unified concept to which Hegel gives the name ‘absolute idea.’ When theory and practice continually check and reinforce each other we have a way of integrating concept and actuality that is valid in all respects.

Continuing, in a passage too lengthy to quote in full, Burbidge reviews the moments of Hegel’s speculative method or method of pure reason: the moment of immediacy, the moment of difference, and the moment of dialectic. He then sums up the endpoint and new beginning of Hegel’s system:

What is distinctively Hegelian is the final move, in which the speculative synthesis is ... united into a single concept, complete in itself, which can be considered on its own apart from all the mediation that led up to it. ... As a unity it is universal incorporating a

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88 Ibid., 112.
89 *Science of Logic*, 671, italics in original
number of elements; as now given a new immediacy through abstraction, however, it is indeterminate in form, even though its content includes the results of the earlier development. Conceiving thus introduces a new beginning ready for further dialectical analysis. ... It is this final move, where conceptual thought creates a new immediate beginning out of a complex development, that enables Hegel to set his discussion of the movement of thought into system. Each stage develops through complications towards a new beginning. And when we reach a conclusion that includes all conceptual determinations whatever – the absolute idea – we collapse this complex into a new single thought which, having nothing other that it can be distinguished from, can only be indeterminate. We have returned to the concept of simple self-equivalence, which is nothing else but the ‘being’ with which we began.91

In an earlier book, Burbidge put the same argument in the following terms:

At its limits … a concept begins to break down. … In working out a concept thought becomes aware of what it is missing, and goes looking to fill the gap. When it comes to the end of the logical project the same thing happens. At this point the logic reaches a concept that captures the full nature of its own activity, that incorporates and sums up all the various moments that have gone before into a single, highly potent, pattern. Thought now understands its own dynamic, in which various moments are distinguished, then related, then ‘sublated.’ This ‘idea’ of logic is no longer relative to other concepts or ideas, but absolute.92

Of course, there is much more that could be said about the Idea in Hegel.93 However, this would not be especially relevant here. For my purposes, and at the risk of over-simplification, it is sufficient to envisage the distinction between Vorstellung and Idee in Hegel by refining Fig. 1.1 as shown in Fig. C.1.

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91 Burbidge, Logic of Hegel’s Logic, 104, italics added.
93 Recent literature includes Rosen, The Idea of Hegel’s Science of Logic, esp. 465ff.
C.4 Schoenberg and Idea

The models in Figs. 1.1 and C.1 offer a novel way of engaging with one of the most famous – but often perplexing – uses of the term “idea” in music. I refer to the writings of Arnold Schoenberg, especially in the pieces collected in *Style and Idea* (1975)\(^ {94}\) and *The Musical Idea* (1995).\(^ {95}\) As is well-known, Schoenberg never managed to articulate precisely what he meant by the term “idea” in relation to musical works. His projected book on the subject was left uncompleted at the time of his death. This has led to considerable discussion and debate in the musicological literature.\(^ {96}\)

Most frequently, Schoenberg uses the German word *Gedanke* when referring to “idea”. However, on occasion, he also uses *Idee* and *Einfall*. In one manuscript at least,\(^ {97}\) Schoenberg uses both *Gedanke* and *Idee* next to each other, clearly synonymously. Jack Boss has shown that there is no evidence that Schoenberg had any *direct* familiarity with the works of Hegel.\(^ {98}\) However, Boss does suggest that some “second-hand”

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\(^ {98}\) Boss, *Schoenberg’s Twelve-Tone Music*, 16
knowledge was possible, in the cultural milieu of turn-of-the century Vienna.99 Nevertheless, we should be cautious about any simple equation between Schoenberg’s choice of terms and those found in Hegel.

Still, some of the elusiveness of precisely what Schoenberg was getting at whenever he talked of the (musical) “idea,” can perhaps be explained by the fertile polysemy inherent in Fig. 1.1. I suggest that Schoenberg’s sense of “idea” shifted, across his various writings, to different points along the spectrum of thought (Gedanke) shown in Fig. 1.1, sometimes also encompassing the mystical overtones found in Hegel (and illustrated in Fig. C.1 above). Indeed, Schoenberg’s “unfinished” opera Moses und Aron is ultimately about the inexpressibility of the idea (Gedanke) of God,100 in fundamental conflict with the act of representation. As such, Moses und Aron could be described as a work of conceptual music par excellence.

C.5 Concepts and Expository Forms

In view of the one or more “narrative turns” in critical theory,101 it might be asked where narrative fits into the view of concepts that I have sketched in Chapter 1? In other words, how are narratives related to ideas and concepts? In short, I consider that the relationship is one of expository interdependence. In the rest of this section, I shall briefly outline my reasons for this view.

99 Ibid.
100 As Schoenberg has Moses say in Act II, Scene 5: “Unvorstellbarer Gott! Unaussprechlicher, vieldeutiger Gedanke!” which Allen Forte translates as “Inconceivable God! Inexpressible, many-sided idea ...” Booklet included with the premiere recording Columbia K3L-241, p. [19]
101 Matti Hyvärinen suggests that there have been at least four different types of “narrative turn,” not all of which can be aligned to “narrow and particular Proppian prototype of narrativity.” See Matti Hyvärinen, “Prototypes, Genres, and Concepts: Travelling with Narratives,” Narrative Works, 2, no.1 (2012). Available at https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/nw/article/view/19496/21110.
Firstly, I accept the skeptical or “mildly deflationary” stance towards narrative espoused by authors such as Peter Lamarque\textsuperscript{102} and, less vehemently so, Peter Goldie.\textsuperscript{103} Lamarque proposes three minimal conditions for the establishment of a narrative –

1. “A story must be told, it is not found.”\textsuperscript{104}
2. “At least two events must be depicted in a narrative and there must be some more or less loose, albeit non-logical, relation between the events.”\textsuperscript{105}
3. “There is a temporal dimension in narrative, not just in the sense that component sentences are tensed but there must be a temporal relation between the event, even if just that of simultaneity.”\textsuperscript{106}

From this perspective, narrative is deflated to an expository \textit{structure or form}.\textsuperscript{107} As such it is ubiquitous, “not only in the obvious places like literature, history and biography, but in virtually all forms of reflective cognition.”\textsuperscript{108} But, Lamarque argues that no major significance should be attached to this readily observable fact. “Once we see how little is involved in being a narrative – how minimal the conditions are for narrativity – we will see that the focus of interest nearly always shifts away from mere narrative itself.”\textsuperscript{109} In this thesis, of course, the focus is on ideas and concepts.

Secondly, narratives can be explanatory.\textsuperscript{110} Thus, they may – but need not necessarily – be used to represent and reveal, through the unfolding of plot, the potential meanings of ideas and concepts.

\textsuperscript{102} Peter Lamarque, “On Not Expecting Too Much from Narrative,” \textit{Mind & Language}, 19, no. 4 (2004): 393-408. Others who adopt similarly deflationary views include Monika Fludernik, who goes so far as to argue that narrative does not necessarily require the presence of plot, or even of temporality. See Monika Fludernik, \textit{Towards a \textquoteleft Natural\textquoteright Narratology} (London: Routledge, 1996).


\textsuperscript{104} Peter Lamarque, “On Not Expecting Too Much,” 394.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{107} This deflationary account is not necessarily inconsistent with Hayden White’s well-known claim that narrative, as a form, is not neutral and has an inherent “content.” Hayden White, \textit{The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation} (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), ix - xi. There is no need to pursue this point further here.


\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.

Steven Collins discusses a useful distinction between *systematic* and *narrative thought*.\(^{111}\) While his particular focus is on the soteriology of *nirvana* in Buddhist religion, the distinction between the two modes of exposition is general and transferrable. For Collins, “Narrative is necessarily sequential, in two senses beyond the fact that any discourse takes time: the specific sequencing of its *constituent parts* makes the story what it is, and the passage of time is intrinsic to the way it produces meaning as a story.”\(^{112}\) He contrasts this with *systematic thought*, which “unifies a field, organizes it into a system, by means of a *matrix of categories*.“\(^{113}\) Collins explains that

In Buddhist systematic thought, the beginning and end points of an exposition can differ, as can the ordering of the intervening items, without any basic change in the meaning of what is said in and through the lists thus ordered. In narrative, by contrast, differences in any of these three things must have an effect on meaning, and significant differences may lead one to say that the story has a different meaning, or even that one is dealing with a different story.\(^{114}\)

Drawing on Ricoeur, Blunden puts it this way:

Narrative rationality presents concepts to us as *predicaments* and related situations and the unfolding of the process of their resolution in human action. Every plot therefore presents us a concept and an understanding of what drives the plot, namely, the predicament. The predicament produces the drama and represents the concept. The whole project through which the predicament plays itself out and is overcome is the meaning the concept has for us. This is what those who would interpret the narrative must make explicit.\(^{115}\)

In other words, narrative is (typically)\(^{116}\) a temporal expository *form* which – through the working out of predicament and plot – can be employed to illustrate concepts and

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\(^{112}\) Ibid., 15, emphasis added.

\(^{113}\) Ibid., 16, emphasis added.

\(^{114}\) Ibid., 15.


\(^{116}\) However, as noted above, some scholars such as Monika Fludernik do not insist on plot and temporarily as essential to narrative, instead arguing in favour of alternative criteria, such as embodied experientiality. See Pirjo Lyytikäinen, “Paul Ricoeur and the Role of Plot in Narrative Worldmaking,” in *Rethinking Mimesis: Concepts and Practices of Literary Representation*, ed. Saija Isomaa et al (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012): 63.
illuminate aspects of their meaning. However, narratives usually involve spatio-temporally entangled sequences of events which may make reference to multiple inter-related ideas and concepts. Therefore, narratives cannot be simply equated with the ideas and concepts which they contain.

Nevertheless, at a meta-level, the names and titles of well-known narratives, characters, places and events – whether historical or fictional – can often become the shorthand labels for what have become abstracted and widely embedded as shared concepts in a given discourse community. Thus, for example, in Australian culture, “Gallipoli” is a label for a (contested) concept – e.g. selfless bravery in the face of an almost certain and militarily pointless death – rather than the name of any particular narrative re-telling of the “story” (of which there are many versions and media variants).

Blunden points out that the relationship between narrative and concepts is one of mutual dependence:

Narrative is after all, simply the meaningful presentation of experience, situating concepts in vicarious action and providing the material from which conceptual knowledge can be abstracted as the ‘truth’ of the narrative.117

Thus, “just as conceptual knowledge relies upon narrative to legitimate itself, narrative relies on conceptual knowledge in order to legitimate itself.”118 In other words, concepts are essential to the articulation of any narrative. At the same time, narratives – perhaps involving the sequential presentation of multiple concepts and their inter-relationships – may become meta-referentially abstracted as a higher-level concept which receives its own name or level within a given community. Thus, narratives can be used to represent higher-order concepts, but still remain distinct from them.

A similar recursive interdependency holds between concepts and other expository structures which involve the predication of statements and meaningful sequences, such as logical arguments, propositions, and theories. Vygotsky states that “any concept can

117 Blunden, Concepts, 35.
118 Ibid., 37.
be represented through other concepts in an infinite number of ways."¹¹⁹ Glossing over
the fiendishly difficult philosophical debates regarding the construction of meaningful
“statements”¹²⁰ – whether linguistically or in non-linguistic media such as images or
music – an essential and logically “primitive” entity required to successfully formulate
and communicate such statements is invariably some ontological variant of the concept.

¹¹⁹ Quoted in Blunden, Concepts, 289.
¹²⁰ Many of the debates are centred on Frege’s account of predication. See, for example, Alex Oliver, “What is a
predicate?” in The Cambridge Companion to Frege, ed. Tom Ricketts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), 118-48.
Appendix D

Conceptual Art

D.1 Introduction

Many of the issues associated with the topic of conceptual music have clear precedents in the expansive history of conceptual and post-conceptual art. This Appendix presents a brief overview of selected aspects of this history. The discussion here is not intended to be comprehensive from an art-historical perspective. It is deliberately skewed towards themes which are particularly relevant to the key arguments developed in the main body of this thesis. In particular, I explore a sublimated antagonism which lies at the heart of much of the discourse on (post-)conceptual art, viz. the tension between cerebral meanings (= “concepts”) on the one hand, and material sensation and embodied experience on the other.

D.2 What is Conceptual Art?

As with most terms in art, conceptual art resists easy definition. We could adopt a narrow historical perspective and refer to conceptual art as a specific movement in Western avant-garde art, which flourished between, say, 1966 and 1972 (to adopt Lucy Lippard’s *Six Years*\(^{121}\) as the definitive period), or perhaps between 1966 and 1977.\(^{122}\) Indeed, it will sometimes be useful in this thesis to use Conceptual Art (with capitals) in this particular sense. However, as discussed below, there are important non-Western traditions of conceptual art, such as Moscow Conceptualism, whose historical trajectories and distinctive characteristics cannot be simply conflated with development of Conceptual Art in the West.

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\(^{121}\) Lucy R. Lippard, *Six Years: The dematerialization of the art object from 1966 to 1972* .... (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

Most authors use conceptual art (uncapitalised), and its near relatives neo- or post-conceptual art, in a broader a-historical sense, but are typically reluctant to give hard and fast definitions. For example, Peter Osborne, whose survey of the topic spans a timeframe from the 1950s (and earlier) up to the present day, proposes a typology of six main kinds of conceptual art, schematised as follows:

- **Formal/Critical**
  - Instruction, Performance, Documentation
  - Process, System, Series
  - Word and Sign
- **Cultural/Political**
  - Appropriation, Intervention, Everyday
  - Politics and Ideology
  - Institutional Critique

However, when it comes to the challenge of definitions, Osborne has this to say:

> All art (after Duchamp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists conceptually. Definitions make bad philosophy, but for a time at least they made good art. Any attempt at a definition of conceptual art immediately runs up against the problem that definition is one of the main things at stake in conceptual art itself. Conceptual art, one might say, is art about the cultural act of definition – paradigmatically, but by no means exclusively, the definition of ‘art’.

Osborne goes on to give a long list of questions provoked by conceptual art, including two which are especially pertinent to the present discussion: “... is not all contemporary...”

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123 Peter Osborne, ed., *Conceptual Art* (London: Phaidon, 2002): 19. Of course, Osborne’s is not the only schematic framework proposed for categorising types of conceptual art. For example, Juli Carson uses Sol LeWitt’s seminal essay to identify and label four meta-discourses which, in her view, make up a “closed academic system” that has constrained and stunted the further development of conceptualism. She associates each of these meta-discourses with a leading historian of conceptual art, as follows:

- Dematerialist Conceptualism – Lucy Lippard
- Authorial Conceptualism – Joseph Kosuth
- Materialist Conceptualism – Benjamin Buchloh
- Formless Conceptualism – Rosalind Kraus


art in some relevant sense ‘conceptual’? Is there, then, such a thing as a completely non-conceptual art?” 125 As already discussed, I consider that there is no such thing as a purely conceptual music. All music inevitably involves a conceptual dimension to a greater or lesser extent, as well as non-conceptual dimensions. Thus, in simple black-and-white terms, the answers to Osborne’s two questions above could only be “yes” and “no”, respectively. However, in this thesis I shall mostly stay away from extreme limit cases and spend more time exploring the shades of grey along the categorical spectrum that ranges from non-conceptual to conceptual. Therefore, at times, I will refer to certain works that are, at their intentional and philosophical core, avowedly and emphatically “conceptual”, but remain well-removed from the minimalist aesthetic and dematerialised tendencies of Conceptual Art and conceptual art in the West.

If simple answers to the two questions that I have singled out above, do not get us very far, then let’s approach the issue from a slightly different angle: What characteristics would need to be in evidence for us to claim that something is a work of conceptual art?

Peter Lamarque suggests that perhaps the answer lies in the direction of experience rather than perception. This is a useful insight. Note that Lamarque does not deny the role – indeed the necessity – of perception of physical objects, beings or occurrences. But he goes on to suggest that “… it might be better to admit a perceptual level but somehow make it subservient to the conceptual”. 126 Here, Lamarque has – unnecessarily, in my view – shackled his key insight about the importance of the experiential dimension in conceptual art to a set of conventional assumptions regarding the relative unimportance of sensory perceptions. In doing so, Lamarque appears to be displaying a bias towards art as idea and a correspondingly reduced interest in art as material object or art as medium. This bias still underpins many contemporary characterisations of conceptual and post-conceptual art.

Such, for example, seems to be partly what Eve Meltzer is getting at when she writes that “a range of aesthetic strategies and figures that are most often associated with

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125 Ibid., 15.
conceptualism ... include systems and structures, language and ‘information,’ and the scientific and seemingly disaffected mode of rendering the visual field ...”.

Peter Osborne notes that the tendency of conceptual art towards dematerialisation is sometimes described as “Western art’s linguistic turn” emerging from a “minimalist negation of medium”. While Osborne does not deny the importance of a linguistic turn and minimalism in the history of conceptual art, he recasts these factors as arising from more fundamental artistic – and philosophical – concerns with process, systems, and series.

Jeff Wall states plainly that

with conceptual art it will only do to speak strictly – conceptual art had only one objective: the reduction of art to an intellectual statement of the intellectual statement itself as a work of art, not of literary art, but of visual art – to pass beyond the status of art needing either to be an object or a work, to posit it as something utterly other to all of that.

Each of these quotations reflects an ambivalence, if not a latent hostility, towards any residual presence of materiality still lurking at the heart of conceptual art. It is almost as if the impossibility of entirely dispensing with perceptible objects is only discreetly and circumspectly acknowledged. By virtue of their possibly suspect ancestry in the history of art, these indispensable objects are cast in the role of old-fashioned and slightly embarrassing relatives, the less seen in public the better.

But, as we shall see in Section D.4, not all historians and leading practitioners of conceptual art share the same viewpoint on dematerialisation. Firstly, however, a digression on the term dematerialisation is warranted.

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128 Peter Osborne, “Survey,” in Osborne, Conceptual Art, 23, italics added.
D.3 The Quest for Dematerialisation in Conceptual Art

A recurring theme in the history and development of conceptual art has been a tendency to downplay the role of perceptible materiality, often manifested as an unmistakably minimalist aesthetic. Of course, the avant-garde roots of this aesthetic can be traced back to at least the early decades of twentieth century modernist abstraction, in the thought of pivotal figures such as Kazimir Malevich (and his book *The Non-Objective World* (1927)).

These ideas gained new impetus with artists of the post-World War II generation, with particular energy in the sixties. As Ursula Meyer pointed out in an essay from 1969, the autonomy of the object was being challenged by several artists (including herself) and artforms, including the “destructionists”, Minimalists, and Happenings (before their commercialisation). Indeed, for a time at least (as Lucy Lippard documents in *Six Years*), it seemed possible that Conceptual Art, taken to its logical limits, was becoming – and could become altogether – dematerialised.

The term *dematerialisation* itself was coined by Lucy Lippard and John Chandler in 1968. It was fully inducted into the language of arts criticism with the publication, in 1973, of Lippard’s now classic survey of Conceptual Art, *Six Years*. To be sure, since the nineties, the rise of the internet – and the digitisation of nearly everything – has led to a revival of interest in dematerialised things of all kinds. As a result, in the art world, the term has now expanded to encompass connotations of the digital and

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135 Here I follow Goldie and Schellkens, who use the capitalised ‘Conceptual Art’ to “refer to the artistic movement that took place between 1966 and 1972” and to uncapsulated ‘conceptual art’ to refer to a “more inclusive” category loosely inscribed by what they suggest as five characteristic features, including “an emphasis on ideas and the view that the art object is to be ‘dematerialized’.” Goldie and Schellkens, *Philosophy and Conceptual Art*, xii.
136 Lippard, *Six Years*.
virtual, and is no longer solely confined to the realms of conceptual or post-conceptual art, no matter how defined.\textsuperscript{138}

Nevertheless, the historical associations of dematerialisation with the Conceptual Art movement of the late sixties and early seventies continue to loom large in the present era. In much contemporary arts writing today, the term conceptual art still refers to art concerned with “the thinking process almost exclusively,” a process which – as Lippard and Chandler foresaw it in 1968 – “may result in the object becoming wholly obsolete.”\textsuperscript{139}

Of course, the anticipated obsolescence of the art object never happened. In hindsight, it never could. It became apparent that, even at the limits of abstraction and conceptualisation in art, it is not possible to completely eliminate all modes of reliance on material “objects” of some kind. These objects may include vehicular media, to use David Davies’ term,\textsuperscript{140} such as transiently perceivable events, people or other living things, besides inanimate physical objects. Here is how Jamie Allen puts it:

> Our digital, networked age hides from us (in plain sight) the concrete, historical and affective correspondences between matter and information, object and thought, that which is present and that which re-presents. The practices and culture of art-and-technology make it all too easy to ignore or devalue the material underpinnings and implications of artistic activity and production. Art is perhaps always an act of reconstituting the directly-communicative power of materials; for the rendering-present of the tension between the semantic or symbolic power of matter and its constitutive “real,” at once simple and complex, always possibly sensual and potently tangible.\textsuperscript{141}

From Boris Groys we have:

> After conceptualism we can no longer see art primarily as the production and exhibition of individual things – even readymades. *However, this does not mean that conceptual or post-conceptual art became somehow “immaterial.”* Conceptual artists shifted the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[139] Lippard and Chandler, “Dematerialization,” 46.
\item[140] Davies, *Art as Performance*, 71ff.
\end{footnotes}
emphasis of artmaking away from static, individual objects towards the presentation of new relationships in space and time. These relationships could be purely spatial, but also logical and political. They could be relationships among things, texts, and photo-documents, but could also involve performances, happenings, films, and videos – all of which were shown inside the same installation space. In other words, conceptual art can be characterized as installation art – as a shift from the exhibition space presenting individual, disconnected objects to a holistic exhibition space in which the relations between objects are the basis of the artwork. ¹⁴²

Paul Thibault, in his *ecosocial semiotic theory*, points to the importance of a material “substrate” to all semiotic processes (not just conceptual art).

Semiosis is also a physical-material phenomenon. That is, semiosis is enacted and materially supported by the biologically based physical interactions that occur between individual organisms and their physical-material environments. From this point of view, semiosis is integrated with the material processes of our bodies and brain in interaction with their external environments. Semiotic activity both originates in physical-material (e.g. biological) interactions and, at the same time, has material effects on the environment, including other individuals and their bodies. ¹⁴³

Craig Dworkin concludes that:

> even the most abstract and cerebral works of conceptual art cannot be separated from those material and technical supports. There is no single medium, to be sure, but media are inescapable. ¹⁴⁴

Nevertheless, a minimalist, dematerialised ethos is often the default when it comes to critical writing about conceptual art. For example, returning to Peter Lamarque’s essay, it is evident that his discussion is occasionally coloured by a minimalist, almost dismissive, attitude towards the “things” of conceptual art.

> The bottles, the branches, the bricks, the clothes, the on-and-off lights, if they are to succeed in becoming *works* distinct from the things themselves, must invite a kind of


perception which makes salient particular aspects and suggests significance for them. If they fail to generate this kind of experience they have failed as art precisely because they have failed to distinguish themselves from the things that are their constitutive base. Being a work – certainly being a work of art – must make a difference and the difference, I suggest, must be realizable either in the phenomenology or the intentional content of an experience, broadly conceived.\textsuperscript{145}

Lamarque sums up his position as follows:

... my point is that there must be something that counts as apprehending the works as \textit{works} rather than merely the objects or performances they seem to be and that this must be realizable in some broad sense experientially.\textsuperscript{146}

To be clear, Lamarque does not argue that any \textit{publicly perceivable object(s)} (using Jeffrey Strayer’s terminology, introduced in Chapter 2) are entirely devoid of aesthetic qualities. On the contrary, he states that

the kinds of conceptual works I am thinking of are not mere ideas, mentalistically defined, accessible contingently through different media. There is an inescapable visual dimension, a physical medium which acts as a vehicle for the transmission of ideas. There is even an aesthetic dimension if we allow the consonance of means to ends under this heading.\textsuperscript{147}

Nevertheless, the presumed subservience of the perceptual to the experiential in Lamarque’s view of conceptual art is apparent.

Despite his leanings towards an anti-materialist characterisation of conceptual art, Lamarque’s distinction between \textit{perception} and \textit{experience} is, I think, insightful and important. The next section develops this distinction – by considering the question “What kind of experience?” – while not insisting on any necessary allegiance to a minimalist/dematerialised aesthetic.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 15, italics in original.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
D.4 Conceptual Art, Experiences and the Production of Meanings

If we were to look for a way to develop some of the implications of allowing an experiential dimension to conceptual art (without in any way denying the perceptual), where could we begin? I turn to Joseph Kosuth – a founding practitioner and less than conventional theorist of the history of conceptual art – for inspiration.

In a 1994 interview with Stuart Morgan, Kosuth challenged a number of assumptions about the aims and the then recent history of (conceptual) art.

[Kosuth]: What is the nature of making art? If it is not simply about fashioning forms and colours, then it has to do with the production of meaning. ... If you begin there you realize that potentially everything is material for art, because at some point it has to have an aspect of concretion and must be framed in relation to people’s lives. ...

[Morgan]: So art is about the making of meaning.

[Kosuth]: Yes, and that involves not only the assertion of meaning but also its cancellation, since one kind of meaning needs to be produced through cancellation or denial or erasure of a group of meanings.148

Later in the same interview, Kosuth expressly disavows any essential connection between Conceptual Art – at least in his own practice – and dematerialisation.

Quite early in my career I realized that my work may be Conceptual but it wasn’t Post-Minimalism nor, on the other hand, could it be explained by the idea of dematerialization. There were very intelligent examinations of my work by Lucy Lippard, the most sympathetic critic of the time. But she was very much part of the generation of Sol LeWitt and others, so understandably she saw the work from that point of view. We were doing something else. It wasn’t simply to do with the ‘dematerialization of the art object.’ Whether it consisted of a grain of sand or a block of granite was irrelevant. It wasn’t about materiality at all. It was about meaning.149

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149 Ibid., 28, italics added.
But where, specifically, is this meaning to be found? Kosuth had already offered an answer earlier in the same interview:

More and more, I realize that my work exists in the gaps between models. This autumn I made a work at Margo Leavin in Los Angeles. And because it was in Los Angeles, I reduced the elements and used a different presentational format, so what it came down to was cartoons and quotes from philosophy: Thomas Hobbes, Blondie and Dagwood, Schopenhauer, whatever. People were surprised. They said ‘You’re stealing this cartoon and you could be sued.’ They didn’t worry about stealing texts of Hegel and the others. Just the cartoons. So I said ‘I’m not selling the cartoons. I’m not selling the text, My work is between the cartoons and the text. And that’s what you’re buying if you buy the work.’

