A social welfare optimal sequential allocation procedure

Title: A social welfare optimal sequential allocation procedure
Creator: Kalinowski, Thomas; Narodytska, Nina; Walsh, Toby
Relation: 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (Beijing, China 3-9 August, 2013) p. 227-233
Relation: http://ijcai-13.org/proceedings
Publisher: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) Press
Resource Type: conference paper
Date: 2013
Description: We consider a simple sequential allocation procedure for sharing indivisible items between agents in which agents take turns to pick items. Supposing additive utilities and independence between the agents, we show that the expected utility of each agent is computable in polynomial time. Using this result, we prove that the expected utilitarian social welfare is maximized when agents take alternate turns. We also argue that this mechanism remains optimal when agents behave strategically.
Subject: sequential allocation procedure; indivisible items; social welfare
Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/1959.13/1317682
Identifier: uon:23473
Identifier: ISBN:9781577356332
Language: eng
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