- Title
- A review of false data injection attacks against modern power systems
- Creator
- Liang, Gaoqi; Zhao, Junhua; Luo, Fengji; Weller, Steven R.; Dong, Zhao Yang
- Relation
- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid Vol. 8, Issue 4, p. 1630-1638
- Publisher Link
- http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2015.2495133
- Publisher
- Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Resource Type
- journal article
- Date
- 2017
- Description
- With rapid advances in sensor, computer and communication networks, modern power systems have become complicated cyber-physical systems. Assessing and enhancing cyber-physical system security is therefore of utmost importance for the future electricity grid. In a successful false data injection attack (FDIA), an attacker compromises measurements from grid sensors in such a way that undetected errors are introduced into estimates of state variables such as bus voltage angles and magnitudes. In evading detection by commonly employed residue-based bad data detection tests, FDIAs are capable of severely threatening power system security. Since the first published research on FDIAs in 2009, research into FDIA-based cyber-attacks has been extensive. This paper gives a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art in FDIAs against modern power systems. The paper first summarizes the theoretical basis of FDIAs, and then discusses both the physical and economic impacts of a successful FDIA. The paper presents the basic defense strategies against FDIAs, and discusses some potential future research directions in this field.
- Subject
- cyber-physical security; false data injection attacks; state estimation; power system
- Identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/1959.13/1349991
- Identifier
- uon:30469
- Identifier
- ISSN:1949-3053
- Language
- eng
- Reviewed
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