If we persist and ask “But where exactly is the work?” then the answer Kosuth seems to put forward can be found in First Investigation [Art as Idea (as Idea)] (1967-68), a conceptual work which exhibits a photographic enlargement of a dictionary definition of “meaning”, opening with the definition “meaning = that which exists in the mind”.

Kosuth’s essential claim here is that works of (conceptual) art are meaning(s) produced (in the mind) by virtue of something that happens “in the gaps between models.” Here, Kosuth’s use of the word model is important, as is the fact that he explicitly points to the theory of models in the sciences. Specifically, we might ask, what is it that is going on in “the gaps between models” that somehow produces meaning? As far as I am aware, Kosuth himself never elaborates on this in any of his writings or published interviews. We’ll need to look elsewhere for an answer. Kosuth’s formulation finds a parallel in the theories of Juri Lotman (1922-1993), co-founder of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics (see Chapter 7).

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150 Joseph Kosuth solo exhibition: Double Reading: An Allegory of Limits, October 23-December 18, 1993, Margo Leavin Gallery, Los Angeles. One example from the exhibition is given at https://www.margoleavingallery.com/kosuth. Other examples from the series can be readily found on the internet.


152 Illustrated in Osborne, Conceptual Art, 117.

153 Kosuth and Morgan, “Art as Idea,” 28. One of the most profound discussions of models in science can be found in Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science.

154 For an overview of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, its history and work, see Semenenko, The Texture of Culture; Waldstein, Soviet Empire of Signs. I know of no evidence to suggest that Kosuth was directly influenced by Lotman. However, indirect influences were certainly possible. Thus, Lotman was presumably aware of the conceptual movement in Russian art. For example, Kabakov was part of the Photography and Art exhibition at the Tartu Art Museum in 1984. See Sirje Helme, “Nationalism and Dissent: Art and Politics in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania under the Soviets,” in Art of the Baltics. The Struggle for Freedom of Artistic Expression under the Soviets,
can only ever emerge through processes of translation between two or more semiotic modelling systems. In other words, translation (or interpretation) is the fundamental answer to the problem left in abeyance by Kosuth, i.e. how meaning somehow emerges from the “gaps” between models.

Appendix E

Interpretation versus Translation

E.1 Introduction

Roman Jakobson, and others, have observed that “translation” lies at the heart of Peirce’s philosophical system. Peirce’s own words support this claim:

That word translating seems to me to contain profound truth wrapped up in it.

A sign is not a sign unless it translates itself into another sign in which it is more fully developed.

Meaning … is, in its primary acceptation, the translation of a sign into another system of signs.

It is apparent that Peirce is here using the term “translation” to refer to something beyond the activity of translating between two natural languages, while nevertheless also accommodating the latter. Other quotations show that, for Peirce, interpretation and translation are one and the same:

Interpretation is merely another word for translation.

There is no exception, therefore, to the law that every thought-sign is translated or interpreted in a subsequent one, unless it be that all thought comes to an abrupt and

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157 Letter to Lady Welby, March 14, 1909, SS 111.
158 CP 5.594 (1898).
159 CP 4.127 (ca.1893).
160 This is a frequently quoted passage from unpublished MS 283. See, for example, Susan Petrilli, Expression and Interpretation in Language (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2012): 231; Gorlée, Semiotics and the Problem of Translation, 122.
final end in death.\textsuperscript{161}

From statements such as these, it is clear that Peirce considers translation to be the process through which the dynamic triadic relationship between sign, object and interpretant is formed and sustained. In other words, for Peirce, translation/interpretation is the fundamental process of semiosis.

The question obviously arises: is it valid to equate translation with interpretation, as Peirce clearly did? This is the topic addressed in this Appendix.

\section*{E.2 A Brief Review of Literature}

For Roman Jakobson – one of the early champions of Peirce – the terms translation and interpretation were apparently more or less equivalent. Such a conclusion could be drawn from the famous passage in which Jakobson proposes his three-fold typology of translation, first presented in 1959:

1) Intralingual translation or \textit{rewording} is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language.

2) Interlingual translation or \textit{translation proper} is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language.

3) Intersemiotic translation or \textit{transmutation} is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.\textsuperscript{162}

However, whether or not Jakobson fully equated translation with interpretation is debatable, as Umberto Eco has shown\textsuperscript{163}. This need not detain us here.

In his classic book \textit{After Babel} (1975), George Steiner unequivocally states his preference for the same broad definition of translation that he found in Peirce (and

\textsuperscript{161} CP 5.284, W2:224; italics added.


A ‘theory’ of translation, a ‘theory’ of semantic transfer, must mean one of two things. It is either an intentionally sharpened, hermeneutically oriented way of designating a working model of all meaningful exchanges, of the totality of semantic communication (including Jakobson’s intersemiotic translation or ‘transmutation’). Or it is a subsection of such a model with specific reference to interlingual exchanges, to the emission and reception of significant messages between different [natural] languages. The preceding chapters have made my own preference clear. The ‘totalizing’ designation is the more instructive because it argues the fact that all procedures of expressive articulation and interpretive reception are translational, whether intra- or interlingually.  

A number of other semioticians also use term *translation* in its most general or ‘totalizing’ sense, as Peirce did. In this category we could certainly include Lotman, as discussed in Chapter 7, and other leading figures currently working in the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics tradition. For example, Peeter Torop has articulated a model of “total translation” intended “to account for any kind of translation, in principle.”

Kalevi Kull and Peeter Torop put it simply: “Translation is a transmission of meaning from one sign system to another.”

However, not all philosophers – or practitioners – of translation have been willing to accept the proposition that translation and interpretation are synonymous. In the essay already cited, Umberto Eco gives an excellent and thorough discussion of the question. In the end, Eco’s conclusion (with which I partly agree) is that it is useful, at least for some purposes, to reserve the term interpretation for a broader category than what is usually considered as translation:

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If the concept of interpretation is to be assumed in its widest sense (and its semiotic fecundity makes this advisable), it is clear that translation, at least in the sense of interlinguistic translation, is only a very limited type of interpretation.169

Or, more succinctly: “… translation is a species of the genus interpretation, governed by certain principles proper to translation.”170 Eco offers his own classification of the different forms of interpretation, as follows:

1. Interpretation by transcription
2. Intrasystemic interpretation
   2.1. Intralinguistic, within the same natural language
   2.2. Intrasemiotic, within other semiotic systems
   2.3. Performance
3. Intersystemic interpretation
   3.1. With marked variation in substance
      3.1.1. Interlinguistic, or translation between natural languages
      3.1.2. Rewriting
      3.1.3. Translation between other semiotic systems
   3.2. With mutation of continuum
      3.2.1. Parasyonymy
      3.2.2. Adaptation or transmutaion171

We need not dwell on Eco’s classification here, other than to note that it addresses what are arguably weaknesses and omissions in Jakobson’s simpler framework. Importantly, the highest order term in Eco’s classification is interpretation, a conscious nod to the general applicability of the terms interpretation and interpretant to all types of sign – linguistic and non-linguistic – in Peirce’s model.

Paul Ricoeur also considered the question of interpretation versus translation. Indeed, his study “The Paradigm of Translation” opens with the following paragraph:

Two different ways of access to the problem posed by the act of translation present

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169 Ibid., 76, italics added.
170 Ibid., 80, italics in original.
171 Ibid., 100.
themselves: either to take the term ‘translation’ in the narrow sense of the transference of a verbal message from one language to another or take it in a broader sense as a synonym of ‘interpretation’ that applies to the whole range of meaning within one and the same linguistic community.\footnote{172}

And, typically for Ricoeur, in the next sentence he observes that “Both approaches have arguments in favor of them.”\footnote{173} Indeed, Ricoeur concludes the essay without deciding in favour of one or the other approach. As he says: “For myself, I remain, it must be said, perplexed. … Yes, there are indeed two ways of taking up the problem of translation.”\footnote{174}

Nevertheless, the vast edifice of Ricoeur’s entire philosophical project can be legitimately characterised as an enterprise in the philosophy of language, premised on the paradigm of interpretation as translation, in its broadest possible sense. Thus, Domenico Jervolino claims that translation is – implicitly – a unifying theme which connects the entirety of Ricoeur’s philosophy, a theme that he only made explicit in his later writings. According to Jervolino, Ricoeur’s later thought represents the culmination of a lifelong progression through three successive paradigms—symbol, text and translation.\footnote{175} In a similar vein, Richard Kearney suggests that “Ricoeur’s thought represented both philosophy as translation and a philosophy of translation.”\footnote{176} Elsewhere Kearney claims that “Translation has been a central feature of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy, though it was not until his later years that he made it an explicit theme of his work.”\footnote{177}

\footnote{173} Ibid.
\footnote{174} Ibid., 119-20.
E.3  The Role of Language in Hermeneutics

The above discussion begs a question which warrants closer consideration. Is the hermeneutic act – “the apprehension of … worlds,” as Ricoeur characterises it – necessarily dependent on language, whether spoken or written? The question is entangled with an ambiguity in modern hermeneutics, between terms such as apprehension, interpretation, understanding, and explication. This ambiguity can be traced back to the time of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834). It remains a touchpoint for a major debate – between “expressive constitutive” versus “representational” viewpoints – in the contemporary philosophy of language. There is no need to review the broader debates here. Rather, I will focus on clarifying a point of apparent inconsistency in Ricoeur’s various statements on language and the hermeneutic enterprise.

Certainly, for Ricoeur, “to interpret is to explicate.” The clear implication, at least here, is that such explication is language-based, in the usual sense of human “language,” and involves discursive exchange with others. However, in his few remarks on aesthetics and art, mostly made late in his life, Ricoeur also allows for the possibility that universalised understandings are able be communicated directly – he says

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181 Ricoeur, “Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation”, in *Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences*, 141.
“iconically” – through the presentation of artists’ singular works to an audience, i.e. without any intermediate dependency on language.\textsuperscript{182}

Does this suggest a type of hermeneutic “explication” which is able to be presented non-linguistically, iconically, or ekphrastically, perhaps as a painting or a musical performance? It is tempting to contemplate a case for the affirmative. However, Ricoeur’s own writings provide little or no support in this regard. On the contrary, as far as I am aware, Ricouer never deviates from describing hermeneutics as an essentially philosophical or explicatory enterprise, always performed in language. Even the most generalised form of hermeneutics, i.e. a “meditation on [non-linguistic] symbols,”

starts from the fullness of language and of meaning already there; it begins from within language which has already taken place and in which everything in a certain sense has already been said.\textsuperscript{183}

In this context, Ricoeur’s remarks on religious faith and experience are illuminating.

For a philosophical inquiry, a religious faith may be identified through its language, or, to speak more accurately, as a kind of discourse. This first contention does not say that language, that linguistic expression, is the only dimension of the religious phenomenon; nothing is said – either pro or con – concerning the controversial notion of religious experience, whether we understand experience in a cognitive, a practical, or an

\textsuperscript{182} Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction, 178-79. See also: Annalisa Caputo, “Otherness and Singularity in Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of Works of Art,” Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies, 7, no. 2 (2016), 74-93. In relation to music, Roger W. H. Savage has pursued the hermeneutic possibilities of this under-developed train of thought in Ricoeur’s philosophy of imagination. For example, in Music, Time, and Its Other: Aesthetic Reflections on Finitude, Temporality, and Alterity (London: Routlegde, 2018), he argues that, in musical works, aporias of time and its other (i.e. eternity) may be mimetically construed as a “world.” In Savage’s words, music has a “worlding power” to iconically exemplify “a mimetic refiguration of time’s ultimate unrepresentability” (31) and its profoundly “aporetic character” (7). Such worlds are able to be apprehended directly – i.e. non-linguistically – through the singular aural experiences of listeners’ sensitive engagement with the sequential unfolding and progression (which may include apparent stasis) of the sonic materials through which the work is manifested. This type of direct apprehension depends irreducibly on a listener’s embodied, perceptual encounter with the spatiotemporal unfolding of the sonic dimensions of the work. Therefore, it cannot be properly accomplished apart from a real-time immersion in the totality of the aural experience (e.g. as intended by the composer in Western music). Savage’s development of these Ricoeurian ideas opens the door to the possibility of a renewed and constructive aesthetic engagement with the transcendent and sublime in music, contra the deconstructive and sceptical critiques typically encountered in new musicology. See, for example, Roger W. H. Savage, “Criticism, Imagination, and the Subjectivation of Aesthetics,” Philosophy and Literature, 29, no. 1 (2005): 164-79.

emotional sense. What is said is only this: whatever ultimately may be the nature of the so-called religious experience, *it comes to language, it is articulated in a language*, and the most appropriate place to interpret it on its own terms is to inquire into its linguistic expression.\(^{184}\)

These remarks could equally well have been directed towards unmediated aesthetic experience which, as with religious experience, Ricoeur kept at a deliberate distance from his philosophical work, favouring “the mediation of language.”\(^{185}\) To be sure, Ricoeur does not deny that there can be an unsayable or sublime aspect to personal “iconic” encounters with works of art or music, as is the case with personal religious experience.\(^{186}\) However, for such aesthetic or religious experiences to be *explicated* – to oneself or to others – they must be brought “to language,” if only incompletely and imperfectly. This is the domain of hermeneutics. For Ricoeur, “hermeneutics … aims … at *making explicit* the movement by which the text unfolds, as it were, a world in front of itself.”\(^{187}\)

From this brief excursus, I propose that Ricoeur’s consistent position can be summed up in two points, as follows. Firstly, the act of *apprehension* may be achieved either through linguistic or non-linguistic (“iconic”) means. However, the act of *explication* – or *interpretation* proper – is unavoidably and essentially linguistic.\(^{188}\)

Of course, as Ricoeur well understood, the art of poetry shows that the gesture of expressing something in spoken or written language is no guarantee of unambiguous or unequivocally transparent communication of meaning. Indeed, as Lotman argues (see Chapter 7), there is no such thing as a completely and unambiguously translatable message, except in the trivial case of a fully reversible mechanical coding.

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\(^{188}\) Similarly, for Lawrence Kramer, the “primary medium of interpretation [is] language.” See Kramer, *Interpreting Music*, 8.
E.4 Conclusion

Where does this leave us? Are “interpretation” and “translation” synonymous? For my part, I am inclined to follow Ricoeur, and leave the matter somewhat undecided and open-ended, to be settled case by case, depending on context. Certainly, I acknowledge the usefulness of retaining a distinction between translation and interpretation, at least in some contexts, as Eco argues. However, I am not persuaded that Eco’s proposed classification is the best available.\(^{189}\) In any case, the force of Eco’s argument is most strongly felt in relation to translation within and between natural languages.

For the purposes of this thesis – which is largely concerned with translations or interpretations within and between non-linguistic semiotic systems such as music, visual arts, and so on – insisting on a distinction between the two terms is a matter of little practical importance. Therefore, I shall use both translation and interpretation interchangeably. However, with Ricoeur, I consider that hermeneutic explication and interpretation, or exegesis – as undertaken in Part III of this thesis – is essentially a linguistic undertaking.

\(^{189}\) Other approaches to correcting some of the shortcomings of Jakobson’s classification have been put forward, but need not be discussed here.
Appendix F

Notes on Peirce’s Semiotic Theory

F.1 Introduction

This Appendix gives further background on Peirce’s semiotic theory, focusing on aspects which are most relevant for the purposes of this thesis.

Peirce invariably articulated his fundamental categories in groups of three, which he referred to as *trichotomies*. For this reason, his conception of semiotics is rightly described as *triadic*, in contrast with the *dyadic* tradition of semiotics, most prominently represented by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913).\(^{190}\)

F.2 Evolution of Peirce’s Semiotic Theory

At least three distinct formulations of Peirce’s theory of signs can be identified. Each subsequent version is more complex than the one prior. A chronological scheme that reflects Peirce’s own self-descriptive labels where possible, and is similar to those adopted by other Peirce scholars,\(^{191}\) is the one used by Albert Atkin\(^{192}\) –

- Early Account: 1867-8
- Interim Account: 1903
- Final Account: 1906-10

Importantly, many aspects of Peirce’s evolving model of signs remained unclear or unfinished at his death. Thus, his Final Account, mostly documented in letters to Lady

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\(^{190}\) Some argue that the simple label ‘dyadic’ does not do justice to Saussure’s nuanced theory of signs, and that the contrast between Peirce’s and Saussure’s models of sign is not as stark as generally portrayed. See, for example, Paul Thibault, *Re-reading Saussure: The Dynamics of Signs in Social Life* (London: Routledge, 1996). It is outside my scope to consider Saussure, or his relationship to Peirce, further.

\(^{191}\) Essentially the same periodisation, with slightly different labels, is used by many Peirce scholars, including: Savan, *An Introduction to C.S. Peirce’s Full System of Semiotic*; James Jakób Liszka, *A General Introduction to the Semiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).

Welby\textsuperscript{193}, has been characterised as “speculative, rambling, and incomplete.”\textsuperscript{194} Arguably, even the “relatively neat”\textsuperscript{195} Interim Account reveals ambiguities and inconsistencies on closer inspection.\textsuperscript{196} Most perplexingly, Peirce’s terminology was not constant, as the editors of his \textit{Collected Papers} long ago observed.\textsuperscript{197} This applies even to the most fundamental ontological term in his system, the very notion of “sign” itself.\textsuperscript{198}

### F.3 Diagrams for the Basic Sign-Object-Interpretant Relation

At the centre of Peirce’s semiotic theory is the basic triadic relationship of \textit{sign-object-interpretant}. Unfortunately, despite various attempts, this relation resists being illustrated in any unanimously accepted form. Notably, Peirce himself never gave a specific illustration of it.\textsuperscript{199} Often, Peirce’s most basic triad is simply illustrated as a variant of Ogden and Richards’ “signific triangle,”\textsuperscript{200} similar to the one shown in Fig. F.1.\textsuperscript{201}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{194} Atkin, “Peirce’s Theory of Signs.”
\item \textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{196} For example, the Interim Account postulates ten basic classes of sign, derived by eliminating 17 non-permissible combinations from the theoretical maximum of 27 combinatorial possibilities available from a 3x3x3 set. However, some have suggested that the rules for deciding which of the 27 possible combinations are permissible are not altogether clear in Peirce’s account, leading to various attempts to place Peirce’s ten-fold scheme on a stronger footing. See, for example, Len Olsen, “On Peirce’s Systematic Division of Signs,” \textit{Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society}, 36, no. 4 (2000): 563-78; Ralf Müller, “On the Principles of Construction and the Order of Peirce’s Trichotomies of Signs,” \textit{Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society}, 30, no. 1 (1994): 135-53. However, Albert Atkin demurs and states that the “rules for the permissible combinations in Peirce’s 1903 account are actually quite simple …”; see Atkin, \textit{Peirce}, 147. I tend to agree with Atkin but will not pursue this point any further.
\end{itemize}
However, I tend to agree with Floyd Merrell who argues that the “semiotic triangle” of Fig. F.1 is inadequate because “it evinces no genuine triadicity, but merely three-way dyadicity.” In the same book, Merrell proposes a tripod figure, similar to the one shown in Fig. F.2.

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**Figure F.1.** A Typical Triangular Illustration of Peirce’s Triadic Model of the Sign

**Figure F.2.** A Tripod Visualisation of Peirce’s Fundamental Sign Relation - Sign-Object-Interpretant

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203 Ibid., 13 (Fig. 1). Note that there Merrell retains Peirce’s *representamen* for “sign,” whereas, in Figs. F.2 and F.3, I have simply used sign. In his later books, Merrell develops more complicated variations on the basic tripod diagram. See, for example, Floyd Merrell, *Entangling Forms: Within Semiotic Processes* (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2010), 24 (Fig. 1), or 174 (Fig. 26). I am not convinced of their general utility and will not consider them further here.
While Peirce nowhere illustrates the basic *sign-object-interpretant* relation in a simple diagram, his writings do offer some justification for preferring the tripod form. Specifically, Peirce stated

that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations ... In existential graphs, a spot with one tail –X represents a quality, a spot with two tails –R– a dyadic relation. Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But you can never by such joining make a graph with three tails. You may think that a node connecting *three lines of identity* Y is not a triadic idea. But analysis will show that it is so. ... It is interesting to remark that while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to build graphs with every higher number of tails.  

Also, Peirce does use of the tripod form in his discussion of “trichotomic mathematics.”

Nevertheless, it is also true that, in other places, Peirce did not eschew the use of triangular diagrams to represent his increasingly complex typologies. The most important instance is in a letter to Lady Welby. While there is no need to review the details any further, C. W. Spinks rightly concludes “that the triangular structure is fundamental to Peirce’s thinking whether it is portrayed as a fork or a triangle.”

Both of the two most common diagrammatic representations of Peirce’s *sign-object-interpretant* relation – triangle and tripod – are justifiable. However, for my purposes, the tripod form is more useful, in the arrangement illustrated in Fig. F.3.

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204 CP 1.346-347, italics added. Similar passages occur elsewhere in Peirce’s papers, for example, CP 2.274. For a discussion of the disputed validity of Peirce’s claim that all higher-order relations can be composed of triads, see C. W. Spinks, *Peirce and Triadomania: A Walk in the Semiotic Wilderness* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 9.

205 CP 4.310

206 CP 8. 376; EP 2.491, where Peirce illustrates his ten-fold classification of signs as a lattice of equilateral triangles, the three apexes of each representing sign, object, or interpretant. See also Priscilla L. Farais and João Queiroz, “On Peirce’s Visualization of the Classifications of Signs: Finding a Common Pattern in the Diagrams,” in Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words: 100 Years of Semiotics, Communication and Cognition, ed. Torkild Thellefsen and Bent Sørensen (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2014), 527-35.

207 Spinks, *Peirce and Triadomania*, 13. Note that Spinks also offers his own proposal – a vertical perspective view of a pyramid – for illustrating Peirce’s triadic relations (p. 12, Fig. 3). I will not discuss it further.
Authors such as João Queiroz and Charbel Niño El-Hani have demonstrated that the basic triadic module, arranged as in Fig. F.3, is a good approach to depicting Peirce’s Final Account of the semiotic process. This tripod arrangement is especially convenient for illustrating multi-stage semiotic processes (see Chapter 5, Fig. 5.5), where each interpretant in the chain becomes a sign for a subsequent interpretation.

F.4 A Problematic Peircean Diagram from the Musicological Literature

A diagram which first appeared in Gilles-Gaston Granger’s *Essai d’une philosophie du style* (1968) has had wide circulation in the musicological literature (Fig. F.4). A version was included in Jean-Jacques Nattiez’s influential book *Music and Discourse* (1990). Raymond Monelle also used it, in his *Linguistics and Semiotics in Music* (1992). Both Nattiez and Monelle made it clear that their diagrams are based on the

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209 Ibid., 94, Fig.3


one from Granger’s book. Unfortunately, Nattiez’s text is formatted in a way that, without careful reading, it could give the false impression that the diagram is from Peirce’s own papers, rather than originating with Granger. This is perhaps what misled Robert Samuels, in his study Mahler’s Sixth Symphony (1995) into mistakenly asserting that the formulation shown in Fig. F.4 is “Peirce’s diagram,” which it certainly is not.

Figure F.4 A Potentially Misleading Diagrammatic Representation of Peirce’s Model of Semiosis (after Granger), and Often Copied. Permission to reproduce requested.

It is evident that Fig. F.4 fails to reflect several key aspects of Peirce’s Final Account, as discussed in Chapter 5. Specifically, the notions of Final Interpretant, Immediate Object, and Dynamic Object are not shown. Thus, in my view, Fig. F.4 is an inadequate representation of Peirce’s mature semiotic model. It seems to suggest that the object and the sign in the semiotic process remain fixed, as if they are Platonic “ideals,” while interpretants simply continue indefinitely. Indeed, as discussed in Section 5.7, this is the misreading of Peirce which Nattiez puts forward. To be fair to Nattiez and others who present diagrams such as Fig. F.4, Peirce’s Early Account could be read to mean

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213 See Nattiez, Music and Discourse, 6-7, which contains three long quotations from Peirce’s Collected Papers. Certainly, after a careful search, I have been unable to trace any diagram similar to Fig 1.1 in any of Peirce’s published papers.

214 Robert Samuels, Mahler’s Sixth Symphony: A Study in Musical Semiotics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 4. Samuels also conflates Peirce’s terminology with that of Saussure, an expository choice that does not seem useful to me. In so doing, he follows Umberto Eco, who also sought to conjoin Peirce with Saussure. However, as T. L. Short acerbically observes, “Eco fails as an expounder of Peirce’s semiotic.” See T. L. Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 228. Elsewhere, Short asserts that Saussurean semiology and Peirce’s semeiotic “are fundamentally incompatible.” (ibid., xiii; see also 19-20); I agree.

215 Granger, Essai d’une philosophie, 114, Fig. 10.
“that in every case the interpretant of a sign is another sign of the same object.”  

However, it does not do justice to the subtleties of Peirce’s Final Account (see Chapter 5).

F.5 Peirce’s Universal Categories

Peirce’s universal categories – firstness, secondness, thirdness – are not central to my argument. The details have been well-summarised more than once. However, as these categories feature in some musicological applications of Peirce (see Section 5.7), I will give a brief discussion here. Albert Atkin discusses how Peirce – at different times – arrived at the three universal categories in different ways. Specifically, Atkin describes a logical and a phenomenological derivation. Under the logical derivation, Peirce equates the three universal categories to the number of entities involved in a logical relation:

The three fundamental categories of fact are, fact about an object, fact about two objects (relation), fact about several objects (synthetic fact).

Atkin puts it well:

Firstness correlates with single-place predicates, secondness with two-placed predicates, and thirdness with three-placed predicates. ... Our experiences of qualities or feelings correlate with unsaturated monadic predicates; our experiences of brute existence or resistance correlate with dyadic predicates; our experiences of mediation, synthesis, and so on correlate with triadic predicates; and any other experience is in fact reducible to just these three kinds of relation.

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217 On Peirce’s universal categories see, for example, Savan, Introduction, 7-14; Atkin, Peirce, 219ff; Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 74.
219 CP 1.371.
220 Atkin, Peirce, 237.
It is not necessary to also review Peirce’s topological or phenomenological derivations of the universal categories.\textsuperscript{221}

The key point is that Peirce was convinced that there is a profoundly and irreducibly triadic structure to reality and all that it contains. He unequivocally asserted that three universal categories are both necessary and sufficient; there is no need for a category of fourness.\textsuperscript{222} The spiritual overtones of Peirce’s ontology cannot be dismissed,\textsuperscript{223} although they are not important to the present discussion. It is nevertheless notable that Peirce’s three universal categories have clear resonances with the conceptual and explanatory frameworks of scholars working in other fields, such as ontology\textsuperscript{224} and memory studies.\textsuperscript{225}

Perhaps the most important example I am aware of is the work by Stanley Salthe, on open-ended evolutionary systems in biology. As discussed in Chapter 1, Salthe reached the conclusion that the “smallest cluster of levels required to represent fundamental interactive relationships is a triad of contiguous levels.”\textsuperscript{226} He is well aware of the parallels between his work and Peirce’s universal categories.\textsuperscript{227}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{221} For a discussion of the phenomenological derivation, see ibid., 238-41. The topological basis for Peirce’s categories is discussed by Ketner, “Hartshorne and the Basis.”
\textsuperscript{222} EP 2. 267. Attempts have been made to argue that (i) Peirce’s three categories are reducible to one, or that (ii) three categories are insufficient to model the semiotic world, and that four, or more, categories are required. All these arguments have been critiqued – I think convincingly. See Appendix H.2 for a brief discussion of the reductionist/anti-reductionist question.
\textsuperscript{223} See, for example, Søren Brier, “The riddle of the Sphinx answered: On how C. S. Peirce’s transdisciplinary semiotic philosophy of knowing links science and spirituality,” in Death and Anti-Death, Volume 12: One Hundred Years After Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) (Ann Arbor, MI: Ria University Press, 2014): 47-130.
\textsuperscript{225} The tripartite model of memory proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin, first published in 1968, continues to find widespread support amongst non-reductionist scholars. See Alan Baddeley, Michael W. Eysenck, and Michael C. Anderson, Memory (Hove: Psychology Press, 2009). As Stephen Tyler, amongst others, has observed, the basic articulation of Atkinson and Shiffrin’s three-stage model is aligned with Peirce’s fundamental semiotic categories, i.e. iconic, indexical, and symbolic. See Stephen A. Tyler, “Memory and Discourse,” in Relations and Functions Within and Around Language, ed. Michael Cummins, Peter Fries, David Lockwood, and William Spruiell (London: Continuum, 2002): 189-224.
\textsuperscript{226} Salthe, Evolving Hierarchical Systems, 75, italics added. It may be noted that the different perspectives that I have adopted in this chapter, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, respectively align to the three levels of a scale hierarchy as Salthe defines it, i.e. a lower level (this chapter), a focal level (Chapter 7), and a higher level (Chapter 8). See Salthe, “Hierarchical Structures,” 358.
\textsuperscript{227} Stanley N. Salthe, “The System of Interpretance, Naturalizing Meaning as Finality,” Biosemiotics, 1 (2008): 285-94. See also Mogens Kilstrup, “Naturalizing semiotics: The triadic sign of Charles Sanders Peirce as a systems property,” Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 119, no. 3 (2015): 563-75. Notice also that there is a resonance between the model of musical meaning shown in Fig. 4.3 and Peirce’s universal categories, with musicogenic, intra-musical and extra-musical modes aligning to firstness, secondness, and thirdness respectively. As Koelsch shows, these modes can also be further divided into three, again with Peircean overtones. See Section 3.5.2.
\end{flushright}
Appendix G

Metaphor/Metonymy in Peirce’s Sign Classification

G.1 Introduction

In a short landmark paper, first published in 1956\textsuperscript{228}, Roman Jakobson elevated the importance of two tropes of classical rhetoric – metaphor and metonymy. While Jakobson’s bold insight has been much debated, its subsequent influence can hardly be over-estimated. To this day, it continues to reverberate in contemporary research into conceptual metaphor theory, and cognitive linguistics more generally.\textsuperscript{229}

Taking inspiration from Karl Bühler,\textsuperscript{230} Jakobson defined metaphor as a relation of similarity (and contrast), and metonymy as one of contiguity (and remoteness).\textsuperscript{231} Further, he linked this dichotomy to Saussure’s differentiation between syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes of discourse.\textsuperscript{232} In summary, Jakobson claimed that all human discourse – and sign systems generally – exhibit the same metaphoric and metonymic processes, which he portrayed as being located at two opposed poles along a continuum:

The dichotomy discussed here appears to be of primal significance and consequence for all verbal behavior and human behavior in general. … A competition between both devices, metonymic and metaphoric, is manifest in any symbolic process, be it intrapersonal or social.\textsuperscript{233}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{228} Roman Jakobson, “Two Aspects of Language [1956],” in Selected Writings II: Word and Language (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 239-59. This important paper has been often re-printed, in part or whole, for example, in René Dirven, and Ralf Pörings, eds., Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast, (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003), 41-47. In this thesis, I shall refer to the page numbers in Jakobson’s Selected Writings II.
\item \textsuperscript{229} See, for example, the papers in Antonio Barcelona, ed., Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads: A Cognitive Perspective (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003); Dirven and Pörings, eds., Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast.
\item \textsuperscript{230} Writing in 1967, Jakobson stated that “Karl Bühler’s book \textit{Sprachtheorie (1934)} ... still is for linguistics probably the most inspiring among all the contributions to psychology of language.” See Roman Jakobson, “Linguistics in Relation to Other Sciences [1967],” in Selected Writings II, 671. An English translation of \textit{Sprachtheorie} is Karl Bühler, \textit{The Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language}, trans. Donald Fraser Goodwin (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 1990). The principles of similarity and contiguity have historical precedents in Aristotle’s laws of association as discussed in his \textit{On Memory}.
\item \textsuperscript{231} Roman Jakobson, “Aphasia as a Linguistic Topic [1955],” in Selected Writings II, 232.
\item \textsuperscript{232} See, for example, the discussion in Paul Friedrich, “Polytropy,” in Beyond Metaphor: The Theory of Tropes in Anthropology, ed. James W. Fernandez (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 44.
\item \textsuperscript{233} Jakobson, “Two Aspects of Language,” 256-8, italics added.
\end{itemize}
Terrence Deacon discusses results from brain-imaging studies which lend a degree of empirical support to Jakobson’s theoretical synthesis.\textsuperscript{234} However, we should be cautious about unilaterally endorsing Jakobson’s binary opposition. Jeannette Littlemore points out that

the dividing line between metaphor and metonymy is by no means clear cut ... There is by no means a consensus regarding the nature of the difference between metaphor and metonymy.\textsuperscript{235}

However, a terminological distinction between resemblance (metaphor) and relatedness (metonymy) has a long and respectable pedigree across many disciplines. While there may grey areas and debates over detail, the high-level distinction between metaphor and metonymy is sufficiently useful to retain both terms in arts and music discourse.

**G.2 Reconciling Peirce & Jakobson**

Some authors have sought to reconcile Jakobson’s metaphor/metonymy opposition with Peirce’s tripartite classification of signs into icon/index/symbol.\textsuperscript{236} It was through Jakobson’s early advocacy that Peirce’s theory of semiotics became more widely known.\textsuperscript{237} Indeed, Jakobson was convinced that his and Peirce’s models of semiotics were compatible.\textsuperscript{238}

However, Jakobson does not appear to have fully grasped the irreducible triadicity of Peirce’s semiotic theory, and placed greater emphasis on binary oppositions.\textsuperscript{239} Nevertheless, despite the obvious challenge of aligning two categories with three, the parallels between the two models are sufficiently compelling to justify the attempt to bring them together.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{238} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
G.2.1 Iconicity & Metaphor

It turns out that Peirce only occasionally discusses metaphor. However, wherever he does, it is consistently treated as a sub-type of iconicity.\textsuperscript{240} So, any proposed alignment between Jakobson and Peirce would need to begin by equating metaphor with icon, and by extension with \textit{firstness}.

G.2.2 Indexicality & Metonymy

There appear to be no explicit references to metonymy in any of Peirce’s published writings.\textsuperscript{241} Nevertheless, as contiguity and relatedness are often cited as essential relations defining both metonymy\textsuperscript{242} and indexicality\textsuperscript{243}, there are good reasons to consider that metonymy is essentially an indexical relation. Glossing over differences in detail, a number of authors have arrived at the same conclusion.\textsuperscript{244} For example, in a broader discussion about the problem of distinguishing between metaphor and metonymy in cognitive linguistics, Klaus-Uwe Panther proposes\textsuperscript{s} that the difference between metaphor and metonymy resides in the type of semiotic relation between their respective source and target. I contend that metaphor is an \textit{iconic} relation and metonymy is an \textit{indexical} relation.\textsuperscript{245}

\textsuperscript{245} Panther, “Metonymy as a usage event,” 148, italics in original.
G.2.3 What About Symbols?

In his book *The Symbolic Species* (1997), Terrence Deacon draws on a range of neuroscientific evidence in order to explain the evolution of human language capabilities. Alluding to Peirce’s terminology,²⁴⁶ he claimed that iconic and indexical sign relations are semiotically universal across all living species, but only humans are capable of symbolic sign relations. He pictured a layered, hierarchical sequence governing the three types of signifying process.²⁴⁷ According to Deacon, all higher-order relationships must be preceded by at least one occurrence of each of the relations which are located lower in the hierarchy.

To generate an indexical interpretation of any sign vehicle requires interpreting it iconically and interpreting this iconicity with respect to other iconic interpretations, and interpreting it symbolically requires interpreting it indexically and interpreting this indexicality in context with other indexical interpretations.²⁴⁸

The main point to notice is that Deacon argues that symbolization is functionally different from iconic and indexical relations.

Symbolization enables substitutions that cross-logical-type (e.g. part for whole, member for class, word for phrase) levels in linguistic communications. Neither icons not indices can refer across logical types because of the involvement of sign vehicle properties (e.g. similarity of form, correlation in space or time) in determining reference. But because of the independence of sign vehicle properties from the objects of reference, symbols can represent other symbolic relationships including even combinations of symbols forming higher logical type units (such as phrases, whole sentences, and even narratives.)²⁴⁹

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²⁴⁷ Deacon, *Symbolic Species*, 75 (Fig. 3.1).
²⁴⁸ Deacon, “Beyond the Symbolic Species,” 16.
²⁴⁹ Ibid., 19.
G.3 Conclusion

From this brief review, I conclude that, in applying Peirce’s ideas in contemporary contexts, (1) metaphor is fundamentally an iconic sign relation, and (2) metonymy is indexical. The “missing” sign relation in Peirce’s scheme – symbolic – operates outside the metaphor/metonymy spectrum. Symbols, in Peirce’s triadic scheme, are founded on cultural conventions. These may be quite arbitrary. Or, some may have historically originated in metaphoric or metonymic relations which have subsequently become culturally conventional or ossified, so much so that their origins have largely been forgotten. Either way, as Deacon also argues, symbols operate at a different level to the metaphor/metonymy axis envisaged by Jakobson.

The terminological expansion outlined in this section is summarised in Fig. G.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peirce</td>
<td>firstness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>icon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakobson</td>
<td>metaphor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure G.1 Aligning Peirce’s Basic Sign Typology with Metaphor and Metonymy*
H.1 Introduction

One of the best definitions of *semiotics* that I know of is from Roman Jakobson. For Jakobson, semiotics deals with those *general principles* which underlie the *structure of all signs* whatever and with the character of their utilization within messages, as well as with the specifics of the various *sign systems* and of the diverse messages using those different kinds of signs.\(^{250}\)

Here the link between semiotics and the structuralist perspective is made plain. During the heyday of poststructuralism, dominated by such influential figures as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas, the paradigm of structuralism – which Jakobson did so much to establish – was widely critiqued and resisted.\(^{251}\) The excesses of structuralism taken to extremes are, today, plain enough. Jean-Jacques Nattiez aptly characterised the Structuralist paradigm at its apogee as follows: “In whatever way we approach it, structuralism is a denial of Time”.\(^{252}\) However, such excesses – where they occur – can hardly be blamed on Jakobson himself, whose scholarship was typically meticulous in detail and simultaneously bold in sweeping insights. Since the turn of the millennium, with the passing of the postmodern era, a more balanced re-assessment of the structuralist heritage has been taking place. There is today a growing recognition amongst scholars that there are many lasting achievements to be found in

\(^{250}\) Roman Jakobson, “Language in Relation to Other Communication Systems,” in *Selected Writings II*, 698, italics added.


\(^{252}\) Nattiez, *The Battle of Chronos and Orpheus*, 17. In this book, Nattiez posits an opposition between *semiotics* and *hermeneutics* which, in my view, is over-stated. The example of Peirce is sufficient to show that semiotic structures do not necessarily need to eliminate the temporal dimension. Judy Lochhead’s most recent book is devoted to the notion of “emergent structuring” as a viable approach to the analysis of contemporary art music. See Judy Lochhead, *Reconceiving Structure in Contemporary Music: New Tools in Music Theory and Analysis* (New York: Routledge, 2016). Lochhead approaches her subject as a considered response to the post-structuralist critique. However, she does not discuss Peirce, Jakobson, or Lotman. Thus, her book is not directly relevant to the semiotic framework that I develop in this thesis.
structuralism’s intellectual legacy. Perhaps the most important legacy is the most fundamental, recognized more in hindsight than at the time, i.e. discourse is impossible without some kind of structure, previously assumed or newly proposed.

### H.2 The Inescapable Need for Structure

Jean-Michel Rabaté has aptly observed that “Heidegger [who] appears as the first post-Structuralist ... like all post-Structuralists ... needs the concept of structure to proceed with his constructive destruction or ‘de-structuration’. “\(^{253}\) In other words, in order to participate in meaningful discourse about anything whatsoever – including the shortcomings of Structuralism – some kind of basic ontological framework – i.e. structure – of posited categories, definitions and distinctions is minimally and unavoidably necessary.

Without dwelling further on the historical context, there is no doubt that the discipline of semiotics is built on a number of foundations it shares with structuralism. In both cases there is the core assumption that at least some recurring patterns – or structures – exist (and are discoverable) in the unimaginably complex diversity of sign use by human (and other biological) agents, in their interactions with each other and their environments. Rabaté puts it plainly: “semiotics ... [is] the logical extension of Structuralism to the study of culture as a whole.”\(^{254}\)

However, it is important to emphasize that, in contemporary semiotic thought, acceptance of certain principles associated with Structuralism is not the same as assuming that all human behaviour and culture can be reduced to the mechanistic unwinding of predetermined forces. Agency, intention and contingency mean that there is always an irreducible remainder of uncertainty and unpredictability, inextricably bound up with deep and hidden contradictions.\(^{255}\) Here, of course, I am articulating a strong anti-reductionist position, with a Hegelian twist. As can be inferred from the

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\(^{254}\) Ibid., 23. For the shared intellectual history of Structuralism and semiotics see, for example, Chandler, *Semiotics*, 1-11; Nöth, *Handbook of Semiotics*, 298-306.

\(^{255}\) As John Burbidge argues, contingency and contradiction lie at the heart of Hegel’s philosophical system. See Burbidge, *Hegel’s Systematic Contingency*, 19-20.
epigraph by Goethe which I quote at the start of this thesis, I do not subscribe to a reductionist philosophy. However, I will not embark on a defence of anti-reductionism here. Suffice to say that I agree with John Burbidge’s eloquent summation of the anti-reductionist viewpoint:

Since the action of the complex whole operates in ways quite different from the actions of its more basic components, any explanation cannot simply consider the latter in isolation if it is to be adequate, but must also take into account both the way the elements mesh together into a reciprocal dynamic and the features and modes of operation of the unit as a whole. Those features and functions have emerged from the complex interaction, and cannot be extrapolated by simply adding together the features and functions of the parts in isolation.

Paul Ricoeur observed that structuralist methods and a structuralist philosophy were, for him, clearly distinguished.

I have always made a clear distinction between a structuralist philosophy and a structural study of specific texts. I have considerable appreciation for the latter approach, because it is a manner of doing justice to the text and of extending it to the fullest dimension of its internal articulations, independent of the author’s intentions, and hence of the author’s subjectivity. This aspect of structuralism was not foreign to me as I had always espoused, under the title of the semantic autonomy of the text, the idea that the text escapes its author and signifies for itself. ... I distinguish this from a structuralist philosophy, which draws from its practice a general doctrine in which the subject is eliminated from its position as the author of discourse.

I agree with Ricoeur’s balanced assessment, and see no good reason to forgo the search for explanatory structures – which may certainly involve the temporal dimension – that aid in the study and understanding of literary, artistic or musical “texts”.

257 Burbidge, Cause for Thought, 97.
258 Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction, 77.
Appendix I

Modelling Systems Theory

1.1 Introduction

In the final years of his life, and knowing that he was nearing the end of a remarkably prolific career, Thomas A. Sebeok (1920 – 2001) worked on three volumes that he considered to be the culmination of a series of “a dozen of so others” devoted to themes in general and applied semiotics. The first two titles were –

- *Forms of Meaning* (2000), co-authored with Marcel Danesi;

Sebeok also foreshadowed a third book, with the projected English title *The Semiotic Self*. As Sebeok explained, he saw these three volumes as a vehicle for highlighting two “critical notions” for the future development of semiotic theory, the importance of which he had not fully recognized in his own earlier work. These were –

- Jakob von Uexkull’s *Umwelt* research; and
- the concept of *modelling systems*, as developed by Juri Lotman and the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics.

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259 For an overview of Sebeok’s achievement, see Paul Cobley, John Deely, Kalevi Kull, and Susan Petrilli, eds., *Semiotics Continues to Astonish: Thomas A. Sebeok and the Doctrine of Signs* (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2011), especially the introductory essay by the editors (pp.1-17).
264 Sebeok, *Global Semiotics*, ix
I.2 Relevance for Semiotic Studies in Music and the Arts?

For semiotic studies in music and the arts, the most important of the volumes cited above is *Forms of Meaning*. This is devoted to an exposition of a universal theory of semiotic modelling systems. It owes much to the pioneering work of Lotman and the Tartu-Moscow School. However, its aims are, if anything, even more all-encompassing. Indeed, Sebeok and Danesi’s *modelling systems theory* (MST) is, arguably, the most ambitious attempt in the history of semiotics to synthesize multiple theoretical speculations and viewpoints into a single overarching framework. Besides references to Lotman, Roman Jakobson, and Mikhail Bakhtin, to name a few, the influence of Peirce’s ideas – especially his basic categories of *firstness*, *secondness*, and *thirdness* – is paramount. So much so, that the over-arching structure of MST is divided into a tripartite scheme of *primary*, *secondary*, and *tertiary modelling systems*. Sebeok and Danesi conclude *Forms of Meaning* with a prescribed list of tasks that need to be considered when undertaking a *systems analysis*, i.e. a detailed analysis of the different characteristics of the specific semiotic systems that may be identifiable in a given situation.

In the years since it was first presented, *modelling systems theory* has been occasionally adopted as theoretical framework in applied studies, but perhaps not to the extent that Sebeok and Danesi may have originally hoped. Applied semiotic studies which have relied, to a greater or lesser extent, on the MST paradigm include those by Danesi and Bockarova, Moser, Raudla, and Taha. Meanwhile, Danesi has published several recent papers which present an outline of MST and continue to argue for its wider adoption in contemporary semiotic research.

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265 However, as Petrilli and Ponzio point out, the “totalizing orientation” of Sebeok’s is counterbalanced with an openness towards continuing discovery. For this reason, Sebeok referred to his semiotic framework as “a doctrine of signs” – not “a science” or “a theory” – “adapted from John Locke according to whom a doctrine is a body of principles and opinions that vaguely form a field of knowledge.” Petrilli and Ponzio, *Thomas Sebeok and the Signs of Life*, 25.

266 Sebeok and Danesi, *Forms of Meaning*, 10.

267 Ibid., 170, Fig. 56.


271 Taha, *Heroizability*.

The direction sketched by Sebeok and Danesi in their *modelling systems theory* is important and promising. It deserves to be more widely investigated in applied semiotic research than, to date, appears to have been the case. For my purposes, however, the full repertoire of MST distinctions and terminology is not required. This is essentially for the same reason that, as discussed in Chapter 5, I have not attempted to apply Peirce’s detailed sign typologies in classifying the detailed features of a given musical work or performance, viz. that the entities of primary interest are all interconnected, overlapping and continuously evolving combinations of the detailed sub-categories posited in detailed classification schema.

Putting it in the terminology of MST itself, I suggest that virtually all non-trivial examples of musical and artistic works fall into the category which Sebeok and Danesi have labelled as “connective,” involving “metaforms,” “meta-metaforms,” and “meta-symbols.” In their scheme, “Discourse is a pliable tertiary modelling system.”273 However, such labels do little to enhance the interpretation of such discourse. In other words, the more granular classificatory categories of MST tend to suffer from the same difficulties of application to complex real art-world examples, as do Peirce’s detailed sign typologies. For this reason, I have not pursued MST in this thesis.

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Appendix J

The Character & Iconography of Pierrot

J.1 Introduction

Several of the works discussed in this thesis are united by the central role played by Pierrot, the archetypical tragic-comic clown, first made famous in *commedia dell’arte*. In this Appendix, I give an overview of the Pierrot character, highlighting specific aspects of historical context, his/her persona, cultural associations and visual iconography. My aim is certainly not to offer anything like a comprehensive study of Pierrot. That would be a vast undertaking in its own right, well outside my scope. Rather, my aim is merely to present some background information which is important to the exegetical case studies included in this thesis. Specifically, I concentrate on the Belle Époque, a period when many of the present-day clichés and the key foundational texts regarding Pierrot originated.

J.2 *Commedia dell’arte* Origins

The masks of the clown – and specifically of Pierrot – have been a standard trope in the visual arts, theatre and music at least since the Italian *commedia dell’arte* of the seventeenth century. Jean-Antoine Watteau’s famous portrait of *Pierrot* (formerly known as *Gilles*) (ca. 1720) (Fig. J.1) captures an early version of Pierrot, as the childlike, lovesick buffoon of traditional *commedia dell’arte*. Other paintings of the

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era, for example by Watteau and Nicolas Lancret (Fig. J.2) show Gilles-Pierrot holding a guitar. This is evidence that the cliché of Pierrot as guitar-playing musician was already well-established in the visual iconography of the early eighteenth century.

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**Figure J.1**   Pierrot (formerly Gilles), Jean-Antoine Watteau (ca. 1718-19)


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279 Although Pierrot is often portrayed as a musician, the exact type of stringed instrument associated with him has varied, and includes not only the guitar, but also the lute and mandolin.

280 For approximate dating of this postcard, refer: *La Maison d’Édition Ilya Lapina à Paris. Sergueï Solomko* (Kirov: Krepostonov, 2013), 264 (No. 1158).
Figure J.2. Nicolas Lancret, Les acteurs de la Comédie italienne (between 1716 and 1736). Original painting: Musée de Louvre. Reproduced from a postcard published Paris: Lapina (ca. 1914-27),

author’s collection.

J.3 Jean-Gaspard Deburau

It is universally agreed that the most important and revolutionary transformation of Pierrot occurred in the early nineteenth-century, with the performances of Jean-Gaspard Deburau (1796-1846) at the Théâtre des Funambules in Paris. By all accounts, Deburau’s Pierrot was a complex creation, both naïve and nasty, simultaneously a villain and a victim. At times he took on the cloak of a melancholic, sensitive and anguished artist, an association which has continued as a defining hallmark of the Pierrot character into the present era.
In an engraving first published in 1840, Deburau’s Pierrot is shown holding a bottle of wine or perhaps champagne (Fig. J.3). The identification of Pierrot with alcohol – and its abuse – has continued ever since. Some – but by no means all – of Deburau’s scenarios centered on the classic love triangle between the three commedia dell’arte characters: Columbine, Harlequin, and Pierrot. Over time, this trio became increasingly prominent in the iconography of Pierrot, eventually being transformed into the familiar clichés of twentieth-century kitsch.

Figure J.3. Deburau as Pierrot, from a lithograph published in 1840

Source: Author’s collection.


285 As Paul Verlaine put it in his poem “Pantomime,” from the collection Les Fêtes Galantes (1869) –

“Pierrot, qui n’a rien d’un Clitandre,
Vide un flacon sans plus attendre,
Et, pratique, entame un pâté.”


286 Storey, Pierrots on the Stage of Desire, 22.

287 Galerie, 1840.
With Deburau, Pierrot had become Everyman, “the hapless butt of every cruel jest that an inscrutable fate chose to play on him.”

Deburau and the Pierrot character that he created were idolised by writers who frequented the Théâtre des Funambules, such as Théophile Gautier (1811-1872) and Théodore de Banville (1823-1891). It is they, not Deburau directly, who were responsible for introducing the moon – and contriving an association with the folk song *Au clair de la lune* – into the core mythology of Pierrot’s symbolic universe.

After Deburau’s death, in 1846, Pierrot pantomimes at the Théâtre des Funambules continued, with influential new scenarios written by Champfleury and performed by Paul Legrand. It was Champfleury’s *Pierrot pendu* – performed in 1846 and 1847 – which introduced the hanging Pierrot, a trope which gained currency over the following decades, as ever darker versions of Pierrot became popular. Notably, this variant of Pierrot turned up in the marionette play *Pierrot pendu* (1898) by Lemercier de Neuville, staged at the Nouveau Théâtre de Guignol (Fig. J.4). Meanwhile, the full cast of *commedia dell’arte* characters – Polichinelle, Arlequin, Cassandre, Columbine, and of course Pierrot – became an established feature of the marionette plays staged in the 1860s, at Louis Duranty’s puppet theatre in the Tuileries Garden.

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291 The nom-de-plume of Jules François Félix Fleury-Husson (1820-1889).


By the fin-de-siècle, there were several variants of a darker, melancholic, decadent, androgynous and criminal Pierrot character on the scene. An early example is Jean Richepin’s pantomime Pierrot assassin [“Pierrot, Murderer”] (1883 [1881])[297] – a scenario comprised of three tableaux, involving murder, a ghost, and madness – with Sarah Bernhardt playing the role of Pierrot in the premiere performance (Fig. J. 5).[298]
Two years earlier, this had been preceded by a similarly unhinged suicidal murderer in Paul Margueritte’s pantomime Pierrot assassin de sa femme [“Pierrot, Murderer of His Wife”] (1882), who murders his unfaithful wife by tickling the soles of her feet until she laughed to death! First performed by Marguerrite himself in 1881, to music composed by Paul Vidal, this pantomime was popular for years to come. Margueritte later recollected his Pierrot as “my satanic, ultra-Romantic, and yet very


300 The incipt on p. [iii] of the first edition explicitly states that the first performance was in 1882, at the Théâtre de Valvins, Seine-et-Marne. However, this is surely an error. All other sources confirm that the premiere performance was given at that theatre in 1881. See, for example, Daniel Gerould, “Paul Margueritte and ‘Pierrot Assassin of His Wife’,” *The Drama Review: TDR*, 23, no. 1 (1979): 103-12; Storey, *Pierrots on the Stage of Desire*, 330.

modern conception: a subtle, neurotic, cruel, and ingenuous Pierrot, \textit{uniting in himself all contrasts}, a veritable physical Proteus, a bit sadistic, willingly drunken and perfectly villainous.”\textsuperscript{302}

In that same year, the debauched “Pierrot Noir” (Black Pierrot) character suddenly came to prominence \textit{via} the superb cover design by Jules Chéret for Léon Hennique and Joris-Karl Huysmans’ pantomime \textit{Pierrot Sceptique} [“Pierrot the sceptic”] (1881) (Fig. J.6).\textsuperscript{303} Huysmans himself stated that Chéret’s illustration was the first time that Pierrot had been portrayed in a black tailcoat.\textsuperscript{304} While that claim is not precisely accurate, \textit{Pierrot Sceptique} was undoubtedly one of the very earliest and most influential appearances of Pierrot Noir.\textsuperscript{305} Dressed in his dandified black suit (in mourning for his wife\textsuperscript{306}), the Pierrot Noir of \textit{Pierrot Sceptique} was, if anything, an even more depraved and violently cruel criminal creation than any of his most vicious Pierrot Blanc predecessors. This particular Pierrot Noir murders his tailor, executes a mannequin (after raping it), and then sets fire to his rooms in order to destroy all evidence. Laura Purcell-Gates points out that, in the Pierrot tradition of the era, “whiteness [was linked] with both purity and sterility and blackness with \textit{bêtise} [“foolishness” or “stupidity”] and the overflowing of corporeality … ”\textsuperscript{307}


\textsuperscript{304} Huysmans (ca. 1889), reported in Paul Hugounet, \textit{Mimes et Pierrots: Notes et Documents inédits pour servir à l'Histoire de la Pantomime} (Paris: Libraire Fischbacher, 1889), 218.

\textsuperscript{305} Jean-Marie Seillan points out that, while \textit{Pierrot Sceptique} was one of the earliest appearances of the Pierrot Noir variant, it was not the very first. That honour apparently goes to \textit{Le Duel} (1879), a renowned show by the Hanlon-Lees performing troupe. See: Jean-Marie Seillan, “Silence, on fantasme: Lecture de \textit{Pierrot sceptique, Pantomime de L. Hennique et J.-K. Huysmans},” \textit{Romantisme: Revue du dix-neuvième siècle}, 22, no. 75 (1992): 82, n. 46. Also Storey, \textit{Pierrots on the Stage of Desire}, 219.


Before long, Pierrot Blanc and Pierrot Noir sometimes came to represent two opposed poles inherent in human nature, symbolising good and evil. However, such associations were not universally accepted. As Paul Hugenout recounts, opinions on the matter of Pierrot’s garb differed at the time.³⁰⁸ For example, in about 1889, Paul Margueritte – well aware of the Pierrot Noir innovation of Pierrot sceptique – insisted that Pierrot’s costume, even when portraying the murderer in his Pierrot assassin de sa femme, must always be white.³⁰⁹ For Margueritte, Pierrot – only ever to be dressed in white – was essentially the tragic embodiment of fear, resulting from the terror and anguish of his crimes.³¹⁰

Few of his contemporaries shared Margueritte’s strongly held views regarding Pierrot’s costume. Indeed, Pierrot Blanc and Pierrot Noir would often appear together, perhaps never more famously than in Michel Carré and André Wormser’s highly successful

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³⁰⁸ Hugounet, Mimes et Pierrots, 218 ff.
³⁰⁹ Paul Margueritte (ca. 1889), quoted in Hugounet, Mimes et Pierrots, 228.
³¹⁰ Ibid. Also Storey, Pierrot: A Critical History, 123.
musical pantomime *L’Enfant prodigue* [“The Prodigal Child”] (1890).³¹¹ This was captured in Adolphe Willette’s renowned poster for the production (Fig. J.7). Willette himself seems to have viewed Pierrot Noir as the apostate alter-ego of Pierrot Blanc, fallen from grace. This is evident in a short allegorical piece, published in *Le Chat Noir* in 1884, where he talks of a party-going, womanising Pierrot “whose white blouse was stained and, not being able to clean it, he cried and became grey, and then became black.”³¹² The same trope – good (Pierrot Blanc) *versus* bad (Pierrot Noir) – is at play in the cover illustration for the first issue the weekly review which Willette launched in 1888, named, aptly enough, *Le Pierrot* (Fig. J.8).³¹³

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³¹³ *Le Pierrot*, 1 (6 July 1888).
Regardless of his (or her) garb, the fin-de-siècle Pierrot had become the ultimate cipher, able to take on virtually any and all roles, emotions, and experiences available to the human condition. This recalls Derrida’s much-quoted statements on mime, made in response to Stéphane Mallarmé’s critical poem “Mimique” (1897), itself a response to Margueritte’s Pierrot assassin de sa femme:

The mime imitates nothing … But … [t]here is mimicry. … We are faced then with mimicry imitating nothing …

Later he adds:

The Mime mimes reference. He is not an imitator; he mimes imitation.

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315 Derrida, Dissemination, 205-206.
316 Ibid., 219.
Nevertheless, despite the inherently unbounded polysemy of mime, as highlighted by Derrida, it was the tragic version of Pierrot who resonated most with the decadent aesthetic which flourished in fin-de-siècle artistic and literary circles.

It was into this milieu that the Belgian poet Albert Giraud\textsuperscript{317} published his \textit{Pierrot Lunaire: Rondels bergamasques} (1884).\textsuperscript{318} This is a collection of fifty poems – or \textit{rondels}\textsuperscript{319} – entirely in keeping with the neurotic, debauched and fragmented persona of Pierrot which was then current.\textsuperscript{320} Most of the poems allude to well-known aspects of Pierrot’s fictional world as it had evolved up to that time. However, there is no clearly defined narrative arc which connects them. Rather, each poem is a self-contained, impressionistic vignette, all adhering to the same formulaic “rondel” structure which Giraud had adopted from the Parnassians, such as Théodore de Banville, who he so much admired.\textsuperscript{321} The overall mood is one of unrequited love, reckless dissolution and hopeless despair, with individual poems devoted to such subjects as drunkenness, robbery, narcissism, death and suicide.

Richard Kurth points out the pun in Giraud’s title \textit{Pierrot Lunaire}:

Giraud’s Pierrot takes the moon [\textit{la lune}] as his emblem, but is the very opposite of \textit{l’une}: instead of being self-identical, he is \textit{lunaire}, a moonstruck lunatic and a reflecting blank whose identity, if one can call it that, is everywhere and nowhere.\textsuperscript{322}

Giraud followed up the success of \textit{Pierrot Lunaire} with a spoken word play, titled \textit{Pierrot Narcisse} (1887),\textsuperscript{323} involving Pierrot, Harlequin and Cassander in the lead roles. Here the Pierrot is portrayed as a narcissistic poet out of touch with reality, who

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[317]{Nom-de-plume of Marie-Émile-Albert Kayenbergh (1860-1929).}
\footnotetext[318]{Gregory C. Richter, ed. and trans., \textit{Albert Giraud’s Pierrot Lunaire}, [bilingual edition] (Kirksville, MI: Truman State University Press, 2001).}
\footnotetext[319]{Giraud’s rondel form was adopted from the work of Parnassians, such as Théodore de Banville. See Bryn-Julson and Mathews, \textit{Inside Pierrot Lunaire}, 83-84.}
\footnotetext[320]{Giraud was in correspondence with Karl Huysmans and would have been well aware of the decadent Pierrot Noir variant. See Philippe Barascud, “Huysmans et ses correspondants belges,” in \textit{Échanges épistolaires franco-belges}, ed. André Guyaux and Sophie Vanden Abeele-Marchal (Paris: PUPS, 2007), 130.}
\footnotetext[322]{Kurth, “\textit{Pierrot’s Cave},” 236, n. 22.}
\end{footnotes}
eventually has to break a mirror in order to be released from the dream-world and stay alive. With this publication, the element of the mirror – already present in Pierrot Lunaire\(^{324}\) – is further cemented into the Pierrot tradition.

The cult for all-things commedia dell’arte – and Pierrot in particular – was a global phenomenon, spreading into most major cities of the cosmopolitan world, including in Europe, Great Britain, United States, and Russia\(^ {325}\). By the turn of the century, Pierrots were everywhere to be seen, in masquerade and carnival costumes, salon paintings,\(^ {326}\) porcelain figures,\(^ {327}\) postcards, advertising posters, and, of course, the Pierrot-costumed character of Canio in Leoncavallo’s highly popular opera Pagliacci (1892) (Fig. J.9). In German-speaking countries, the fractured, moon-struck version of the Pierrot persona was a perfect icon for the fin-de-siècle zeitgeist in Berlin and Vienna.\(^ {328}\) Pantomimes and mimodramas were standard fare on the cabaret stages of the era; Pierrot was a stock character.\(^ {329}\) German-language writers enthusiastically embraced pantomime, both as a genre and as a literary trope.\(^ {330}\) In 1892, Otto Erich Hartleben (1864-1905), a highly respected poet and author, published his German translations of Giraud’s rondels.\(^ {331}\)

\(^{324}\) Rondel No. 47 in Pierrot Lunaire is titled “Le Miroir.”

\(^{325}\) In addition to the standard references cited above (see n.123), see also: Clayton, Pierrot in Petrograd.

\(^{326}\) For example: Gaston La Touche (1854-1913), Scène de Carnaval (1909); Guillaume Seignac (1870-1924), Pierrot Vainqueur (1913).


\(^{329}\) Percival Pollard, Masks and Minstrels of New Germany (London: William Heinemann, 1911).

\(^{330}\) Hartmut Vollmer, Die literarische Pantomime: Studien zu einer Literaturgattung der Moderne (Bielefeld: Aisthesis Verlag, 2011). Karin Wolgast, Die Commedia dell’arte im Wiener Drama um 1900 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1993).

\(^{331}\) Otto Erich Hartleben, Albert Giraud Pierrot Lunaire (Berlin: A. Liebmam, 1892).
In the same year, Richard Beer-Hofmann created his dark and violent pantomime *Pierrot Hypnotiseur* (1892), which remained unpublished at the time, but was performed for *Jung Wien* audiences. The plot centres on Pierrot’s attempt to use hypnosis in order to release a pregnant Columbine from her emotional dependence on an abusive and alcoholic Harlequin. When this fails, Pierrot resorts to murder-suicide as the means to end both Columbine’s and his own suffering. Other contemporaneous appearances of a suicidal and decadent Pierrot in German language works include: Richard Schaukal’s *Pierrot und Colombine, oder das Lied von der Ehe* [“Pierrot and Columbine, or the Marriage Song”] (1902), and Arthur Schnitzler’s *Schleier der Pierrette* [“The Veil of Pierrette”] (1910), in which Columbine is renamed Pierrette.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) Pierrette, the female form of Pierrot, is found at least as early as the 1880s, often with the two characters appearing together in illustrated scenes as children or infantilised adults. For example J. Burgmein (pseud. Giulio
The figure of the Dandy – already associated with Pierrot by Giraud – also appeared as a widespread variation on the Pierrot persona developed by German writers and composers.\textsuperscript{335}

Meanwhile, the success of \textit{L’Enfant prodigue}, which toured widely throughout Europe and England, had set the standard for Pierrot costumes for years to come.\textsuperscript{337} Back in France, Adolphe Willette not only helped to fuel the continuing Pierrot craze, by producing vast numbers of illustrations and caricatures depicting white and black Pierrots, he often dressed in Pierrot costume himself, typically in black.\textsuperscript{338} Georges Wague (1874-1965), one of the greatest French mimes and silent film actors the Belle Époque era, played both the Pierrot Blanc and Pierrot Noir characters in a number of productions.\textsuperscript{339} He starred in the first feature-length film produced in Europe, \textit{L’Enfant prodigue} (1907), directed by Michel Carré himself, and based on his stage pantomime.

\section*{J.5 Pierrot into the Twenties & Beyond}

Pierrot’s popularity continued to flourish during the post-war exuberance of the 1920s. The core trio of characters – Pierrot, Columbine (sometimes named Pierrette), and Harlequin – were ubiquitous in the visual arts, crafts and postcards of the Art Deco era, not to mention in advertising graphics and popular culture generally. Often the Pierrot persona became even more androgynous or feminine than his \textit{fin-de-siècle} predecessors (Fig. J.10), laying the foundations for the countless kitsch representations which became prevalent in subsequent decades.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{339} Tristan Rémy, \textit{Georges Wague: Le Mime de la Belle Époque} (Paris: Georges Girard, 1964), plate between p.16 and p. 17.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Figure J.10  Female or Androgynous Pierrots

Source: Author’s collection.

(a) Christiane Mendelys in L’Enfant Prodigue [probably a film tie-in] (ca. 1907)
(b) Postcard, by Scattina (ca. 1913)
(c) Postcard, photographer unknown (ca. 1930s (?))
(d) Postcard, photographer unknown (ca. 1939)
The later development of Pierrot into virtually every corner of twentieth-century and contemporary culture is far too complex to trace any further here. Suffice to say that Pierrot continues to hold an attraction for contemporary artists, such as David Bowie (Chapter 9) and Lady Gaga, despite – or perhaps because of – character’s clichéd omnipresence. Nevertheless, throughout a myriad of guises and interpretations, the essential aspects of Pierrot’s persona and visual iconography have been well-established and relatively stable for at least a century.

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340 See, for example, Green and Swan, *The Triumph of Pierrot.*

341 Lady Gaga’s single and official video “Applause” (2013) features the artist dressed as Pierrot. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pc9kroVgQ.
Appendix K

Nelson Goodman on Worldmaking

In *Ways of Worldmaking* (1978), Nelson Goodman discusses five different ways through which a world can be created out of another world: (a) composition and decomposition, (b) weighting, (c) ordering, (d) deletion and supplementation, and (e) deformation. He is quick to add that his “classification is not offered as comprehensive or clearcut or mandatory. Not only do the processes illustrated often occur in combination but the examples chosen sometimes fit equally well under more than one heading.”

To a considerable extent, Goodman’s classification – which is still sometimes referred to by some recent authors – was overshadowed, at the time and subsequently, by his radical positions on a number of fundamental philosophical issues. Specifically, he is agnostic with respect to the traditional philosophical oppositions of realism versus anti-realism, and monism versus pluralism. Goodman asserts that “the issue between monism and pluralism tends to evaporate under analysis. If there is but one world, it embraces a multiplicity of contrasting aspects; if there are many worlds, the collection of them all is one.” Also, he describes his philosophy as “irrealist,” indifferent to the competing claims of realist and anti-realist viewpoints.

In an important review of *Ways of Worldmaking*, Paul Ricoeur describes his assessment of Goodman’s position as “a mixture of agreement and disagreement.”

On the one hand, Ricoeur

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343 Ibid., 7-17.
344 Ibid., 16-17.
348 Ibid., 209.
[has] no hesitation in acknowledging that I heartily approve the daring attempt to go further than Cassirer in the recognition of the plurality and irreducibility of world-versions.\(^349\)

However, on the other hand, Ricoeur does not agree with Goodman’s radically relativist argument that there are only world versions with no “world in itself before or beneath these versions.”\(^350\) He puts forward an alternative position in which still allows for the existence of a real, albeit opaque, and perhaps never completely discoverable world. According to Ricoeur,

> the world may be more than each version without being apart from it. It is the very experience of making that yields that of discovering. And discovering is to confront the opacity of the world. The world is included-excluded as the horizon of each intentional aiming. It is not something to which versions refer, but that out of which, or against the background of which, versions refer.\(^351\)

Similarly, Ricoeur does not accept Goodman’s arguments regarding the irrelevancy of truth, and its complete displacement by multiple “right versions” of worlds dependent only on context.\(^352\)

It is beyond my scope to embark on a detailed discussion of Goodman’s pluralist and relativist philosophy.\(^353\) Powerful critiques – especially of irrealism – have been given by W. J. T. Mitchell\(^354\) and Hilary Putnam,\(^355\) amongst others.\(^356\) Like Ricoeur, I accept the fundamental principle of worldmaking as a major insight, but pull back from the radical extremes of Goodman’s overall argument. Like Peirce, I do not accept nominalist or anti-realist arguments to the effect that there is no underlying reality – no

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\(349\) Ibid.

\(350\) Ibid., 201.

\(351\) Ibid., 212, emphasis added.

\(352\) Ibid., 213-14.

\(353\) For an excellent entry point into the literature, see Peter J. McCormick, ed., *Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism, and Irrealism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).


matter how opaque it might be – corresponding to our ideas and conceptions of the world.357

For my purposes, Goodman’s key point – with which I agree – is that worldmaking sits at the heart of all constructive and creative acts in the arts, as well as in the sciences. In this important respect, Goodman’s conception of worldmaking is “congenial” 358 with contemporary approaches to cultural and literary studies. However, unlike Goodman – and with Peirce – I hold that the worlds which are made should ultimately bear some truthful relationship, able to be abductively tested and refined, to a real and existent (i.e. not merely constructed) world. However, as Peirce himself cautions, “man’s truth is never absolute because the basis of Fact is hypothesis.”359

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357 For a recent discussion, see Paul Forster, Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
359 W.17 (1854?)
Appendix L

Lotman on Creative Translation

The idea of translation (Ru. перевода, perevoda) is central to Lotman’s model of cultural semiotics. In the Russian language, the word ‘perevoda’ has broadly the same connotations as ‘translation’ does in English. For Lotman, there is a critical distinction to be drawn between creative or artistic translation (which produces new information) and rote conversions between two artificial codes (which produce no genuinely new information). He illustrates creative translation using the following diagram:

![Figure L.1. Juri Lotman’s Model of Artistic Translation (after Lotman, Universe of Mind, 15, corrected to align with Lotman, Семиосфера, 159). Reproduced with permission of The Licensor through PLSclear.](image)

Lotman contrasts creative or artistic translation, as illustrated in Fig. L.1, with a degenerate or limit-case type of translation that is exactly reversible. In Lotman’s model, exactly reversible translation is only possible between texts T₁ and T₂ composed

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360 The illustration in Lotman, Universe of Mind mistakenly shows T₂" rather than T₂" as found in the Russian text.

361 Here I use the term ‘degenerate’ in the mathematical sense, without any pejorative overtones.
in artificial languages L₁ and L₂ respectively, where transmitter and receiver both share a fully-specified common code C (Fig. L.2).

![Figure L.2. Juri Lotman’s Model of Translation in Artificial Language Systems (after Lotman, Universe of Mind, 14). Reproduced with permission of The Licensor through PLSclear.](image)

In this second scenario, the act of translation is a mechanistic transcription, or a simple 1:1 mapping, to employ a mathematical term. Such a mapping does not create any genuinely new information. Existing information is merely re-coded into the signs and symbols of a different target language. The original text can be fully recovered simply by reversing the process. A simple real-world example would be the conversion of a sequence of 1s and 0s in 7-bit binary code (say 110001) into the corresponding ASCII character (lowercase “a”). Lotman explains:

> If the translation of text T₁ from language L₁ to language L₂ leads to the appearance of text T₂ in such a way that the operation of a reverse translation results in the input text T₁, then we do not consider text T₂ to be new in relation to text T₁. So from this point of view the correct solution of mathematical problems does not create new texts. We might recall Wittgenstein’s remark that within logic you cannot say anything new.³⁶²

This is in stark contrast to the scenario of creative or artistic translation:

> The diagram [i.e. Fig. L.1 above] representing artistic translation shows that the transmitter and receiver use different codes C₁ and C₂ which overlap but are not

³⁶² Lotman, Universe of Mind, 13-14. Wittgenstein’s view of logic is repeated throughout his writings. For example, from the Tractatus “5.43 ...all the propositions of logic say the same thing, to wit nothing.”
identical. A reverse translation will result not in the input text but in a third text, T3. Even closer to the actual process of the circulation of messages is the case when the transmitter is faced with not one code but a plural space of codes c₁, c₂, c₃ … cₙ, and each of them is a complex hierarchical construction capable of generating a set of texts in equal degree corresponding to it. The asymmetrical relationship, the constant need for choice, make translation in this case an act of generating new information and exemplify the creative function both of language and of the text.

Summing up, for Lotman there is a fundamental and important distinction between exactly reversible translation on the one hand, and creative or artistic translation, on the other hand. Creative or artistic translation is never exactly reversible. In this respect, it always involves a degree of mistranslation.

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363 The upper case C₁ and lower case cₙ in this quotation are exactly as printed in the English translation, which faithfully reflects the cases found in the Russian original. However, I can see no particular significance for the change of case in this passage and assume it is a compositing oversight in the Russian source – probably uppercase was intended throughout.

364 Lotman, Universe of Mind, 14-15, with emphasis added.
Appendix M

Artistic Identity, Fictional Identity & Authenticity

Much of the historical discussion of identity in music and the arts is closely intertwined with issues of authenticity. In the artworld, authenticity has had an ambiguous status, at least since the aesthetics of inauthenticity practised so successfully by Andy Warhol. However, in music, it is often assumed that only “authentic” music and artistic identities are good. Any music or identity considered to be “inauthentic” is typically condemned. Such views are especially prevalent in discussions of popular music, where the distinctions between authentic/inauthentic, good/bad, and rock/pop are typically conflated. Nicholas Cook sums up a common attitude (which he goes on to critique):

Rock musicians perform live, create their own music, and forge their own identities … Pop musicians, by contrast, are the puppets of the music business … they lack authenticity.365

Cook observes that maintaining such a simplistic and artificial distinction between rock and pop is very difficult, perhaps impossible.366 It would take me too far afield to embark on a detailed discussion of authenticity in culture, music and the arts.367 However, it is worth recalling Theodor Adorno’s potent critique of authenticity as an irredeemably solipsistic axiological category.368 Certainly, as authors such as Vincent Cheng have argued, the assumption of a simple equivalence between axiologically-valuable identity and authenticity (a contested notion in any case) is, at best, problematic.369 Even if we hold – as I do – a more optimistic view of the possibility and

366 Ibid., 12.
value of authenticity, we need to proceed cautiously. This is because authenticity, no matter how else it might also be construed, invariably encompasses notions of truth and truthfulness. Thus, any black-or-white judgments regarding authenticity involve choosing between one of the two poles of a stark opposition: authentic/truthful versus inauthentic/untruthful. If this is accepted, then the inadvisability of recruiting authenticity as a context-free or externally-imposed yardstick of identity, artistic or otherwise, quickly becomes apparent.

Erwing Goffman convincingly showed long ago, in his classic *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1956), that an individual’s publicly presented identity emerges through the *theatrical performance* of a role, one selected from a personal repertoire as appropriate to the occasion. In this respect, Goffman’s analysis presages the inherent multiplicity of identity highlighted by Ricoeur. Authors such as Micaela Maftei urge that truthful autobiography should acknowledge and embrace the “division of identity into a multiplicity of selves rather than a permanent selfhood.”

Going further, in artistic contexts, it is widely acknowledged that the garb of a *fictional identity* can nevertheless be a *truthful* representation, at least in part or viewed from a certain perspective, of the artist’s “true” identity (to the extent that access to the inner truth of another human being is ever attainable). Oscar Wilde quipped, in “The Critic as Artist” (1891), that “Man is least himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask and he will tell you the truth.” Or, as he stated in “The Truth of Masks” (1891), a different essay from the same collection: “The truths of metaphysics are the truths of masks.”

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370 For a discussion of how these issues quickly become difficult when dealing with racial or gender identity, or are made even more fraught if mixed with the ethics of cross-cultural appropriation, see Theodore Gracyk, *I Wanna Be Me: Rock Music and the Politics of Identity* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001).

371 Lindholm, *Culture and Authenticity*, suggests that authenticity “is the leading member of a set of values that includes sincere, essential, natural, original, and real.” (p.1). The notions of truthfulness, authenticity and identity are often found discussed together. See, for example, Bernard Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002): 172, 201-6.


376 Wilde, *Artist as Critic*, 432. Both “The Critic as Artist” and “The Truth of Masks” first appeared in the collection titled *Intentions* (1891), much revised from essays first published in 1890 and 1885 respectively.
Summing up, there is no necessary connection between artistic identity and any notions of authenticity which hinge on a distinction between fact and fiction. On the contrary, it is entirely possible for artists and composers to use fictional identities which serve as “revealing masks.” A fictional character hidden behind a mask may turn out to be more truthful than one who might, at first glance, appear to be more “authentic” (a term which I have no further need to use in this thesis). Also, there is no necessary equivalence between artistic identity, as publicly presented to audience in the course of an artist’s work, and the private or personal identity of the artist (which may well be never presented to the public). Thus, for example, David Bowie – the professional name adopted by David Robert Jones – was often described, by those who knew him well, as an extremely private person who rarely revealed his “real” self to others. For instance, over a period of some eighteen months, he kept as a closely-guarded secret the fact that he was seriously ill with cancer.

377 I have taken this term from W. Anthony Sheppard, Revealing Masks: Exotic Influences and Ritualized Performance in Modernist Music Theater (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

Appendix N

Poetics & Artistic Intentions

N.1 The Irreducible Factor of Artistic Intentions

In this thesis, the presence of one or more creating artists – human agents who act with the intent to “say something” – has been taken for granted. However, not everyone would agree that discourse involving only written texts or material artefacts has any obligation to preserve a recognition of the originating author or artist, or to understand his/her intentions. The time is not long past when “the intentional fallacy” and Barthes’ “death of the author” were the prevailing doctrines of postmodern critical theory.

The role of artistic intentions in the interpretation of creative works has been much debated, at least since William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley’s famous paper on “the intentional fallacy.” While the debates still continue today, I agree with the balanced position articulated by Ricoeur as long ago as 1976. Ricoeur certainly grants a written text a considerable degree of autonomy.

> With written discourse … the author’s intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide. ... Inscription becomes synonymous with the semantic autonomy of the text, which results from the disconnection of the mental intention of the author from the verbal meaning of the text, of what the author meant and what the text means. The text’s career escapes the finite horizon lived by its author.

However, he immediately pulls back from the “fallacy of the absolute text.”

---

382 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 29-30
This … does not imply that the notion of authorial meaning has lost all significance. … On the one hand, we would have what W. K. Wimsatt calls the intentional fallacy, which holds the author’s intention as the criterion for any valid interpretation of the text, and, on the other hand, what I would call in a symmetrical fashion the fallacy of the absolute text: the fallacy of hypostasizing the text as an authorless entity. If the intentional fallacy overlooks the semantic autonomy of the text, the opposite fallacy forgets that a text remains a discourse told by somebody, said by someone to someone else about something.\textsuperscript{383}

More recently, others who have argued in favour of some form of “partial” or “moderate intentionalism” include Paisley Livingston,\textsuperscript{384} Robert Stecker,\textsuperscript{385} Noël Carroll,\textsuperscript{386} Amie Thomasson,\textsuperscript{387} Raymond Gibbs\textsuperscript{388} and Jerrold Levinson.\textsuperscript{389}

Sherri Irwin talks of publicly-accessible information about the “artist’s sanction.” This is a useful terminological nuance which elegantly opposes the psychologising tendencies of a strongly intentionalist position. She sums up her argument as follows:

If we wish to be true to the nature of many contemporary artworks, we must appeal to information related to the artist’s intention at relevant points during the works’ production. My view, however, is not an intentionalist one: it does not require that we make inferences about the artist's intentions, whether actual or hypothesized, construed as mental states or as behavioral dispositions. It requires, instead, that we examine the artist's publicly accessible actions and communications, the contexts in which they were…

\textsuperscript{383} Ibid., 30. He adds the eloquent coda: “It is impossible to cancel out this main characteristic of discourse without reducing texts to natural objects, i.e., to things that are not man-made, but which, like pebbles, are found in the sand.”


delivered, and the conventions operative in those contexts to determine what the artist has sanctioned.\footnote{Sherri Irwin, “The Artist's Sanction in Contemporary Art,” \textit{The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism}, 63, no. 4 (2005): 315.}

Without embarking on a detailed review of the topic here, I agree that some account of publicly accessible information regarding artistic intentions – minimally, an awareness of the artist’s sanction – is essential to interpretation which satisfies the criterion of verisimilitude (Chapter 1). However, with Ricoeur, I do not grant any paramount standing to such information. Nevertheless, I conclude that any adequate act of interpretation – including, of course, analysis – needs make respectful enquiry regarding a composer’s rhetorical intentions in the presentation of a particular work (insofar as those intentions are able to be inferred or discovered).

N.2 John Cage & Anti-Intention?

It might be objected that John Cage is an obvious counter-example to the argument, outlined above, in support of a “moderate intentionalist” position. Cage once stated that he considered his most important legacy was to “[have] shown the practicality of making works of art nonintentionally.”\footnote{Richard Kostelanetz, \textit{Conversing with Cage}, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003): 25.} This is reminiscent of his famous line from “Lecture on Nothing,” – “I have nothing to say and I am saying it and that is poetry as I need it.”\footnote{John Cage, “Lecture on Nothing,” in \textit{Silence}, 50th anniversary ed. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2011 [1961]), 109.}

Ray Kass offers an interpretation that Cage himself encouraged: “In all his work, regardless of medium, Cage consistently dismissed conventional aesthetics by limiting or eliminating the artist’s choice in the creative process.”\footnote{Ray Kass, \textit{The Sight of Silence: John Cage's Complete Watercolours} (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), cover blurb.}

The self-contradictory paradox lurking in such statements by and about Cage has been pointed out by a number of authors.\footnote{Christopher Shultis, “Silencing the Sounded Self: John Cage and the Intentionality of Nonintention,” \textit{The Musical Quarterly}, 79, no. 2 (1995): 312-50. See also Gibbs, \textit{Intentions}.} We have ample information about Cage’s “anti-
intentionalist” philosophy, and its consistent application in making the perceptual artefacts in his practice. This fact alone points inescapably to the presence of a single-minded intentionally – i.e. to be self-consciously “anti-intentional” – albeit at a higher, conceptual, level. Quite simply, it is impossible to completely dissolve all traces of intentionality while simultaneously retaining a place, no matter how residual, for the originating human agency of the artist known as “John Cage.”

Ricoeur states that:

Representation obeys not only a law of intentionality which makes it the expression of some object, but also another law, which makes it the manifestation of life, of an effort or a desire.

In other words, in order to ascribe meaning – at some level – to the manifested actions of a human agent, we must also seek to understand intentions.

---

395 Charles Altieri aptly puts it this way: “Intentionality is the force by which we make determinate an otherwise indeterminate field. To attribute an intention is to attribute the power to make a this or a that of a situation by organizing a perspectival rendering of it (even if the perspective attempts to be a view from nowhere.” Charles Altieri, “Tractatus Logico-Poeticus,” Critical Inquiry, 33, no. 3 (2007): 529.

Appendix O

The “Hybrid Poetics” of W. G. Sebald

O.1 Introduction

Lynn Wolff uses the term “hybrid poetics” to characterise the recognisable, yet elusive, quality of W. G. Sebald’s unique style of writing, especially in his four main “novels.” In this Appendix, I survey some of the specific techniques employed by Sebald in his literary craft.

O.2 Eight Characteristics of Sebald’s Technique

The following list is a partial compilation of the attributes which could be validly adduced in an attempt to explain the elusive character of a “Sebaldian poetics.”

1. “Incompatible rhetorical strategies,” the coexistence of “multiple conceivable forms.”
2. Melancholy, “one of the more obvious features of Sebald’s prose.”
3. Metonymy, especially as a way of indirectly referring to what cannot be said directly.
   - “The metonymy of melancholy – the adjacent, contiguous things of the pained condition, rather than the condition itself.”
4. An aesthetics of ruins
   - “… ruin landscapes … sites of broken narration, realms where the imagination actively engages with, indeed transforms, the material environment, filling in the gaps …”

---

5. “The labyrinthine topology of his semantics”
   - “… long sentences, the lack of paragraph and section breaks, the persistent
digressions, and the concentric narration …”
   - “In its temporal open-endedness, Sebald’s prose suggests an open-ended
reading process: The words pile up, the sentences and paragraphs seem
infinite. … Every comma, every word and sentence, seems geared at
extending the distance between ‘tick’ and ‘tock,’ beginning and end.”

6. Intertextuality, bricolage
   - “intertextuality as a defining aspect of Sebald’s prose … literary allusions to
other authors and texts across European literature and film …”
   - “the organization of ‘textual debris’ … and how such citations or
Bruchstücke from other texts can build new structures that lend new forms of
meaning to the work at hand.”

7. An archival impulse
   - “[Sebald’s] goal … is to find a language through which the beings whose
memory is confined to the archives can survive.”

8. Intermediality, especially manipulated “found” photographic images included in
text.
   - “Lisa Patt notes that Sebald played a major role in determining the precise
layout of his texts, thereby controlling text-image relations to an intimate
degree. She also shows that Sebald’s interventions went much further than this,
however, and included various forms of image manipulation.”
   - “The paradigmatic form of the tourist photograph is the picture postcard,
reproductions of which can be found in all of Sebald’s prose narratives.”

---

403 Leone, “Textual Wanderings,” 90.
404 John Zilcosky, “Lost and Found: Disorientation, Nostalgia, and Holocaust Melodrama in Sebald’s Austerlitz,”
MLN, 212, no. 3 (2006): 685.
405 Eshel, “W. G. Sebald’s Austerlitz,” 93.
406 Wolff, “Das metaphysische Unterfutter,” 82, summing up Mark R. McCulloh, Understanding W. G. Sebald
(Columbia: University of South Carolina, 2003).
407 Ibid., 91.
408 Muriel Pic, “Sebald’s Anatomy Lesson: About Three Images-Documents from On the Natural History of
Sebald: Image, Archive, Modernity.
in Literatur intermedial: Paradigmenbildung zwischen 1918 und 1968, ed. Wolf Gerhard Schmidt and Thorsten Valk
Patt, with Christel Dillbohner (Los Angeles: Institute for Cultural Inquiry, 2007), 16-97.
411 Ibid., 76.
O.3 Sebald’s Influence in the Arts

Lise Patt claims that, despite the difficulties of pinning down precisely what we might mean by the term, “an essence we call ‘Sebaldian’ … floats from one discipline to another, and in so doing disrupts traditions, ignites heated discussions and produces creative thought.”  In particular, she observes that “Sebaldian has infiltrated our art practices and our theoretical writing.”

Certainly, in non-literary spheres, a number of artists have acknowledged the influence and inspiration of Sebald, notably Tacita Dean, and the artists participating in the exhibition Waterlog in 2007. A music theatre production, titled Austerlitz: Eine Kindheitsreise [Un Voyage d’Enfance] (2011) has been composed by Jerome Combier and staged at Opera Lille.

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413 Ibid., 97.
Appendix P

Portfolio of Original Works

P.1 Introduction

This Appendix presents copies of original scores, a script, images, and links to internet locations of audio and video materials created during the course of this PhD research. The majority of these works have been solely composed and created by the author. The only exception relates to several items produced under the ongoing “open work” titled The Ghosts of Nothing, *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode* (2014 - ). This project is jointly created and curated by Sean Lowry and myself, and includes the participation of a number of other collaborators. Items which have been collaboratively created are identified as such at the relevant locations in Section (i) of this Appendix.

a. *Austerlitz Fantasy* (2007), for piano solo 578
b. *Lament Tango* (2010), for oboe, cello and piano 586
c. *Chant funèbre transfigurée* (2010), for chamber orchestra 599
d. *Koechlin Mix #1* (2010), for double reed quartet 623
e. [Untitled message] for *The Voicemail Project* (2010) 633
g. *Silences from 13 Felix Werder Recordings* (2014) 641
h. The Ghosts of Nothing – Band Identity Visual Aspects 663
   1. *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode* – CD packaging 664
   2. Promotional Flyers & Advertisements 671
i. *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode* – Other Items 689
   1. Script for a Radio Play (2014) 691
   2. Album & single – Audio Tracks 708
   3. World Tour – Live Performances & Videos 718
   4. Exhibitions & Installations 729
Austerlitz Fantasy (2007)

by

Ilmar Taimre

for piano solo
Performance History

Not yet performed.

An audio demo, using sampled sounds from Sibelius music notation software, is available at http://www.ilmartaimre.com/page1/page10/
Lament Tango (2010)

by

Ilmar Taimre

for oboe, cello and piano
Performance History

Not yet performed.

An audio demo, using sampled sounds from Sibelius music notation software, is available at http://www.ilmartaimre.com/page1/page9/
Lament Tango

Ilmar Taimre

Copyright © 2010 Ilmar Taimre
592

53

57

Ob.

Pno.

Vc.

ff

pizz.

mf
Chant funèbre transfigurée (2010)
incorporating elements from Schoenberg’s Verklärte Nacht, Op. 4 (1899)

by

Ilmar Taimre

for chamber orchestra

**Performance History**

Not yet performed.
Rehearsals with Newcastle Chamber Orchestra occurred in late 2010.
An audio demo, using sampled sounds from Sibelius music notation software, is available at [http://www.ilmartaimre.com/page1/page8/](http://www.ilmartaimre.com/page1/page8/)
**Instrumentation**

Flute (at least 1)
Oboe (at least 2)
Clarinet (1 optional)
Trumpet (at least 1)
Trombone (at least 1)
Piano (1 optional)
Violin (at least 2)
Viola (at least 1)
Cello (at least 2)
Double bass (at least 1)
Chant funèbre transfigurée

(incorporating elements from Schoenberg's Erwählne Nacht, Op. 4 (1899))

Ilmar Taimre

Copyright © 2010 Ilmar Taimre
Koechlin Mix #1 (2010)
recomposed from motifs of Charles Koechlin

by

Ilmar Taimre

for 2 oboes, oboe d’amore, cor anglais
NOTE: This composition is based on short motifs from the following compositions by Charles Koechlin –


Quotations from *Le Repos de Tityre* (Op.216, No. 10) and *Monodie* (Op.216, No. 11)
© With kind authorization of Editions Durand (Eschig).
Based on short motifs from *Two Monodies*, for solo oboe, Op. 213, Nos. 1 & 2 (1947)

**Performance History**

Not yet performed.

An audio demo, using sampled sounds from the CD, *Charles Koechlin: Chamber Works for Oboe*,¹ is available at [http://www.ilmartaimre.com/page1/page3/](http://www.ilmartaimre.com/page1/page3/). Samples used with kind permission of cpo.

---

Performance Notes

1. A highly reverberant room or performance space is preferred.

2. As far as practicable, the four performers should be located at a considerable distance from each other, ideally at different points of the compass encircling the audience.

3. It is not essential for the players to be able to see each other or a conductor.

4. Note durations and metronome markings are not absolutely strict. The intent is for performers to expressively respond to the musical calls of the others, rather than watch for any visual cues or gestures (or be constrained by synchronizing mechanisms, such as click tracks).
Koechlin Mix #1
Recomposed from motifs of Charles Koechlin

Freely

$J = 120$

Copyright © 2010 Ilmar Taimre
calling, slightly more insistent

As before

joining in, calm

more insistent

plaintive

response

calling
[Untitled message] for The Voicemail Project (2010)

by

Ilmar Taimre

Part of installation Voicemail, curated by Sean Lowry, consisting of the works of 23 artists who were asked to record a work in the form of a voicemail message. All messages were recorded on Wednesday, 24 March (Sydney time) on +61 414 236 501.

Presented at SNO Contemporary Art Projects, SNO #58
Marrickville, Sydney
10 – 25 April 2010

i. **Exhibition Documentation**

Exhibition details:  SNO #58
presented at SNO Contemporary Art Projects
Marrickville, Sydney
10 – 25 April 2010

*The Voicemail Project* curated by: Sean Lowry

Exhibition Overview & Link to Room Sheet

ii. **Installation Audio**

An MP3 of the [Untitled message] audio, duration approx. 1 minute, can be accessed at:

http://www.ilmartaimre.com/page7/page11/
iii. Images of Home-Made Theremin Used as the Only Signal Source

*Theremin (fabricated by Karl Bertling)*

*Self-Portrait, Author’s Shadow with Theremin*
Motet for Maitland (2014)

by

Ilmar Taimre

A music video work created for the 2014 Grotto Project: Art and the Expanded Cover
Version, 23-24 May 2014, University of Newcastle, curated by Sean Lowry.
Motet for Maitland (2014) – Music video

i. Exhibition Documentation

Exhibition details: Art & the Expanded Cover Version presented at The Grotto Project The University of Newcastle Central Coast Campus (Fine Art Building) Ourimbah NSW 2258

Curated by: Sean Lowry

Two repeat performances:
7.30 pm Friday 23 May 2014 & 7.30 pm Saturday 24 May 2014

Further information about the exhibition is posted here:

https://www.facebook.com/pg/TheGrottoProjectPI/posts/?ref=page_internal

ii. Artist’s Statement Included in the Program Sheet Available at the Event

This “cover version” of Adrian Willaert’s (c. 1490 – 1562) composition Ecce lignum crucis/Crux fidelis (inspired by themes sampled from traditional Gregorian chant and originally published in Motets for Five Voices, Venice: Scotto, 1539) is a musical riddle. What could be the tenuous link between a half-forgotten event in the local history of Maitland, NSW, and a rarely performed (and commercially unrecorded) masterpiece of Renaissance polyphony? The impossibly obscure answer is revealed in the video program notes. This cover version indulges in the guilty pleasures of juxtaposing arcane minutiae and discovering ephemeral coincidences.
iii. **Video Information**


The visual material is based mostly on antique still images, plus photographs and video footage taken by the author in 2014.

The video duration is 6’02”. It is available online at:

https://youtu.be/uOy7jgtwrqg

http://www.ilmartaimre.com/page7/page6/

iv. **Screen Shots from the Video Motet for Maitland (2014)**

*St. Mark’s Basilica, Rome.* From an intaglio print, dated 1913, author’s collection.
St John’s Catholic Cathedral, Maitland. From a photograph by the author, 2014.

Scots’ Presbyterian School, Maitland. From a photograph by the author, 2014.
*Scots’ Presbyterian Church, Maitland.* From a video by the author, 2014.

*William McIntyre,* The Heathenism of Popery (*1860*). From a video by the author, 2014.
Silences from 13 Felix Werder Recordings (2015)

by

Ilmar Taimre

An installation at the group exhibition ‘____’ [Blankness]

presented at the Margaret Lawrence Gallery

Victorian College of the Arts

University of Melbourne

9 April – 16 May 2015
i. **Exhibition Documentation**

Exhibition details: ‘_____’ [Blankness]
presented at the Margaret Lawrence Gallery
Victorian College of the Arts
University of Melbourne
9 April – 16 May 2015

Curated by: Alex Gawronski and Biljana Jancic

Exhibition Overview & Link to Catalogue:


ii. **Installation Audio**

An MP3 of the exhibition audio can be accessed at:

http://www.ilmartaimre.com/page7/page5/
iii. Images of Installation

Photographs by the author, 2015.
iv. **Installation Booklet**

The booklet – Ilmar Taimre, *Silences from 13 Felix Werder Recordings* (2015) – is reproduced on the following pages. It can also be downloaded as a PDF from the following sites:


Silences from 13 Felix Werder Recordings

📖 A Mute Homage to Felix Werder 📖

Ilmar Taimre
Silences from 13 Felix Werder Recordings

A Mute Homage to Felix Werder

An audio work for Exhibition: ‘_______’
VCA and MCM
Margaret Lawrence Gallery
09 Apr 2015 - 09 May 2015

Ilmar Taimre
Abbreviations for Australian Libraries

NFSA: National Film & Sound Archive, Canberra
UA: University of Adelaide
UM: University of Melbourne
MU: Monash University
UN: University of Newcastle
UQ: University of Queensland
US: University of Sydney
UT: University of Tasmania
UWA: University of Western Australia
SLV: State Library of Victoria
NLA: National Library of Australia

Recording Notes

All LPs from the collection of Ilmar Taimre, photographed on 1 March 2015.
All digital transfers of silent sections from these LPs took place on 1 March 2015

Contact

Ilmar Taimre can be contacted at itaimre@gmail.com

Printed in a limited edition of 100 copies
of which this is # _____

Copyright © Ilmar Taimre 2015
Blankness: The Endpoint of Cultural Forgetting

1. Blankness can be thought of as a state that exists prior to beginnings, an empty space not yet inscribed, a place from which to make a start.

2. Alternatively, blankness could be conceptualised as a logical endpoint, the silence that remains after the music has finished. When the work of erasure has obliterated the material traces of what was once there, blankness is the unconsummated absence that persists.

3. This work points towards – but never quite attains – the second type of blankness. The audio being played in the gallery is made up of 13 edits of the “silent” lead-in/lead-out tracks, each sampled on 1 March 2015 from the 13 different recordings listed in this program booklet. These 13 LPs all come from my personal collection. All of them include one or more compositions by the German-born Australian composer Felix Werder (1922-2012).

4. In his heyday, Werder was a well-known and often controversial figure in the Melbourne music scene, influential as music critic for *The Age*, an active teacher, and a prolific composer of classical and electronic pieces (with over 400 works to his name). During the course of his lifetime, Werder’s compositions appeared on over a dozen commercial and privately issued LPs. However, most of these LPs were not widely disseminated at the time of their release. Many are now rare collectors’ items, some almost impossible to find. I am not aware of any institutional library, in Australia or overseas, which holds copies of all 13 of the LPs used in this project. With a touch of melodramatic hyperbole that Werder himself might have appreciated, it could be said that, today, the ravages of time threaten to erase the audible remains of Felix Werder’s music from our cultural memory.

5. Many years ago, I had the good fortune of attending two semesters of Felix’s courses at the Council of Adult Education in Melbourne. His lectures on the history of music were never dull and always thought-provoking. This, then, is my mute homage to Felix Werder, once briefly my teacher.

6. Of course, being transferred from vinyl LPs, the audio samples I am presenting in this exhibition are not perfectly “silent.” They betray their material origins through the usual hisses, crackles and occasional bleed-through echoes found on old recordings. Except for these audible “silences,” no traces of the also-present Werder compositions have been retained, leaving a blank sonic hole for listeners to imagine, with little to go on, what the records might actually sound like. Given the rarity and physical inaccessibility of the original recordings, most of which have never been re-issued on CD and have not been uploaded to the internet in digital form, my intention is to use this audible blankness to evoke an imaginary musical encounter which, in practice, few are likely to experience.
Recording #1

**Australian Festival of Music, Vol. 3**
Festival SFC-80020 [also L42013]

Werder Composition: Concerto for Violin and Orchestra
Performers: Leonard Dommett (violin), Melbourne Symphony Orchestra
            (Fritz Rieger, conductor)
Released: 1972
Date of original recording: 1972?

Australian Library Locations: NFSA UM UN UQ UWA
Recording #2

**Australian Music Today, Volume II**  
World Record Club SA-602

Werder Composition: String Quartet No. 6  
Performers: Austral String Quartet  
Released: 1965?  
Date of original recording: 1965?

Australian Library Locations: NFSA UM UN US UA SLV NLA
Recording #3

**Paul McDermott String Quartet**  
Magnasound MT-01

Werder Composition: String Quarter No. 5  
Performers: Paul McDermott String Quartet  
Released: 1957?  
Date of original recording: 1956

Australian Library Locations: NFSA UA SLV
Recording #4

Requiem – Felix Werder
Private recording

Werder Composition: Requiem
Performers: Australia Felix with Merlyn Quaife
Released: 1980?
Date of original recording: 1980?

Australian Library Locations: SLV UWA
Recording #5

**Felix Werder’s Agamemnon**  
Lyra SSM 007 [Studio M]

Werder Composition: Agamemnon, or “The Wages of Sin”  
Performers: Ian Cousins, Christine Beasley, Pauline Ashleigh, Halina Nieckarz, Hartley Newnham, Mark Foster, Brian Brown, Bruce Clarke, Laurie Wiffen, Felix Werder  
Released: 1977?  
Date of original recording: 1977?

Australian Library Locations: NFSA UM UA
Recording #6

Australian Chamber Music
W&G WG-AL-660

Werder Composition: Piano Quartet
Performers: Margaret Schofield (piano), Sybil Copeland (violin), John Glickman (viola), Otti Veit (cello)
Released: 195-?
Date of original recording: 195-?

Australian Library Locations: NFSA
Recording #7

Felix Werder’s Banker – A Music-Theatre
Discovery GYS 001

Werder Compositions: Banker – A Music Theatre, Bach: Toccata in D Minor transcribed for percussion; a teaching piece, Percussion Play
Performers: Felix Werder and Keith Humble (synthesizers), John Seal (percussion), Jochen Schubert (guitar), Dennis Henning (piano)
Released: 1973
Date of original recording: 1973

Australian Library Locations: NFSA MU UM SLV
Recording #8

Music by Felix Werder Volume 3 [on label The Music of ... ]
Mopoke GYS 004

Werder Compositions:  Concert Music for Flute, Encore for Violin and Piano, Saxtronic, Koheleth
Performers: Ensemble conducted by Vanco Cavdarski, Rotraud Schneider (violin), Daniel Herscovitch (piano), Australia Felix
Released: 1979?
Date of original recording: 1979 (except Concert Music for Flute 1977)

Australian Library Locations:  NFSA  UM  UA  UT
Recording #9

Felix Werder/Harold Badger
W&G WG-A-1635

Werder Composition: Music for Clarinet, Horn and String Trio (1959)
Performers: Paul McDermott String Quartet, Thomas White (clarinet),
            Roy White (horn)
Released: 1963?
Date of original recording: 1962

Australian Library Locations: NFSA UM
Recording #10

Australian Composers – Keith Humble, Felix Werder, Colin Brumby, George Tibbits, Helen Gifford
ABC RRCS-386

Werder Composition: La Gamme d’Amour
Performers: West Australian Symphony Orchestra (John Hopkins, conductor)
Released: 1975?
Date of original recording: 1975?

Australian Library Locations: NFSA UM MU US UQ UWA SLV
Recording #11

**Australian Composers – Don Banks, Robert Trumble, Felix Werder**  
ABC RRCS1774 [AC 1010]

Werder Composition: Trilude for Unaccompanied Violin  
Performers: Leonard Dommett (violin)  
Released: 1975  
Date of original recording: 1975?

Australian Library Locations: NFSA UM UN US UQ
Recording #12

Sculthorpe/Werder
EMI OASD-7563

Werder Composition: String Quartet No. IX
Performers: Austral String Quartet
Released: 1975?
Date of original recording: 197-?

Australian Library Locations: NFSA  UWA
Recording #13

**Australian Composers - Larry Sitsky, Felix Werder**

ABC RRCS1781 [AC 1017]

Werder Composition: String Quartet No. IX
Performers: Austral String Quartet
Released: 1975
Date of original recording: 197-?

Australian Library Locations: NFSA MU UM UN US UQ UWA
1. The Ghosts of Nothing – *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode*

Packaging for CD Album & Single

*Graphic design by*

Ilmar Taimre
Six panel cover design for The Ghosts of Nothing, In Memory of Johnny B. Goode – A Rock Opera, CD album.

Graphic design by Ilmar Taimre based on found postcards ca. 1900 to 1910, original artists and photographers unknown.

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Graphic design by Ilmar Taimre based on found postcard ca. 1904, original artist unknown.

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Disc art for The Ghosts of Nothing, *Mercedes Benz*, CD single
Graphic design by Ilmar Taimre based on found postcard ca. 1904, original artist unknown.
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2. The Ghosts of Nothing – *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode*

Promotional Flyers & Advertisements

*Graphic design by*

Ilmar Taimre

Graphic design by Ilmar Taimre based on found postcard *ca.* 1904, original photographer unknown.

Real and fictitious tour dates devised by Sean Lowry.

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Note: No separate flyer was issued for Act II, Scene 5, performed on 31 August 2015.

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Real and fictitious tour dates devised by Sean Lowry.

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The Ghosts of Nothing present

The Mirror

Featuring LAURA PURCELL

Saturday, 19 March 2016
12:00 midday sharp

by the gravel pit at entrance to Newhaven Track,
off Myalla Road
Tarkine Wilderness
Meunna
Tasmania, Australia

as part of

The Ghosts of Nothing

www.ghostsofnothing.com


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Full page advertisement for In Memory of Johnny B. Goode –
Graphic design by Ilmar Taimre based on found postcard ca. 1908, original photographer unknown.
Real and fictitious tour dates devised by Sean Lowry.
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3. The Ghosts of Nothing – *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode*

World Tour 2014-2017 – T Shirt

*Graphic design by*

Ilmar Taimre
T-Shirt for “In Memory of Johnny B. Goode – World Tour 2014/2017”

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The Ghosts of Nothing – Other Items

Created & produced collaboratively
by
The Ghosts of Nothing
(aka Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre)

with contributions from additional collaborators where indicated
Statement of Collaboration

To varying extents, the materials presented in this sub-section “The Ghosts of Nothing – Other Items” have been created and produced collaboratively, under the auspices and leadership of the creative partnership known as The Ghosts of Nothing (aka Sean Lowry and Ilmar Taimre). In some cases, other collaborators besides Lowry and Taimre have also been involved in the creative aspects of one or more of the items presented in this sub-section. Where applicable, the names of all creative collaborators are credited in the information provided for each item.
1. *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode -
Script for a Radio Play
(2014)*

by

The Ghosts of Nothing

Incorporating rondels in the original French from Albert Giraud, *Pierrot lunaire* (1884),
with English mistranslations by Ilmar Taimre.
Narrative introductions (Part A on each page) co-authored jointly by Sean Lowry and
Ilmar Taimre.

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Broadcast History: Dec 6, 2014: 10pm - 11pm
Wavefarm WGXC 90.7-FM: Hands-on Radio
http://wgxc.org
Audio archive: https://wavefarm.org/archive/z1ecr4

Performance History: Individual scenes used as spoken-word voice-over for the
*In Memory of Johnny B. Goode - World Tour* mime-based performances and videos.
IN MEMORY OF JOHNNY B. GOODE

A Radio Play

by

The Ghosts of Nothing

Incorporating thirteen rondels in French

from

PIERROT LUNAIRE

By

Albert Giraud

(and freely altered translations by Ilmar Taimre)

VOICE SCRIPT

FINAL (REVISED TITLE VERSION 08, corrected)

14 October 2014
In Memory of Johnny B. Goode (Radio Play)

Script – FINAL (REVISED TITLES), Version 08 (14 October 2014)

Titles and Credits (to be read, with clean breaks after each line)

In Memory of Johnny B. Goode

A Radio Play by The Ghosts of Nothing

With rondels from “Pierrot Lunaire” by Albert Giraud

Read by Linda Taimre

Act 1 – Rise & Fall

Act 2 – Remembering & Forgetting

Act 3 – Life & Death
1. **Bohemian Crystal**

**Part A**

This is Johnny. He doesn’t read or write too well. He carries his guitar wherever he goes. He has Someone Special in his life. Or at least he believes that he does. But that’s enough for now.

**Part B (read title)**

**BOHEMIAN CRYSTAL**

A moonbeam locked in beautiful Bohemian crystal. Such is the fairy poem I have rhymed in these verses. I am Johnny, dressed as a clown, able to offer anything I like a rare and precious offering to the one I love ... a moonbeam locked in beautiful Bohemian crystal. My dearest one, this is the symbol which truly captures who I am: Johnny the Clown, in a pale disguise. I feel, under my made up mask ... A moonbeam locked in.

**Part C (read the title)**

**CRISTAL DE BOHÊME**

Un rayon de lune enfermé  
Dans un beau flacon de Bohême,  
Tel est le féerique poème,  
Que dans ces rondels j’ai rimé.

Je suis en Pierrot costumé,  
Pour offrir à celle que j’aime  
Un rayon de lune enfermé  
Dans un beau flacon de Bohême.

Par ce symbole est exprimé  
O ma très chère, tout moi-même :  
Comme Pierrot, dans son chef blême,  
Je sens, sous mon masque grimé,  
Un rayon de lune enfermé.
2. **Sunset**

*Part A*

The first deathly blow has struck. Without any warning, she has chosen another. There is a wedding … a White Wedding. Lies beget lies. It is – and always will be – the darkest day in Johnny’s life … This is how betrayal feels.

*Part B (read title)*

SUNSET

The Sun opened its veins on a bed of russet-red clouds: Out of a mouth of holes, its blood ejaculates in red fountains. Convulsive branches of oak trees whip the insane horizons: The Sun opened its veins on a bed of russet-red clouds. Like a debauched Roman, stuffed with disgust, vomiting into sewers of filth, bleeding from diseased arteries, the Sun opened its veins!

*Part C (read the title)*

COUCHER DE SOLEIL

Le Soleil s’est ouvert les veines
Sur un lit de nuages roux :
Son sang, par la bouche des trous,
S’éjacule en rouges fontaines.

Les rameaux convulsifs des chênes
Flagellent les horizons fous :
Le Soleil s’est ouvert les veines
Sur un lit de nuages roux.

Comme, après les hontes romaines
Un débauché plein de dégoûts
Laissant jusqu’aux sales égouts
Saigner ses artères malsaines,
Le Soleil s’est ouvert les veines !
3. For Columbine

Part A

Johnny proclaims his love one last time. He begs on bended knee and is refused once again. He soon slides into a desperate place. What is the point of anything? What is the point of staying alive ...? A mystical voice proclaims a cryptic message ... is this the answer or another impossible question? Johnny is not ready to think about this right now ...

Part B (read title)

FOR COLUMBINE

The pale flowers of moonlight, like pink shades of clarity, bloom in the summer nights: If I could just gather one of them! To relieve my misfortune, along rivers of oblivion, I seek the pale flowers of moonlight, like pink shades of clarity. And I will alleviate my bitterness, if I can reach to the swirling sky for an elusive pleasure, the play of dappled light on your soft brown hair, the pale flowers of the moonlight!

Part C (read the title)

A COLOMBINE

Les fleurs pâles du clair de lune,
Comme des roses de clarté,
Fleurissent dans les nuits d’été :
Si je pouvais en cueillir une !

Pour soulager mon infortune,
Je cherche, le long du Léthé,
Les fleurs pâles du clair de lune,
Comme des roses de clarté.

Et j’apaiserai ma rancune,
Si j’obtiens du ciel irrité
La chimérique volupté
D’effeuiller sur ta toison brune
Les fleurs pâles du clair de lune !
4. **Hymn to Hysteria**

**Part A**

Perhaps the cure for lost love is not so hard to find ... Johnny goes looking for fun! He finds himself swept along with a strange and lawless crowd, a blank, lost generation, thrill-seeking at any cost … Now in a stolen car, Johnny is out of control. Red-eyed and numb with heartache, Johnny finds himself at the wheel … it is frightening, yet at the same time gloriously… exhilarating.

**Part B (read title)**

HYMN TO HYSTERIA

O Madonna of Hysterias! Climb the altar of my worms, plunge the sword of fury into your shrivelled breasts. Your aching wounds are like red, open eyes: O Madonna of Hysterias! Climb the altar of my worms. With your long bony hands, offer up to an incredulous universe ... Your Son, with gangrenous limbs, with falling and rotted flesh, O Madonna of Hysterias!

**Part C (read the title)**

ÉVOCATION

O Madone des Hystéries !
Monte sur l’autel de mes vers,
La fureur du glaive à travers
Tes maigres mamelles taries.

Tes blessures endolories
Semblent de rouges yeux ouverts :
O Madone des Hystéries !
Monte sur l’autel de mes vers.

De tes longues mains appauvries
Tends à l’incrédule univers
Ton Fils aux membres déjà verts,
Aux chairs tombantes et pourries,
O Madone des Hystéries !
5. **Intoxicated by the Moon**

**Part A**

The party crowd never sleeps. Johnny tries to lose himself in an excess of everything: sex, drugs and rock and roll … he parties hard, trying to forget.

**Part B (read title)**

INTOXICATED BY THE MOON

A wine to be drunk with the eyes flows in green floods across the face of the moon, and submerges like a swell on silent horizons. Soft, pernicious counsels push and shove in the crowded potion: A wine to be drunk with the eyes flows in green floods across the face of the moon. The religious poet gets drunk on absinthe. He breathes heavily — until his head rolls, in an insane gesture, skywards — a wine to be drunk with the eyes!

**Part C (read the title)**

IVRESSE DE LUNE

Le vin que l’on boit par les yeux  
A flots verts de la lune coule,  
Et submerge comme une houle  
Les horizons silencieux.

De doux conseils pernicieux  
Dans le philtre nagent en foule :  
Le vin que l’on boit par les yeux  
A flots verts de la lune coule.

Le poète religieux  
De l’étrange absinthe se soûle,  
Aspirant — jusqu’à ce qu’il roule,  
Le geste fou, la tête aux cieux —  
Le vin que l’on boit par les yeux!
6. The Mirror

Part A

Try as he might, Johnny cannot forget. The memories are just too strong …

Part B (read title)

THE MIRROR

The moon’s smiling crescent cuts an incision into the blue sky of evening. And, by the boudoir’s balcony, an errant light enters. Opposite, in the shimmering calm of a clear and deep mirror, the moon’s smiling crescent cuts an incision into the blue sky of evening. Johnny the Conqueror studies his reflection. And suddenly, in the blackness, he laughs silently to see himself crowned by his white luminescent parent, the moon’s smiling crescent.

Part C (read the title)

LE MIROIR

D’un croissant de lune hilarante
S’échancre le ciel bleu du soir,
Et par le balcon du boudoir
Pénètre la lumière errante.

En face, dans la paix vibrante
Du limpide et profond miroir,
D’un croissant de lune hilarante
S’échancre le ciel bleu du soir.

Pierrot de façon conquérante
Se mire — et soudain dans le noir
Rit en silence de se voir
Coiffé par sa blanche parente
D’un croissant de lune hilarante!
Part A

With temptations all around, Johnny abandons all restraint. Spurred on by the madness of his companion, he runs ever faster … wilder ...

Part B (read title)

TO MY CRAZY-ASS COUSIN

We are children of the Moon, my crazy-ass cousin and me, because we feel a pale agitation whenever she shows herself at night. At the foot of the gallows he used to gesture wildly at the king: We are children of the Moon, my crazy-ass cousin and me. I have the light of glow-worms to guide my fortunes. I live by drawing, like you, my language in endless blood-feud with the Law, my own words constantly pleading with me: We are children of the Moon.

Part C (read the title)

A MON COUSIN DE BERGAME

Nous sommes parents par la Lune,
Le Pierrot Bergamasque et moi,
Car je ressens un pâle émoi,
Quand elle allaite la nuit brune.

Au pied de la rouge tribune,
Il chargeait les gestes du roi :
Nous sommes parents par la Lune,
Le Pierrot Bergamasque et moi.

J’ai les vers luisants pour fortune ;
Je vis en tirant, comme toi,
Ma langue saignante à la Loi,
Et la parole m’importune :
Nous sommes parents par la Lune !
8. Johnny On Ice

**Part A**

The next morning, Johnny is wasted, more wasted than he has ever been in his life. A dull, thudding realisation pounds its way into the desperate corners of his brain … he still cannot forget.

**Part B (read title)**

JOHNNY ON ICE

A gleaming polar ice floe of cold sharp light halts an exhausted Johnny, who feels his ship sinking low. With a stolen glance, it masquerades as his impromptu rescuer: A gleaming polar ice floe of cold sharp light. And the sinister mime leads him to believe in a disguised Johnny, and an eternal white beacon in the crystal night: A gleaming polar ice floe of cold sharp light.

**Part C (read the title)**

PIERROT POLAIRE

Un miroitant glaçon polaire,
De froide lumière aiguisé,
Arrête Pierrot épuisé
Qui sent couler bas sa galère.

Il toise d’un œil qui s’éclaire
Son sauveur improvisé :
Un miroitant glaçon polaire,
De froide lumière aiguisé.

Et le mime patibulaire
Croit voir un Pierrot déguisé,
Et d’un blanc geste éternisé
Interpelle dans la nuit claire
Un miroitant glaçon polaire.
9. Johnny Robber

Part A

Johnny is in a downward spiral. He now moves only at night, always searching for somewhere wilder, some place or thing more exciting than the last. The night creatures grow faster, the drugs are harder. What is happening to Johnny is becoming less predictable. Things are getting really crazy …

Part B (read title)

JOHNNY ROBBER

Red royal rubies, injected with murder and glory, hide in the secret corners of this cabinet, full of the horrors of endless underground tunnels. Johnny, with a band of thieves, wants to ravish the day, having drunk of red royal rubies, injected with murder and glory. But the hairs on their necks bristle with fear, cloaked with mohair and velvet, just as eyes masked in black eye-shadow set fire to jewel cases full of red sovereign rubies!

Part C (read the title)

PIERROT VOLEUR

Les rouges rubis souverains,
Injectés de meurtre et de gloire,
Sommellent au creux d’une armoire
Dans l’horreur des longs souterrains.

Pierrot, avec des malandrins,
Veut ravir un jour, après boire,
Les rouges rubis souverains
Injectés de meurtre et de gloire.

Mais la peur hérissé leurs crins :
Parmi le velours et la moire,
Comme des yeux dans l’ombre noire,
S’enflamment du fond des écrins
Les rouges rubis souverains !
10. Absinthe

Part A

Dangerously close to the edge, Johnny searches for the Fast Night People and finds them. So begins another dark night of excess and drug-fuelled madness. But relentlessly taking control, over him and over everything around him, dominating every sense and every fragmentary thought, is a siren call – a siren scream – calling up vivid images of Someone Special … who will never leave him alone.

Part B (read title)

ABSINTHE

In an immense sea of absinthe Johnny discovers drunken countries, with capricious and insane skies, like the desires of a newly pregnant woman. Heady waves tinkle in greenish and soft rhythms. In an immense sea of absinthe, Johnny discovers drunken countries. But suddenly his boat is hugged by viscous and soft octopuses. In the middle of a sticky movement he disappears, with no complaint. In an immense sea of absinthe.

Part C (read the title)

ABSINTHE

Dans une immense mer d’absinthe,
Je découvre des pays soûls,
Aux ciels capricieux et fous
Comme un désir de femme enceinte.

La capiteuse vague tinte
Des rythmes verdâtres et doux :
Dans une immense mer d’absinthe,
Je découvre des pays soûls.

Mais soudain ma barque est étreinte
Par des poulpes visqueux et mous :
Au milieu d’un gluant remous
Je disparais, sans une plainte,
Dans une immense mer d’absinthe.
11. Black Butterflies

Part A

Johnny drives through the night. Is he alone or is he with the Fast Night People? Is this even Johnny’s car? He is no longer sure of anything. He just keeps driving. But something is still not right. He has lost Someone Special and there is nothing he can do about it. And Oh God … the flashing lights of police cars are now exploding in the rear view mirror.

Part B (read title)

BLACK BUTTERFLIES

Sinister black butterflies extinguish the Sun’s glory. The far horizon turns starless and Bible-black, smeared in the ink of evening. Occult smoke drifts from the censer, a secret perfume concocted to disturb the memory: Sinister black butterflies extinguish the Sun’s glory. Monstrous insects with sticky suckers search angrily for blood to drink. And out of the sky, in black storm of dust, swooping down on our desperation, are sinister black butterflies.

Part C (read the title)

PAPILLONS NOIRS

De sinistres papillons noirs
Du soleil ont éteint la gloire,
Et l’horizon semble un grimoire
Barbouillé d’encre tous les soirs.

Il sort d’occultes encensoirs
Un parfum troublant la mémoire :
De sinistres papillons noirs
Du soleil ont éteint la gloire.

Des monstres aux gluants suçoirs
Recherchent du sang pour le boire,
Et du ciel, en poussière noire,
Descendent sur nos désespairs
De sinistres papillons noirs.
12. Suicide

Part A

This is the bleak and inescapable end that awaits us all … was it all a rock and roll dream, a cruel nightmare in teenage wasteland? Have we all been here before?

Part B (read title)

SUICIDE

In a white moon dress, Johnny laughs his bloody laughter. His drunken gestures become troubling. He decants another glass of the Sunday wine. His sleeves drag in the dust. He hammers a nail into the white wall. In a white moon dress, Johnny laughs his bloody laughter. He wriggles like a worm, as the slipknot forms a collar, pushing back the shaking stool, gagging on his words, and swaying like a glorious dancer in a white moon dress.

Part C (read the title)

SUICIDE

En sa robe de lune blanche
Pierrot rit son rire sanglant.
Son geste ivre devient troublant :
Il cuve le vin du dimanche.

Sur le sol traînaille sa manche :
Il plante un clou dans le mur blanc :
En sa robe de lune blanche
Pierrot rit son rire sanglant.

Il frétille comme une tanche,
Se passe au col un nœud coulant,
Repousse l’escabeau branlant,
Tire la langue, et se déhanche,
En sa robe de lune blanche.
13. Johnny’s Departure

Part A

Just one last song before you go, please dear Johnny B. A grand pathetic gesture to all those that you’ve left behind ... a parade of lunatic clowns forever struck dumb, your frantic orphaned children with danger in their eyes.

Part B (read title)

JOHNNY’S DEPARTURE

A moonbeam is my steering oar, a white water lily my funeral launch. On a zephyr breeze I return to Memphis, adrift on a pale river of madness. The mourners sing a tearful song of sadness, like a vapour trail cutting across the sky. A moonbeam is my steering oar, a white water lily my funeral launch. The snow-capped king of mime has proudly powdered her face for the final show. And like a lover’s punch swirling in a crystal cup, the vague green horizon sets itself on fire— A moonbeam is my steering oar.

Part C (read the title)

DÉPART DE PIERROT

Un rayon de lune est la rame,
Un blanc nénuphar, la chaloupe ;
Il regagne, la brise en poupe,
Sur un fleuve pâle, Bergame.

Le flot chante une humide gamme
Sous la nacelle qui le coupe.
Un rayon de lune est la rame,
Un blanc nénuphar, la chaloupe.

Le neigeux roi du mimodrame
Redresse fièrement sa houppe ;
Comme du punch dans une coupe,
Le vague horizon vert s’enflamme.
— Un rayon de lune est la rame.
2. *In Memory of Johnny B. Goode – A Rock Opera*

(2014)

*by*

The Ghosts of Nothing

Digital audio tracks released on physical CD album and single, as well as on digital download and audio streaming sites. For convenience, links to Apple (Apple Music, iTunes) and Spotify are included below. However, the tracks are available from most of the usual digital music sources.

Created and produced jointly by Sean Lowry and Ilmar Taimre, with the involvement a number of additional performers (see full list of credits at the end of this sub-section).

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In Memory of Johnny B. Goode – A Rock Opera (Audio Tracks)

i. Album Tracks

Act I – Rise & Fall

1. Johnny B. Goode

Available at:
https://open.spotify.com/track/4R0kCW08B4tftod5tcGKlp

2. White Wedding

Available at:
https://open.spotify.com/track/4bJ3WL3DQfewMxcFjs4eIv
3. Into the Same Rivers We Step

Available at:
https://open.spotify.com/track/7Gec2Ivrffw52KBm9ZHix0

4. Mercedes Benz

Available at:
https://open.spotify.com/track/1gQfmoCv3JbAwgHLaHvX3U
Act II – Forgetting & Remembering

5. Rock Around the Clock

Available at:
https://open.spotify.com/track/5LHSngl9dKS7tYkDqTtxuF

6. Remembering

Available at:
https://open.spotify.com/track/5Ps9ZXKc7EKRoA5h9q4ls
7. Johnny Surrenders to Excess

Available at:


https://open.spotify.com/track/73ULPZmyfKEl5ZKtd1leSG

8. Still Remembering

Available at:


https://open.spotify.com/track/5mqJnJWcfruevecGokze6W
Act III – Life & Death

9. I’m So Excited

Available at:
https://open.spotify.com/track/5yOWYi6wLpGKwMFht3hfpH

10. The True Confessions of an Addict

Available at:
https://open.spotify.com/track/2h9iuTJeMvrrNrnCUPDWTQ
11. Johnny Dances Helplessly Into Despair

Available at:
https://open.spotify.com/track/2SyFtG9GiCNjLmnDuCYadX

12. The Ending of Everything

Available at:
https://open.spotify.com/track/3FP4KuH33f1bO1OYEvzK5r
Curtain

13. Funeral Music (One Step Closer to Chaos)

Available at:


https://open.spotify.com/track/40Wte4smfZ7kVBkA9d5uRF
ii. Single Tracks

1. Mercedes Benz

Available at:


https://open.spotify.com/track/0nBbp52HhtkOS0kDQU0ss3

2. The Ending of Everything

Available at:


https://open.spotify.com/track/3Jo7vqxwuIm2Unz70l2Q3l

3. Into the Same Rivers We Step

Available at:


https://open.spotify.com/track/75wLxUODlExgK0kGaxw2Sv
iii. Credits

The Ghosts of Nothing: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre.

All songs composed & arranged by: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre [except Johnny B. Goode (Berry), White Wedding (Idol), Mercedes Benz (Joplin, McClure, Neuwirth), Rock Around the Clock (DeKnight, Freedman), I'm So Excited (Lawrence, Pointer, Pointer, Pointer, Bontenbal, Steenhuis)]

Vocals: Lee Devaney, Sean Lowry, Ilmar Taimre, Rachel Scott & Linda Taimre.
Major instrumentation, production & FX: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre.
Orchestral & choral instrumentation, programming & recording: Ilmar Taimre.
Metal gamelan, bamboo flutes, marimba, Celtic harp programming & recording: Ilmar Taimre.
Harmonica: Ilmar Taimre.
Guitars: Ilmar Taimre, Rob Taylor, Guss Mallmann.
Keyboards: Sean Lowry, Ilmar Taimre, Rob Taylor & Duane Morrison.
Additional SFX production: Mark Turner.
Basses: Rob Taylor.
Synth basses: Sean Lowry.
Drum programming: Sean Lowry, Rob Taylor & Ilmar Taimre.
Stem production, editing & arrangement: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre.
Occasional live drums and percussion: Steve Allison & Ilmar Taimre.

Produced & mixed by: Sean Lowry with Ilmar Taimre.
Recording engineers: Sean Lowry, Rob Taylor & Ilmar Taimre.
Mastering supervisor: Rob Taylor.
Mastered by: Don Bartley at Benchmark Mastering.
Cover design & website: Ilmar Taimre (based on old postcard images).
Music publishing: Perfect Pitch Publishing


*by*

The Ghosts of Nothing

In collaboration with a number of mime-based artists, The Ghosts of Nothing have staged a series of one-off live performances at various locations around the world. Each performance lasted approximately 5 to 6 minutes. Videos of all performances to date have been edited by Ilmar Taimre and have been posted to the YouTube channel of The Ghosts of Nothing.

Created and produced jointly by Sean Lowry and Ilmar Taimre, with the involvement of the performing artists identified. Other video production credit as listed. All videos © The Ghosts of Nothing and the identified artists. Still images used with permission.
Stage I


1. This Is Johnny – The Ghosts of Nothing (feat. Frank J. Miles)

A street performance outside 315 Bowery (formerly CBGBs), Manhattan, NY, USA, at 8:00 pm on 6 December 2014.

Produced by The Ghosts of Nothing (Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre)

Mime: Frank J Miles
Voice: Linda Taimre
Camera 1: Jesse English
Camera 2: Honi Ryan
Camera 3: Christian Lock
Video editing: Ilmar Taimre
Music: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre
Music publishing: Perfect Pitch Publishing

Copyright © 2014 The Ghosts of Nothing & Frank J Miles. Used with permission.

Full video available at: https://youtu.be/mkDG4Ln_ZRE
2. Betrayal - The Ghosts of Nothing (feat. Charles Famous)

Full video available at:  https://youtu.be/Tw54O-dj9H4

A street performance outside Terminus Hotel, 61 Harris Street, Sydney, NSW, Australia, at 8:00 pm on 11 April 2015.

Produced by The Ghosts of Nothing (Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre)

Mime: Charles Famous
Voice: Linda Taimre
Camera 1: Augusto M. Duarte
Camera 2: Luiza Pradella
Camera 3: Fábio Hamann
Camera 4: Dave Stein
Video editing: Ilmar Taimre
Music: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre
Music publishing: Perfect Pitch Publishing
3. An Impossible Question - The Ghosts of Nothing (feat. Lyndall Johnston)

Copyright © 2015 The Ghosts of Nothing & Lyndall Johnston. Used with permission.

Full video available at: https://youtu.be/eiA6XVR2VmQ

A street performance outside The Star Hotel, 410 King Street, Newcastle, NSW, Australia, at 8:00 pm on 18 April 2015.

Produced by The Ghosts of Nothing (Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre)

Tap/mime: Lyndall Johnston
Voice: Linda Taimre
Camera 1: Augusto M. Duarte
Camera 2: Rob Taylor
Video editing: Ilmar Taimre
Music: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre
Music publishing: Perfect Pitch Publishing

Full video available at: https://youtu.be/MkK2vy5V2Zw

A street performance outside Lofly Hangar, 151 Musgrave Road, Red Hill, Brisbane, QLD, Australia, at 8:00 pm on 25 April 2015.

Produced by The Ghosts of Nothing (Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre)

Butoh: Zoë Tuffin
Voice: Linda Taimre
Camera 1: Linda Taimre
Cameras 2 & 3: Tim Roane
Camera 4: Bree Kettley
Camera 5: Aita Taimre
Video editing: Ilmar Taimre
Music: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre
Music publishing: Perfect Pitch Publishing
Stage II

In Memory of Johnny B Goode - World Tour of Remote Wildernesses, 2015-2016

5. Intoxicated by the Moon – The Ghosts of Nothing (feat. Lee Devaney)

Copyright © 2015 The Ghosts of Nothing & Lee Devaney. Used with permission.

Full video available at: https://youtu.be/GyQnowsb5_A

Performed somewhere between Tromsø & Lofoten, Norway, around midday on 31 August 2015.

Produced by The Ghosts of Nothing (Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre)

Mime: Lee Devaney
Spoken voice: Linda Taimre
Camera: Lee Devaney
Video editing: Ilmar Taimre
Music: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre
Vocal styling: Lee Devaney
Music publishing: Perfect Pitch Publishing
6. The Mirror - The Ghosts of Nothing (feat. Laura Purcell)

Copyright © 2016 The Ghosts of Nothing & Laura Purcell. Used with permission.

Full video available at: https://youtu.be/Fa0ZyicelX8

Performed in Tarkine Wilderness, Meunna, Tasmania, Australia, 12:00 noon on 19 March 2016.

Produced by The Ghosts of Nothing (Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre)

Performer/puppeteer: Laura Purcell
Voice: Linda Taimre
Main camera: Angus Ashton
Drone video: Angus Ashton
Time lapse video: Laura Purcell
Video editing: Ilmar Taimre
Music: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre
Music publishing: Perfect Pitch Publishing

Produced with support of Contemporary Art Tasmania. Contemporary Art Tasmania is supported by the Australian Government through the Australia Council, its principal funding body, and by the Visual Arts and Craft Strategy, an initiative of the Australian, State and Territory Governments, and is assisted through Arts Tasmania by the Minister for the Arts.
7. Children of the Moon - The Ghosts of Nothing (feat. Coleman Grehan)

Copyright © 2016 The Ghosts of Nothing & Coleman Grehan. Used with permission.

Full video available at: https://youtu.be/wiA8F65UuYw

Performed at Summit, Tabletop Mountain, Toowoomba, QLD, Australia, around 12:00 noon on 3 September 2016.

Produced by The Ghosts of Nothing (Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre)

Butoh: Coleman Grehan
Voice: Linda Taimre
Cinematographer: Stewart Tyrrell
Drone Pilot: Jason Tann
Additional cameras: Alexandra Lawson, Ilmar Taimre
Logistics: Alexandra Lawson, Tarn McLean, The Ghosts of Nothing
Camera Assistant: Boudicca Davies
Video editing: Ilmar Taimre
Music: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre
Music publishing: Perfect Pitch Publishing

Produced with support of Raygun Projects, Toowoomba.

Full video available at: https://youtu.be/uE99PmJmM4

Performed at Trail Connector to Appalachian Trail, Salisbury, Connecticut, USA, 12:00 noon on 12 November 2016.

Produced by The Ghosts of Nothing (Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre)

Mime: Frank J. Miles
Voice: Linda Taimre
Cinematographer: Al Prexta
Video post-production & editing: Ilmar Taimre
Logistics: Sean Lowry, Paul Lamarre, Melissa P. Wolf, Simone Douglas, Joseph Pastor
Music: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre
Music publishing: Perfect Pitch Publishing
Stage III
In Memory of Johnny B Goode – World Tour of Abandoned Gaol-Houses, 2016-2018


Copyright © 2016 The Ghosts of Nothing & Zackari Watt. Used with permission.

Full video available at: https://youtu.be/fzhbsFdvB4Y

Performed at The Lock-Up, 90 Hunter Street, Newcastle, NSW, Australia, 6:00 pm on 6 May 2017.

Produced by The Ghosts of Nothing (Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre)

Mime: Zackari Watt
Voice: Linda Taimre
Camera 1: Moz Waters
Camera 2: Karen McKenzie
Video post-production & editing: Ilmar Taimre
Pre-production video: Zackari Watt
Live video projection: Zackari Watt
Logistics: Sean Lowry
Music, soundscape & mixing: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre
Music publishing: Perfect Pitch Publishing

Produced with support of The Lock-Up, Newcastle.
10. Absinthe - The Ghosts of Nothing (feat. Zoë Tuffin)

Copyright © 2017 The Ghosts of Nothing & Zoë Tuffin. Used with permission.

Full video available at: https://youtu.be/AlQ3N5rN0lw

Performed at Boggo Road Gaol, Brisbane, QLD, Australia, around 6:00 pm on 22 July 2017.

Produced by The Ghosts of Nothing (Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre)

Butoh: Zoë Tuffin
Voice: Linda Taimre
Camera 1: Bree Kettley
Camera 2: Aita Taimre
Camera 3: Ilmar Taimre
SLR Camera/Chief Pilot: Jason Tann
Drone 1: Thomas Schipke
Drone 2: Kendrick George
Ground crew: Phil Heggie
Special thanks: Stewart Tyrrell
Video post-production & editing: Ilmar Taimre
Music, soundscape & mixing: Sean Lowry & Ilmar Taimre
Music publishing: Perfect Pitch Publishing
4. In Memory of Johnny B. Goode -
Exhibitions & Installations
(2015 – )

by

The Ghosts of Nothing

In Memory of Johnny B. Goode has occasionally been presented in the form of gallery exhibitions and installations, containing a selection of audio, video and/or other artefacts selected from the “world of the work.”
i. Exhibition Documentation

PopCAANZ 2015 Exhibition: Virtually Pop
Massey University Campus
Wellington, New Zealand
29 June - 1 July 2015.

Curators: Julieanna Preston & Adam Geczy


Exhibition catalogue (PDF download):
[https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=0BxfeTj6EorczNC1HaThkakNtMEk](https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=0BxfeTj6EorczNC1HaThkakNtMEk)
ii. Exhibition Images

*The Ghosts of Nothing Exhibit at PopCAANZ 2015, video screen and display cabinet.*

Photos by the author.
i. Exhibition Documentation

Johnny On Ice (redux)
presented at Plato’s Cave at EIDEA House
Brooklyn, NY USA
19 November – 10 December 2016

Curators: Paul Lamarre, Melissa Wolf

ii. Exhibition Images


© 2016 EIDIA Paul Lamarre, Melissa Wolf. Used with permission.
Bibliography
A. Primary Sources – Peirce, Ricoeur & Lotman

1. Charles Sanders Peirce

In this thesis, I adopt the following abbreviations customarily used amongst Peirce scholars.¹


Abbreviated *CP*, followed by the volume and paragraph numbers. For example, *CP* 2.228 refers to vol. 2, para. 228 of *The Collected Papers*.


Abbreviated *EP*, followed by the volume and page numbers. For example, *EP* 2.292 refers to vol. 2, p. 292 of *The Essential Peirce*.


Abbreviated *SS*, followed by page numbers.


Abbreviated *W*, followed by volume and page numbers.

Some previously unpublished Peirce manuscripts have been printed in the following recently edited collection, for which no standardised abbreviation has yet been established –


I shall use the abbreviation *Prolegomena* to refer to citations from this volume.

¹ See, for example, Atkin, *Peirce*, xiii-xiv.
2. **Paul Ricoeur**

2.1 **Bibliography**

The standard bibliography on Ricoeur is –


2.2 **Books Cited in This Thesis**

Entries are listed in chronological order of first editions, usually appearing in French.


---

\(^2\) Unless otherwise noted, all internet links cited in this Bibliography were tested and found to be working on 10 October 2017.


2.3 Anthologies of English Translations


2.4 Key Essays & Interviews Cited in This Thesis


Also in: Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, 145-64.


Also in: From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II, 53-74.

Reprinted in: Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, 93-106.


“Mimesis and Representation [1980].” In Valdés, Ricoeur Reader, 137-55.

Reprinted in Valdés, A Ricoeur Reader, 200-215. Citations in this thesis are to page numbers in A Ricoeur Reader.


“Becoming Capable, Being Recognized.” Translated by Chris Turner. Original “Devenir capable, être reconnu.” Esprit, 7 (July 2005). A PDF of the English translation was once available on the internet. However, in preparing this bibliography, I have been unable to find any links which are still current.

3. **Juri Lotman**

### 3.1 Recent Bibliographies in English


Not a bibliography. However, a useful list of references is given on pp. 138-41.

### 3.2 English Translations of Primary Sources (Books & Papers) Used in This Thesis & Corresponding Original Versions in Russian

In this sub-section, I list the English translations of the Lotman works used in this thesis, and identify the corresponding original source(s), all in Russian (the full bibliographical details of which can be found in Section 3.3). While Kalevi Kull’s bibliography of Lotman in English translation (see Section 3.1 above) is useful and thorough, it does not give any information on the sources of the translated items. Marek Tamm’s list of references includes sources for the Russian texts, but is not intended to be exhaustive and therefore omits several of the items I have used in this thesis.

Lotman’s original writings – over 800 articles and books, mostly in Russian – are scattered across a daunting range of monographs, edited volumes and journals. Most of these are not readily accessible in Australia. Fortunately, almost all of the works that are important for my purposes are available in English translation, which are generally of excellent quality.

All items in this sub-section are by Juri M. Lotman (Юрий М. Лотман) as sole author. Entries are listed in chronological order of first editions, in Russian.

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3 In this thesis, for the sake of consistency, I have standardised the spelling of Lotman’s name in the Roman alphabet to Juri M. Lotman, or Juri Lotman, regardless of the transliteration from the Cyrillic (Юрий М. Лотман) given in the translated sources.


5 Lotman has been translated into many different languages, including French, German, Italian, Spanish, Estonian, amongst others. While I have occasionally consulted some of these other translations in my collection, I have made no systematic attempt to review translations of Lotman in languages other than English. Note that, in her Ph.D. thesis, Laura Gherlone includes lists of Lotman translations into Italian (2013: 482-491) and Spanish (2013: 491-497).

Original book first published as –


The full Russian text is also reprinted in –


Original article first published as –


The full Russian text is also reprinted in –


Original article entitled first published in 1984 as –


The full Russian text is also reprinted in –


This book is partly a compilation of English translations of edited versions of a number of Lotman’s articles from the 1980s. After Universe of the Mind was issued in English, it was also issued as a unified work in the Russian language, titled Внутри мыслящих миров, and included in Лотман, Юрий М., Семиосфера (Санкт-Петербург: «Искусство-СПБ», 2000), 150-390.

I am not aware of any synoptic key which identifies the sources of all the Russian texts that formed the basis of and were translated in Universe of the Mind. Unfortunately, such information is not provided in the book itself. In any case, the Russian texts in Внутри мыслящих миров are not necessarily 100% identical to Lotman’s original Russian articles. Specifically, a comparison between the texts printed in Семиосфера and the following two

Semenenko, The Texture of Culture, 2.
original Russian papers reveals that some editing has occurred in the first instance (apparently during the process of preparing these texts for inclusion in *Universe of the Mind*):


Original book published as –


Reprinted in –


Original published as –


3.3 **Collected Works of Juri Lotman in Russian**

Two substantial multi-volume collections of Lotman’s writings exist. Items in Section 3.2 above have been cross-referenced to their availability in volumes in these collections (marked with * below).

Избранные Статьи [Selected Papers] – 3 volumes


[Collected Works] Iskusstvo SPB Publishing House, St. Petersburg – 9 volumes


* История и типология русской культуры. Санкт-Петербург: «Искусство-СПБ», 2002

B. Other Sources

1. Dictionaries, Bibliographies & Reference Works


2. Classical Authors

*Aristotle.*


Heraclitus.


3. Books, Papers & Theses


Auner, Joseph. “‘Heart and Brain in Music’: The Genesis of Schoenberg’s Die glückliche hand.” In Brand and Hailey, Constructive Dissonance, 112-39.


Автономова, Наталия. Открытая структура: Якобсон-Бахтин-Лотман-Гаспаров. Москва: РОССПЭН, 2009. [= Nataliia Avtonomova, Otkrytaia struktura: Jakobson-


Bhagwati, Sandeep. “Notational Perspective and Comprovisation.” In De Assis, Sound & Score, 165-77.


Brinkmann, Reinhold. “Schoenberg the Contemporary: A View from Behind.” In Brand and Hailey, Constructive Dissonance, 196-219.


Fleischhack, Maria, and Elmar Schenkel, eds. *Ghosts – or the (Nearly) Invisible” Spectral Phenomena in Literature and the Media*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016.


Forster, Michael N. *German Philosophy of Language: From Schlegel to Hegel and Beyond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.


Hartleben, Otto Erich. Albert Giraud Pierrot Lunaire. Berlin: A. Liebmann, 1892. [= First edition, limited to 60 numbered copies.]


Inglis, Brian. “Analytical approaches to graphic scores.” Paper presented at the conference *Putting the Graphic into Music*, Senate House, Middlesex University London, 30th November 2015. [Transcript and slides (slightly edited) kindly provided to the present author in December 2016.]


Lowry, Sean, and Ilmar Taimre. “Are We a Band?” Unpublished working paper.


McIntyre, Rev. William. *The Heathenism of Popery, Proved and Illustrated; a Lecture Delivered in Maitland, on the 12th April, 1860, and Published at the Unanimous Request of the Audience*. Maitland: Henry Thomas, 1860. [A second, enlarged edition was also published later the same year.]


Muxeneder, Therese. “Arnold Schönberg’s image in print media.” In Fess, Arnold Schönberg im Fokus, 240-56.


[Partch, Harry]. “In Explanation of ‘Gate 5’.” In “Photographs of Instruments Built by Harry Partch and Heard in His Recorded Music,” [= 16 page booklet included with some issues of Gate 5 recordings] (date unknown, ca. 1957), 16. Booklet included with a copy of *The Wayward*, Gate 5 Records, Issue B.


Petrilli, Susan. “About a master of signs starting from *The Sign & Its Masters*.” In Cobley et al., *Semiotics Continues to Astonish*, 293-305.


Ransdell, Joseph. “Some Leading Ideas of Peirce’s Semiotic (Ver. 2.0 of November 20, 1997).” Available at http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/LEADING.HTM.


An earlier and much shorter collection, titled *Style and Idea* was also published. Edited and translated by Dika Newlin. London: Williams and Norgate, 1951.


Seifermann, Ellen and Christine Kintisch. “Vorwort/Foreword.” In Seifermann and Heiser, Romantischer Konzeptualismus, 4-8.


Torop, Peeter. “Foreword: Lotmanian explosion.” In Lotman, Culture and Explosion, xxxiii-xxxv.


Wooller, Rene, Andrew R. Brown, Eduardo Miranda, Rodney Berry, and Joachim Diederich. “A framework for comparison of process in algorithmic music systems.” In *Generative Arts*


Young-Gerber, Christine. “‘Attention must be paid’, cried the balladeer: The concept musical defined.” Studies in Musical Theatre, 4, no. 3 (2010): 331-42.


4. **Sheet Music & Printed Scores**


Schidlowsky, León. *Deutschland, ein Wintemärchen* (1979). Graphic scores for all seven parts are available online at [www.emmaus.de/ingos_texte/wintermaerchen.html](http://www.emmaus.de/ingos_texte/wintermaerchen.html). Also included in Schidlowsky, *musikalische Grafik – graphic music*, 166-79.


5. *Audio Recordings, Films & Videos*

5.1 *Audio Recordings*


Note that the CD booklet text is printed – in a much more readable format – in the ephemeral Point Music press kit issued to promote this CD.


Crosby, Stills, Nash, and Young. Déjà vu. SD 7200 Atlantic, 1970. Vinyl LP.


Drake, Nick [aka Nicholas Rodney Drake]. Time Has Told Me. [no other release data, bootleg]. Two compact discs.


Flynn, George. George Flynn Trinity. Frederik Ullén (piano). BIS-CD-1593/94, 2007. Compact disc. [Also includes a PDF version of the entire score].


*Sounds of Silence: The Most Intriguing Silences in Recording History*.  Edited by Patrice Caillet, Adam David, and Matthieu Saladin.  alga marghen plana-VA alga046, n.d.  Vinyl LP.


5.2  Videos


Bowie, David.  *Best of Bowie*.  EMI 7243 5 41930 2 6, 2002.  Two DVDs.  Includes the official videos for “Space Oddity” (DVD-1, Track 1) and “Ashes to Ashes” (DVD-2, Track 2).


Copyright Permissions
1. Figure 2.1. Ilya and Emilia Kabakov, The Untalented Artist (1988)

Re: Permission to Include Kabakov Image in PhD Thesis

Ilmar Taimre

Date: 10 Dec 1998

Subject: Permission to Include Kabakov Image in PhD Thesis

Dear Julio,

This image was downloaded from the Phaidon website. I am attaching a better resolution image that you can use instead of the one you downloaded from the Phaidon website.

We were not amused at exhibiting by a multitude of artistic production in the eclectic manner, represented along the entire periphery of the classical hierarchy: religious, near-"revolutionary" painting with the participation of bishops like Lenin in the Pantheon. In the Congo, and in Africa the "cultural events" had turned into dead, unnecessary, and frozen in eternal solemnity. There is not a single "cultural event" which could be called "cultural" in this turn. The "great masters" work, and others the leaves out, not speculating that they even existed. But some of them provide the means to play the door 'so that something similar to what was expected could result. And everything must be in a form appealing to us, walking shoulder to shoulder with my consequences, I know own two

The Untalented Artist

Catalog No 17

Ronald Feldman Fine Arts, New York, 1988,

Please see below credits for the image.

Website.

I am attaching a better resolution image that you can use instead of the one you downloaded from the Phaidon website.

Ronald Feldman Fine Arts, New York, 1988,

Please see below credits for the image.

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The Untalented Artist

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The Untalented Artist

Catalog No 17

Ronald Feldman Fine Arts, New York, 1988,

Please see below credits for the image.

Website.
in the work which is produced in this way, insights, and maybe thanks to, the fact that both parents didn't devote to it 'all their talent,' responsibility, and 'their entire hearts and souls'.

Commentary:

Joseph Bakshtein: As I understand it, the task of this installation was to show, among other things, the fact, as it were, a style as a source of 'great styles' of Socialist Realism which flourished in our country during Stalin's reign and continued until the 1960's and 1970's. This style doesn't concede anything in terms of the clarity of its forms and constructions like the Baroque and Classicism. As in any established canon, it is no longer important what level of artists worked in it or what their attitude toward it was - the style remains definitive of their creative endeavors.

Ilya Kabakov: Yes, of course, this is not only sad, but horrible because now one must assume total responsibility for the drawing. In a certain sense, one must become an adult, and how undesirable this is...

Best Regards,

Julio C. Munoz
Web Developer
Fine Art Biblio
Cell: 305-972-6925

From: Ilmar Taimre [mailto:Ilmar.Taimre@uon.edu.au]
Sent: Tuesday, August 22, 2017 1:45 AM
To: info@fineartbiblio.com
Subject: Permission to Include Kabakov Image in PhD Thesis

Hello

I am contacting you to seek written permission to copy and communicate the following image of "The Untalented Artist," an installation by Ilya Kabakov within the electronic version of my Ph.D. thesis:

The image is copied from the Kabakov's website -
http://www.ilya-emilia-kabakov.com/installations-1/

If you are not the rights holder for this material I would be grateful if you would advise me who to contact.

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle's online digital repository http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index

Kind regards

Ilmar Taimre
2. Figure 2.2. Susan Hiller, *Dedicated to the Unknown Artists* (1972–76)

By the way, Susan Hiller has also granted permission for the use of this image. Kind regards

Ilmar

From: Louise Burley <Louise.Burley@tate.org.uk>
Sent: Friday, 1 September 2017 2:02:28 AM
To: Ilmar Taimre
Subject: RE: Tate Images Licence for Reproduction Form

Dear Ilmar,

Thanks for your email.

Please find a proforma invoice attached. Payment details can be found before the Terms and Conditions and must be submitted within 30 days.

The image will be sent on receipt of payment.

Kind regards,

Louise

From: Louise Burley <Louise.Burley@tate.org.uk>
Sent: Saturday, 26 August 2017 1:46:44 AM
To: Ilmar Taimre
Subject: RE: Tate Images Licence for Reproduction Form

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Kind regards,

Louise

From: Ilmar Taimre <Ilmar.taimre@uon.edu.au>
Sent: 26 August 2017 00:01
To: Louise Burley
Subject: Re: Tate Images Licence for Reproduction Form

Dear Louise

Yes, could you please raise an invoice to

ILMAR TAIMRE
280 Old Farm Road
Pullenvale
Brisbane 4069
Australia

Kind regards

Ilmar

From: Louise Burley <Louise.Burley@tate.org.uk>
Sent: Friday, 25 August 2017 9:05:03 PM
To: Ilmar Taimre
Subject: RE: Tate Images Licence for Reproduction Form

Dear Mr. Taimre,

Thanks for completing a Tate Images Licence for Reproduction Form.

Please note that this artwork is still in copyright and you are obliged to clear additional artistic copyright with artist Susan Hiller at susan@artesian.org.uk

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Please find our terms and conditions attached.

Kind regards,

Louise

Louise Burley
Picture Library Executive
Tate Images
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London, SW1P 4RG
T: +44 (0)20 7887 8871
F: +44 (0)20 7887 8805
E: louise.burley@tate.org.uk
W: www.tate-images.com
W: www.tate.org.uk
Follow us on Twitter @TateImages

-----Original Message-----
From: ILMAR TAIMRE <ilmar.taimre@uon.edu.au>
Sent: 22 August 2017 07:05
To: Tate Images
Subject: Tate Images Licence for Reproduction Form

Tate accession number: T13531
Usage: Academic
Media: Thesis/Dissertation, Not Published
Territory: World, 1 Language
Size up to &/or placement: 1/4 page inside Distribution up to: Unlimited transmissions Electronic License Period up to: N/A
Start Date: June 2018 (estimated)
End Client: University of Newcastle
Description: The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index

Your Details/make invoice payable to:

Client ID: UNINOR13
Client IP: 121.222.251.25
First Name: ILMAR
Last Name: TAIMRE
Company: University of Newcastle
Address: 280 Old Farm Road
Pullenvale
Brisbane, QLD

Date: 26 August 2017 23:19

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Kind regards

Ilmar Taimre

Susan Hiller Studio 0413 788 833 Email: susan.hiller@nsw.gov.au

Dear Susan,

Thank you for your email and interest in Susan Hiller’s work.

I am seeking written permission to copy and communicate the following images from Tate, in your work, Deadlock in the Unknown Arts, within the electronic version of my PhD thesis.

I am advised by Tate Gallery that your permission is also required.

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository: http://www.novarise.nuwww.nsw.gov.au/;

Kind regards

Ilmar Taimre
3. Figure 3.1. The Dimensions of Musical Meaning According to Stefan Koelsch

Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

Re: Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

Dear Ilmar Taimre,

I am happy to grant you my permission to copy and communicate that image. Very curious to read your thesis! Please let me know when I can access the online version, as I plan to include these ideas in one of my publications. In the meantime, you can see other online publications of mine on:


Cheers and good luck,

Stefan Kölsch

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle's online digital repository:

http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index

Kind regards,

Ilmar Taimre
4. Figure 5.4. Summary of Peirce’s Final Account of Signs (after Atkin)

The Sign
The Dynamic object.

The Dynamic Interpretant.
(The actual understanding of the dynamic object at some interim stage in the semiotic chain/process.)

The Final Interpretant.
(The understanding of the dynamic object at the end of enquiry.)

The Immediate object.
(The object suggested by current understanding, and generated by previous dynamic interpretants.)

The Immediate Interpretant.
(One general understanding of the form, or syntax, of the sign.)

(The real object as it is known at the end of inquiry.)

If you are not the rights holder for this material I would be grateful if you would advise me who to contact.

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository
https://digirca.newcastle.edu.au:8080/ark:/8720/.uninewc/jn7f8g

Kind regards
Ilmar Taimre
5. Figure 9.2. David Bowie as the Thin White Duke (Photo: Andrew Kent)

The title of my thesis is "An Interpretive Model for Conceptual Music." I deal with different ways artists and composers introduce ideas and concepts into music.

I am including a lengthy discussion on David Bowie, and his use of the Pierrot character as one of his enduring artistic identities. I trace the visual iconography of Pierrot in Bowie's work, through early work with Lindsay Kemp, in the Ashes to Ashes video, the Thin White Duke, Lodger cover, and then into his later videos.

Let me know if you would like more information.

Cheers,
Ilmar

---

From: Warren Winter <warren@psgwire.com>
Sent: Wednesday, 30 August 2017 9:26 PM
To: Ilmar Taimre
Subject: Re: Permission to Use Bowie Image in PhD Thesis

Hi Ilmar,

Permission granted. Best wishes for you and your thesis.

Warren Winter

PSG

On Aug 30, 2017, at 3:21 AM, Ilmar Taimre <Ilmar.Taimre@uon.edu.au> wrote:

Hi Warren

That’s great, much appreciated.

Cheers
Ilmar

From: Warren Winter <warren@psgwire.com>
Sent: Wednesday, 30 August 2017 9:26 PM
To: Ilmar Taimre
Subject: Re: Permission to Use Bowie Image in PhD Thesis

Hi Ilmar,

Permission granted. Best wishes for you and your thesis.

Warren Winter

---

On Aug 22, 2017, at 1:24 AM, Ilmar Taimre <Ilmar.Taimre@uon.edu.au> wrote:

Hello

I am contacting you to seek written permission to copy and communicate the following image of David Bowie within the electronic version of my Ph.D. thesis:

The image is on pp.31-32 of "Behind the Curtain" by Andrew Kent.

If you are not the rights holder for this material I would be grateful if you would advise me who to contact.

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index

Kind regards
Ilmar Taimre

---

From: Ilmar Taimre
Sent: Wednesday, 23 August 2017 8:20:37 AM
To: Warren Winter
Subject: Re: Permission to Use Bowie Image in PhD Thesis

Hi Warren

Just checking that you received my reply below?

Cheers
Ilmar

From: Warren Winter <warren@psgwire.com>
Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017 11:21:02 PM
To: Ilmar Taimre
Subject: Re: Permission to Use Bowie Image in PhD Thesis

Hi Ilmar,

Thank you for reaching out and requesting permission to use Andrew Kent’s photo.

Before I grant permission to use the image I would like to know the title and theme of your thesis please.

Cheers,
Warren Winter

PSG

On Aug 22, 2017, at 1:24 AM, Ilmar Taimre <Ilmar.Taimre@uon.edu.au> wrote:

Hello

I am contacting you to seek written permission to copy and communicate the following image of David Bowie within the electronic version of my Ph.D. thesis:

The image is on pp.31-32 of "Behind the Curtain" by Andrew Kent.

If you are not the rights holder for this material I would be grateful if you would advise me who to contact.

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index

Kind regards
Ilmar Taimre

---

From: Ilmar Taimre
Sent: Wednesday, 23 August 2017 8:20:37 AM
To: Warren Winter
Subject: Re: Permission to Use Bowie Image in PhD Thesis

Hi Warren

I am contacting you to seek written permission to copy and communicate the following image of David Bowie within the electronic version of my Ph.D. thesis:

The image is on pp.31-32 of "Behind the Curtain" by Andrew Kent.

If you are not the rights holder for this material I would be grateful if you would advise me who to contact.

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index

Kind regards
Ilmar Taimre
Re: Permission for use of Duffy photographs

Ilmar Taimre
sandie@duffyphotographer.com

Hi Sandie

Thanks for that - much appreciated

Cheers

ilmar

On 22 August 2017 at 04:52:49, contact@duffyphotographer.com (contact@duffyphotographer.com) wrote:

Subject: Permission for use of Duffy photographs

Hi Sandie

Many thanks for your email. We agree to the use of the two images:

SKU Z_1649_08 Scary Monsters Clown Costume #2
SKU ZTP_CT_0042_03 The Lodger Polaroid

On the basis that the following copyright credit is attached to the images:

Photo Duffy © Duffy Archive

No other use/duplication/commercialisation is permitted for these images without prior consent. Additionally, the images should not be cropped, altered or manipulated in any capacity.

We wish you well with your thesis.

All best

Ilmar

On 22 August 2017 at 16:52:49, contact@duffyphotographer.com (contact@duffyphotographer.com) wrote:

Hi Sandie,

Many thanks for your email. We agree to the use of the two images:

SKU Z_1649_08 Scary Monsters Clown Costume #2
SKU ZTP_CT_0042_03 The Lodger Polaroid

On the basis that the following copyright credit is attached to the images:

Photo Duffy © Duffy Archive

No other use/duplication/commercialisation is permitted for these images without prior consent. Additionally, the images should not be cropped, altered or manipulated in any capacity.

We wish you well with your thesis.

All best

Ilmar

From: Sandie Goodman <sandie@duffyphotographer.com>
Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017 8:48:32 PM
To: Ilmar Taimre
Subject: Permission for use of Duffy photographs

Hi Ilmar

Many thanks for your email. We agree to the use of the two images:

SKU Z_1649_08 Scary Monsters Clown Costume #2
SKU ZTP_CT_0042_03 The Lodger Polaroid

On the basis that the following copyright credit is attached to the images:

Photo Duffy © Duffy Archive

No other use/duplication/commercialisation is permitted for these images without prior consent. Additionally, the images should not be cropped, altered or manipulated in any capacity.

We wish you well with your thesis.

All best

Ilmar
7. Figure 9.6. George Underwood, The Depth of the Circle.

Dear George,

Thank you, much appreciated.

Kind regards,

Ilmar

From: George Underwood <underwood.george@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, 23 August 2017 8:54:18 PM
To: Ilmar Taimre
Subject: Re: Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

Dear Ilmar,

Thanks for contacting me regarding 'The Depth of the Circle' painting. The copyright is with me and I am happy for you to use this image for your Ph.D thesis.

If you have any questions regarding the image, please let me know.

Kind regards,

George Underwood

On 23 Aug 2017, at 01:44, Ilmar Taimre <Ilmar.Taimre@uon.edu.au> wrote:

Dear Mr Underwood

I am contacting you to seek written permission to copy and communicate the following image, of your illustration for the back cover of David Bowie’s Space Oddity album, within the electronic version of my Ph.D thesis:

<Space Oddity Cover.jpg>

If permission for this image is likely to be difficult to obtain, I would also be interested in seeking permission for the alternative version printed on p.142 of the V&A book, David Bowie Is.

My aim is to illustrate a detailed discussion of Bowie’s use of the Pierrot character/iconography at different stages of his career.

If you are not the rights holder for this material I would be grateful if you would advise me who to contact.

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index

Kind regards

Ilmar Taimre

Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

Dear George,

I am contacting you to seek written permission to copy and communicate the following image, of your illustration for the back cover of David Bowie’s Space Oddity album, within the electronic version of my Ph.D thesis:

<Space Oddity Cover.jpg>

If permission for this image is likely to be difficult to obtain, I would also be interested in seeking permission for the alternative version printed on p.142 of the V&A book, David Bowie Is.

My aim is to illustrate a detailed discussion of Bowie’s use of the Pierrot character/iconography at different stages of his career.

If you are not the rights holder for this material I would be grateful if you would advise me who to contact.

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index

Kind regards

Ilmar Taimre

Extract 1 -
Do you remember a guy that lived
In such an early song
I've heard a rumour from Ground Control
Oh no, don't say it's true

Extract 2 -
Ashes to ashes, funk to funky
We know Major Tom's a junkie
Strung out in heaven's high
Hitting an all-time low

Extract 3 -
My mama said, "To get things done
You'd better not mess with Major Tom."

Any other use including further print runs would be the subject of a separate licence.

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EFT:        Bank: ANZ 420 Hampton St, Hampton VIC 3188
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Account   351647105
Please send payment confirmation to: rgriffin@halleonard.com.au  or
Hal Leonard 4 Lentara Crt Cheltenham VIC 3192 Att: Robert Griffin

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The Licensee shall not collect any further income for the reproduction of the Work or the Arrangement and/or Engraving of the Work

9. Figure 9.9. Photo of Arnold Schoenberg

Dear Ilmar Taimre,

you may have permission to use the requested photograph - a high resolution file can be downloaded from: http://www.schoenberg.at/resources/?r=4230&k=b6d53aec31

Please credit: Arnold Schönberg Center, Vienna

When your thesis has been published online, please give me a short message.

Kind regards,
Eike Fess

Am Samstag, 07. Januar 2017 00:15 CET, Ilmar taimre <ilmar22@yahoo.com> schrieb:

Hello

I am currently completing a PhD thesis in music at the University of Newcastle (Australia)

I would like to include the image PH1533 = PH7974 in the body of my thesis (which may ultimately be made available online as a PDF document).

For this reason, I request permission to include this image in my thesis, and if possible would appreciate receiving a high-resolution TIF file version.

Kind regards,

Ilmar Taimre
10. Figure 10.2 (a). León Schidlowsky, “Du sollst nicht” Collage

Re: Permission to Use Images in PhD Dissertation

Ilmar Taimre

Dear David,

Thank you for granting permission to use the first image; it is not too late. I certainly understand that it is a musical work and make this very clear in my discussion.

I shall contact Ingo Schütz regarding the second image.

Kind regards,
Ilmar

Dear Ilmar Taimre,

I am David and have the responsibility for the virtual correspondence of my father León Schidlowsky and his works. I had an operation that’s the reason why it took me so long to talk to my father by telephone (he lives in Tel Aviv and I in Berlin) and to give you an answer. I hope it’s not too late.

I asked my father about your request and he has no problem that you used the first graphic of “Deutschland ein Wintermärchen”. For him is important to make clear that this is a musical work, not only a graphic. I hope you understand that and you can understand that if you read my book about his graphic works.

About the second image, the photo of the performance, you have to ask Ingo Schulz for his permission because he has the right of it, if I know well. His mail is: ingo.schulz@emmaus.de

We wish you a lot of success in your PhD Dissertation

All the best from Berlin
David


The second image is from the CD booklet: Leon Schidlowsky zum 75. Geburtstag Weiß und Blau (EMMAUS, 2006). p. 6.

I am including a discussion on this work as an example of shifting the signifying aspects of a work into conceptual prominence.
11. Figure 10.2 (b). Photo of Performance of León Schidlowsky, “Du sollst nicht”

Re: Permission to use image in PhD Dissertation

Ilmar Taimre

Thank you. I confirm that I will not receive payment. I will credit copyright as you request.

Kind regards

Ilmar

Dear Ingo Schulz

Thank you. I agree if you don’t receive any money with the foto.

Please write © Christian Fischer, 2006

Greetings from Berlin,

Ingo Schulz

---

Ilmar Taimre

Mon 11/09/2017 7:37 AM

To: Ingo Schulz <ingo.schulz@emmaus.de>; 

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index

Kind regards

Ilmar Taimre

---

Ingo Schulz

29.08.2017 um 23:53 schrieb Ilmar Taimre:

I am contacting you to seek written permission to copy and communicate

the following image in the electronic version of my PhD thesis:

This image is copied from the CD booklet: /Leon Schidlowsky zum 75. Geburtstag von 1952 bis 2005/, musik art ingo schutz, ma 34, 2006, p. 6.

I am advised by Dr David Schidlowsky that you are the rights holder for

this image. If you are not the rights holder for this image you will be

grateful if you would advise me who to contact.

12. Figures 10.3 & 10.4. Dieter Schnebel MO-NO Examples
13. Figure 11.1 (b). Performance of John Cage, *Europera 5*, Rustbelt Salon

Re: Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

From: Ilmar Taimre
Sent: Friday, 1 September 2017 10:38:32 PM
To: jon roy
Subject: Re: Fw: Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

Hi Jon,

Thanks much appreciated. I will make sure to let you know when it is done.

Kind regards
Ilmar

From: jon roy <roy.jon@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, 1 September 2017 3:36:52 AM
To: Ilmar Taimre
Subject: Re: Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

Hi Ilmar,

I hereby grant permission for your non-commercial use of the aforementioned image from *Europera 5* in your thesis/dissertation. Please credit the image courtesy of Jon Roy/NewDissonance.com, and if you can send me a direct link when your paper is live. I'd be quite interested in reading your work.

My very best,
Jon Roy

On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 6:44 PM, Ilmar Taimre <Ilmar.Taimre@uon.edu.au> wrote:

Hello

I am forwarding this as my email to the info address at New Dissonance bounced back.

I am hoping you might be able to assist with the request below?

Kind regards
Ilmar Taimre

14. Figure 11.2. Performances of Peter Ablinger, *Weiss/Weisslich 31e*

Re: Permission to Use Images in PhD Dissertation

From: Ilmar Taimre
Sent: Wednesday, 23 August 2017 9:36 AM
To: Ilmar Taimre
Subject: Re: Permission to Use Images in PhD Dissertation

Hi Peter,

There should be no problem with the images at all.

But if you want to go over for 200% you might contact Lukas Schiske about the second image:

Lukas Schiske <lukas.schiske@gmail.com>

good luck

Peter

Zitat von Ilmar Taimre <Ilmar.Taimre@uon.edu.au>:

> Dear Peter
> 
> Thank you - I will also contact Lukas Schiske.
> 
> Best regards
> Ilmar
> 
> From: abliger@mur.at <ablinger@mur.at>
> Sent: Tuesday, 29 August 2017 7:24:45 AM
> To: Ilmar Taimre
> Subject: Re: Permission to Use Images in PhD Dissertation
> 
> Dear Ilmar,
> 
> there should be no problem with the images at all.
> 
> But if you want to go over for 200% you might contact Lukas Schiske about the second image.
> 
> Lukas Schiske <lukas.schiske@gmail.com>
> 
> good luck
> 
> peter
15. Figures 11.3 & 11.4. Lawrence English, *Viento*

Dear Lawrence,

Much appreciated! All the best with yours.

Cheers,

Ilmar

From: Lawrence English <lawrence@room40.org>
Sent: Wednesday, 23 August 2017 9:13 AM
To: Ilmar Taimre
Subject: Re: Permission to Use Images in PhD Thesis

good to hear from you. I hope the PhD is taking shape well! I am under examination on my own….

find free to use those images.

my best

cheers

Ilmar

ROOM40 . PO BOX 191 . RED HILL . QLD . AUSTRALIA 4059
WWW.ROOM40.ORG
WWW.SOMEONEGOOD.ORG
WWW.LAWRENCEENGLISH.COM

On 23 Aug 2017, at 9:13 AM, Ilmar Taimre <Ilmar.Taimre@uon.edu.au> wrote:

Dear Lawrence,

I corresponded with you some time ago re: The Peregrine and have enjoyed several of your releases over the years.

I am currently completing a PhD in music at University of Newcastle (by distance, I live in Brisbane). The title of my PhD is "An Interpretive Model for Conceptual Music." I am including a discussion of your work in a chapter dealing with uses of recording music ("recits") as an important conceptual dimension in different works (I also discuss John Cage and Peter Ablinger in that chapter).

I am contacting you to seek written permission to copy and communicate the following four images, associated with your field recording *Viento*, within the electronic version of my PhD thesis:

- ![Viento1.jpg](http://www.factmag.com/2014/11/18/a-beginners-guide-to-field-recording/2/)
- ![Viento2.jpg](http://www.factmag.com/2014/11/18/a-beginners-guide-to-field-recording/6/)
- ![Viento3.jpg](http://www.factmag.com/2014/11/18/a-beginners-guide-to-field-recording/6/)
- ![Viento4.jpg](http://www.factmag.com/2014/11/18/a-beginners-guide-to-field-recording/6/)


If you are not the rights holder for some or all of this material I would be grateful if you would advise me who to contact.

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository [http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index](http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index)

Kind regards

Ilmar Taimre

---

Kind regards

Ilmar Taimre
16. Figure 12.1. Productive/Reproductive Imagination According to Ricoeur

Re: Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

Dear Ilmar,

I did create that image and I hereby give you permission to use it, but please mention the article from which you took it (make sure to cite the published version). The image is based on a diagram Ricoeur himself created in his as yet unpublished Lectures on Imagination, but in this form it is my creation.

Good luck with finishing your PhD.

Best wishes,

Martijn

Martijn (M.) Boven
Lecturer, Contemporary Philosophy & Art Theory
+31 (0) 6-20503185 | m.boven@rug.nl

Dr. M. (Martijn) Boven
Lecturer, Contemporary Philosophy & Art Theory
Minerva Art Academy, Groningen, The Netherlands

On Wed, Sep 6, 2017 at 7:55 AM, Ilmar Taimre <Ilmar.Taimre@uon.edu.au> wrote:

I am contacting you to seek written permission to copy and communicate the following image from your essay "The Site of Initiative: Towards a Hermeneutic Framework for Analysing the Imagination of Future Threats," within the electronic version of my PhD thesis.

If you are not the rights holder for this material I would be grateful if you would advise me who to contact.

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle's online digital repository http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Repository

Kind regards

Ilmar Taimre
17. Figure 12.6. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Structure (Bruhn)

Re: Permission to Use Table in PhD Dissertation

Dear Ilmar Taimre,

You replied on 11/09/2017 7:38 AM.

I am contacting you to seek written permission to copy and communicate the following table, adapted from your summary in Arnold Schoenberg’s Journey, p. 36, within the electronic version of my Ph.D. thesis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dehmel</th>
<th>Schoenberg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part I</td>
<td>Part I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stanza I</td>
<td>section I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-28</td>
<td>3-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stanza II</td>
<td>section II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>woman’s speech</td>
<td>29-187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stanza III</td>
<td>section III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>narration</td>
<td>188-228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stanza IV</td>
<td>section IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>man’s speech</td>
<td>229-369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stanza V</td>
<td>section V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>narration</td>
<td>370-418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, I acknowledge the analysis of Egon Wellesz, however I think this tabular format originates with you?

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Show?recordID=... kind regards

Ilmar Taimre

19. Figure 13.6. Rohan Kriwaczek Illustrations

Best regards,

Ilmar

Caroline Burghardt <caroline@luhringaugustine.com>
Sent: Friday, 8 September 2017 4:27:04 AM
To: Ilmar Taimre
Subject: RE: Permission to Use Images in PhD Dissertation

Hi Ilmar,

Sure, you may include the sketch as well. I have attached the best image we have available. Please follow the same guidelines for this piece as were sent for the video, the crediting would be just © Ragnar Kjartansson; Courtesy of the artists, Luhring Augustine, New York, and i8 Gallery, Reykjavik. If you need anything else let me know.

Best wishes,
Caroline

Caroline Burghardt
Director of Publications and Archives
Luhring Augustine Bushwick
25 Knickerbocker Avenue
Brooklyn, NY 11237
Tel: 718.386.2745
Fax: 718.386.2744
Mailing address:
Luhring Augustine
531 West 24th Street
New York, NY 10011
me who to contact.

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/moreinfo

Kind regards

ilmr taimre
21. Re-Arrangement of Schoenberg, Verklärte Nacht

The University of Newcastle digital thesis repository is, in principle, accessible from anywhere in the world, so I can't confirm that the PDF score would only be available to people in Australia. Similarly, the MP3 audio file will be digitally available for people from other states you would have to ask for arrangement.

I have attached a PDF of the score as well as an MP3 audio "demo" file, which uses instrumental samples to give an approximate idea of what the piece could sound like if it was ever performed by the specified instruments.

This is not really a conventional "arrangement." Rather, it approaches the idea of "re-composition" or "mash-up" approaches to contemporary classical music composition (as exemplified by the Deutsche Grammophon Re-Composed series of recordings).

I would like to include a copy of the attached score in the electronic version of my thesis, as well as an internet link to the audio "demo." This is purely to allow someone a public performance or be rendered in a real chamber orchestra, as specified in the thesis.

I am not sure whether my planned use falls within the scope of activities for which copyright permission is required. However, I thought it best to check with you.

I do not wish to include any parts of Schoenberg's original score in the electronic version of my thesis.

Please let me know if you require any further information or clarification.

Best regards,

Ilmar Taimre

Subject: Re: Arrangement

To: Aygün Lausch <Lausch@universaledition.com>

Sent: Monday, 25 September 2017 5:32:10 PM

Hi Aygün,

Sorry for the delay in answering your email. In principle, you need our permission. But if your thesis and the PDF/MP3 audio file will be digitally available for people from other states you would have to ask for arrangement permission. Can you confirm that only a limited number of Australian people will be made possible? Otherwise I have to forward your version to the Schoenberg family. They decide about the authorization of arrangements.

With best regards,

Ilmar Taimre

lausch@universaledition.com

Tel: + 43 / 1 / 337 23 - 112
A - 1010 Wien
Bösendorferstrasse 12
Universal Edition AG

www.universaledition.com
Composer: Arnold Schönberg
Work: Verklärte Nacht

Applicant:
Mr. ILMAR TAIMRE
E-Mail: ilmar.taimre@uon.edu.au

Company: Universitediemen
Address: 280 Old Farm Road, 4069 Pullenvale, Brisbane, Australia

Arranger:

Arrangement Information

Use: A score to be included in a portfolio of compositions as part of a PhD thesis
Performance: No public performances to date envisaged in the future or envisaged for the arrangement
Instrumentation: For small chamber ensemble
Language: English
Performance Data: No public performances to date envisaged in the future
22. Figures L.1 & L.2. Lotman Diagrams

Re: Permission to Reproduce Material Copyrighted by The Ghosts of Nothing

Sean Lowry <sean.lowry@unimelb.edu.au>

Subject: Permission to Reproduce Material Copyrighted by The Ghosts of Nothing

Dear Sean,

I am delighted to enter into an agreement to permit the reproduction of any materials copyrighted under our collaborative partnership “The Ghosts of Nothing,” as may be needed for inclusion in the electronic version of my PhD thesis.

Kind regards,

Ilmar Taimre

Get Outlook for iOS

Sean Lowry

Kinds regards,

Ilmar Taimre

Get Outlook for iOS

--- Forwarded Message ---

From: Sean Lowry <sean.lowry@unimelb.edu.au>
Date: Wednesday, November 30, 2011 1:32 PM
Subject: Permission to Reproduce Material Copyrighted by The Ghosts of Nothing

Hi Ilmar,

I am completing and documenting all the written permissions I require in order to copy and communicate copyrighted material in the electronic version of my PhD thesis.

For the sake of good order, can you please confirm that you approve of my use of any materials, which we have copyrighted under our collaborative partnership “The Ghosts of Nothing,” as may be needed for inclusion in the electronic version of my PhD thesis.

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository http://ogma.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index.

Cheers,

Ilmar

Fw: Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

Ilmar Taimre <ilmar22@yahoo.com>

Subject: Re: Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

On Sep 16, 2017 11:54 PM, “ilmar taimre” <ilmar22@yahoo.com> wrote:

Dear Frank,

I hope all is well with you.

I would like to use a couple of stills from our videos in my PhD thesis. As the videos are jointly copyrighted by The Ghosts of Nothing and you, I am contacting you to seek your written permission to copy and communicate the two following images within the electronic version of my PhD thesis:

From the “This Is Johnny” video:

From the “Johnny On Ice” video:

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Best regards,

Ilmar Taimre

--- Forwarded Message ---

From: Coleman Grehan <coleman.grehan@live.com.au>
Date: Monday, September 11, 2017 1:01:47 PM

Dear Coleman,

I understand from Sean Lowry that you are the “representative” of the artist known as Charles Famous, in my PhD thesis.

I would like to use a still shot from the video “Betrayal,” produced by The Ghosts of Nothing and featuring Charles Famous, in my PhD thesis.

As the videos are jointly copyrighted by The Ghosts of Nothing and you, I am contacting you to seek your written permission to copy and communicate the following image within the electronic version of my PhD thesis:

The image I would like to use is one which appears in the YouTube menu attached as JPG.

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Kind regards,

Ilmar Taimre

--- Forwarded Message ---

From: David Clomas <davidclomas@gmail.com>
Date: Monday, September 11, 2017 3:58 PM

Dear David,

Thanks for asking.

Yes, of course you can.

Thanks for asking,

David

--- Original Message -------

From: Coleman Grehan <coleman.grehan@live.com.au>
Date: Monday, September 11, 2017 3:58 PM

Subject: Re: Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

Hi Ilmar,

I hereby provide written permission to use both images in your PhD Thesis.

Hope all is well.

Regards,

Coleman Grehan

Mon 11/09, 4:28 PM

Ilmar Taimre;

Frank J Miles <frankjmiles10678@gmail.com>

Wednesday, 20 September 2017, 18:28

Sent: 20/09/2017 7:17:32 AM

To: “Ilmar Taimre” <ilmar22@yahoo.com>

Subject: Re: Permission to Use Images in PhD Thesis

On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 7:12 AM, “Ilmar Taimre” <ilmar22@yahoo.com> wrote:

On Sep 16, 2017 11:54 PM, “Ilmar Taimre” <ilmar22@yahoo.com> wrote:

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Ilmar Taimre

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From: David Clomas <davidclomas@gmail.com>
Date: Monday, September 11, 2017 3:58 PM

Subject: Re: Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

Hi Ilmar,

Thanks for asking.

Yes, of course you can.

Thanks for asking,

David

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Date: Monday, September 11, 2017 3:58 PM

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From: David Clomas <davidclomas@gmail.com>
Date: Monday, September 11, 2017 3:58 PM

Subject: Re: Permission to Use Image in PhD Thesis

Hi Ilmar,

Thanks for asking.

Yes, of course you can.

Thanks for asking,

David
Hi Ilmar,

Lovely to hear from you.

Oh that photo brings back wonderful memories of Norway!

Please feel free to use the photo as you desire. I appreciate you asking for permission.

Good luck with your thesis.

All the best!

Cheers

Lee

On Sun, Sep 17, 2017 at 2:12 PM, Ilmar Taimre <ilmar22@yahoo.com> wrote:

Dear Lee

I hope all is well with you.

As what like to use one still shot from our video in my PhD thesis. As the video is jointly copyrighted by the School of Design and you, I am contacting you to seek your written permission to copy and communicate the following image within the electronic version of my PhD thesis:

The image I would like to use is the one which appears in the YouTube menu (attached as JPG).

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository:

https://pure.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index

Kind regards

Ilmar Taimre

The image I would like to use is the one which appears in the YouTube menu (attached as JPG).

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository:

https://pure.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Index

Kind regards

Ilmar Taimre
Dear Ilmar,

I am good, I hope you are also keeping well.

You have my permission to copy and communicate the provided image for your Ph.D. thesis. I also wish you all the best of your luck with your Ph.D.

Kind Regards,

Lyndall Johnston

Dear Ilmar,

I hope all is well with you.

I would like to use a still shot from our video in my Ph.D. thesis. As the video is jointly copyrighted by The Ghosts of Nothing and you, I am contacting you to seek your written permission to copy and communicate the following image within the electronic version of my Ph.D. thesis:

The image I would like to use is one which appears in the YouTube menu (attached as JPG).

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository

http://nrga.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/index

Kind regards

ilmar taimre

Dear Zoë

Yep all good, happy for you to use those!

Best wishes

Zoe

Zoe Tuffin

MA Directing (Western Australian Academy of Performing Arts)

Co-Artistic Director

Wax Lyrical Productions

M: +61 (0) 404 388 533
E: tuflnzoe@gmail.com
W: zoetufln.com

On Sun, Sep 17, 2017 at 2:02 PM, ilmar taimre <ilmar22@yahoo.com> wrote:

Dear Zoë

Re-sending with images attached

Kind regards

ilmar taimre

----- End forwarded message ----
From: Zoe Tuffin <tuflnzoe@gmail.com>
To: ilmar taimre <ilmar22@yahoo.com>
Sent: Sunday, 17 September 2017, 20:45
Subject: Re: Permission to Use Images in PhD Thesis

Hi Ilmar,

I would like to use a couple of still shots from our video in my Ph.D. thesis. As the videos are jointly copyrighted by The Ghosts of Nothing and you, I am contacting you to seek your written permission to copy and communicate the two following images within the electronic version of my Ph.D. thesis:

From the “Madonna of Hysterias” video:

From the “Absinthe” video:

The thesis will be made available on the internet via the University of Newcastle’s online digital repository

http://nrga.newcastle.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/index

Kind regards

ilmar taimre